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Gustav Shpet (1879–1937) is one of the most noteworthy thinkers 
in the history of Russian philosophy. Yet having fallen from grace in 
the eyes of the Bolsheviks, he was executed in Stalin’s Great Terror and 
removed from philosophy books for nearly fi fty years. Shpet was redis-
covered in the late 1980s, and the scholarship around his thought has 
since grown, both in Russia and abroad. Especially strong interest has 
been directed towards his idiosyncratic reading of Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Shpet was Husserl’s student in Göttingen in 1912–14 
and published his own considerations about transcendental phenom-
enology on his return to Moscow. But while he has come to be seen as 
a pioneer in Russian phenomenology, Shpet’s unconventional interpre-
tation has also raised concerns.
For roughly the fi rst half of his Iavlenie i smysl (1914), Shpet relies 
on Husserl’s Ideen I (1913). But the book then takes an unprecedented 
turn, leading to an original view of phenomenology. Instead of focusing 
on structures of the experiencing consciousness, Shpet’s philosophy 
raises questions about ‘what is’ and how ‘meaning’ originates. As its 
conclusion, Iavlenie i smysl proposes the existence of a special collective 
consciousness in which the world as we know it fi nds its form. It has 
been suggested that Shpet thus not only reinterpreted Husserl’s termi-
nology and made his own additions to it, but even reversed the latter’s 
transcendental turn. According to this view, Shpet’s own philosophy 
failed to adopt Husserl’s fundamentally presuppositionless standpoint 
and instead remained in the natural attitude, albeit with a hermeneutic 
twist.
According to many, Shpet’s reading was founded on a misinterpreta-
tion; he is seen as either unwilling to follow Husserl’s idea or incapable of 
doing so. In addition, it is frequently proposed that Shpet’s unorthodox 
approach may be explained by a certain Russianness at the foundation 
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of his system. The traditional philosophical standpoint in Russia has 
emphasized ontological questions, as well as the collectiveness of ex-
perience. It is suggested that Shpet thereby ‘Russianized’ Husserl by re-
placing his transcendental subjectivity with a collective consciousness.
The present dissertation proposes a new reading of Shpet’s interpre-
tation of Husserl. The study fi rst discusses the Russian roots of Shpet’s 
phenomenology, that is, the philosophical framework in which his 
thinking matured, and from which he approached Husserl’s thought. 
Subsequently, the dissertation presents a novel analysis of Iavlenie 
i smysl, comparing it not only to Husserl’s Ideen I but also his earlier 
Logische Untersuchungen (1900–01) and the considerably later Formale 
und Transzendentale Logik (1929). The study maintains that Shpet not 
only followed through the transcendental turn but proposed themes and 
ideas which Husserl himself arrived at in the 1920s. It is suggested that 
the similarity between Shpet’s and Husserl’s approaches might be traced 
back to their shared questions and discussions in 1912–14.
The reinterpretation of Shpet’s phenomenology leads to the study’s 
second principal topic: his theory of the inner form of the word. After 
the October Revolution, Shpet’s phenomenology evolved into a phi-
losophy of language and art. While his theory was known among the 
Moscow formalists, it was also deemed archaic and unscientifi c. The 
concept of the inner form seemed to return Shpet’s philosophy to 
Aleksandr Potebnia, against whose romantic theory of the ‘spirit’ of 
language the formalists fought. The dissertation builds its fi nal argu-
ment as a response to Maryse Dennes’s pivotal article, published in 
2006, in which she shows that Shpet’s theory of the inner form was 
in fact closely related to his earlier phenomenological ideas. Yet the 
signifi cance of this phenomenological foundation to Shpet’s cultural 
theory had yet to be established. The dissertation’s last chapter thus 
continues Dennes’s work, expanding on her philosophical conclusions, 
and Shpet’s theory of the inner form of the word is tackled with the re-
newed understanding of his phenomenology. It is suggested that Shpet’s 
theory — especially in his 1922–23 Esteticheskie fragmenty — was in 
a strict sense phenomenological.
The concept of the inner form is just a circuitous route to 
the main issue. Whether I will ever start speaking about 
the main thing itself, when and how — I do not know.
(Понятие внутренней формы — только обиходной путь 
к главному. Заговорю ли я о нем самом, когда и как, не 
знаю.)
Shpet in a letter to Timofei Rainov in November 1927

Introduction
This dissertation tackles the two themes that are probably most 
actively discussed in research concerning Gustav Shpet’s (1879–1937) 
philosophy: his interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and 
his conception of the ‘inner form of the word’ (vnutrenniaia forma slova). 
In what follows the two issues are treated as interrelated — but their 
connection is by no means my own discovery. The phenomenological 
foundation of Shpet’s language theory was already brought to light by 
Maryse Dennes in 2006. Her detailed article specifi es the moments in 
Husserl’s thought which Shpet discussed fi rst in 1914, and which later led 
him to formulate the conception of the inner form — even if outwardly 
the term seemed directly borrowed from Wilhelm von Humboldt and 
Aleksandr Potebnia. Through her analysis Dennes draws a defi nition of 
Shpet’s inner form that both identifi es its Husserlian core and places it 
within the Humboldtian-Potebnian tradition that was so signifi cant for 
the development of Russian language theories in the twentieth century.
The present work suggests a new reading of Shpet’s idiosyncratic 
phenomenology. In relying on this, I suggest a revised defi nition of 
Shpet’s inner form of the word by associating it still more closely with 
Husserl. The proposed defi nition could thus be described as ‘non-Hum-
boldtian’. While the philosophies of Shpet and Husserl have been com-
pared numerous times, the outcomes of these analyses have been fairly 
unvarying. It has been demonstrated that Shpet’s Iavlenie i smysl begins 
with a rather straightforward paraphrasing of Husserl’s Ideas I, but that 
in the fi fth chapter we can see the emergence of his concern for the 
problem of ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ (smysl, corresponding to Husserl’s Sinn). 
By the end of the book Shpet is seen to have reinterpreted Husserl’s 
phenomenology through a hermeneutic lens which — seemingly unbe-
knownst to Shpet himself — challenges his transcendental position. The 
conclusion of Iavlenie i smysl certainly raises questions of this sort. Shpet 
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there postulates a new ‘form’ of reality, the ‘social being’ (sotsial’noe by-
tie), in which objects appear carrying a meaning. This sphere of being 
consists primarily of man-made objects — books, benches, etc. — that 
have been constructed for a certain purpose. Their sense is found in an 
‘entelechy’ that embodies the logic or motivation of their construction. 
However, Shpet also notes that any thing or object included in the social 
reality can be seen to inhabit an entelechy, or as he also calls it, an ‘inner 
sense’. Once we give a rock a meaning (whether it is taken as a tool or an 
object of aesthetic pleasure), it becomes a social object.
Commentators have found that although Shpet seems fi rst to follow 
Husserl through his transcendental turn, at the end of his book he has 
returned to a ‘natural’ position. Instead of analysing the structures of 
the pure ego’s experience, Shpet focuses on an external and objective 
reality, questioning its forms and manner of being. This hermeneutic 
and ontological emphasis is often traced back to a certain ‘Russianness’ 
at the base of Shpet’s philosophy, exemplifi ed especially in his doctoral 
thesis, Istoriia kak problema logiki. The perspective introduced there is 
indeed unusual. First, Shpet asserts that history should be treated above 
all as a hermeneutic discipline: the events of the past appear to us as 
‘signs’ requiring interpretation. He then goes on to argue that reality 
itself should be treated through a similar prism: as a meaningful and 
objective whole constructed by a collective consciousness. Approaching 
the question of reality, Shpet thus redirects his attention to communal 
meaning-forming functions, as it were, behind it. To many his position 
has seemed to carry an echo of Vladimir Solov’ev’s idea of ‘vseedinstvo’, 
unity-of-all, or the Slavophiles’ conception of ‘sobornost’. Consequently, 
Shpet’s idea of the inner form of the word has often been associated with 
the logocentric tradition of Orthodox Christianity, in which the word is 
endowed with world-creating powers.
This study proposes another way of interpreting Shpet’s path from 
Husserl’s phenomenology, through a hermeneutical turn, to the theory 
of the inner form of the word. In the fi rst chapter I argue that Shpet’s 
focus on the questions of ‘meaning’ and ‘being’ should be associated not 
with the religious philosophical tradition of Russian thought but rather, 
and more specifi cally, with the heritage of the Moscow metaphysical 
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school and its commitment to positive philosophy (polozhitel’naia 
fi losofi ia). I suggest that this approach motivated Shpet’s entrance to 
philosophy, which took place through a rejection of neo-Kantianism. 
Shpet argued that contemporary philosophy, bearing Kant’s infl uence, 
had shifted its focus to ‘what seems to be’ instead of the eternal ques-
tion of ‘what is’. Shpet believed that to move forward, philosophy had 
therefore to backtrack and rediscover its original question. Interestingly, 
while he thus argued for a return to a ‘pre-Kantian’ standpoint, Shpet 
also discovered phenomenology as the next necessary step for positive 
philosophy. In chapter two I aim to show that Shpet’s phenomenology 
did, in fact, remain rooted in Husserl’s transcendental thought. To de-
monstrate this, I analyse Iavlenie i smysl not only in relation to Ideas I but 
also Logical Investigations, and include in my discussion the period dur-
ing which Shpet’s understanding of phenomenology matured (in a dia-
logue with Husserl), that is, his sojourn in Göttingen between 1912 and 
1914. This was also a crucial time for Husserl as he reconsidered his early 
phenomenological insights from a novel perspective. As I will argue, it 
is in the problematic points of Logical Investigations, which Husserl was 
still at the time unable to reformulate according to the transcendental 
position, that we fi nd the common ground he shared with Shpet.
The third chapter discusses Shpet’s return to Moscow shortly be-
fore the First World War as the period during which he redefi ned the 
phenomenological entelechy as the inner form of the word. Shpet’s 
1917 essay ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ concludes that the motivation at the 
foundation of all sense-formation is by its nature linguistic; in other 
words, the nature of consciousness itself is linguistic. At the same time, 
Shpet presents the interesting and even puzzling view that words can 
grasp and express essences, the veritable ‘truth’ about ‘being’, wholly 
and directly. Thereafter, the inner form of the word was at the centre of 
Shpet’s philosophical system. In the fourth chapter I take up an analysis 
of Shpet’s concept as he presented it in the cultural debates of post-
revolutionary Moscow. His theory of a ‘realistic’ poetic language became 
infl uential, fi rst in the Moscow Linguistic Circle and later at the State 
Academy of Artistic Sciences. However, the opposition Shpet faced was 
equally strong. In the discussions with formalists, as well as in the later 
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analyses of these discussions, his concept has typically been considered 
outdated: the Humboldtian and Potebnian echo of the inner form is seen 
as countering the modern precision of Russian formalism.
My argument in the fi nal chapter is that Shpet’s clearest defi nition 
of the inner form of the word can be found in his Esteticheskie fragmenty, 
composed during his participation at Moscow Linguistic Circle. As I aim 
to show, this 1923 version inner form was fi rmly rooted in his conception 
of Husserl’s phenomenology, and its meaning can thus be interpreted 
using the phenomenological terminology of Shpet’s earlier texts. Seen 
in this way, Shpet’s concept does not so much continue the Orthodox 
logos tradition as question it. Similarly, the inner form appears distinct 
from Humboldt’s and Potebnia’s metaphorical and psychological concep-
tions; its meaning is both more clear-cut and philosophically complex. 
The suggested phenomenological reading thus sheds new light on the 
unresolved debates between Shpet’s ‘organic’ school and the empirical 
literary theory of the formalists.
Throughout his career Shpet was above all concerned with the ‘true 
being’ of reality, and how to gain a comprehensive and indubitable 
knowledge of it. As I will attempt to show in what follows, this was 
a concern he shared with Husserl, despite their diff erent ways of ap-
proaching the question. In my understanding Shpet’s theory of the inner 
form of the word is best understood as an intricate part of this general 
philosophical quest.
1. Shpet’s Path to Phenomenology
Understanding Shpet’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, 
and how it led to his later structural theory of the word, requires some 
digging into the ‘Russian roots’ of his thinking. This will be the task 
of the present chapter. First, I will present a short analysis of the late 
nineteenth century philosophical debates — partly through Shpet’s 
own commentaries on them — that formed the specifi cally Russian 
background of his emergence as a thinker. Then, I will discuss the de-
velopment of Shpet’s philosophy in the pre-Göttingen period, roughly 
between 1902 and 1912. During this period he began his career at St 
Vladimir University in Kiev, moved to Moscow University and partici-
pated in the city’s philosophical and cultural circles, eventually making 
his way to Germany. The intellectual atmosphere of Moscow especially 
infl uenced Shpet’s thinking; he began to philosophize against it.
Shpet’s critique was directed primarily at the neo-Kantian philoso-
phy that had become the leading intellectual trend in pre-war Moscow. 
Shpet opposed not only the new philosophical school, but indeed all 
thinking that had, as he argued, blindly followed Kant’s ‘Copernican 
turn’. In Shpet’s opinion Kant’s Critique had led philosophy to excessive 
subjectivism and abstraction. In denying the mind’s access to what truly 
‘is’, it had accepted the problem of what ‘seems to be’ as the primary 
problem of philosophy. In Kiev Shpet tackled Kant’s philosophy system-
atically and then, upon his arrival in Moscow, he began to criticize the 
neo-Kantian infl uences he found prevalent not only in philosophical 
debates but also, for example, in Andrei Belyi’s theory of symbolism. 
Finally, it appears that Shpet selected Göttingen as the ‘least Kantian’ of 
German university towns as a peaceful location to work on his doctoral 
dissertation. However, this plan failed as Shpet plunged into Husserl’s 
phenomenology and indeed found in it a way to respond to Kant’s phi-
losophy.
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Yet, although Shpet supported Husserl’s approach, he suspected that 
even phenomenology had fallen prey to Kant’s subjectivism. To counter-
balance this fl aw, inbuilt in Western rationalism, Shpet suggested that 
phenomenology should broaden its viewpoint and strive for the kind 
of ‘concreteness’, ‘wholeness’ and ‘unity’ that were inherent in the late 
nineteenth century Russian metaphysical tradition. As will be shown in 
the following chapters, these attributes can be discerned in Shpet’s own 
interpretation of phenomenology. His unconventional reading accepted 
Husserl’s transcendental turn and yet went against the latter’s concep-
tion of transcendental subjectivity. With the Russian philosophical tra-
dition as his foundation, Shpet conceived of a phenomenological method 
that was instead grounded in a collective consciousness and generated 
an original vision of phenomenology that emphasized its ontological, 
hermeneutical and intersubjective aspects.
The thesis as a whole aims to construct a chronological depiction of 
the evolution of Shpet’s philosophy. However, in this fi rst chapter the 
order of events will be somewhat altered: I off er a discussion of Shpet’s 
own interpretation of late nineteenth-century Russian philosophy be-
fore tackling his own philosophical emergence in the early 1900s. The 
reason for this is simple: although Shpet only published his thoughts 
on the traditional traits or Russian philosophy in the 1910s, it is evident 
that a certain ‘Russianness’ infl uenced his attitude to Western philoso-
phy from the start.
1.1. Nineteenth-Century Debates: 
Shpet’s Emergence
Shpet’s career began at a time when, as he argued, Western philoso-
phy was hampered by the rise of Kantianism. This was mainly due to the 
growing neo-Kantian school, but Shpet conceived of the phenomenon 
as broader than this. For him it related to an entire modern attitude that 
endorsed a detachment of the mind from reality. Shpet indeed argued 
that the overall ‘spirit’ of Kantianism had led to excessive abstraction, 
logicism and psychologism in all areas of  Western thought. However, he 
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believed that Russian philosophy could off er a cure for this. In his 1912 
essay ‘Odin put’ psikhologii i kuda on vedet’ (‘One Path of Psychology and 
Where It Leads’) Shpet suggested that especially the Russian philoso-
phers Pamfi l Iurkevich, Lev Lopatin and Sergei Trubetskoi exemplifi ed 
how to argue against the contemporary trend.
The metaphysical philosophy of Iurkevich, Lopatin and Trubetskoi 
had developed as a counterreaction to the materialism and positivism 
that prevailed among the Russian intelligentsia in the mid-nineteenth 
century. According to Iurii Lotman, materialism aff ected Russian in-
tellectual culture still more profoundly than other European cultures. 
He presents the example of France, where it was adopted mainly as 
a tool of social and political struggle, whereas in Russia materialism was 
at once perceived as ‘the study of the nature of man and society’.1 a new 
atheist understanding of the human nature gained popularity along 
with a tendency to seek scientifi c answers to traditionally philosophical 
questions such as the mind-body controversy.2 Ivan Sechenov’s Refl eksy 
golovnogo mozga (1863), which grounded the functions of consciousness 
in physical processes, became the new ‘catechism’ for human behaviour.3 
Aside from ground-breaking empirical innovations, the pamphlet pre-
sented statements on the innermost human nature, in particular the 
question of the soul. Sechenov writes:
All the endless diversity of external manifestations of cerebral activity 
ultimately leads to just one phenomenon — muscle movement. Be it 
a child laughing at the sight of a toy, Garibaldi smiling when pursued 
for his excessive love of country, a girl trembling at the fi rst thought of 
1 Lotman 2000, p. 47.
2 Martsinkovskaia (2016a, p. 14) notes that the new trend evolved closely in conjunc-
tion with the emerging fi elds of the new human sciences, e. g. sociology and poetic 
theory. The mind-body controversy and the problem of free will became topics of 
intense public debate. For more on this see Janoušek & Sirotkina 2003, p. 432.
3 Martsinkovskaia 2016a, p. 12. Sechenov’s work retained its value during the 
Soviet era. In an edition from 1942, it is described as a perfect example of ‘that 
fi ghting, materialist natural scientifi c literature which played an exceptional role 
in the formation of a materialistic worldview of the leading people of the sixties’ 
(Koshtoiants 1942, p. 5).
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love, Newton creating the fi rst universal laws and writing them down 
on paper — the fi nal fact everywhere is muscle movement.1
Spiritual considerations were thus largely set aside in Russia in the 
mid-nineteenth century. According to Aleksei Pavlov the majority of 
the intelligentsia concluded that ‘in the modern world, the answer to 
worldview questions needs to be sought in scientifi c studies, whereas 
philosophy is the study of the past, not to speak of religion, which fi nds 
refuge only in the heads of the uneducated’.2 This trend was opposed from 
the 1860s by the so-called Moscow metaphysical school (Moskovskaia 
metafi zicheskaia shkola), which attempted to reintroduce the questions 
of ‘spiritual’ experience to the public discourse. In Shpet’s opinion espe-
cially Iurkevich, Lopatin, and Sergei Trubetskoi, who were among the 
leading members of this school, had succeeded in expressing the very 
‘soul of philosophy’ that was by its nature ‘vital, concrete’ and based on 
‘reliable fi ndings of internal experience’.3 In what follows I discuss Shpet’s 
treatment of these nineteenth-century thinkers, as well as his own emer-
gence as a philosopher as a continuation of their tradition.
1.1.1. Rediscovering ‘True Being’
In the era of materialism, psychology found itself torn between two 
academic traditions. Having long been considered a branch of philoso-
phy, the empirical side of psychology now evolved rapidly. Experimental 
methods increased in sophistication, and the results were analysed 
mathematically. Through the growth of empirical accuracy, psychol-
ogy came to be seen as the most reliable of the human sciences, and the 
only discipline that could provide objective knowledge of private states 
of mind. Furthermore, according to a popular psychologistic outlook, 
man-made phenomena such as works of art were treated as products of 
the subjective experience, and so they too became a subject matter for 
1 Sechenov 1942, p. 37.
2 Pavlov 2015, p. 3.
3 Shpet 2006, p. 263.
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psychology.1 In a 1914 essay dedicated to Iurkevich’s memory, Shpet as-
serts that even scientifi c ‘truths’ could thus be considered susceptible to 
human psychology. In his words, materialism, in the guise of psychology, 
in fact attempted to ‘create an absolute physics which would exclude 
metaphysics’; it presupposed a metaphysical foundation but failed to 
open it to critical analysis. In other words, materialism set itself meta-
physical goals but strove to achieve them by physical means.2
In Shpet’s opinion this amounted to a dangerously naive reaction to 
Kant’s distinction of the object of experience from the ‘thing-in-itself ’. 
Unable to respond to Kant, Shpet argued that materialists desired to fi nd 
reality in the physical experience itself, and to proceed from it, as if from 
a fi rm basis, to an explanation of both natural and spiritual phenomena. 
To overcome such simplistic arguments, Shpet stated that philosophy 
must fi nd a way to take on the challenge presented by the empirical sci-
ences and respond to it on its own terms. He believed that with the great 
volume and variety of new scientifi c knowledge this task was now more 
crucial and also more diffi  cult than ever since each ‘new fact of natural 
science or history has a side which cannot be explained by the methods 
and principles of physics alone; it always contains a certain “remainder 
of being” which awaits its metaphysics’. Consequently, Shpet stated that 
the fi rst and foremost question of philosophy must be that of ‘being’, 
understood as a metaphysical problem. He continued: ‘Every further 
question about being, questions about whether the diff erences between 
material and spiritual phenomena are resolved in a higher unity, and 
whether they are not a simple consequence of our limited cognition 
[…] all these questions belong to metaphysics and equally cannot be 
resolved by any one science’.3
Shpet asserts that in an era that was hostile to philosophy Pamfi l 
Iurkevich stood out as a ‘fi erce supporter’ of its free spirit.4 Iurkevich 
rose to popularity when philosophy was only about to re-enter Russian 
universities after a ban of more than a decade. Previously a professor 
1 Martsinkovskaia 2016a, p. 14.
2 Shpet 1914a, p. 661.
3 Shpet 1914a, p. 656.
4 Shpet 1914a, p. 655.
22 1. Shpet’s Path to Phenomenology
at the Kiev Theological Academy, in 1860 he published a refutation 
of the overly crude positivist outlook on the human mind, ‘Iz nauki 
o chelovecheskom dukhe’. The essay became a small sensation after it was 
reissued in the widely read Moskovskie vedomosti in 1861, and Iurkevich 
was soon promoted to be a professor of philosophy at Moscow University.1 
The essay argued that the positivist method of identifying, classifying 
and analysing facts and phenomena was not directly transferrable to the 
study of the human mind: it was simply impossible to catalogue all that 
the mind contained.2 Iurkevich writes:
Thousands of feelings, strivings, suppositions, concepts and ideas, hab-
its, tendencies and passions emerge on the surface of consciousness 
unexpectedly and unbeknownst to us, defi ne our actions, our view of 
people and circumstances, our likes and dislikes, the state of our souls 
every single minute — and all that diversity of phenomena, of which 
each one wants to tell us, in its own way, what the soul is, proceeds 
from reasons and conditions eternally in change.3
Iurkevich asserts that the new empirical psychology could fulfil 
a task that had been beyond the reach of the earlier idealists: to fi nd 
the cognitive phenomena directly in introspection and analyse them 
systematically. In his opinion both psychology and philosophy were 
thus entering an entirely new fi eld of research by focusing on the nature 
of ideal phenomena. For now, it was unnecessary even to touch upon 
the diffi  cult metaphysical question of the ‘true essence’ of the mind’s 
ideal realm. Instead, Iurkevich strives for a mere distinction between 
two kinds of modes of perception: the internal and the external. He 
writes that ‘psychology studies matters provided for internal experi-
ence, whereas natural science studies matters which present themselves 
1 Frede 2010, p. 77. Irina Sirotkina (2006, p. 242) adds that after the reintroduction 
of philosophy courses to the curricula few universities could make the necessary 
appointments due to a shortage of philosophy teachers. Iurkevich was one of the 
few qualifi ed people available.
2 The argument was directed especially against Nikolai Chernyshevskii. For more on 
the debate between them see Sirotkina 2006, pp. 242–243.
3 Iurkevich 1860, p. 369.
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in the external experience; in both, we repeat, science studies the world 
of phenomena, mental in the fi rst case, and physical in the second’.1
The question of what kind of perception takes place in psychological 
introspection was still far from clear, Iurkevich asserts. Mental phe-
nomena cannot be recognized by their movement, form, colour, sound, 
smell, taste, weight or temperature. In other words, they cannot be per-
ceived sensually. Furthermore, introspection is always self-perception; 
only in his or her ‘inner look’ can the scientist recognize themselves 
as a ‘thinking, feeling, striving being’. Because of this, psychological 
introspection must not be considered isomorphic with the empirical 
study of natural phenomena, Iurkevich argues:
A writer writes: ‘we know that sensation belongs to certain nerves and 
movement to others’. Break that statement down. When an external 
push acts on a nerve, whether that nerve is one of sensation or one 
of movement, it will, all the same, as a result of that push, move or 
shudder: that much we may observe in a physiological experiment. 
Thus, it must be said: we know that every nerve starts to move as the 
result of an external impression. However, we do not at all know from 
physiological experiments whether ‘a certain sensation belongs to 
certain nerves’, because these ‘certain nerves’ merely represent for the 
purposes of an external physiological experiment movement, which, 
in the eyes of the observing physiologist, never turns into sensation, 
idea or thought.2
In the history of Russian philosophy Iurkevich came to be known 
as the founder of the Moscow metaphysical school.3 This was a loosely 
defi ned group of likeminded thinkers, with Lev Lopatin its most ac-
claimed member. The group is sometimes considered a faction of 
Vladimir Solov’ev’s religious-mystical circle, but this connection is 
only partial. Lopatin and Solov’ev were childhood friends, and their 
growth as professional philosophers was parallel. However, as Aleksei 
1 Iurkevich 1860, pp. 373–374.
2 Iurkevich 1860, p. 385.
3 Haardt 1992, p. 29.
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Pavlov asserts, Lopatin emerged early as an independent thinker, ‘and 
he may in no way be considered either the student or the follower of 
Vl. Solov’ev’.1 Iurkevich’s school reopened concepts such as ‘knowledge’, 
‘mind’ and ‘reality’ to metaphysical investigation. Consequently, the 
Moscow metaphysicians returned to the ancient idea of ‘true being’ 
(istinno sushchee) and its foundations (poslednie osnovania), but from 
a critical viewpoint.2 In the words of Nikolai Losskii, Iurkevich sought 
‘in the spirit of Platonism’ to discover ‘the eternal idea of the object’, 
lying ‘behind the everchanging phenomena perceived by the senses’.3 
In spite of this Platonic tradition, Shpet considered Iurkevich a ‘realist’ 
and an ‘empiricist’ in the full sense of these terms. According to Shpet, he 
‘protested against the narrowness and one-sidedness of the conclusions 
of materialism, against the rejection of other methods and ways, against 
the conscious nihilism applied to the philosophical tradition’.4
Apart from Lopatin, Iurkevich’s work was continued in Moscow by 
Nikolai Grot and Sergei Trubetskoi. All of them played an important 
role in the launch of professional academic philosophy in Russia in the 
late nineteenth century. Through their association with the Moscow 
Psychological Society (Moskovskoe psikhologicheskoe obshchestvo), meta-
physical concerns also became intricately connected with contemporary 
work in psychology. The Society was founded at Moscow University in 
1884 on the initiative of Matvei Troitskii.5 According to Thomas Nemeth 
this was ‘the singular event’ of the late 1880s, promoting communi-
cation within the professionally trained philosophical community in 
Russia.6 Indeed, very soon after the Society’s founding, according to 
the 1884 University Charter, the teaching of philosophy in Russia 
was limited to ancient Greek and Latin philosophy. The link between 
modern philosophy and psychology was thus cemented, as researchers 
from both fi elds united their eff orts in studying cognition. In Moscow, 
1 Pavlov 2013, p. 12.
2 Haardt 1992, pp. 27–29.
3 Losskii 1951, p. 73.
4 Shpet 1914a, pp. 655–656.
5 Sirotkina 2006, p. 252.
6 Nemeth 2017, p. 237.
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the collaboration was further facilitated by the fact that psychology at 
Moscow University was administratively part of the faculty of humani-
ties, even though the contemporary trend was to attach the experimen-
tal psychological laboratories to medical schools.1
Nemeth suggests that the Society’s name excluded the word ‘phi-
losophy’ mainly to avoid an association with the contemporary trends of 
revolutionary social thought. A diff erent decision was made in the case 
of the journal Voprosy fi losofi i i psikhologii (Questions of Philosophy and 
Psychology, 1889–1918), which was undoubtedly the most important 
organizational undertaking of the Psychological Society.2 The founder 
of the journal and its fi rst editor was Nikolai Grot, whose liberal and 
broadminded attitude is often associated with his ability to found the 
fi rst Russian journal of a professional philosophical level.3 Trubetskoi 
and Lopatin collaborated at the Psychological Society at the beginning 
of the new century, and from 1900 to 1905 (when Trubetskoi died), 
they functioned as the co-editors of Voprosy. Lopatin continued in this 
function until the journal’s closure.
It is generally accepted that the metaphysical school aff ected Shpet’s 
thinking at the beginning of his career. Indeed, the idea of ‘positive 
tasks’ (polozhitel’nye zadachi) of philosophy became a guiding premise 
of his philosophy. This idea had been crystallized by Lopatin in his two 
dissertations, published in 1886 and 1891.4 Shpet characterized positive 
philosophy as a tradition evolving from Plotinus to Descartes, Spinoza 
and Leibniz.5 In his opinion they had approached reality ‘as it is’, and 
not only as it ‘appears’, and thereby set positive philosophy in direct 
opposition to Kantianism. In contrast with mere phenomena Shpet 
maintained that positive philosophy could grasp the very foundations of 
being that were shared, objective and rational. His thought can thus also 
1 Sirotkina 2006, pp. 251–252.
2 Nemeth 2017, pp. 237–238. Nemeth adds that the journal was fi nanced by the 
Moscow confectionery merchant A. A. Abrikosov, who absorbed all its losses.
3 See, e. g., Kozulin 1985, p. 23 and Sirotkina 2006, pp. 252–253. Grot’s father, Iakov 
Grot, made a career for himself at the Imperial Alexander University in Helsinki, 
and Nikolai Grot himself was born in Helsinki. For more, see Byckling 2018.
4 Pavlov 2013, p. 16.
5 Shpet 1916, p. 20.
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be seen as bearing an infl uence from Sergei Trubetskoi, who specialized 
in ancient Greek philosophy. Trubetskoi considered epistemic subjectiv-
ism a typical trait of  Western philosophy, emanating from the ideals of 
Protestant Reformation. He criticized  Western philosophy for building 
its conceptions on a narrowly defi ned conception of rationality and for-
mulated his own philosophy of the ‘universality of human conscious-
ness’, that is, his understanding of the ancient logos.1
1.1.2. Towards Rationalist Metaphysics
Shpet’s connection with the Moscow metaphysicians was partly 
direct — he attended Lopatin’s lectures at Moscow University — and 
partly took place through his Kiev professor, Georgii Chelpanov. Nikolai 
Grot had been Chelpanov’s professor at the Novorossiisk University 
in Odessa, as well as his colleague at Moscow University and the 
Psychological Society; in 1896, Chelpanov defended his magister’s dis-
sertation against both Grot and Lopatin.2 In 1897 Chelpanov was ap-
pointed Professor at the University of St Vladimir in Kiev, where he led 
a famous seminar on psychology.3 Shpet began to attend this seminar 
actively in 1902 and, in 1907 he relocated to Moscow with his family 
following the invitation of Chelpanov.4 The same year he was elected 
(with recommendations from Chelpanov and Sergei Trubetskoi) a full 
member of the Moscow Psychological Society. Looking at the history of 
the Society more closely can thus inform us further about the origins 
of Shpet’s philosophy.
The oscillation of the ‘sciences of the mind’ between their human-
istic foundations and the new empirical ideals was a central theme for 
both psychologists and philosophers at the end of the century. According 
to Ol’ga Zakutniaia the change that took place in Grot’s thinking, for 
1 Marchenko 2017, p. 192.
2 Martsinkovskaia 2016a, p. 20.
3 Martsinkovskaia 2016b, p. 90. For more on Chelpanov’s seminar see Kozulin 1985, 
pp. 23–24.
4 Shchedrina 2015, pp. 55–57.
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example, was therefore typical of the time. At fi rst a supporter of posi-
tivism, Grot saw the value of philosophy mainly as an instrument for the 
systematization of the empirical sciences. However, from the mid-1880s 
he became increasingly interested in idealism and acknowledged the 
signifi cance of metaphysics as an independent fi eld of research. Grot 
turned to questions concerning the essence of science, religion and art, 
and considered philosophy a special fi eld of knowledge that could inte-
grate the analyses of these disciplines. This in turn could provide a uni-
fi ed and more complete understanding of the world.1 Grot suggested 
that psychology and philosophy should evolve through interaction and 
collaboration. The value of experimental psychology lay in its ability to 
access the ‘real facts’ (real’nye fakty) of spiritual life (dushevnaia zhizn’), 
and Grot asserted that its research must not be reduced to psychophys-
ics, but that psychological experiments should instead approach any 
possible subject matter such as thoughts and emotions.2
In his editorial of the fi rst issue of Voprosy Grot wrote that while the 
journal’s core function was to off er a platform for the development of 
properly philosophical terminology and methodology in Russia, it would 
also embrace questions of arts and religion to off er a ‘comprehensive 
knowledge’ (tsel’noe znanie) of life. Such knowledge would help the 
reader navigate modern existence. Grot underlines that even though 
science and technology, in the West as in Russia, had moved forward 
with giant leaps, the happiness of humanity had not grown but, rather, 
has begun to fall. He is especially concerned about the modern indi-
vidual’s ability to gain an understanding (vozzrenie) about the reality 
which surrounds him:
It is precisely our time’s outlook on life which is not only particularly 
nebulous and inconsistent but also cheerless. And how could it not 
be so when next to perfected telephones and other unusually fast 
and convenient means of communication between people, frighten-
ingly destructive means for the […] merciless destruction of people 
1 Zakutniaia 2008, pp. 7–8.
2 Martsinkovskaia 2016a, p. 17.
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are invented and manufactured every day, when mutual love and the 
free interaction of people in the name of higher causes not only do 
not grow but ever weaken, and are limited as a consequence of fateful 
misunderstandings which fan the fl ames of rage and perfi dy.1
Grot fi nds the reason for this state in an imbalance between people’s 
inner and outer lives. While on the ‘outside’ life had become more com-
fortable, he argues that the ‘inner life’ was growing weak. Humanity 
had focused its eff orts on perfecting the material aspects of existence 
that infl uenced people through their sensual experience. However, Grot 
asserts, only the knowledge acquired through ‘inner feelings and experi-
ence’ (vnutrennie chuvstva i opyt) could reveal life ‘in its true root, in its 
inner content and meaning’.2
Lev Lopatin also emphasized the importance of not understanding 
‘knowledge’ as merely the grasping of what is empirically or outwardly 
perceived. Aleksei Pavlov writes that materialism presented for him the 
belief that ‘the sole reality belongs unconditionally to being, which is 
outside itself and absolutely unconscious, the features of which come 
down to duration, impenetrability, inertia, motility and other purely 
geometric and mechanical attributes’. Consequently, Lopatin considered 
materialism unable to explain how the external reality could become the 
object of consciousness in the fi rst place because, in contrast, the soul 
‘possesses only internal attributes and is the opposite of all matter in 
its properties’. All human knowledge, Lopatin argued, was thus under 
a threat of being dramatically divided into two.3
The natural sciences, including psychology, could not serve as a foun-
dation for philosophy in Lopatin’s opinion. Instead, he argued that 
consciousness in itself presented a philosophical problem, and it must 
therefore be addressed through nonempirical methods of introspection.4 
In 1886 Lopatin presented a forceful attack on the prevalent empiricist 
1 Grot 1889, p. VII.
2 Grot 1889, p. VIII.
3 Pavlov 2013, p. 21.
4 Ibid.
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and positivist attitudes, describing them as ‘sophistry’ and ‘scepticism’.1 
He argued that their viewpoint, being ‘cleansed from all metaphysical 
projections’ (metafi zicheskikh dopolnenii), would lead to ‘the denial of 
the most important truths of reason, to the denial of all its truths which 
reveal the real nature of things and the true and universal relations be-
tween them’.2 According to Lopatin to know an object empirically was 
to know it through observation (nabliudenie) and perception (opyt). 
However, such experience was entirely dependent on the observer’s 
sensory organs and their position in space and time. In other words, 
his perception remained subjective and contingent: no truly objective 
knowledge of the object was given, but only a subjective image was re-
fl ected by it.3 To grasp the true structure and essence of reality, a much 
richer metaphysical and epistemological viewpoint would be required.
Lopatin’s conclusion was that metaphysics as a branch of philosophy 
should not yet be archived as a closed case. Returning to the old dispute 
between rationalism and empiricism, he writes: ‘I refer to an old dis-
pute, one declared so many times decisively resolved; I take my stand 
as a defender of speculative philosophy’. Lopatin understood the goal of 
rationalist philosophy as proving that ‘by pure reason a justifi ed study of 
that which exists is possible and necessary’. He argues that to deny reason 
as a source of true knowledge of being would be the same as denying the 
power of reason altogether.4 The argument was directed not only against 
materialism, but also philosophical neo-idealism. He mentions the 
Hegelian Boris Chicherin, as well as Vladimir Solov’ev, who, he believed, 
had followed the path of the German post-Kantian generation too uncrit-
ically. Lopatin believed that Solov’ev, having realized that ‘philosophy in 
Hegel’s system arrived at an abstract and lifeless formalism’, had merely 
demanded that philosophy must instead base itself on religious truths.5 
1 The attack was presented in the opening speech of Lopatin’s defence of his magis-
ter’s thesis.
2 Lopatin 1911, p. XXII.
3 Pavlov 2013, p. 20.
4 Lopatin 1911, p. XXI.
5 Lopatin 1911, p. XXIV.
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In Lopatin’s opinion Solov’ev had therefore accepted the neo-Kantian 
premise, which his trust in religious intuition could not overcome.1
Lopatin’s mistrust of (neo-)Kantian philosophy can be understood 
within the broad framework of the conventional Russian scepticism 
concerning Kant. Russian philosophy indeed presents a long tradition 
of understanding Kant’s ideas as a form of subjectivism and scepticism.2 
By introducing the unknowable noumenon, Kant seemed to deny the 
mind’s direct access to reality, as well as the possibility of absolute val-
ues.3 On the other hand, the turn of the century saw an intense growth 
in interest in Kant among the Russian intelligentsia. James West as-
sociates this phenomenon with the widespread quest for a ‘reconcilia-
tion of rational enquiry and religious belief ’. Kant’s ‘Copernican turn’ 
of modern philosophy had suggested that instead of reality imprinting 
its form on the consciousness, it was the consciousness whose formal 
categories (such as those of space and time) formulated the informa-
tion received through the senses. Modern philosophy and culture, in 
Europe as in Russia, were irreversibly infl uenced by this thought, leading 
to a variety of anti-rational intellectual and artistic trends. In Russia 
these formulations often acquired a religious formulation. West notes 
that Solov’ev, for example, admired Kant for ‘laying the foundation of 
an analytical theory of knowledge that would enable critical philosophy 
to be extended to religion, relating belief to other forms of cognition and 
giving it the formal status it had hitherto lacked’.4
For Lopatin, in contrast, Kant’s system was essentially ‘morbid’ (bo-
lez nennyi).5 His main attempt was to formulate a new basis for rational 
philosophy; one that could achieve ‘positive results’ without running 
1 Oleg Ermishin (2013, pp. 30–34) suggests that the success of both philosophical 
materialism and mystical neo-idealism at the end of the century was founded on the 
failure of rationalism to provide a secure epistemological basis. In turn, this had fol-
lowed from German Idealism, resulting in the view that rationally based philosophy 
could only provide abstractions that had little to do with concrete rea lity.
2 For more on the Russian ‘anti-Kantian’ tradition see Oittinen 2017.
3 As James West (1996, p. 56) writes, Kant was held responsible for causing ‘nothing 
less than a crisis in European civilization’ by making it ‘impossible to believe in 
revealed truths’.
4 West 1996, pp. 55–56.
5 Lopatin 1911, p. XXIV.
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into the ‘dead-end’ of Kantianism and German Idealism. Lopatin based 
his metaphysics on the assumption that what appears in cognition, ap-
pears directly. Thus, he emphasized the metaphysical signifi cance of his 
viewpoint, even if it approached reality by analysing the phenomena 
of consciousness. ‘We know everything only through the prism of our 
own spirit,’ he writes.1 Lopatin held that the creative consciousness, or 
‘spirit’, was located between the human psyche and external reality. 
In the consciousness the objects of the physical world were accessible 
through ‘symbols’, as the ‘spiritual equivalents’ of empirical objects. 
According to Oleg Ermishin, this symbolism of consciousness became 
a focal point of Lopatin’s theory. He conceived it as a result of a complex 
process in the system of sensations, perceptions and ideas, and, at the 
same time a source of the immediate knowledge of being.2
Aleksei Pavlov suggests that Lopatin’s fi nal solution to the problem 
of the knowledge of being was found through a combination of ‘faith’ 
(vera) and ‘understanding’ (ponimanie).3 By combining the two ‘paths’ 
of cognition, he arrived at a conception of knowledge that incorporated 
its rational, logical and abstract aspects, and united creative and intui-
tive forms of knowing. Lopatin asserts that ‘the mind translates the 
dark ideas of creative reason to the language of clear, sharply defi ned 
concepts’.4 In Vasilii Zen’kovskii’s assessment Lopatin never rejected 
empirical experience or denied its ‘cardinal importance for the cognition 
of the world’, but he did, however, subject empiricism to a ‘thorough 
and devastating critique’. Zen’kovskii writes that since empiricism can 
only acquire information through sensations, its knowledge is restricted 
to appearances, and it thus builds up a questionable metaphysics — es-
sentially, one of faith. This was the basis of Lopatin’s adoption of ‘faith’ 
as a technical term: for him ‘it stands between experience and reason’ 
and must be subjected to a philosophical analysis, as well as a ‘rational 
reworking’.5
1 Cited in Ermishin 2013, p. 45.
2 Ibid.
3 Pavlov 2013, p. 24.
4 Cited in Pavlov 2013, p. 25.
5 Zenkovsky 1953, pp. 656–657.
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In 1911 Lopatin updated his argument in more contemporary philo-
sophical language but asserted that he still held on to his earlier meta-
physical conclusions. These were: that there is an external reality with 
certain absolute qualities; it exists independently of our experience of 
it; spatially and temporally, we always only grasp a small part of it; the 
philosophizing subject himself is real, as are other subjects. And, Lopatin 
concludes, there is ‘some internal link in all that exists, a link independ-
ent of our thought and our subjective consciousness’. In modern termi-
nology, he adds, ‘we would be speaking of transcendental hypotheses’.1 
Lopatin’s metaphysics have often been associated to the Leibnizian 
tradition in Russian philosophy. As some have suggested, he can thus 
be argued to have taken Russian thought back to a ‘pre-modern’ philo-
sophical position.2
Philosophically speaking, the infl uence of a ‘Lopatian’ metaphysics 
on Shpet’s thought is undeniable. Shpet not only opposed neo-Kantian 
philosophy as a form of ‘negativism’ and subjectivism, but constructed 
his own thinking as a way of approaching the fundamental question 
of ‘being’ through transcendental philosophy and, moreover, through 
a kind of ‘symbolism’. Moreover, Shpet, too, expressed an interest in 
returning to a pre-Kantian philosophical frame of mind. For example, 
in a short and untitled manuscript, probably written in 1914 or 1915 
(fi rst published in 1991 as ‘Rabota po fi losofi i’3), Shpet suggests fi nding 
a methodological foundation in the philosophy of Leibniz, which sees 
as a continuation of the Platonic tradition. He writes:
Kant’s philosophy sets the tone for philosophy for the entire nine-
teenth century; both negative and positive directions are attuned to 
it to a greater or lesser degree. Platonism continues to live, but is hid-
den under the surface of philosophical thought visible to all, while its 
purpose and role are insignifi cant: only insofar as the ideas of the last 
1 Lopatin 1911, p. XI–XII.
2 See, for example, Scanlan 2010, p. 158; Nemeth 2017, pp. 242–246; Tremblay 2020, 
pp. 179–180.
3 See Mikela Venditti’s and Liudmila Fedorova’s publication of the manuscript, to-
gether with foreword, in Nachala 1/1992.
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Platonist, Leibniz, are revived may the voice of Platonism be heard 
in the common choir of philosophy of the nineteenth century. Only 
recently does that voice sound more clearly and cleanly.1
In what follows, I will turn to a discuss of the evolution of Shpet’s 
early philosophy towards his espousal of phenomenology. As the fol-
lowing chapters will demonstrate, Shpet’s interpretation of Husserl’s 
thought demonstrates his ‘rootedness’ in the Russian philosophical — 
and more specifically, the Moscow metaphysical — tradition. Shpet 
elaborated phenomenology in a direction where it could respond to ques-
tions regarding the ‘eternal idea’ and ‘true being’ of reality. He argued 
that Husserl had indeed discovered a way beyond the mere phenomenal, 
and thus subjective, knowledge of the world. For Shpet phenomenology 
was an example of how the modern philosopher could (re)learn to trust 
his ‘inner knowledge’ that could eventually provide philosophy with 
a more comprehensive understanding of that which is. Later, Shpet was 
to expand his phenomenological conception to a theory of a ‘historical 
reality’, or culture, as a peculiar hermeneutic structure, which can be 
seen as his suggestion for a Leibnizian kind of rational metaphysics.
1.2. Going against Kant
In his 1916 doctoral thesis Istoriia kak problema logiki (History as 
a Problem of Logic), Shpet formulated the conception of a historical 
reality, based on Lopatin’s principle of positive philosophy and an in-
terpretation of pre-Kantian Enlightenment rationalism. He especially 
relied on Christian Wolff , the follower of Leibniz and the immediate 
predecessor of Kant; indeed, it was the very Leibnizian-Wolffi  an meta-
physics that Kant refuted in his Critique of Pure Reason. Kant doubted 
the possibility of reconciling traditional metaphysics with the exact sci-
ences of his day. He argued that metaphysics would have to fi rst discover 
1 Shpet 1992, p. 41.
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and justify its own principles — it needed to analyse the conditions of 
possibility of metaphysics — and only then could actual metaphysics 
be synthetically constructed. However, as phenomena proved necessar-
ily separated from things-in-themselves, Kant ultimately rejected the 
possibility of any general metaphysics (as ontology). In contrast, what 
Shpet found appealing in Wolff ’s theory was his trust in the capacity of 
rational thought to make reliable metaphysical claims.1
Yet, Shpet’s reliance on metaphysics was by no means ignorant of 
Kant’s critique.2 On the contrary, he began his philosophical career 
by tackling the scepticism of David Hume who, in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment, had questioned the utmost authority of rational thought: 
our trust in the causality of events.3 Famously, it was Hume who shook 
Kant from his metaphysical slumber, leading him to the revolutionary 
turn. In his 1906 undergraduate thesis, however, Shpet asks: ‘Did Kant 
answer Hume’s doubts?’ Shpet’s pre-Göttingen philosophy presents 
a confrontation with all forms of scepticism and irrationalism, both of 
which were growing in popularity (mainly in various guises of mysti-
cal and religious thought) in Russia. Shpet associated this phenomenon 
with the rise of neo-Kantianism to the centre stage of the intellectual 
landscape. He argued that the problem in contemporary philosophy was 
not merely with individual thinkers, but that the whole spirit of the time 
was leading philosophy in the wrong direction. Thus, through his analy-
sis of Hume and Kant, Shpet began by scrutinizing the very origins of 
Enlightenment scepticism — something that he would later endeavour 
to overcome with the help of phenomenology.
And yet, curiously, Shpet himself emerged as a philosophical sceptic 
in Moscow. It indeed seems that before travelling to Göttingen, he had 
yet to formulate the philosophical foundation on which he could strive 
to respond to Hume’s doubts. An examination of Shpet’s activities in 
pre-war Moscow demonstrates that he was a visible fi gure in the city’s 
cultural and academic circles, where he would constantly appear arguing 
1 For more on Shpet’s reception of Wolff  see Anan’eva 1998.
2 Nemeth (2019a, p. vii) suggests that for all his later anti-Kantianism Shpet in fact 
went through a distinctly neo-Kantian (Rickertian) phase during his student years.
3 For Shpet’s early essays on Hume see Shchedrina & Pruzhinin 2012.
1.2. Going against Kant 35
against neo-Kantian infl uences. Shpet’s criticism was directed especially 
against Andrei Belyi, who at the time developed his theory of symbolism 
under the infl uence of Heinrich Rickert. Through his critique Shpet thus 
accessed the ongoing debates concerning the nature of the poetic word, 
a theme which he would take up afresh after the revolution.
1.2.1. Shpet’s Response to Kant’s Response to Hume
Having just begun attending Chelpanov’s seminar in 1902, Shpet 
describes Hume through a Kantian prism, as the ‘best thought provoker’, 
who ‘captures the reader’s mind and mood, and forcibly plants in his 
mind that sceptical criticism which equally well protects both against 
an excessive enthusiasm with metaphysical fogs and against blind de-
votion to the vulgarity of common sense’.1 However, while Hume had 
posed a crucial question, Shpet asserts that his own response to it had 
taken philosophy down a dangerous path. He fi nds Hume’s attitude 
problematic from the start: it places no trust in the power of reason, and 
instead restricts the capacities of cognition. ‘From the phenomenalistic 
viewpoint, experience is itself in need of justifi cation,’ Shpet writes; ‘it 
is from the start insuffi  cient’. Thus, he fi nds that ‘Hume goes round in 
circles hopelessly: real objects are not to be cognized; all cognition is 
limited by a sphere of phenomena; consequently, we cannot penetrate 
the real relations between things; causality as a relationship lying at 
the basis of the cognition of facts hangs in the air’.2 In conclusion, Shpet 
states: ‘Hume’s philosophy thus merely proves yet again that the limita-
tion of the rights of reason does not go unsanctioned, that the theory 
of cognition may not be transformed into the theory of ignorance, that 
the true path of philosophy is in the development of the endless creative 
forces of reason…’3
Yet Shpet believes that Kant had only made things worse. Citing 
Hume, he agrees that no one in their right mind would seriously 
1 Shpet 2010a, p. 21.
2 Shpet 1911, p. 13.
3 Shpet 1911, p. 18.
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question the authority of sensual experience (opyt), the ‘great com-
mander of human lives’.1 In Shpet’s reading Hume was not interested in 
tackling the question of the ontological reality of causality. Instead, his 
scepticism was ‘contained in the fact that he subjected to doubt the pos-
sibility of logically justifying the universal scope of the law of causality’. 
From Shpet’s viewpoint Hume was indeed unable — or unwilling — to 
draw metaphysical conclusions regarding causality. What he provided 
was ‘a new psychological interpretation’ of the matter.2 In contrast, Shpet 
argues that Kant’s response to Hume’s dilemma presented a danger-
ous step that jeopardized the entire future development of philosophy.
Shpet sees Kant agreeing with Hume on many aspects. For one 
thing, both philosophers believed causality to be something that car-
ried the quality of necessity. The diff erence, Shpet asserts, is that for 
Hume this necessity was subjective (each consciousness ‘creates’ itself 
a concept of causality, seeing that phenomenon A, seemingly, always fol-
lows phenomenon B, though in theory it could be otherwise), whereas 
Kant believed it should be objective (causality is an a priori structure 
of consciousness and cannot be otherwise).3 In Shpet’s opinion Kant 
thus turned Hume’s psychological question into an epistemic one and 
took his scepticism in a new and philosophically questionable direction: 
the possibility of knowledge of reality became a matter of subjective 
perception.
Shpet sympathizes with some of Hume’s basic statements. In his 
opinion, ‘it is obvious in and of itself that our consciousness has noth-
ing to do with anything other than perceptions, that is, impressions and 
ideas, “that external objects become known to us only thanks to the 
perceptions they arouse in us”’.4 Shpet suggests, however, that if we take 
Hume’s sceptical conclusion seriously, a collapse of the natural sciences 
is the result, since ‘[n]o matter how correct the fl ow of events in the past 
was, no mental conclusion gives us the right to make a conclusion in the 
future — permanence in the past does not give us the logical right to draw 
1 Shpet 1906, p. 48. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 6 (1906): pp. 17–49.)
2 Shpet 1906, p. 41. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 6 (1906): pp. 17–49.)
3 Shpet 1907, p. 194. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 5 (1907): pp. 165–203.)
4 Shpet 1906, p. 79. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 7 (1906): pp. 51–82.)
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conclusions about the future’.1 If no laws can be deduced from perception, 
the empirical sciences are rendered impossible. Hume’s reaction to this 
threat was remarkable, according to Shpet: ‘Let it collapse’. Kant, on the 
other hand, could not accept the destruction of scientifi c truth. Shpet as-
serts that he ‘took up the task of proving the a priori nature of the causal 
idea and law’2 and concluded that ‘all synthetic a priori fundamentals are 
nothing more than principles of possible experience and can never be 
related to things in themselves, but only to phenomena as to subjects 
of experience’.3
Shpet argues that with his transcendental logic Kant formulated 
a law of causality according to which, while we cannot grasp the real 
connection between individual phenomena, we can perceive the a priori 
law that phenomena, in our perception, seem to follow without excep-
tion.4 Indeed, Shpet writes that in this case the mind no longer follows 
the ‘forms’ of reality, as it were, but imprints its own categories on the 
perceived reality. In 1916 Shpet described Kant’s position as stating that
the authentically existing and cognizable is what it is, because reason 
is incapable of thinking otherwise! The mind does not wind the diversity 
of subjects around and does not detect its creative forces in its limit-
less resources, and through its inability to think otherwise it subjects 
all that exists to a uniform regulation and order. And that is called: 
prescribing laws to nature..! a far, far too legalistic idea of the reality of 
reason. Quaestio juris (a problem of the law)…5
From Kant’s standpoint Hume’s conclusion regarding the subjectiv-
ity of causal relations was the result of his having in mind ‘things in 
themselves’ rather than their appearances, Shpet asserts.6 Kant’s solu-
tion to Hume’s problem was thus to turn the situation upside-down and 
to direct his philosophical question to appearances instead of ‘things’. 
1 Shpet 1906, 48. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 6 (1906): pp. 17–49.)
2 Shpet 1907, p. 196. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 5 (1907): pp. 165–203.)
3 Shpet 1907, p. 171. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 5 (1907): pp. 165–203.)
4 Shpet 1907, p. 167. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 5 (1907): pp. 165–203.)
5 Shpet 1916, p. 4.
6 Nemeth 2019c, p. 280.
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Causality could retain its necessary quality, but at a high price. Shpet 
concludes that Kant hereby posed the question of ‘what seems to be’ 
before the question of ‘what is’. This was precisely the negative outcome 
against which positive philosophy must position itself.1
According to Shpet the Kantian categories ‘through’ which reality 
is perceived are translatable into the language of psychology. But he 
asserts that even if psychologists ‘now proved that we […] acquire the 
idea of causality due to habit […], that would in no degree exclude the 
Kantian theory of cognition’. Shpet assumes that Kant’s answer to such 
a discovery would be simple. The manner of the development of the 
mind’s categories would make little diff erence to him: they nonetheless 
remain a priori in relation to what can be known.2 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, Shpet’s conclusion, presented in his undergraduate thesis, stands 
in contrast to the reasoning of his teacher, Georgii Chelpanov, In his doc-
toral dissertation, Problema vospriiatiia prostranstva v sviazi s ucheniem 
ob apriornosti i vrozhdennosti,3 Chelpanov explains:
Upon hearing the word ‘space’, everyone thinks of the question of the 
‘reality’ of space, the question of the nature of ‘geometric axioms’ and 
the question of the ‘innateness’ of the concept of space. What is space? 
Is it something ‘objectively’ given, or is it only a ‘subjective form’ of 
our consciousness? In what way do we learn to perceive space? From 
where does the concept of space come? How do our judgements on 
spatial relations, which fi nd expression in geometric axioms, form?4
Chelpanov asserts that according to the traditional understanding 
we are empiricists if our answer to these questions is that we acquire 
our understanding of geometric forms through our experience of real-
ity. However, if we conclude that geometrical axioms cannot be grasped 
1 See, for example, Shpet 1916, pp. 12–13.
2 Shpet 1907, p. 181. (Kievskie universiteskie izvestiia: 5 (1907): pp. 165–203.)
3 Chelpanov defended the work as his doctoral dissertation in 1904. It appeared as 
the second part of a larger study, the fi rst part of which was his magister’s thesis in 
1896 (Martsinkovskaia 2016a, p. 20).
4 Chelpanov 1904, p. 1.
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through the kind of induction that is at work in the physical sciences, 
we approach Kant’s position. According to this view the axioms ‘are 
a sui generis product of our mind’s activity, one in which the senses’ 
impressions appear only to be a reason’.1 In other words, axioms are 
a priori forms of cognition. Chelpanov argues that this categorization is 
outdated and must be reconsidered. There is something uncomfortably 
archaic about the Kantian categories, Chelpanov claims: they appear 
‘ready-made’ metaphysical forms of the mind to be ‘found’ in it. ‘This 
view may in no way be brought into agreement with psychological 
views on the existence of mental processes; in general, the recognition 
of any ready forms is irreconcilable with the real psychological genesis 
of mental forms’, Chelpanov writes. His aim in Problema vospriiatiia is 
thus to shed new light on the philosophical debate between ‘nativists’ 
and ‘apriorists’ with the help of modern psychology. Indeed, he sug-
gests that a crucial contribution can already be made by distinguish-
ing between the psychological and philosophical methodologies: the 
former studies the origin and evolution of a given conception, while 
the latter ‘has as its aim the establishment of the “objective reality” 
of these conceptions’.2 Chelpanov’s answer to the problem of space 
perception is thus a combination of Kant’s philosophy and contem-
porary psychology.
However, Shpet’s views remained constantly critical of Kant. In 1916 
he argued that the Kantian method had resulted in ‘privatism’ in con-
temporary thought. In his words, philosophy had begun to turn inwards, 
specializing in its own forms. Consequently, within philosophy itself
there is a constant battle between specialized directions, depending 
on one ‘scientifi c’ bias or other. Naturalism, mechanism, biologism, 
psychologism, historicism, etc. — all are diff erent names and diff erent 
‘worldviews’ sharing in common the fact that they characterize diff er-
ent types of a single private ‘scientifi c’ form of negative philosophy.3
1 Chelpanov 1904, p. 2.
2 Chelpanov 1904, 2–3.
3 Shpet 1916, p. 5.
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Shpet likens Kant to the ancient sophists when, instead of actually 
negating reality, he merely modifi es the ancient question concerning 
‘what is’ into the form ‘how is being possible?’ In Shpet’s opinion ‘by the 
answer we receive we may judge the degree of sincerity hidden by that 
question’.1 Kant’s position contained a dangerous seed of philosophi-
cal tiredness, according to Shpet. He asserts: ‘Age frequently refuses to 
understand youth; disappointed by its own experience, it foresees failure 
in bursts of creativity, is irritated by an urge to go beyond the limits of 
where it itself stopped, and to that into which it does not fi t it reacts with 
sceptical self-limitation’. Shpet declares that such a temporary fatigue of 
the philosophical spirit is merely a sign indicating that it is time to move 
forward. But to do this, he believes it is necessary fi rst to go somewhat 
back in time. Shpet writes that ‘positive philosophy in its discrete forms 
never ceased its affi  rmative activity, and the time will come for it, too, 
to become common property’. In his work, Shpet attempts to get a grasp 
of a pre-Kantian — ‘positive’ in Lopatin’s sense — metaphysical attitude 
to reformulate its spirit and goals to fi t the needs of his day. ‘Only by 
becoming common property may [positive philosophy] discover all its 
values and riches,’ Shpet writes.2
Shpet’s relationship with Chelpanov remained ambivalent through-
out his career. While the years at Chelpanov’s seminar were undoubt-
edly a crucial formative period for Shpet,3 and even though the two 
engaged in а close collaboration in Moscow both before and after the 
revolution, Chelpanov’s infl uence on Shpet’s philosophy appears lim-
ited.4 Still, as Galin Tihanov points out, Chelpanov was widely known 
as Shpet’s mentor at Kiev University and his ‘patron’ in Moscow. Shpet 
was in turn considered Chelpanov’s most gifted pupil.5 Shpet’s profes-
sional life underwent a considerable transformation after he was in-
vited to accompany his teacher to Moscow in the spring of 1907. During 
1 Shpet 1916, p. 3.
2 Shpet 1916, p. 4.
3 Mikhail Polivanov (1995, p. 8) suggests that the acquaintance with Chelpanov was 
possibly the most important event of Shpet’s career as a professional philosopher.
4 For a discussion of Chelpanov’s infl uence on Shpet’s interpretation of Kant see 
Nemeth 2017, pp. 275–276.
5 Tihanov 2008, p. 269.
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the following autumn Shpet was teaching at Moscow University, the 
Moscow Pedagogical Courses (Moskovskie pedagogicheskie kursy) and the 
Moscow Higher Education Courses for Women (Moskovskie vysshie zhen-
skie kursy). In 1908 he began teaching logic at the Alferov Gymnasium 
(Alferovskaia gimnaziia).1 Describing the joint appearance of Shpet and 
Chelpanov in the Moscow circles, Andrei Belyi writes:
That Shpett [sic] was known among us, among philosophers at the 
‘House of Song’ [‘Dom pesni’] of the d’Algeims, at the Metners’, as 
a cunning, talented, nimble ‘rogue’. His academic career was rapidly 
on the up, while that of his patron, Chelpanov, progressed in some 
dreary philosophical backwaters somewhere. With some gallant gri-
mace, bordering on outright irony, Shpett held on to Chelpanov; Shpett 
was seen everywhere. Chelpanov — nowhere.2
1.2.2. Belyi’s Neo-Kantian Symbolism
Remembering his fi rst meeting with Shpet in 1910, Fedor Stepun 
writes, ‘who didn’t know Shpet?’3 Although Stepun suggests that Shpet 
rarely participated in public discussions (guarding ‘his popularity and 
academic merit’4), the latter seems to have been remarkably well-con-
nected in the social circles of the city. Shpet’s fi rst serious association, 
as Tihanov notes, was with the Society of Free Aesthetics (Obshchestvo 
svobodnoi estetiki), or ‘Estetika’, which Riurik Ivnev describes as one of the 
main centres of artistic, literary and scholarly activities of its time.5 This 
group, which had been founded under the informal leadership of Valerii 
Briusov, included, apart from the abovementioned Stepun, Andrei Belyi, 
1 Shchedrina 2015, pp. 55–58.
2 Belyi 1934, pp. 306–307.
3 Stepun 1956, p. 191. Shpet received Stepun in his home offi  ce. Stepun describes: ‘from 
the door to the bedroom, an apparently ordinary but actually rather unusual person 
emerged with a light, elegant gait, with a little round head and very small line of 
a smoothly shaven face, one still young, yet crumpled, wrinkled and in reddish spots’.
4 Ibid. 
5 Cited in Tihanov 2009b, p. 57.
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Mikhail Gershenzon, Nikolai and Emilii Metner, Boris Vysheslavtsev, 
Jurgis Baltrušaitis, and many others.1 Of these, Baltrušaitis was to become 
a lifelong friend of Shpet, who also collaborated extensively with both 
Gershenzon and the Metner brothers.2 Yet it was Belyi especially who 
proved an intellectual supporter of Shpet during his fi rst Moscow period. 
Belyi respected Shpet’s taste, valued his philosophical knowledge and 
as Tihanov quotes, once confessed being ‘in love’ with Shpet’s ‘subtle 
and sophisticated mind’.3 In exchange, Belyi’s infl uence was visible in 
Shpet’s future conceptions of art and its symbolic nature, and his name 
appeared as a focal point of comparison — and critique — in the 1922–23 
Esteticheskie fragmenty (Aesthetic Fragments).
Shpet’s acquaintance with Belyi took place during the latter’s strong 
interest in neo-Kantian philosophy as a foundation for a symbolist theo-
ry.4 Yet, as Klavdiia Nikolaevna Bugaeva attests in her memoirs, this was 
not a case of the poet’s unequivocal acceptance of Kant; Belyi was at 
times even ‘obsessively hostile’ to his thought. Nevertheless, Bugaeva 
believes that he ‘gave Kant almost all of his best years’.5 This neo-Kantian 
period stretched roughly from 1901 to 1913/1915, when Belyi converted 
to antroposophy.6 Between 1904 and 1908 he published ‘a whole series’ 
of reviews of books about neo-Kantian themes, and in 1909 reported in 
a letter to Marietta Shaginian that he was working on a ‘theoretical book 
on the theory of symbolism’ in which he would ‘derive’ symbolism from 
a ‘critique of cognition’ with the aid of the theories of Hermann Cohen, 
Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask.7 The period of Shpet and Belyi’s friend-
ship (roughly 1909–1912) coincides with the years when Belyi made his 
crucial discoveries for a concrete ‘theory’ of symbolism.
1 For more on the Society and its members see Belyi 1934, pp. 218–223.
2 For more see Shchedrina 2004, pp. 68–72.
3 Tihanov 2009b, p. 57. Belyi (1934, p. 310) writes: ‘I loved the refi ned Shpett [sic] 
mind, to admire it, but did not understand what it was fi ghting for’.
4 ‘I thought about the gnoseology of symbolism for 25 years’, Belyi (1934, p. 211) as-
serts, and lists the texts in which this theory was developed. Of these the majority, 
‘Smysl iskusstva’, ‘Emblematika smysla’ and ‘Lirika i eksperiment’ were published in 
the 1910 collection by Musaget, Simvolizm.
5 Cited in Cassedy 1987, p. 314.
6 Cassedy 1987, pp. 313–314.
7 Dmitrieva 2007, pp. 358–359.
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While neo-Kantian thought was certainly not the only philosophi-
cal undercurrent of symbolism,1 it was particularly visible during its 
consolidation as the leading ‘school’ of poetics around 1910.2 That year, 
Belyi published (through the Musaget publishing house) a collection 
of essays, Simvolizm, at the same time as interest in neo-Kantian phi-
losophy was rapidly growing. Indeed, in the fi rst decade of the century, 
there appeared in Moscow ‘a whole group of young philosophers who 
had received a neo-Kantian “baptism”’, Nina Dmitrieva writes.3 In 
Belyi’s words, Kant’s theory of knowledge had established an entirely 
novel perspective on reality: ‘Cognition — knowledge about knowl-
edge’. This perspective was new to Russian culture, because epistemic 
questions were not developed in traditional Russian idealism. Thus, 
Belyi writes that Kantian themes were imported to Russia by ‘Cohen, 
Natorp, Cassirer, Kinkel, Windelband, Rickert, Lask, Cohn and others’.4 
The religious neo-idealism was likewise aff ected by them, even if it ap-
peared in general opposed to the strictly academic neo-Kantian trend. 
Dmitrieva argues that neo-Kantians and neo-idealists shared common 
ground in emphasizing the subjective nature of experience. Their main 
disagreement concerned the nature of this subjectivity: whether it was 
to be viewed as inherently rational or irrational.5
Belyi refers to this, writing: ‘Ellis and Briusov were considered en-
emies until 1907; for Briusov, Ellis was a bungler; Ellis threatened Briusov 
with all retributions; I, upon my return to Moscow, fi nd out they have 
made peace; an issue of Vesy is now a venue of Ellis’s attack on the 
enemies of Briusov’.6 Collaboration between the neo-idealist and the 
neo-Kantian thinkers took place mainly at the Moscow Philosophico-
Religious society (Moskovskoe RFO pamiati V. S. Solov’eva), also known 
as the Kruzhok. The ‘Argonauts’ group, organized around Belyi, Sergei 
1 The other important philosophical infl uences came, at least, from Nietzschean 
existentialism, Bergsonian intuitivism, Steinerian anthroposophy, and the religious 
thought of Vladimir Solov’ev and his followers.
2 Dmitrieva 2007, p. 332.
3 Dmitrieva 2007, p. 359.
4 Belyi 1934, p. 209.
5 Dmitrieva 2016, p. 387.
6 Belyi 1934, p. 218.
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Solov’ev and Ellis (Lev Kobylisnkii), appears to have been a ‘reservoir’ 
of members for the RFO, and Grigorii Rachinskii, one of the earli-
est Argonauts, indeed later became the spokesperson for the RFO.1 
The Philosophico-Religious society was offi  cially founded in 1906, and 
its founding members included Sergei Bulgakov, Lev Lopatin, Pavel 
Florenskii, Vladimir Ern and others.2 According to Iana Morozova Belyi 
took part in the RFO’s activities from the start.3 It also seems that, apart 
from ‘Estetika’, the ‘Kruzhok’ was also a place where Belyi and Shpet 
would meet.4
According to Andrea Zink Belyi’s interest in Kantian and neo-Kantian 
theories can be traced back to ‘a very specifi c occasion, which resulted 
in a sense of wounded pride’.5 In 1902 Belyi gave a presentation on the 
question of forms of art (‘Formy iskusstva’) at a student philological 
society. He was later told by his listeners (among them Vladimir Ern) 
that he ‘lacked adequate knowledge’, especially when it came to the 
neo-Kantian concept of ‘form’.6 Belyi’s paper, which also appeared as an 
article in Mir iskusstva, presented a discussion of literature’s relation-
ship to music.7 Belyi had become interested in Schopenhauer’s vision of 
music as an art form that was independent from the phenomenal world, 
thus off ering an unhinged way to access the deepest forces underly-
ing the universe. He appeared determined to discover a link between 
the phonetics of poetic language and musical sounds to emphasize the 
symbol’s expressive powers.8 Belyi identifi ed rhythm as the common 
denominator between music and poetry.9
However, Roger Keys asserts that from about 1907 Belyi tacitly aban-
doned such an ‘overtly mystical aesthetic’ and with it ‘the naive “corre-
spondence” theory of language’. At this point Belyi’s question about the 
1 Sobolev 1994, p. 104.
2 Morozova 2008, pp. 184–185. Iana Morozova notes the quick success the society 
gained: its membership had grown to 150 in only a month.
3 Morozova 2008, p. 186.
4 Belyi 1934, p. 305.
5 Zink 2011, p. 224.
6 Ibid. For more on the dispute see Dmitrieva 2007, pp. 351–352.
7 For more on the article and Aleksandr Blok’s reaction to it see Pyman 2004, p. 223.
8 Keys 1996, pp. 111–115.
9 Keys 1996, p. 121.
1.2. Going against Kant 45
nature of art became intertwined with his systematic studies in language. 
According to Keys Belyi no longer regarded language as a ‘translucent 
medium’ for the refl ection of the otherworldly. However, as his vision 
of language became increasingly opaque, its creative powers grew ac-
cordingly. It was no longer a medium that could express hidden realities; 
instead, it now seemed to Belyi that language could forge entirely new 
realities. Keys argues that Belyi’s interest thus shifted from a viewpoint 
of ‘mystical clairvoyance’ to a psychology of artistic creation, and that it 
can be suggested, broadly speaking, that he integrated Kant’s Copernican 
turn in his aesthetic vision. In the article ‘Budushchee iskusstva’ (written 
in 1907) Belyi expresses the hope that the question of the purpose of art 
can be transferred from an examination of the products of creation to 
the process of creation itself.1
A text from the same year, ‘Smysl iskusstva’ (1910) refl ects another 
infl uence that Belyi had integrated in his thought: that of Aleksander 
Potebnia. The Ukrainian nineteenth century linguist had adopted 
Wilhelm von Humbodlt’s Romantic theory, which suggested a meta-
phorical connection between the word and what it designated. Arguing 
against the understanding of language as a mere instrument, Humboldt 
considered it indivisible from cognitive acts. For him language was the 
‘formative organ of thought’ through which an (internal) intellectual 
activity was turned into an (external) audible form. It thus existed in 
the form of energeia, a living force which constantly renews itself, in-
stead of ergon, a set and determinable structure. Humboldt launched 
the term ‘inner form’ of language to explain what directed its evolution, 
and in Potebnia’s adaptation it proved highly infl uential for Russian 
modernism.2
Potebnia’s interpretation, presented in his 1862 Mysl’ i iazyk (Thought 
and Language) relied on an etymological conception. He understood the 
inner form of each word to be the etymon as the original form of a word. 
It was the morpheme, or a more authentic form of the word — a primal 
combination of (external) sound and (internal) meaning — from which 
1 Keys 1996, pp. 184–185.
2 For a discussion on Potebnia’s interpretation of Humboldt see Seifrid 2005, 
pp. 30–52.
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the word in its fi nal form was derived.1 Furthermore, Potebnia suggested 
that poetic language could help rediscover these combinations, whereas 
in the everyday uses of language, the original forms had been hidden due 
to sedimentations of time. According to Potebnia the poetic word still 
retained the image-nature (obraznost’) of symbol, revealing the inner 
form of the expression. In ‘Smysl iskusstva’ Belyi speaks of poetic art as 
movement and creative energy, and refers to the obraznost’ of poetry. 
He asserts that there is a vital power (vulkanicheskaia sila) in the image-
symbol (obraz-simvol):
The artistic image is similar to a mountain, the slopes of which are 
covered in the vineyard of ideas; here, on the slope, a new wine is be-
ing made — the wine of new life. […] The peaks of the mountain are 
covered in the clouds of emotions, out of which lightning fl ashes and 
thunders claps; and only in the breaks in the cloud do the icy peaks of 
duty shine to us, peaks which may, however, become a crater throw-
ing a pillar of fi re to the sky — a crater fl ooding the vineyard of ideas 
so the slopes of the new duty may be covered by a garden of new 
ideas.2
In ‘Lirika i eksperiment’ (1909) Belyi took up the task of formulating 
a defi nition of art for the service of aesthetics. He argued that contem-
porary critics focused excessively on what they thought art should be 
and forgot to ask what art actually was.3 In ‘Emblematika smysla’ (1909) 
Belyi specifi es this question to concern symbolist art, asking, ‘What 
is the meaning of the aesthetics of symbolism? What is its ideological 
justifi cation?’4 Belyi’s approach is epistemological: he questions the 
limits of scientifi c knowledge and searches for a formulation of a less 
constrained conceptualization of what it is to ‘know’ in art. Having 
analysed the basic elements of Kant’s critique, he summarizes them as 
1 For example, the inner form of the word okno (window) was to be found in the word 
form oko (eye). (Seifrid 2005, p. 40.)
2 Belyi 1910, p. 207.
3 Cited in Keys 1996, p. 26.
4 Belyi 1910, p. 49.
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follows: ‘The object of cognition, a thing in itself, becomes apparent only 
as a thought concept; thus the objectively given material of cognition 
fl ies into the void; the study of the laws of formation of concepts is si-
multaneously the study of the laws of objective being’.1 Belyi thus fi nds 
a crucial task for symbolist art, establishing a connection between the 
concerns of contemporary philosophers and the poets, both tackling the 
problem of consciousness.
Dmitrieva suggests that Belyi’s ideas on symbolism’s ‘epistemo-
logical’ mission were especially infl uenced by Heinrich Rickert, even 
though the poet’s interpretation was somewhat eclectic and incoher-
ent.2 Belyi’s relationship with the neo-Kantians indeed appears com-
plex. For example, in his memoirs, Belyi describes his impressions of 
the young Sergei Hessen, arriving in Moscow to make a presentation ‘in 
which there was not a single word not from Lask’s lexicon’: ‘the presen-
tation gave me the impression of a nimble philosophizer, a snake-man, 
showing his agility as he jumped from a fourth-fl oor window to the 
pavement without breaking his nose — in the slogan “the form of form 
of form is the same as the form of form, which is not form, but norm”’. 
Belyi continues:
the ‘Cassirerians’ and ‘Laskites’ brutally, like termites, ate everything, 
while remaining just as dry and gaunt as ever; among other things 
they ate up the scholastics of Lev Lopatin; I had to deal with them to 
avoid surrendering my own positions; I even learned their terms as I 
practised their jargon; that was my game of chess: to mimic Rickert’s 
jargon to then use his language to topple his very stronghold…3
1 Belyi 1910, pp. 69–70.
2 Dmitrieva 2007, p. 349. According to Keys (1996, p. 161) Belyi’s theory from this 
time ‘was a confused and confusing aff air, more a feeling about the way the word 
is constituted and where it is heading, than a fully thought-through philosophical 
system’.
3 Belyi 1934, p. 305. Andrea Zink (2011, p. 227) confi rms that, for example, Rickert’s 
Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (1904) provided Belyi with the concepts of the 
‘content of consciousness’ (Bewußtseinsinhalt) and ‘affirmation of judgment’ 
(Urteilsbejahung) — terms of which the poet made ‘liberal use’.
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Concerning the theoretical force of his own views, Belyi was later to 
appear equally critical. In his memoirs, he concludes that ‘symbolism 
is a critical disposition, a revolutionizing worldview, and not a school’.1
Shpet played an important role in Belyi’s growing (self-)criticism of 
the neo-Kantian theory of art. The poet attests that Shpet saw ‘right 
through’ him and mentions him threatening jokingly, ‘I’m going to come 
to the ‘Kruzhok’ and tear your mask off !’2 Attracted by Shpet’s scepticism, 
Belyi describes him as follows:
…he had just published his book O probleme prichinnosti u Iuma [On 
the Problem of Causality in Hume]; he had made himself comfort-
able in Hume’s scepticism as in an armchair; that was merely his 
form of refusal from the then dominant currents; he particularly 
despised the ‘uncleanliness’ of Berdiaev’s position and simply rab-
idly mocked Nietzschefi ed Orthodoxy; he pointed acerbically to the 
lipstick of Bulgakov, prepared from a clerical spirit and memories of 
an odd Marxism; more than anyone else he saw the Cohenites and 
Rickertists […] Shpett [sic] had least sympathy of all for empiriocriti-
cism; he was walking irony on the left — just as Lopatin was power-
less anger on the right; Shpett [sic] was prepared, for a bet, to join 
Lopatin in teasing the Kantians, while at the same time keeping his 
distance from him.3
In Belyi’s description Shpet appears critical of his attempts at phil-
osophical theorizing, insisting that he was a philosopher only when 
writing poetry.4 Belyi adds that in 1908 he was reading through a great 
deal of philosophy, from Shpet’s Problema prichinnosti u Iuma i Kanta 
to Hume, Sigwart, Bacon, and Kant’s Critique; ‘and all that in view of 
the fact that Shpett [sic] strongly shook the Kantian in me’.5 The poet 
1 Belyi 1934, p. 212.
2 Belyi 1934, p. 305.
3 Belyi 1934, pp. 305–306.
4 Belyi 1934, p. 306. According to Bely Shpet valued the 1903 collection Zoloto v la-
zuri.
5 Belyi 2016, p. 378. Nonetheless, Belyi concludes: ‘but I remain “faithful” to my 
understanding of criticism and am again rereading Rickert, as well as Natorp’.
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asserts that ‘None of the philosophers was friends with us as he was; 
and no one treated us with the same dread: in academic presentations’,1 
and concludes with a description of Shpet’s critically ironic attitude: 
‘“Boris Nikolaevich,” he exhaled a curl of smoke, staring at some point 
behind me, “Boris Nikolaevich presents quite interesting thoughts in an 
intimate circle; but as soon as he starts giving presentations, he puts on 
a worn-out tailcoat he’s rented from Rickert’s wardrobe!”’2 Thus, Shpet, 
in Belyi’s words, went to war with the neo-Kantians: ‘The Kantians 
went to battle in heavy armour, looking from a distance like Goliaths; 
and out came Shpett [sic], like David, enveloped in the nudity of scep-
ticism; having torn it off , he released a bowling ball: ‘bang — Goliath’s 
forehead has cracked […]’.3
1.2.3. Shpet’s Scepticism
In 1909, when it was still unclear whether Musaget would be laun-
ched as a publishing house or merely a journal, Belyi regarded Shpet 
as a potential contributor, who could write on Fichte, as well as Polish 
philosophy and culture.4 Musaget (1909–1917) was a project led by the 
artistic collaboration of Emilii Metner, Belyi and Ellis.5 According to 
Aleksandr Lavrov the leadership’s tripartite structure led to a division 
of Musaget’s various aspects as follows: its general book publishing 
activities; the publication of the philosophical journal Logos; and the 
publication of the Orpheus (Orfei) series, which focused on mystical 
and religious themes.6 Together, the three branches were intended to 
‘traverse the vital impulses enabling the formation and developing of 
a universal symbolist culture in mutually conversant spheres of artistic 
1 Belyi 1934, p. 306.
2 Belyi 1934, p. 307.
3 Belyi 1934, p. 310.
4 Tihanov 2009b, p. 57.
5 Lavrov 2014, p. 13.
6 Boris Mezhuev (2014, p. 55) points out that the founding of Musaget coincided with 
the period when Belyi was growing close to Viacheslav Ivanov and Anna Mintslova.
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creativity, philosophical cognition and theurgist comprehension’.1 
Shpet was one among many philosophers who participated in the ac-
tivities around Musaget; others who frequented there were Vladimir 
Ern, Sergei Bulgakov, Sergei Hessen, Nikolai Berdiaev and Mikhail 
Gershenzon.2
In Lavrov’s assessment Musaget was from the outset divided by 
internal confl icts, some of which concerned organizational and other 
‘external’ matters, while others were rooted in deep philosophical dis-
cords.3 One of these demarcation lines stretched across the work of the 
Russian version of the international journal Logos (1910–1914), edited by 
Stepun and Hessen. According to Galin Tihanov there was ‘a clear divide 
between those who were in favour of the line represented by Logos and 
those who opposed it as being too neo-Kantian and not heeding in suf-
fi cient measure other currents in contemporary philosophy’.4 The shared 
goal of the writers of Logos was nonetheless clear: to become a ‘crystal 
clear sphere of rational unifi cation of all motives of a shared cultural, 
and in particular, philosophical creativity’. This vision was contrasted es-
pecially with the ‘dark and irrational chaos’, which the writers believed 
to be represented by the Slavophile school of thought.5
The journal was launched in close collaboration with some of the top 
contemporary philosophers in Germany. Dmitrii Filosofov describes the 
situation in the summer of 1909, as the future editors of the Russian 
Logos travelled to Freiburg to negotiate their contract with the German 
editorial board:
The journal was the idea of a small group of Rickert’s close students, 
which included two young Russians. The group had already pub-
lished a small volume of articles in German under the general title 
1 Lavrov 2014, p. 13.
2 Tihanov 2009b, p. 58.
3 Lavrov 2014, p. 14. In Lavrov’s opinion the main division of the Musagetians was 
into two camps: those who followed the anthropological doctrine of Rudolf Steiner, 
and those who rejected it.
4 Tihanov 2009b, p. 58.
5 Polovinkin 2014, p. 454.
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of ‘Messiah’.1 The authors dream of the emergence of a new philo-
sophical system which could provide a synthesis for our eclectic age, 
they dream of the coming of a philosophical messiah, for whom they 
prepare the way. […] So far, the publication of two journals has been 
proposed: one in Russian in Moscow; the other in German in Freiburg. 
The tasks are broad, young and very Russian.2
The editorial of the fi rst Russian Logos issue in 1910 declared its opposi-
tion to the Slavophiles, viewed as representing the traditional approach 
to philosophy in Russia. The editors, Hessen and Stepun write: ‘We, 
as before, in wishing to be philosophers, must be Westernizers. We 
must recognize that no matter how signifi cant and interesting certain 
Russian phenomena in the area of natural philosophy are, philosophy, 
formerly Greek, is now predominantly German’.3 The same position 
concerning the journal is described by Stepun in his memoirs: ‘As phi-
losophers from a young age, we fi rmly intended to tackle the excesses 
of the Moscow neo-Slavophiles. I will not say we were right about eve-
rything, but we set about reforming the style of Russian philosophy 
with great self-confi dence’.4 According to Stepun the point that united 
the intellectual projects of Logos and Musaget was the ‘aim of spiritu-
ally splicing Russian culture with the Western one and to place under 
the discovery of Russian creativity a solid, professional and technical 
foundation’.5
Stepun contrasts Logos and Musaget’s goals and methods to those of 
the publishing house Put’ (1910–1919), which was an off spring of the 
Moscow Philosophico-Religious society. ‘The main question of Put’ was 
1 Vom Messias. Kulturphilosophische Essaye von R. Kroner, N. von Bubnorff , G. Mehlis, 
S. Hessen, F. Steppuhn (Leipzig: Verlag von W. Ehglehmann, 1909). John Krois (2013, 
p. 103) mentions that the international Logos project was initiated by ‘a group of 
fi ve doctoral students, three of whom were from Russia’.
2 Cited in Kantor 2014, pp. 110–111.
3 Cited in Kantor 2014, p. 111.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. According to Vladimir Kantor (p. 109), Musaget and Logos were also equally 
dedicated to the promotion of German thought and culture in Russia. The pub-
lishing house received considerable funding from Emilii Metner’s friend Hedwig 
Friedrich.
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“what is your faith”; the main question of Musaget was “do you have 
a command of your mastery?”’, he writes. Even Belyi, who had only 
recently associated himself with the activities of the RFO, now busied 
himself with ‘technical issues’ of rhythm, poetics and aesthetics.1 Belyi 
himself remembers having been torn between the opposite infl uences of 
technical neo-Kantianism and the existential depth of Nikolai Berdiaev, 
writing that ‘the personality of Berdiaev, perceiving the trepidation of 
the age and understanding the symbolists’ psychology, rather spoke to 
me’. Belyi considered Berdiaev not only as a profoundly original thinker 
but a ‘great man’, and he was drawn to the sincerity of the discussions 
with him ‘over tea’.2 Thus, Belyi found himself in the centre of opposing 
philosophical currents, ‘making the work of self-consciousness more 
diffi  cult’. He writes:
discussion with Metner and Shpet fi lled me with sometimes harsh 
criticism of Berdiaev’s ‘credo’: Shpet is an admirer of Shestov, and in 
those years he always directed the blade of his foil at N.A.’s mixture of 
metaphysics and mysticism; he said to me: ‘Mysticism should not be 
rationalized in thought; poetry is mysticism; a gnoseological treatise 
is philosophy. They must not be mixed’.3
Nonetheless, Vladimir Kantor suggests that Belyi saw himself as the 
‘master’ of Musaget. He describes the new offi  ce in which the publishing 
company had recently settled in his memoirs: ‘a group sat here every 
day (Shpet, Rachinskii, Boris Sadovskii, Ellis, Mashkovtsev or others); 
this is where Musaget received visitors on business between six and 
eight; how many conversations fl owed here — with Ivanov, Mintslova, 
Blok, Turgenev, Stepun, Shpett [sic]; the room became my domestic 
salon’.4
Belyi pays attention to the fact that, during these early years in 
Moscow, Shpet never revealed his own position in philosophical debates. 
1 Kantor 2014, pp. 111–112.
2 Belyi 1995, p. 319.
3 Belyi 1995, p. 320.
4 Belyi 1934, pp. 339–340.
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He appeared as a supporter of Hume — ‘in those years an exceptional 
phenomenon’ — and remained in the role of the sceptic.1 In Belyi’s words, 
‘he limited himself to poking the formal tailcoats of other positions: with 
Hume’s rapier; when he was asked to give his “credo”, he proceeded to 
the wine bottle; and twirled before us his taste, his precision’.2 a related 
remark is made by Stepun, who in 1910 searched for philosophical sup-
port for his views in Shpet but in vain. He writes:
he does not have anything to do with it — whether Moscow University 
will see a fl ourishing of Lopatinist Leibnitzism, or Marburg neo-Kant-
ism. As a great erudite and refi ned lover of philosophical problematics, 
Shpet, in many ways very close to Husserl,3 who had fought against 
deep thoughtfulness in philosophy, did not physically withstand any 
confessional convictions in science. All that suffi  ced — I later noticed 
this more than once in conversation with him — was the slightest at-
tempt to deepen scientifi c-philosophical thought to some confessional 
conviction, and he would immediately display an absolute ungrounded 
nihilism, which he defended brilliantly and with talent using dialectical 
mastery.4
Some years later, in a letter written from Göttingen to his new fi -
ancée, Shpet explains his previous unwillingness to settle with any of 
1 Belyi 1934, p. 318.
2 Belyi 1934, p. 306. Belyi (p. 307) continues his description: ‘Before me appears the 
face of Gustav Gustavovich: round, beardless and without whiskers, belonging to — 
whom? a youth or an old man? Smooth as a polished sphere of Karelian birch; but 
watch out: that sphere will hit you! […] His face was not large; not lips but liplets; not 
a nose, but a noselet; not fast, brown, rose-tinted eyes, but — two nimble snouts — 
mouse ones: they sniff ed out your ideal landscape, determinedly running from the 
brain hemispheres, they darted into your eyes, from them they ran into your skull; 
and there they raised a hurried rustling with a sceptical squeak; that was the im-
pression when the door opened and out of it a trimmed, small, heavy head glanced 
questioningly; after that the whole thickset, fat fi gure, head out, appeared; it glanced 
up from under the eyebrows with a little smile, searching for a target for its gaze.’
3 Shchedrina (2008, p. 110) doubts that Stepun must have made a mistake here, since 
Shpet never expressed his interest in Husserl’s phenomenology before his trip to 
Göttingen in 1912.
4 Stepun 1956, p. 191.
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the established standpoints of any philosophical current or school, or 
even to express his own philosophical views in debates.1 Shpet writes 
that his reservation had landed him in trouble in Moscow: ‘friends re-
proached me for not writing, my enemies pointed that out as my failure, 
they cried that I was hiding my views, because I had none… And it was 
very diffi  cult for me, but in that there was some kind of satisfaction of 
amour-propre: to be silent until the thought was totally ripe’.2 In another 
letter Shpet admits that his greatest weakness as a teacher is that in the 
classroom he has always felt obliged to convince his listeners of one 
philosophical view over another when he would prefer to refrain from 
stating any argument as defi nite:
here teaching is supposed to be strictly dogmatic, an alphabet must be 
taught, teaching must be free of doubt, but I know that everything that 
must be taught is full of doubt. Not everyone can take even a small 
dose of criticism, far from everyone, and for classroom teaching that 
is not suitable; here, criticism must be dogmatic for it to be learnt by 
heart. And I have a feeling, as if I am cheating, if I lay out everything 
‘as accepted’. […] Therefore, I cannot be, for example, a member of 
a political party, because one then often has to act against one’s con-
science. That is why I am not a member of any of our philosophical 
‘sects’.3
Shpet’s lecture course on logic, which he taught at the Higher 
Education Courses for Women in 1911–1912, refl ects this fundamental 
unwillingness to accept anything akin to a philosophical dogma. At the 
very end of his course, as Shpet is drawing his conclusions in a passage 
titled ‘The method of philosophy’, he is ready to question even the ne-
cessity of pure rationality in philosophy. He writes:
1 Shpet divorced his fi rst wife Mariia Krestovskaia in September 1912 and married 
his second wife, Natal’ia Guchkova, approximately a year later. (Shchedrina 2015, 
pp. 60–62.)
2 Shpet 2005, p. 99.
3 Shpet 2005, pp. 119–120.
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…it cannot be stated that rationalist philosophy is all philosophy. We 
know that in the history of philosophy we constantly face attempts 
to go beyond its limits, and we feel that every such departure beyond 
those limits is a step forwards for rational philosophy and thus also 
a step forwards for the approach of philosophy to life. There are minds 
which extend to more than the possible extent of rational philosophy. 
We need rational philosophy to be really penetrated by life philosophy. 
We need to understand philosophy like life; to understand life like 
philosophy.1
It appears that during the decade before the October revolution, the 
‘irrational’ (or anti-rational) philosopher whom Shpet most looked up to 
was Lev Shestov. Shpet refers to this later, in 1917, when he is — by then 
already critically — reviewing the former’s article on Husserl (‘Memento 
mori (po povodu teorii poznaniia Edmunda Gusserlia)’). In his review ar-
ticle Shpet writes that while Shestov now seems to have lost his touch, 
with the ‘earlier Shestov’ he had ‘never mustered up the courage to ar-
gue’ because, as he explains, ‘I would not have had the necessary tone, 
the tone of real “wisdom”, I would not have had the words to express 
my most serious queries, the ones which Shestov was able to expound 
with such mastery’.2 The mutual appreciation that Shpet and Shestov 
felt for one another’s work is mentioned in a letter from Baltrušaitis to 
Shpet on 23 June 1912:
L. I. Shestov told me a big thing about you: he is deeply impressed by 
your work, both its internal message and its form… My heaven-sent 
inspiration, on which I build all my thoughts about people, from our 
very fi rst meeting fi lled with the deepest human faith in you and with 
heroic hope for you. I knew that you would fulfi l them, and I am so 
overjoyed to hear Shestov praise you. Alleluia!3
1 Shpet 2010b, p. 210.
2 Shpet 2010a, p. 211.
3 Shpet 2005, p. 342. Тhe recipient’s address on the letter is in Rothenbrunnen, 
Switzerland.
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Shestov’s existential scepticism was independent from established 
schools of thought, and Shpet’s collegial relationship with him placed 
him in between, or perhaps outside, the main neo-religious and neo-
Kantian philosophical currents of the time. Yet Shestov appears to have 
previously belonged to Berdiaev’s close circle (including Bulgakov, Belyi, 
Ivanov, Gershenzon, Rachinskii and others). Berdiaev remembers with 
warmth their debates on religious and existential themes:
at stake were the fi nal, extremely vital questions about the primary, 
and not the refl ected, not the secondary. That is how it was not only in 
religious-philosophical societies, but also in disputes in private homes 
which reminded one of the disputes between the Westernizers and the 
Slavophiles in the forties. Belinskii said after an all-night argument: 
no one can go home — we haven’t sorted out the God question yet. 
That was what it was like when we got together […]1
Still, by 1912, Shestov seems to have distanced himself from Berdiaev 
and Bulgakov, because, as Shpet writes in a letter, ‘he cannot calm him-
self down with their truths’.2 At that point, shortly before Shpet was 
to publish his preliminary conclusions about Husserl’s phenomenology 
in Iavlenie i smysl (Appearance and Sense), both Shestov and he appear 
in the role of critical seekers. As Tat’iana Shchedrina writes, this also 
remained a theme of the two philosophers’ conversations after the lat-
ter’s 1914 work, and Shestov was involved in Shpet’s process of fi nish-
ing his 1916 thesis, Istoriia kak problema logiki. According to Shpet’s 
letter to Natal’ia Konstantinovna Shestov liked the text but persuaded 
him ‘not to write “ends” in this book, that is, not to write conclusive 
solutions and not to reveal his positive (polozhitel’nye) views until the 
end’.3
Shpet’s philosophical position remained close to Shestov’s early 
views, as they were expressed, for example, in his 1905 ‘Apofeoz 
1 Berdiaev 1949, p. 171.
2 Shchedrina 2004, p. 186. For more on the interrelationship between Shpet, Shestov 
and Berdiaev see Shchedrina 2008, pp. 37–54.
3 Cited in Shchedrina 2004, p. 185.
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bezpochvennosti (opyt adogmaticheskogo myshleniia)’. As Shchedrina 
points out, this was the very text which had made Shestov appear to 
many as a philosophical sceptic.1 In it Shestov, like Shpet would a little 
later, took up the problem of Hume and Kant, writing:
Did Kant not have those thoughts when reading Hume’s deliberations 
which rocked the basic principles of science? a philosopher is a person, 
and nothing human is foreign to him. He loves broad, well-trodden 
roads on which theoretical thought can easily and freely move, without 
a single tree or blade of grass, where the straight line rules. He feels 
best of all in a broad, level square. Here, to drumbeats, he can bravely 
proceed at a triumphant ceremonial march, glancing neither ahead nor 
back, with the one worry of not falling out of beat and of giving as much 
‘leg’ as possible. The philosopher only values logical thinking, that is, an 
unhurried movement in a direction taken many times before, because 
thus inertia ensures that energy is not wasted on eternally looking 
around, seeking ways, fi ghting with ‘free will’ and its eternal fellow 
travellers, doubts.2
In June 1912, Shpet wrote to Natal’ia Guchkova, recommending her to 
read Shestov’s books, which he considered ‘exceptionally brilliant’.3 He 
assures her that although Shestov is diffi  cult to understand, it is not 
because he writes in a diffi  cult manner. Instead, it is a question of his 
‘unique manner of drawing negative conclusions, which the majority 
understand as scepticism and pessimism’.4 Shpet concludes that in spite 
of everything, he knows of no one who would seek for truth more sin-
cerely and passionately than Shestov.5
1 Shchedrina 2004, p. 186.
2 Shestov 1996, p. 13.
3 Shchedrina 2004, p. 184.
4 Aron Steinberg (2009, p. 248) appears to confi rm Shpet’s impression, writing in his 
memoirs that ‘Shestov and Berdiaev […] were still very young, Nikolai Aleksandrovich 
said, when the tragic sensation of life started to thrust Shestov into inescapable 
nihilism’.
5 Shchedrina 2004, p. 185.
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1.3. Departure for Germany
Shpet’s trips to Europe between 1910 and 1914 resulted in a ground-
breaking change in his thinking, as he discovered a contemporary ‘posi-
tive’ philosophical programme to follow. This programme was Husserl’s 
phenomenology, which, Shpet believed, off ered an entirely new per-
spective on one of the oldest of philosophical problems. In at once over-
coming the dispute between nominalism and realism, phenomenology 
had discovered a way to access reality just as it appears, revealing its 
nature in a pure, pre-theoretical way. According to Shpet the simple 
act of discovering and embracing reality as it is presented the ultimate 
answer to philosophical scepticism. Moreover, phenomenology’s power 
to distinguish all forms of reality amounted to an argument against the 
contemporary trends of positivism and neo-idealism, as both the em-
pirical and the ideal could be shown to result from corresponding forms 
of intuition.
Before travelling to Göttingen in 1912, after which he also visited 
Edinburgh, London and Paris, Shpet had the opportunity to visit psy-
chological institutes and laboratories in Germany with Chelpanov.1 His 
letters, sent to a friend in June and July of 1910, demonstrate his experi-
ence of travelling abroad for the fi rst time in his life. Shpet writes: ‘I feel 
as if I were born and grew up here, and I am to work here. When I came 
to Moscow, I noted the lack of that feeling in me even then — Kiev 
ceased to exist for me. Alas, I think, were I to say to myself, ‘you shall 
live in Germany’, I would move to Germany’.2 And a few weeks later:
my mood is exceptional. It is as if after a heavy illness, you feel some 
sort of weakness and at the same time strength, and the main thing, 
hope and a bright view of the future. In Bonn I simply want to kiss 
the city; I feel fi lled with awe. Külpe is charmed, and how I regret not 
coming here immediately. Now I am convinced that as soon as I tear 
myself away from Russia I am coming here.3
1 For the destinations of their trip, see Shchedrina 2015, p. 59.
2 Shpet 2005, p. 320.
3 Shpet 2005, p. 321.
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As fate would have it, Shpet would not stay in Germany. Likewise, any 
dreams he might have entertained about building a peaceful academic 
career were to be severely undermined by the revolution. Still, what 
Shpet acquired in Göttingen and brought back to Moscow was a philo-
sophical method that he would subsequently develop to suit the chang-
ing philosophical needs in post-revolutionary Russia. Shpet’s enthusi-
asm for Husserl’s philosophy indeed stands in striking contrast with 
the preceding scepticism and non-commitment he had expressed only 
a few years earlier.
Although Shpet would quickly become the most renowned Husserlian 
in Russia, he was not alone in his interest in phenomenology. Indeed, 
as Thomas Nemeth writes, until the end of the First World War Russia 
was ‘arguably the most receptive country to phenomenology outside its 
homeland’.1 In 1909 the fi rst part of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the 
‘Prolegomena to a Pure Logic’ (originally published in 1901) appeared in 
a Russian translation with Semen Frank’s foreword, and the same year 
saw the publication of Heinrich (Genrikh) Lanz’s ‘Gusserl’ i psikhologisty 
nashikh dnei’.2 Husserl’s Logos essay ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’ 
was published in the Russian version of the international journal in 
1911, the same year as the text’s original German publication. In 1913, 
Boris Iakovenko published the article ‘Filosofi ia E. Gusserlia’,3 in which 
he analysed both volumes of Logical Investigations.4 Thus, while discuss-
ing Shpet’s rapid integration of Husserl’s phenomenology in his own 
system of thinking, Nemeth rightly notes that it was ‘a testimony not 
only to the perspicuity of the man but also of the Russian philosophical 
community of the time, as well as to its receptivity and commitment to 
philosophical involvement’.5
1 Nemeth 2009, p. 125.
2 Chubarov 1997, p. 86. An extended version of the article was published in German 
in 1910 as ‘Das Problem der Gegenständlichkeit in der modernen Logik’.
3 In Novye idei v fi losofi i, vol. 3: Teoriia poznaniia (1913).
4 Haardt 1991, p. xviii. For more on the reception of Husserl in Russia see Dennes 
1998.
5 Nemeth 1991, p. ix. Nemeth adds that since Husserl’s Ideas was published in April 
1913, and Shpet’s book appeared before June 1914, the latter must have indeed been 
‘conceived, thought through, and written in remarkable haste’.
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1.3.1. From Moscow to Göttingen
As Shpet gradually made his way to Germany, there was another 
change in his academic environment: little by little, he seemed to 
distance himself from Chelpanov, until eventually fi nding a teacher 
in Edmund Husserl. On his arrival in Moscow in 1907, Chelpanov had 
founded a new psychological seminar within the Department of History 
and Philology at Moscow University. Two years later, he was ready to 
begin his own research in the fi eld of experimental psychology. Shpet 
worked in close collaboration with this project and when, in 1910, the 
seminar received a generous donation of a hundred thousand roubles 
for the establishment of a Psychological Institute, he was naturally 
considered part of it.1 Chelpanov was well prepared to undertake the 
grand project. He was acquainted with Wilhelm Wundt’s Psychological 
Institute in Leipzig, which was indeed to function as a model for the 
Moscow Institute.2 Moreover, Chelpanov had already run a small-scale 
laboratory of psychology in Kiev (between 1897 and 1907)3 and had 
gained, as he writes, a ‘very clear idea of how a psychological institute 
should take shape in our Russian conditions’.4 Chelpanov adds that he 
had also made a thorough study of the corresponding American insti-
tutes at Harvard, Cornell University and Leland Stanford University. He 
believed this to have been especially valuable because of the similarities 
between university education in Russia and the United States.
1 Chelpanov (1914, p. 274) reports that Igor Sergeevich Shchukin’s donation was to 
be directed to the creation of a psychological institute as part of Moscow University. 
It was to be planned and directed by Chelpanov, and to carry the name of Lidiia 
Grigorievna Shchukina. Chelpanov later remarks in a letter to Shpet, written from 
the United States, that Shchukin’s donation ‘astonishes the psychologists, and a no-
tice thereof will appear in one of the psychological journals’ (Shpet 2012, p. 70).
2 Wundt was an infl uential fi gure in the evolution of Russian psychology. The fi rst 
experimental laboratory in Russia was founded after his model at Kazan University 
in 1885, and in the same year the Moscow Psychological Society made Wundt an 
honorary member. According to one claim more of Wundt’s works were translated 
to Russian than any other language. (Blumenthal 1985, p. 44; Sirotkina 2006, 
p. 247; Umrikhin 1997, p. 17.)
3 For more on Chelpanov’s colloquium at Kiev University see Kozulin 1985, pp. 23–24.
4 Chelpanov 1914, p. 275.
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In the summer of 1910 the project was accepted by the Ministry of 
Education and soon afterwards Chelpanov reported having departed 
on a journey with the ‘Privatdozent of Moscow University G.G Shpet’ 
to visit the most signifi cant German psychological institutes, still un-
known to him. He writes:
I became deeply acquainted with teaching in the Berlin laboratory of 
Professor Stumpf, thanks to the cooperation of Privatdozent Rupp. 
I then surveyed the Bonn laboratory with the assistance of Professor 
Külpe and Privatdozent Bühler, and then the large laboratory of 
Professor Marbe in the University of Würzburg. I had the occasion to 
discuss the plans for our institute with Professors Külpe and Wundt. 
Both provided me with rather valuable directions, which I used when 
correcting the plans.1
In the early spring of 1911 Chelpanov’s journey continued to the United 
States, where he visited Harvard, Yale, Cornell, Columbia and the 
University of Chicago, meeting along the way with Edward B. Tichener, 
Hugo Münsterberg, James McKeen Cattell and Charles Hubbard Judd.2 
In the meanwhile, the construction of a three-storey building in the 
grounds of Moscow University began, and by September 1912 the 
Psychological Institute was ready to accept students. The Institute’s 
offi  cial opening, however, took place only later, in March 1914. The 
event was publicized in Germany and the United States, and German 
psychologists, as Alex Kozulin writes, ‘not only congratulated their 
Russian colleagues but also used this event to point out that the 
Russian public appeared to be more sensitive to the needs of the scien-
tifi c community than the German one’. Chelpanov’s Institute was well 
staff ed and indeed, much better than the leading German psychological 
institutes, Kozulin notes: ‘Chelpanov could boast having fi ve assistants, 
fi ve laboratory assistants, and a mechanic’. Wilhelm Wundt expressed 
1 Ibid.
2 Kozulin 1985, p. 24. For Chelpanov’s extensive itinerary, see his letter to Shpet 
(2012, pp. 70–71).
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his delight with the new Institute, calling it the ‘off spring’ of his own 
Leipzig institute.1
In the director’s position Chelpanov could put the results of his 
Kantian research to practical use, and the multidisciplinary approach 
proved fruitful. In 1909 he prepared a course in experimental psychology 
that surveyed topics such as perception, memory and attention from 
the perspective of the methodology of psychological work. Chelpanov 
approached his themes from the point of view of psychophysics and re-
action-time experiments; he discussed statistical methods, the theory of 
probability and the principles of electronic engineering.2 Even with these 
modern methods, Tat’iana Martsinkovskaia suggests, his philosophi-
cal perception remained in much indebted to Kant.3 For Chelpanov the 
Kantian categories were applicable to modern psychology, as long as they 
were not accepted as unchanging Platonic forms, but as structures of 
the mind, which evolve in time and can be traced through experimental 
methods.
However, by the time the Psychological Institute began working, Shpet 
had already left Russia for Germany, and this time for Göttingen.4 He had 
spent the 1910–1911 academic year teaching at the A. L. Szaniawski City 
National University of Moscow (Moskovskii gorod skoi narod nyi univer-
sitet imeni A. L. Shaniavskogo) and to the 8th year of Alferov Gymnasium, 
where he met his future fi ancée Natal’ia Konstantinovna Guchkova, then 
a student. In Göttingen Shpet chose to live separately from his family (his 
wife and two daughters had settled in another fl at), and his intention 
was to engage in intense work on the second volume of his Istoriia kak 
problema logiki, as well as to fi nish the book’s fi rst volume as his doctoral 
dissertation.5 Apparently, in order to have the maximum time and peace 
to work, Shpet did not even register at Göttingen University. Chelpanov 
met his decision with dismay, writing on 25 May 1912:
1 Kozulin 1985, p. 25.
2 Kozulin 1985, p. 24.
3 Martsinkovskaia 2016a; pp. 19, 23.
4 Shpet settled in a fl at on Groner Chausse 22 on 13 April 1912, paying a hundred 
Deutsche Marks for the semester (April-August). (Shchedrina 2015, p. 59.)
5 Shchedrina 2015, p. 59.
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In no way can I approve your plan of not being at the University. That 
would be a great blow to your improvement. In that case, why did you 
have to travel to Göttingen, and what are you going to write in your 
report? And fi nally, it is even incredibly awkward when viewed from 
the outside. You return from two years in Germany without speaking 
or being able to understand the language.1
Judging from his correspondence, Shpet’s greatest distraction from 
work during the Göttingen years, apart from his growing interest in phe-
nomenology, was caused by longing for Guchkova, to whom he wrote 
daily.2 Otherwise, Shpet appears happy with the German way of life, 
reporting to her fi ve days after his departure from Moscow:
The lady of the house is very cautious. She gives me milk twice a day 
(I sensibly turned down their coff ee and butter). Some German, who is 
also writing a book, is also living with her (in Göttingen the only ones 
who do not write books are those who let rooms for writers of books, 
dogs, children and, naturally, civil servants, though the latter write in 
books, however), so she is used to silence (as, by the way, is everyone in 
Göttingen, and those who do not write books understand what writ-
ing books means — that already relates to children and dogs — the 
former grow up to write, and the latter distribute margarine around 
the city to prevent the writers of books from having any gastronomic 
temptation).3
Shpet kept to his writing during the spring and summer of 1912 with 
apparently only one visitor, Shestov, who stayed with him for two days 
at the end of May. In mid-August he returned to Moscow for a month-
long holiday during which he divorced his fi rst wife and stayed at the 
estate of Varvara Il’inichna Zilotti, the mother of Natal’ia Guchkova. The 
return to Göttingen took place in September and roughly a month later 
1 Shpet 2012, p. 71.
2 Shpet 2005, p. 8.
3 Shpet 2005, pp. 36–37.
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Shpet became acquainted with Husserl.1 Shpet’s grandson (the son his 
oldest daughter, Margarita Polivanova), the physicist Mikhail Polivanov, 
reports after Nikolai Zhinkin (who was Shpet’s student in Moscow af-
ter the revolution) concerning the reasons Shpet chose Göttingen over 
other German universities. Zhinkin’s opinion was that Husserl played 
a role in this decision, but only indirectly: ‘a large number of German 
universities were infl uenced by Kant’s philosophy, which was unac-
ceptable to him, and he therefore chose Husserl as the one most free 
from Kantianism’.2
Yet, we can assume that Shpet was already familiar with Husserl’s 
work. In the 1912 essay ‘Odin put’ psikhologii i kuda on vedet’ he makes 
reference to the second volume of Logical Investigations, applauding 
Husserl for his ‘correct understanding of the nature of the psychical’.3 Аs 
will become evident from analysing Iavlenie i smysl, Husserl’s early pres-
entation of phenomenology indeed had a fundamental eff ect on Shpet’s 
thinking. Additionally, Igor’ Chubarov has suggested that the very fi rst 
mention of Husserl in the Russian literature was made by Chelpanov 
during the period Shpet was participating in his seminar (between 1902 
and 1906).4 This view has later been contested by Frédéric Tremblay, 
who identifi es the fi rst mentions of Husserl in Russian print with David 
Viktorov (in 1904) and Nikolai Losskii (in 1905).5
According to Tat’iana Shchedrina’s account6 Shpet began attending 
Husserl’s course ‘Logik und Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre’ in mid-
October 1912, writing a précis of the lectures. In early November he at-
tended Husserl’s seminar ‘Nature und Geist’ on the theme of ‘Ding und 
1 Shchedrina 2015, p. 60. Thomas Nemeth (2017, p. vi) points out that Shpet makes 
no mention of Husserl in his letter to Natal’ia Konstantinovna on 8 October 1912, 
but on 15 November he tells Elena Metner of a meeting with him. However, as 
Nemeth notes, in a letter from early August 1912 Shestov already asks Shpet about 
his impressions of Husserl, adding that ‘[j]udging from the card you sent me, he is 
a very important person’.
2 Polivanov 1995, p. 12.
3 Shpet 2006, p. 254.
4 Chubarov 1997, p. 83.
5 For more see Tremblay 2016, pp. 149–150.
6 Shchedrina 2015, p. 61.
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seine Ausdehnung, Phantom’.1 In 1913 Shpet’s diary entries only resume 
in June, and the summer season seems to mark the intensifi cation of his 
exchange with Husserl. On 8 June Shpet attended Husserl’s lecture, re-
porting having talked to him in person from 1pm to 1:30pm. a week later 
Shpet was invited to supper with Husserl; they discussed matters con-
cerning Kant and phenomenology. On 13 July Husserl presented Shpet 
with a photograph, signed: ‘To Mr von Shpet with friendship in memory 
of Göttingen philosophical discussions 1912/13. E. Husserl’.2
Chelpanov’s letter to Shpet in August 1913 suggests that Shpet’s 
original plan had been to stay in Göttingen until January 1914. In his let-
ter Chelpanov enquires whether Shpet believes his dissertation will be 
fi nished by then, or whether he will need to apply for separate funds to 
extend the stay. Regarding Husserl, Chelpanov writes ‘I am delighted by 
your closeness with Husserl. If the viewpoint which you have adopted 
could be expressed in your dissertation, that would be splendid. It is 
a new and interesting viewpoint!’3
1.3.2. Plunging into Phenomenology
Shpet’s sojourn in Göttingen (from April 1912 to July 1913, and again 
for a short period in the summer of 1914) took place at a crucial mo-
ment in the evolution of Husserl’s phenomenology. After leaving the 
town on 16 July 19134 Shpet travelled to Edinburgh; according to his 
1 Among the participants of this seminar and Husserl’s lectures at the time were e. g. 
Edith Stein, Roman Ingarden and Winthrop Bell.
2 Shchedrina 2015, p. 61. Shpet returned to Göttingen briefl y for a few weeks in the 
summer of 1914. The two philosophers resumed their talks, but the First World War 
soon cut their connection again. For an account of this visit, see Shchedrina 2015, 
p. 63.
3 Shpet 2012, p. 74.
4 Shpet was seen off  at the railway station by Alexandre Koyré and Jean Hering (Shpet 
2012, p. 74). Yet he has rarely been mentioned by his Göttingen colleagues. Edith 
Stein (1986, p. 292) makes a possible exception by referring to a ‘Russian professor’. 
It has nonetheless become customary to include Shpet’s name in the list of phi-
losophers associated with the early phenomenology movement. See e. g. Moran & 
Parker 2005, p. 12.
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daughter, to visit the Advocates’ Library, where the archives of Scottish 
philosophers, including David Hume, were kept.1 While in Scotland, 
Shpet received a postcard from Husserl (dated 30 August 1913), who 
was taking a break from work in the Bernese Highlands.2 Husserl writes 
that he had been unable to ‘tear himself away’ from the fi nishing of the 
text for the second volume Logische Untersuchungen. Husserl writes: 
‘I still have the better part of the work left to do. I hope that by the end 
of October I can send you a sample of the fi nished work as a return gift 
for your kindly sending me Mr Iakovenko’s essay and in memory of the 
term in Göttingen.’3
The revision of the Logical Investigations for a new, corrected edition 
was indeed Husserl’s constant concern during Shpet’s visit. Besides, 
Husserl was in the middle of another monumental project: the writing 
of the fi rst volume of Ideen I. Shpet was thus thrown right into the heart 
of phenomenology during the Göttingen period. The fact that he became 
deeply acquainted with Husserl’s newest philosophy and integrated it in 
his own thinking, and produced an original work explaining Husserl’s 
position, pointing out its weaknesses, and suggesting a way to amelio-
rate them — all of which happened within less than two years — may 
be considered proof of his dedication to the phenomenological method. 
In addition, the fact that Shpet’s acquaintance with phenomenology 
was made at a time when Husserl was continuously questioning and 
rethinking the very foundations of his own system infl uenced Shpet’s 
interpretation, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
Whereas Husserl fi nished the manuscript of Ideas swiftly, during ‘a 
single feverish burst over eight weeks’ in the summer of 1912, the work 
on the investigations turned out considerably more challenging than he 
had anticipated.4 Husserl had fi rst considered reworking the book already 
in 1905 in connection with a failed plan for an English translation, but 
took up the task only in 1911. However, Husserl then decided to set the 
1 Iakovich 2014, p. 75.
2 On some unresolved questions concerning Husserl’s postcard see Stolovich 2013, 
p. 109.
3 Gusserl’ 1992, pp. 234–235. Husserl is probably referring to Iakovenko’s 1913 article 
‘Filosofi ia E. Gusserlia’.
4 Moran 2005, p. 28.
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revisions aside to fi rst publish the results of his latest research; Ideen I 
thus appeared in April 1913.1 He spent the summer of 1913 working on 
the revisions, and by October he had been able to revise the Prolegomena 
and the fi rst fi ve investigations. However, the Sixth Investigation proved 
extremely diffi  cult to rework.
Having realized it would be impossible to raise the whole of Logical 
Investigations to the level of transcendental apprehension of Ideas, 
Husserl decided that the reader should instead be led gradually to 
a higher level of insight while reading the updated investigations, ‘so 
that in the fi nal Investigation the level of the Ideas would be reached’, 
Ulrich Melle writes. Thus, only the Sixth Investigation had to be brought 
‘wholly and fully’ in line with Ideas, and therefore required ‘radical and 
total revision’.2 According to Malvine Husserl, who wrote to Johannes 
Daubert on 31 July, the task was not easy: ‘It is hard work, the Sixth 
Investigation, the hardest that he has ever done’.3 In the preface to the 
second edition of the Investigations of October 1913, published without 
this last investigation, Husserl gave the misleading impression that the 
missing part was completed and in print. This was in fact far from true, 
and at the very end of 1913 Husserl sounds defeated in a letter to Shpet. 
He writes on 29 December:
Dear friend!
Both your letters from Paris overjoyed both me and my wife.4 I am 
cheered that the mountainous land of phenomenology has opened 
1 As Ulrich Melle (2002, p. 111) reports, Husserl’s idea was for the Investigations to be 
revised ‘so that they could be read and used as a complement to the Ideas, in that 
they would introduce the reader to concrete phenomenological work. The reader 
would fi rst study the Logical Investigations and get acquainted with “attempts at 
genuinely executed fundamental work on the immediately envisaged and seized 
things themselves” and “with a group of fundamental questions in explicit inves-
tigation”. Then, he would turn to the Ideas for the elucidation of the method from 
ultimate sources, the delineation of the main structures of pure consciousness and 
the systematic presentation of the fi elds of investigation’.
2 Melle 2002, pp. 111–112.
3 Cited in Melle 2002, p. 112.
4 Husserl’s (Gusserl’ 1992, p. 236) letter reveals that Shpet had the opportunity of 
meeting Henri Bergson in Paris, with an introductory letter from Husserl, but that 
he turned down the proposal.
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before you, as it has before me, in its majesty, beauty and the strength 
which creates philosophy, and that you are not, in the name of ‘eternal 
soulfulness’, scared of those inexpressible diffi  culties which everyone 
who wishes to feel at home there must face. Thus, I paid my own 
tribute to those diffi  culties this winter: possibly as a result of the 
productivity of the years past, the work is going slowly, and I must 
agonizingly work at reproducing in my contemplation the former 
intuitions (Einsichten), and, something I strictly require of myself, 
faithfully representing and depicting that which is contemplated. 
My soul is weighed down by all the time I have lost due to the con-
stant rainy and foggy weather in phenomenology, and by the fresh 
delay of a few months to the publication of the last section of my 
Logical Investigations. ‘Art is eternal — life is short!’ For I am now of 
a rather resolute disposition and simply resumed work; almost noth-
ing remains of the old text, although as a core all the former thoughts 
should be presented here, and merely grasped more clearly, maturely 
and with a fi rm foundation (on the basis of my thorough studies in 
1902–1910).1
Melle confi rms that at some time between October 1913 and the end 
of the same year Husserl fi nally decided not to proceed with the revi-
sion manuscript from the previous summer, but to write an entirely 
new sixth investigation instead.2 This plan was also doomed to fail, and 
fi nally in the spring of 1921 the second and only slightly revised edition 
of the last investigation was published. Analysing the manuscripts of the 
planned revision for the text, Melle comes to a sad conclusion: he sees it 
as a ‘great pity’ that Husserl abandoned this work, since the drafts from 
the summer of 1913 are ‘of an exceptional quality’:
1 Gusserl’ 1992, p. 235.
2 Husserl refers to the pages of a new manuscript in a letter to Shpet dated 28 March 
1914: ‘After all, I have already written to you that I fully rejected almost six already 
printed, correspondingly, typed sheets and took the decision to write a completely 
new volume instead of reworking them, I still keep the set of the next six sheets in 
a bundle, as it contains only high-quality text (and completely new, for that matter)’ 
(Gusserl’ 1992, p. 237).
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They show that Husserl was well on his way to incorporate the most 
recent results of his vast research into the structures of intuitive, 
signicative and categorial acts, of perception, fantasy and judging, of 
modalities, modifi cation and intentional implications into a phenom-
enological theory of knowledge.1
Melle also points to another set of manuscripts, which was later discov-
ered ‘in the papers of Winthrop Bell’.2 These make up two fragmentary 
drafts, probably two alternative conceptions for a preface to the second 
edition of the Investigations also written by Husserl in the late summer 
of 1913. The drafts contain clarifi cations regarding the whole project — 
for example, concerning Husserl’s notions of the formal and material 
a priori, the conception of logic and of the ontology related to those no-
tions, as well as his conception of phenomenology as an ontology of in-
tentional consciousness.3 Melle asserts that the texts off er a remarkably 
clear presentation of the founding ideas of phenomenology. The preface 
was to function as a ‘guide for the reader’, correcting the most common 
misunderstandings that Husserl was trying to combat.4 The themes of the 
1913 manuscripts had long-lasting eff ect on Husserl’s thinking. Having 
turned away from problems of logic for a long period, he resumed their 
examination only in 1929, as he rediscovered his ‘fi rst interests’ in the 
book Formal and Transcendental Logic.5
The overall goal of the Logical Investigations was to establish a new 
foundation for pure logic and epistemology by determining the 
1 Melle 2002, p. 114.
2 Originally from Nova Scotia, Bell studied under Husserl in Göttingen simultane-
ously with Shpet, from 1911 to 1914 (Spielberg 1982, p. 129).
3 Melle 2011, p. 249.
4 Melle 2011, p. 251. The most common reproach was that after his powerful critique 
of psychologism in the Prolegomena, Husserl had fallen back into psychologism in 
the second volume of his book. (See e. g. Drummond 2002, p. 31)
5 Husserl also refers to a return to his early interests in the 1921 foreword to the 
second edition of the Sixth Investigation, writing: ‘Only very recently have these 
systematic studies led me back into the territories where my phenomenological 
research originated, and have recalled me to my old work on the foundations of 
pure logic which has so long awaited completion and publication’ (Husserl 1970, 
p. 661).
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conditions of possibility for objective knowledge.1 As Shpet was to ob-
serve to his satisfaction, Husserl’s leading question was not whether 
consciousness could attain knowledge of mind-independent reality; 
he presented a study of the ways in which it does do just that. Logical 
Investigations analyses the intentional nature of consciousness that is 
always directed towards its object — for example, the something per-
ceived, doubted, loved or expected.2 The fi rst four of the investigations 
revolve around the theme of the various forms of such ‘meanings’, their 
status as ideal unities and their possible combinations. In the last two 
investigations Husserl takes up the question of ‘pure logic’, which is 
a theory not simply of meaning and grammar but of truth itself.3
The Sixth Investigation is a decisive part of the book. There, Husserl 
introduces the doctrine of categorial intuition to explicate the knowledge 
of universals, states of aff airs, and ‘logical forms captured by syntax’, as 
Daniel Dahlstrom expresses it.4 The idea is this: we have no diffi  culty in 
understanding the objective references of words such as ‘house’ or ‘red’. 
But the issue gets more complex with grammatical parts of speech, such 
as the ‘a’, the ‘the’, the ‘and’, the ‘all’, the ‘something’, and so on.5 There 
is no thing and no feature in things for such words to signify, as Robert 
Sokolowski writes. They lack any objective reference and instead add to 
speech ‘an excess or surplus of meaning that seems to have no correla-
tives in the things that are being intended through the expressions’.6 Yet 
Sokolowski asserts that the syntactic parts of speech serve not only to 
organize concepts in our minds. Instead, they express ‘the manner in 
which things can be presented to us. They express relationships in the 
way things appear.’7 For example, there might be a state of aff airs in the 
world as we perceive it such as ‘there is a cat on the table, looking out of 
the window’. Husserl writes:
1 Zahavi 2017, p. 32.
2 Zahavi 2017, p. 8.
3 Dahlstrom 2003, pp. 8–9.
4 Dahlstrom 2003, p. 10.
5 See the discussion in Husserl 1970, pp. 773–774.
6 Sokolowski 2003, pp. 114–115.
7 Sokolowski 2003, p. 116.
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If we were asked what it means to say that categorially structured mean-
ings fi nd fulfi lment, confi rm themselves in perception, we can but 
reply: it means only that they relate to the object itself in its categorial 
structure. The object with these categorial forms is not merely referred 
to, as in the case where meanings function purely symbolically, but it 
is set before our very eye in just these forms. In other words: it is not 
merely thought of, but intuited or perceived.1
Husserl’s development of the theme of categorial intuition came 
to a halt, as the editing work on the Sixth Investigation remained un-
fi nished. Since the Investigations’ fi rst publication, he had come to doubt, 
for example, his earlier theory of fulfi lment, where an empty intention 
was ‘fi lled’ by a corresponding perception, as well as the very possibi-
lity of empty intentions in the fi rst place.2 According to Melle Husserl’s 
new 1913 analysis of the empty intention attempted to overcome this 
‘residual sensualism’. In the fi rst edition of the Investigations Husserl 
had conceived sense data as ‘a kind of stuff  which fi lled an empty form, 
consisting of the matter and the quality of an act’.3 In the later manu-
scripts, he found such clear-cut fulfi lling of intentions to be impossible 
and the constitutive process of intentional meaning now appeared more 
complex to him.
Overall, Husserl’s manuscripts from this period suggest a deepen-
ing of his theory of meaning and a growing role of categorial acts in 
his philosophy. Rudolf Bernet points to yet another set of manuscripts 
from the same period, in which Husserl drafted a new theory of signifi -
cation.4 His new conception of a ‘meaningful sign’5 suggests that all signs 
‘signify on the basis of a deliberate decision, on the basis of a will’: they 
refer to their objects in virtue of an intentional act which Husserl calls 
meaning-intention.6 Bernet proposes that according to this theory, to 
‘bestow a meaning upon a sensuously given object or, to put it otherwise, 
1 Husserl 1970, p. 785.
2 Melle 2002, pp. 115–116.
3 Melle 2002, pp. 117–118.
4 See Rudolf Bernet’s (1988a) article for a comprehensive account of this new theory.
5 As opposed to a merely ‘indicative sign’ (Bernet 1988, pp. 5–6).
6 Bernet 1988, p. 6.
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to create or to use a meaningful sign is the result of a voluntary deci-
sion’ — even if, as he continues, ‘especially for lingual signs this will 
can become an impersonal, anonymous one’. In other words, in the use 
of language the intentional signifying act is performed in the form of 
a ‘blind, habitual tendency’.1
According to Bernet the argument contained a seed of the idea of 
intersubjectivity, as Husserl noticed that the intention to speak pre-
supposes ‘a reproductive consciousness of a signifying, and this repro-
ductive consciousness refers backward to an originary consciousness 
of signifying which is a passive understanding of the sign and not an 
active signifying or speaking’. To put it more simply, ‘the subject mak-
ing a statement always already is part of a social community sharing 
the lingual signs’. This conclusion strikes Bernet as surprising: ‘Coming 
from Husserl, this is indeed a remarkable claim. Neither the Logical 
Investigations nor most of what has been written about Husserl’s phi-
losophy of language ever since has prepared us for what looks like a her-
meneutical turn in Husserl’s work’.2
Curiously, the phenomenological dialogue between Shpet and 
Husserl is defi ned by the very questions of meaning and hermeneutics. 
Indeed, these are precisely the themes that Shpet is generally suggested 
to have added to Husserl’s original philosophy in his Iavlenie i smysl. Thus, 
the timing of Shpet’s stay in Göttingen is certainly of interest. One is 
tempted to ask if Shpet could have infl uenced Husserl’s seeming her-
meneutical turn. There is, however, nothing that would suggest that 
the philosophers engaged in phenomenological discussions as equals. 
Instead, in their correspondence Shpet remains visibly in the role of 
a student. The following chapters will discuss the similarities and dif-
ferences between Shpet’s and Husserl’s phenomenological conceptions. 
I shall argue that to understand their interrelationship, we must look 
beyond Husserl’s transcendental arguments and Shpet’s hermeneutic 
‘additions’ to it. Instead, it will be necessary to analyse the evolution of 
both their philosophies in parallel.
1 Bernet 1988, pp. 7–8.
2 Bernet 1988, p. 16.
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In the following chapter, I tackle Iavlenie i smysl and its complex re-
lationship to Husserl’s Ideas I. My aim is to show that, for all the signifi -
cant changes and additions that Shpet suggests to Husserl’s exposition, 
the two books remain closely interconnected. In the third chapter I will 
address the further hermeneutic and semiotic development of Shpet’s 
phenomenology in Istoriia kak problema logiki (1916), as well as the two 
essays ‘Soznanie i ego sobstvennik’ (‘Consciousness and Its Owner’, 1916) 
and ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ (‘Wisdom or Reason?’, 1917). While there is no 
doubt that Shpet’s philosophy had in these works already fully distin-
guished itself from his teacher’s example, my suggestion is that, given 
the later development of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, their lines of 
thought can still be seen to have followed a parallel path. Interestingly, 
the alterations Husserl would make to his own conception of phenom-
enology in the 1920s and 30s can partly be traced back to the revisions 
of the Sixth Investigation which he was unable to fi nish in 1913.
2. Finding Sense in Appearance: 
Shpet on Husserl’s Phenomenology
This chapter analyses Shpet’s phenomenology, as expressed in the 
1914 Iavlenie i smyl. Shpet intended his book to be a presentation of the 
transcendental phenomenology introduced in Husserl’s Ideen I (1913) for 
the Russian home audience. However, his work turned out to be also an 
original contribution to phenomenology. Having only just acquainted 
himself with Husserl’s latest philosophy, Shpet already discerned certain 
inadequacies in it. He doubted whether Husserl’s dual classifi cation of 
intuitions into empirical and ideal could describe all kinds of experi-
ence of reality, and even more importantly, he claimed that Husserl had 
failed to address a crucial phenomenological question: where did the 
meaning inherent in our experiences come from? In Shpet’s opinion 
Ideas presented a clear analysis of the diff erent ‘forms’ of intuition. That 
is, it successfully observed how we perceived something as something 
physical, something musical, something mobile, something sentient, 
and so on. However, he argued that it off ered no explication of how 
these ‘formed’ experiences acquired a meaning, that is, how something 
musical proved to be a symphony, and something sentient a human be-
ing. In Shpet’s opinion the very core of meaning appeared lacking in 
Husserl’s depiction.
Shpet thus tackled Husserl’s analysis of sense-bestowal, which he 
found inadequate. Iavlenie i smysl presents a quest for a ‘motivation’ of 
meaning, understood as a certain necessary rationality ‘behind’ all intui-
tion. This leads Shpet to establish his own phenomenological terminol-
ogy of ‘intelligible intuition’, ‘internal sense’ and ‘entelechy’, with which 
he creates a new vision of hermeneutical phenomenology. In Shpet’s 
opinion ‘sense’ (smysl, or Sinn) is not to be accepted as simply included 
in the noema. Instead, he argues that it must be grounded in a special 
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interpretative act that ‘penetrates’ the noema to its core, discovering its 
entelechy, soul or essence. The sense of an object (Shpet uses Aristotle’s 
example of the axe) is thus a ‘sign’ of the latter. This phenomenological 
conclusion already indicates the direction for Shpet’s later hermeneutic 
and semiotic vision of culture; according to his theory words (as signs) 
themselves have the power to disclose essences.
Shpet’s hermeneutical approach is thus connected with an ontologi-
cal emphasis of positive philosophy. As Shpet asserts, he is interested not 
only in investigating the ‘appearance’ of reality, reality-as-it-appears, but 
in establishing reality-as-it-is. At the end of Iavlenie i smysl, he suggests 
treating reality itself as a ‘social reality’. In other words, Shpet argues that 
for our vision of the world to be comprehensive of all forms of intuition 
and their correlative forms of  being, it must include not just the empiri-
cal and the ideal, but also the ‘social’ or the ‘meaningful’ forms. For Shpet 
the world itself proves to be a hermeneutical structure. This ontologi-
cal reading of transcendental phenomenology has often been met with 
distrust. It is suggested Shpet either failed to follow Husserl through 
his transcendental turn or abandoned it in raising the question of the 
nature of social objects. In contrast, I will argue that Shpet remained 
committed to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. To prove this, it 
will be necessary to examine what it meant more closely, for both Shpet 
and Husserl.
Although the ontologism of Shpet’s phenomenology is seen as 
problematic, the hermeneutic import of his thought is often said to 
have been ahead of its time. Indeed, Husserl tackled the problem of 
meaning properly only in the 1920s in connection with the develop-
ment of genetic phenomenology and the conception of the ‘lifeworld’ 
(Lebenswelt). Shpet’s thinking is thus sometimes associated with fi  -
gures such as Martin Heidegger or Hans-Georg Gadamer, who deve -
loped hermeneutical viewpoints concerning experience and know-
ledge. The resulting interpretations of his philosophy have strongly un-
derlined its hermeneutic aspects, and Shpet’s Husserlian phenomeno-
logy is seen as an intermediate phase, from which he proceeded to 
develop an original theory of language and culture. My intention in 
the present chapter is rather to return Shpet to his Husserlian roots. 
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Without downplaying the distinctiveness of his argumentation, I strive 
to demonstrate the ways in which Shpet’s thought remains founded in 
Husserl’s pheno menology.
Thus, I suggest that a detailed phenomenological analysis of Iavlenie 
i smysl in its relationship with Husserl’s thought must again be taken 
up. a need for such a work has previously been suggested by Nelli Mo-
troshilova, who believes that the contrast between Husserl and Shpet 
has indeed been frequently exaggerated. In her opinion, readings of 
Iavlenie i smysl tend to interpret Shpet’s discussion through his later her-
meneutical philosophy of language and culture. ‘A critical relationship 
to Husserlian phenomenology recorded [in Shpet’s book] is therefore 
not exaggerated (as in several places and times it is genuinely warrant-
ed), but rather artifi cially placed in another problem plane, one which 
in my opinion [Iavlenie i smysl] does not yet examine,’ Motroshilova 
writes.1
As the present work proposes, even Shpet’s later texts on the theory 
of language and culture can be read as a direct continuation of his early 
phenomenology. Indeed, I believe that a phenomenological reinterpre-
tation of Shpet’s theory of the inner form of the word will shed new 
light on its meaning.
2.1. Husserlian Phenomenology or Not?
Shpet’s two Parisian letters to Husserl in the autumn of 1913 speak 
of his heartfelt enthusiasm for the phenomenological method. In the 
fi rst letter, Shpet admits that the ‘magic of phenomenology’ has for the 
moment rendered him in certain aspects blind, but he is for the moment 
unwilling to question this enthusiasm. He describes his ongoing work 
1 Motroshilova 2006, p. 301. Aleksei Savin expressed a similar view in a roundtable 
discussion organized by the journal Voprosy fi losofi i in 2014. He asserts that Shpet’s 
book is an ‘absolutely phenomenological work, by which I mean phenomenology in 
the Husserlian sense. This book is based on [that phenomenology]. [I]n this work 
Shpet is […] unsatisfi ed by the Husserlian resolution of the question, but in precisely 
a Husserlian sense’ (Denn & al. 2014, p. 148).
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on an article, which was later to grow into a book, namely, Iavlenie i 
smysl.1 Shpet writes:
Dear Professor,
I have been in Paris for four days, but my phenomenological hunger 
is growing larger than my traveller’s curiosity, and I understand that 
notwithstanding the need to fi nish my expansive work quickly, a large 
amount of my time will be devoted to phenomenology; I found time in 
Moscow to rewrite my article, but did not fi nd time to fundamentally 
rework and correct it. Nevertheless, I consider a fundamental rewrite 
of the work completely necessary. I want to concentrate the entire 
exposition: on the one hand, to put in fi rst place the problem of ideal 
being and its relation to intuition, and respectively the problem of pre-
sentativism and representativism, and, on the other hand, to lay out 
the problem of nominalism more clearly. I think that such a rewrite 
should make the exposition fuller and clearer, along with which the 
meaning of phenomenology on the whole will become clearer, as well 
as the ‘turn’ (‘Wendung’) in philosophy itself.2
The three themes mentioned by Shpet were crucial for the evolu-
tion of his views. Husserl’s phenomenology off ered an invaluable op-
portunity to him: an immediate intuition of and a method to study 
essences as ideal beings.3 Shpet believed that phenomenology could 
serve as a counterweight to nominalism, which he saw as a necessary 
outcome of epistemological theories rooted in a negative philosophy.4 
1 Vitalii Kurennoi suggests that Iavlenie i smysl was indeed fi rst meant to be pub-
lished in the form of an article. (Shpet 1996, p. 129.)
2 The original German versions of Shpet’s letters were published in Husserl’s 
Briefwechsel. Band III: Die Göttinger Schule (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). 
For a Russian translation, see Logos, nro 7 (1996), pp. 123–133.
3 As Husserl (1967, p. 81) writes in Ideas, he is engaging in a ‘battle’ with empiricism, 
which denies the being of ‘Ideas’, ‘Essence’ and the ‘knowledge of Essential Being’.
4 Shpet (1991, p. 4) is ready to admit that negative philosophy has often played an im-
portant role in the history of philosophy ‘by drawing the attention of philosophers 
to new aspects and new types of what exists, and by raising new questions and new 
doubts about it’. He sees Locke as having inaugurated a critique that was ‘sharpened 
to the fi nest edge’ by Hume before being turned into a ‘theory of knowledge’ by 
Kant.
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He writes in Iavlenie i smysl: ‘[…] the nominalism of a Berkeley, a Hume, 
or of a Mill is one with the nominalism of Kant and the neo-Kantian 
positivists. Nominalism leads to sceptical absurdity, as in Rickert’s case 
with a proclamation about an ideal cognition removed as far as possible 
from actuality’.1
Shpet trusts that the long-awaited antidote is off ered by Husserl’s 
‘realism’, which takes note of the sceptical question but formulates it in 
a crucially diff erent — positive — way, leading to a ‘creative construc-
tion of the foundation of philosophy’.2 For him, phenomenology’s cen-
tral question is: ‘How and on what basis do we come to see a certain X in 
the originarily given intuition?’ ‘Or to put it in a quite general manner,’ 
he continues, ‘How does actuality exist?’3 It is evident from the outset 
that Shpet’s phenomenology is conditioned by his commitment to the 
metaphysical tradition of positive philosophy, directed to the question 
of what is. Indeed, Shpet sees phenomenology as the next necessary 
step in the evolution of positive philosophy. In the fi rst Parisian letter 
he writes that to better understand phenomenology, he must return to 
Plato and his question of essences. Shpet suggests that he is thus tracing 
the idea of phenomenology all the way back to its beginning:
Until now I have had a salutary fear of Plato… but I cannot without 
trepidation read something such as the following lines about Maine de 
Biran: ‘C’est une de ses idées maîtresses et les plus familières que la vérita-
ble invention en philosophie consiste uniquement dans la détermination 
exacte des données immédiates de la conscience’.4
Shpet writes that in turning all its attention to ‘the solution of the 
problem of being’, positive philosophy discovered ‘with its fi rst steps 
(Plato) the distinction between actual and ideal being as well as that 
between the various types of these forms of being’.5 Phenomenology’s 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 13.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 4.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 16.
4 Shpet 1996, p. 124.
5 Shpet 1991, p. 10.
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greatest advantage for him is that it obtains its objects ‘simply by means 
of a shift of the advertence of our “vision”, by means of, as Husserl him-
self says, another “attitude”’. In addition, Husserl’s distinction between 
empirical and essential intuitions and with their factual and essential 
correlates allows phenomenology to study ‘everything’.1 To Shpet this 
appears perfectly in line with the historical mission of positive philoso-
phy, attempting to ‘affi  rm’ and ‘justify’ ‘everything in all its forms and 
types’.2
Shpet’s metaphysical approach to phenomenology has raised doubts 
concerning whether he actually understood what Husserl intended by 
his transcendental turn, and especially the epoché. I will tackle this ques-
tion in what follows.
2.1.1. Ontological Approach to Epoché
At the beginning of Ideas Husserl asserts that the empirical and the 
essential appear, as it were, together. Empirical intuition gives us con-
tingent ‘facts’. They are truly individual in form, have a spatiotemporal 
existence and thus exist ‘in this time-spot, having this particular dura-
tion’. Yet they could also be present in any other time-spot, have another 
form, and so on. Individual being of every kind is accidental according to 
Husserl.3 ‘But the import of this contingency is limited’, he continues.
[T]he contingency is correlative to a necessity which does not carry 
the mere actuality-status of a valid rule of connexion obtaining be-
tween temporo-spatial facts, but has the character of essential neces-
sity, and therewith a relation to essential universality. Now when we 
stated that every fact could be ‘essentially’ other than it is, we were 
already expressing thereby that it belongs to the meaning of everything 
contingent that it should have essential being and therewith an Eidos to 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 12.
2 Shpet 1991, pp. 3–4.
3 Husserl 1967, p. 52.
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be apprehended in all its purity; and this Eidos comes under essential 
truths of varying degrees of universality.1
Shpet interprets Husserl’s idea as follows: inasmuch as we determine 
the ‘what’ of the individual and ‘put it into an idea’, he states that ‘it is 
not hard to see that this “what” becomes the “what” of the correspond-
ing essence’.2 Shpet argues that empirical intuition can thus be ‘trans-
formed’ into an ideal intuition. He cites Husserl, who asserts that ‘The 
essence (Eidos) is an object of a new type. Just as the datum of individual or 
empirical intuition is an individual object, so the datum of essential intuition 
is a pure essence.’3 Shpet emphasizes that empirical and essential intui-
tion should not be considered two separate ‘sorts’ of intuition but in-
stead a single ‘regard’, which either ‘comes to a halt on the experientially 
given’ or ‘goes further inward, “penetrating throughout” the individual 
thing, right up to its essence in the diff erent, perhaps infi nite, stages of 
its specifi cation and embodiment of genera’.4
Shpet’s viewpoint allows him to highlight aspects of phenomenology 
that make it suitable for the tradition of positive philosophy. He suggests 
that, thanks to Husserl, ‘we can see how the rug is pulled out from under 
nominalism’.5 Certainly, negative philosophy had also analysed the prob-
lem of empirical and essential being, but it had always done it ‘under the 
heading of the relation of consciousness to being’, by taking cognition to 
be a ‘condition of being’. In contrast, Shpet writes that Husserl ‘restores 
the observer to his normal position’, where the ‘given is taken above all 
as given, as turning up in front of us, as an object, as the given problem’.6 
Moreover, with the aid of essential intuition, phenomenology probes 
‘further’ and ‘deeper’ into the appearing reality. Shpet holds that phe-
nomenology has thus found a method concretely to grasp the ideal being.7
1 Husserl 1967, p. 53.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 14.
3 Husserl 1967, p. 55; Shpet 1991, p. 14
4 Shpet 1991, p. 15.
5 Shpet 1991, p. 16.
6 Shpet 1991, pp. 13–14.
7 As Husserl (1967, p. 55) writes in Ideas, ‘Essential insight is still intuition, just as 
the eidetic object is still an object’.
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In the second chapter of Iavlenie i smysl Shpet turns to the question 
of pure consciousness, as the ‘only thing that unites’ the actual and ideal 
worlds. Shpet writes that ‘they are both given to me in consciousness, 
the spontaneous acts of which are constantly changing and fl owing and 
are directed to the externally given’. In Shpet’s words the spontaneous 
acts of consciousness ‘examine and investigate’ that which is given to 
them; they ‘explain and express’ it conceptually. ‘They describe, compare, 
distinguish, and ponder over it. They are glad about it, afraid of it, etc., 
etc.’ According to Shpet we can indeed ‘designate this entire aggregate 
of “spontaneities” with respect to the “given” by the general Cartesian 
term, cogito’.1 Shpet’s description corresponds to Husserl’s account of 
the natural world, ‘the world in which I fi nd myself and which is also my 
world-about-me’. Husserl writes that this world is ‘centred around’ the 
Ego, through the acts of which ‘I become acquainted with the world as 
immediately given to me’.2 Correspondingly, the world is present and 
accessible to the Ego: ‘I fi nd it to be out there, and also take it as it gives 
itself to me as something that exists out there.’3 Even doubts regarding the 
factual details of this world will not change this general thesis of the 
natural standpoint.
In contrast, to establish phenomenology as a radically new eidetic 
science (in Husserl’s words)4 and as a fundamental philosophical science 
(in those of Shpet),5 both philosophers agree that it requires a radical 
change of attitude. a phenomenological reduction, the ‘bracketing’ of 
the natural, the ἐποχή (epoché), must be implemented. Husserl writes:
The whole world as placed within the nature-setting and presented 
in experience as real, taken completely ‘free from all theory’, just as 
it is in reality experienced, and made clearly manifest in and through 
the linkings of our experiences, has now no validity for us, it must be 
set in brackets, untested indeed but also uncontested. Similarly all 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 26.
2 Husserl 1967, pp. 103–104.
3 Husserl 1967, p. 106.
4 Husserl 1967, p. 112.
5 Shpet 1991, p. 25.
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theories and sciences, positivistic or otherwise, which relate to this 
world, however good they may be, succumb to the same fate.1
Shpet follows Husserl’s reasoning but suggests that a question now 
arises: ‘What remains if we exclude the entire actual world with all 
our knowledge of it, exclude ultimately therefore everything, even 
ourselves with all our cogitare?’ He replies: ‘The entire “world as eidos” 
certainly remains.’ Again, Shpet highlights the nature of consciousness 
(or ‘cogito, i. e., our own mental processes’) as ‘the completely unique 
being that actually includes everything’. Consciousness thus appears to 
him a ‘phenomenological residuum’, which he characterizes as ‘a region 
of being, which is of essential necessity quite unique and which can 
indeed become the fi eld of a science of a novel kind’.2 Husserl’s depiction 
of the matter is notably similar when he writes that we must
fi x our eyes steadily upon the sphere of Consciousness and study what 
it is that we fi nd immanent in it. At fi rst, without having yet carried 
out the phenomenological suspensions of the element of judgment, 
we subject this sphere of Consciousness in its essential nature to a sys-
tematic though in no way exhaustive analysis. What we lack above all 
is a certain general insight into the essence of consciousness in general, 
and quite specially also of consciousness, so far as in and through its 
essential Being, the ‘natural’ fact-world comes to be known. In these 
studies we go so far as is needed to furnish the full insight at which 
we have been aiming, to wit, that Consciousness in itself has a being of 
its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaff ected by 
the phenomenological disconnexion.3
Consciousness remains as a phenomenological residuum and becomes 
the ‘fi eld’ of the science of phenomenology.4 Yet, as many have noted, 
Shpet’s interpretation of Husserl’s epoché (presented in the third chap-
1 Husserl 1967, p. 111.
2 Shpet 1991, pp. 27–28.
3 Husserl 1967, p. 113.
4 Ibid.
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ter of Iavlenie i smysl) seems strangely unwarranted in its ontological 
leaning. To him, phenomenology is a ‘science of being itself ’ and thus 
the question it must answer is simply ‘What is?’1 It must gain an under-
standing of being in all its forms, and Shpet suggests that the eidetic 
form of being can be grasped by ‘penetrating’ the outer appearance of 
reality.
It indeed sounds as though Shpet considers phenomenology a path-
way to a Platonic ‘kingdom of ideas’, as Steven Cassedy has suggested.2 
Thomas Seifrid agrees with this, recognizing a certain ‘ontological anxi-
ety running through Shpet’s works’, and accuses the latter of ontologiz-
ing or Platonizing Husserl.3 To be sure, Shpet writes that it is ‘a matter 
of two worlds or, as Plato would say, of two kingdoms’. He continues by 
asserting that ‘the kingdom of ideas simply stands opposed to the king-
dom of the actual, not because the latter is to be taken as actuality but 
because the former is to be taken as something fundamentally absolute’.4 
Thomas Nemeth argues that phenomenology actually provided Shpet 
with a foundation from which his own ontological inquiries could ad-
vance, and that his ultimate goal was distinctly non-phenomenological: 
‘a delineation of all that actually exists’. Nemeth states that while Shpet 
‘manifestly accepts the phenomenological reduction’, his account of it is 
‘disquieting’. Whereas for Husserl the reduction involves ‘the methodic 
exclusion of nature and, concomitantly, of all intellectual and cultural 
formations that presuppose natural attitude, for Shpet the reduction is 
the exclusion of relative individuals, leaving the entire eidetic realm to 
be studied’, Nemeth argues.5
Yet Nemeth points out that unlike most of Husserl’s followers at the 
time, Shpet accepted the former’s notion of the transcendental ego.6 
Shpet did not object to the exclusion of the natural world and did not see 
it as an ‘abandonment of realism for some sort of Cartesian or, worse yet, 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 99.
2 Cassedy 2009, p. 101.
3 Seifrid 2009, p. 182.
4 Shpet 1991, p. 38.
5 Nemeth 2009, pp. 126–127.
6 Nemeth 2009, p. 127.
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Berkleyan idealism’.1 Alexander Haardt has suggested that ‘the peculiar 
feature of Shpet’s acceptance of phenomenology lies in the fact that, 
on the one hand, he followed Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism, 
as presented in Ideas I, and yet, on the other hand, he also interpreted 
transcendental phenomenology as ontology’. Haardt concludes:
Considered from this perspective, Husserl’s regression from objects to 
the stream of consciousness appears primarily as a demonstration of 
a sphere of absolute being on the basis of which the contingent being 
of objects is to be grounded. The distinction of the factual from the es-
sential proves to be a deposition of contingent from necessary being.2
To many of Husserl’s followers in Göttingen the reductions in Ideas 
indeed presented a stumbling block.3 Logical Investigations, with its 
method of describing mental phenomena ‘simply’ in their givenness to 
consciousness, had embodied a liberation from metaphysical traditions. 
The transcendental turn, with its return to questions about the nature 
of the experiencing ego, seemed to restore this historical and theoreti-
cal baggage.4 Shpet, as will be discussed later, was unwilling to follow 
Husserl to his ‘egological’ standpoint, and his philosophy has sometimes 
been associated with the early Göttingen school.5 However, it is im-
portant to emphasize that Shpet in fact followed Husserl through his 
transcendental turn. For him describing phenomena in their immediate 
givenness was the correct path to answering the epistemologists’ doubts 
(whether Humean, Kantian, neo-Kantian, and so on), and the epoché, 
he argues, allowed the phenomenologist to probe the given phenom-
ena further and thus reach the eidetic forms of being.6 Nevertheless, 
1 Nemeth 2018, pp. 271–272.
2 Haardt 1991, p. xxv.
3 Sebastian Luft (2012, p. 251) suggests that perhaps only Husserl’s closest pupils 
and assistants, Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe were able to ‘fully discern’ the 
meaning of the reduction.
4 Luft 2012, p. 243.
5 See e. g. Shiyan 2015.
6 Nemeth (1991, p. x) points to Shpet’s exceptional — at the time — readiness to 
follow Husserl in his new direction. He writes that few if any of the members of the 
Göttingen circle ‘were willing to take up the call for philosophy as a rigorous science. 
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I argue that for Shpet, as for Husserl, the phenomenological reduction 
was a non-metaphysical step that had to be taken to reach a radically 
presuppositionless ground for philosophy.
Sebastian Luft writes that the reduction was so important for Husserl 
because ‘performing it meant overcoming with one stroke the problems 
concerning the foundations of knowledge’ that had originally ‘lured’ him 
into philosophy. ‘The reduction was an attempt to overcome all doubts 
by discovering an indubitable foundation for knowledge.’1 As Luft sum-
marizes, Husserl’s method for achieving such a foundation amounted 
to taking the most basic assumption (‘the world exists’) and suspending 
it.2 This assumption is what Husserl refers to as the ‘general thesis’ that 
defi nes the natural attitude. The natural attitude thus accommodates 
an implicit prejudice, which Luft (like Shpet above) characterizes as 
Husserl’s ‘realism’: in the natural attitude, we take the world as existing 
‘independently of anybody experiencing it’.3 Yet one can always doubt 
one’s experience and perception of the world: our knowledge is limited 
by our meagre physical (and mental, even spiritual) abilities.
However, from the phenomenological perspective a sceptical nega-
tion of the perceived reality ‘misses the point’ of what the natural at-
titude can provide. One cannot negate it without ‘inadvertently being 
in another position from which one enacts such a negation’, Luft writes. 
Phenomenology must therefore be a presuppositionless description of 
the given, which does not criticize or refute the general thesis, but puts 
it ‘in parentheses’. ‘What is of interest to the phenomenologist is not the 
object before me, but the experience of the object, regardless of whether 
this experience is actual or imagined or dreamed, whether or not the 
objects actually exist or are fi gments of my imagination’, Luft concludes.4
Even those personally closest to Husserl who had spent years under his tutelage 
were unwilling or unable to sound the clarion so forthrightly and so modestly, and 
this by a foreigner who could not have had any motive other than one based in 
conviction’.
1 Luft 2012, p. 245.
2 Ibid.
3 Luft 2012, p. 246.
4 Ibid. Søren Overgaard (2002, p. 214) clarifi es that the reduction does not amount to 
‘looking away from the “being” of the natural world with its perceived and perceiv-
able objects […]’ Instead, the ‘thematic focus of transcendental phenomenology 
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Shpet’s phenomenological standpoint, with its strong ontological 
emphasis, certainly diff ers from Husserl’s. Yet his treatment of the epoché 
appears to follow Husserl’s original idea of parenthesizing the world as 
seen in the natural attitude and limiting the phenomenological study to 
the being of pure consciousness.1 Shpet argues against interpreting con-
sciousness and its content naturalistically, psychologistically, or through 
any other theory, and instead demands that it be approached according 
to its own way of being. He conceives the task of phenomenology as the 
uncovering of the precise manner of this being. At the same time, Shpet 
considers phenomenology as a method for acquiring indubitable philo-
sophical knowledge, free from the threat of scepticism and relativism. 
It can secure its own truthfulness by tracing back each of its steps and 
making sure they are infallible.2 This is ultimately what the reduction 
amounts to for Shpet: it is the switch to a properly philosophical view-
point, in which the philosopher can analyse and evaluate his or her own 
cognition purely and essentially, without any contingent clutter. Thus, 
Shpet writes, ‘Phenomenology is not revelation […] its merits should be 
assessed above all by how it arrives at its results’.3 He summarizes this 
later as follows:
After all the reductions are carried out phenomenology turns out to 
be a discipline rigorously shut up in its own shell — this thanks to 
the rigor and purity of its absolute object. It is free not only from all 
is not the objects themselves and their properties (these constitute the theme 
of the sciences of the natural attitude), but precisely on the being of objects and 
the world; more precisely, transcendental phenomenology seeks to answer the 
question, how there can be objects and a world for me, given in my perceptual 
experiences, etc.’
1 During the decades of Thomas Nemeth’s pioneering research on Shpet’s phe-
nomenology, his opinion regarding the latter’s success in interpreting Husserl’s 
reduction has changed somewhat. In 2009 (p. 134) Nemeth still fi nds that Shpet’s 
phenomenology ‘is an eidetic phenomenology, but not a transcendental one’, 
whereas in 2018 (p. 273) he asserts that ‘there is no reason why we cannot label 
Shpet’s program up to this point also as transcendental phenomenology’.
2 Shpet (1991, p. 70) writes: ‘By its essence phenomenology has no need to hurry 
justifying and establishing its methods. Rather, they must be established and justi-
fi ed within the very process of phenomenological work.’
3 Shpet 1991, p. 5.
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theoretical and practical presuppositions, but it also operates only 
with material that it is able to establish by itself. Being the foundation 
of all philosophical as well as special knowledge, phenomenology ‘ac-
cepts’ nothing. It ‘has’ only itself.1
Yet Shpet’s ontological reading of phenomenology is by no means 
unproblematic and requires further analysis. For example, Nemeth’s con-
cern is that even though Shpet seems at fi rst to accept Husserl’s turn, 
he later ‘drops or discards’ it to reach his independent goal of describ-
ing being in all its forms. Nemeth suggests that Shpet’s ultimate goal 
is to ‘return to the actual, which is in danger of being abandoned in the 
reduction’.2 Indeed, this possibility seems plausible as we read through 
the fourth chapter of Iavlenie i smysl, where Shpet discusses the problems 
of phenomenological method. Husserl, opening his own analysis of this 
topic, writes:
Once the diffi  culties of the fi rst beginnings have been overcome, we 
perceive [the fi eld of eidetic knowledge] stretching endlessly in every 
direction. The variety of the species and forms of experience with their 
essential natures real and intentional is indeed inexhaustible; and cor-
respondingly endless is the variety of the essential connexions and 
apodictically necessary truths that have their ground in these. Thus 
this infi nite fi eld of the a priori of consciousness which in its unique 
singularity has never yet come to its own, never strictly been seen 
at all, must now be brought under cultivation and the full value of 
fruitage drawn from it.3
‘But how [to] fi nd the right beginning?’ Husserl asks. ‘The new fi eld 
does not lie spread before our gaze crowded with given products, so 
that we could simply grasp them, confi dent of being able to make them 
objects of our science; nor can we be sure of the method we need for our 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 69.
2 Nemeth 2009, p. 128.
3 Husserl 1967, p. 187.
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advance’.1 Addressing the same issue, Shpet asserts that phenomenol-
ogy must rely purely on intuition. He writes that phenomenology ‘can 
satisfy itself only by analysing defi nite cases and examples and thereby 
establish the essence of Objects and relations through a purely exem-
plifi cational analysis’. But how can phenomenology ensure the validity 
of its intuitions, he asks? Shpet asserts that ‘unclarity and vagueness’ 
are connected with intuiting, ‘and sometimes even preponderately so’.2
2.1.2. Looking for Clarity
Shpet asserts that in coming across intuitions of various degrees 
of nearness or remoteness, we must bring them to ‘absolute nearness’, 
where they attain for us ‘complete clarity’, and we may reach a ‘perfect 
degree of intuitedness’.3 But the question arises of how to recognize an 
intuition that has been brought to complete clarity, to its absolutely 
highest degree of nearness and immediate intuitive givenness. What 
makes an intuition evident, Shpet asks; what conditions of consciousness 
produce immediacy for us?4 The questions lead Shpet to his perplexing 
example, which, presented about halfway through Iavlenie i smysl, indi-
cates a turning point from his description of Husserl’s original thought. 
Shpet writes:
During these refl ections I approached the window. From the window, 
I saw the city; I saw the roofs of houses and a far-off  mountain, but 
all were covered with fog. I thought: ‘The fog is rolling in from the 
sea.’ All of a sudden, I noticed a negro5 on the neighbouring roof, his 
head in black curls, his shoulders like a grey canvas coat. It must be an 
illusion — why would there be a black man on the roof? But why on 
earth is this impossible? More importantly, why is there a black man on 
1 Ibid.
2 Shpet 1991, pp. 69–70.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 73.
4 Shpet 1991, pp. 74–76.
5 Shpet uses the term ‘negr’. My translation is modifi ed from Thomas Nemeth’s earlier 
translation from 1991. In what follows I will replace Shpet’s term with ‘black man’.
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the roof? But I immediately put this doubt aside. I have encountered 
a number of [people of various origins — LB] here. Evidently it is 
a black man! But why has he not changed his position for such a long 
time? It has been too long for a man to be motionless. Evidently it is 
a chimney and not a black man!1
According to Shpet, what the example demonstrates is that even 
though his sensuous intuition was brought to the ‘highest possible de-
gree of clarity’, he remained unsatisfi ed. His sensual ‘evidently’ was over-
come by another ‘evidently’. ‘What was this second “evidence”?’ Shpet 
asks. ‘From the example there is clearly every reason to term the second 
“evidence” rational, and moreover rational in the mentioned sense: 
My intuition did not agree with the whole of my experience.’ As Shpet 
suggests, his initial intuition was corrected by the notions of possibility 
and impossibility; obviously, the ‘rational entered into my conscious-
ness as the motivation for my assertions concerning what is intuitively 
seen’.2
Maja Soboleva has convincingly argued that Shpet’s example takes 
him back to a pre-transcendental phenomenological position. In her 
opinion Shpet’s treatment of Husserl’s method ‘awakens in any unbi-
ased reader doubt about whether [Shpet’s] phenomenology as a descrip-
tive science represents a new step in the development of philosophical 
thought’. Soboleva suggests that Shpet fails to appreciate the basic prin-
ciple of transcendental phenomenology: ‘that the evidence of the given 
is nothing but the givenness of the evident’.3 Shpet’s concern about the 
‘correctness’ of his sensuous intuition certainly raises such a question. 
When Husserl writes about the intentionality of experiences, stating 
that ‘in so far as they are a consciousness of something they are said to 
be “intentionally related” to this something’, he also asserts:
We must, however, be quite clear on this point that there is no ques-
tion here of a relation between a psychological event — called experience 
1 Shpet 1991, pp. 80–81.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 81.
3 Soboleva 2019, pp. 63–64.
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(Erlebnis) — and some other real existent (Dasein) — called Object — or 
of a psychological connexion obtaining between the one and the other 
in objective reality. On the contrary, we are concerned with experiences 
in their essential purity, with pure essences, and with that which is 
involved in the essence ‘a priori’, in unconditioned necessity.1
Dermot Moran suggests that Husserl acknowledges that phenom-
enology is indeed in one sense fallible. We can come up with the wrong 
data, for example, if I have a toothache and I feel it in a certain tooth, 
which is in fact healthy. Thus, I have ‘misperceived’, Moran writes. ‘But 
if I attend purely to the feeling of toothache, I have an evident and ade-
quate perception.’2 According to Moran, such a mistaken intuition should 
from Husserl’s perspective be treated as some kind of misidentifi cation, 
a lack of attention, or misdescription. However, Moran suggests that 
‘Husserl never seems to have seriously entertained that we could be ab-
solutely misled by what appeared in consciousness, provided we attend 
only to what is given as it is given’. Phenomenology, as Moran describes, 
becomes possible when we come to question the very possibility of cogni-
tion and direct our analysis to it; when we raise the questions concerning 
the manner in which thinking refers to its object, and regarding the na-
ture of the connection between the intentional object and the external 
world. ‘We are now no longer interested in consciousness and cognition 
as occurrent facts or episodes in the world.’3 All claims of validity have 
thus been disowned.
Shpet acknowledges the complexity of his own example, writing 
that the motivation he mentioned is an appeal to an intuition in the 
past, which he ‘believes in more’ than is given in immediate intuition. 
Is what appears rational now only so by virtue of the past? Shpet asks; 
‘In this analysis so much “theory” has been introduced that it is not ap-
parent what phenomenological signifi cance “present” experience can 
have. Indeed, the reference to the “past” can easily turn into a regressus 
1 Husserl 1967, pp. 119–120.
2 Moran 2000, pp. 130–131.
3 Moran 2000, p. 145.
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in infi nitum towards all our experience.’1 Considering the role of past 
experiences in one’s current intuition, Shpet writes:
As for ‘theories’, we must free ourselves from them. First of all, <in 
our example> the something theoretical basically was a ‘black man’. 
Actually what I saw was something ‘black’ along with something 
‘grey’ in the ‘fog’, etc. But all the same I had reason to say ‘black man’ 
(in quotation marks), i. e., like a black man. My argument now as-
sumes, as it were, the following form. Let us assume that it is a black 
man. The objection runs, however, that it does not belong to the ‘es-
sence’ of a black man that he be on a roof. Yet another objection runs: 
It does not belong to the essence of a black man that he be here, etc. 
Whether such objections actually exist or not is unimportant. What 
is important is that I come to a halt at the motive for my rejection <of 
the theoretical>, viz. the immobility <of what is perceived>. Mobility 
actually belongs to the essence of ‘man’, and in ideal intuition for the 
‘ideal man’ to be motionless is, evidently, nonsense.2
Shpet asserts that the topic of his discussion is thus an essence, that 
is, an ideal object, which has ‘in general neither past nor a present’. 
Consequently, he observes that ‘in fact, ideal intuitions motivate the 
evidence of sensuous intuitions, and ideal objects motivate sensuous 
objects’.3 What then is the relationship between the sensuous and the 
ideal, Shpet asks.
In order to pass to this question let us turn our attention to what we 
said a moment ago about the ‘black man’. Undoubtedly our presen-
tation at the point where we said that the black man properly is ‘as 
though it were a black man’, a ‘black man’ (in quotation marks), etc. 
had to remain unclear. It had to remain unclear how and what distin-
guishes a ‘black man’, taken theoretically, and a black man, taken phe-
nomenologically. This unclarity of presentation arose owing entirely 
1 Shpet 1991, 81.
2 Ibid. Translation modifi ed.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 82.
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to the diffi  culty involved in verbally presenting the thoughts occurring 
in the various ‘attitudes’ but which we are forced to express by means 
of words alone. Everyone who attempts to carry it out meets this dif-
fi culty of expressing his or her thought. Nevertheless the thought 
itself remains clear both in thinking it over and in its presentation 
provided we understand what we properly mean by the word in each 
individual case.1
As Shpet repeats, by ‘black man’ he had meant a ‘man’, by which he 
meant a complex of visual sensations. The new factor of understand-
ing or comprehension thus comes to the fore of the phenomenological 
investigation, he asserts. What do we mean when we perceive a sensual 
object in this or that way, and associate it with this or that ideal object? 
What is the role of this act of understanding, ‘how is it connected with 
the words <expressed> and in general with rational (concepts), and fi -
nally how can it help us resolve our chief problem?’ Shpet asks.2
Yet when Husserl describes phenomenology as an eidetic science 
in Ideas, he seems to have something diff erent in mind. For him the 
eidetic description of the transcendentally given is not a ‘penetration’ 
(‘pronikanie naskvoz’’),3 as in Shpet’s vocabulary, into the essence of 
the given object. Neither is his concern regarding the correct method 
of apprehending essences with perfect clarity a problem of grasping 
the ‘right’ essence. Husserl writes about the process of clarifying the 
intuition, that is, of bringing it to the level of eidetic seeing. He warns 
his reader that this method should be understood precisely as a pro-
cess, since ‘as a rule no pure intuitions are present, and there are no 
pure empty presentations passing over into pure intuitions; it is the 
impure intuitions which, as intermediate grades maybe, play the chief 
part, bringing their objective matter on certain sides or in certain phases 
intuitively before us, and on the other sides or in other phases yielding 
mere empty presentations’.4
1 Shpet 1991, pp. 82–83. Translation modifi ed.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 83.
3 Shpet 1914b, p. 27.
4 Husserl 1967, p. 196.
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The object of the phenomenological study is not the ‘real world’ 
objects, as in the natural attitude, but the reduced objects-as-intuited. 
‘The phenomenologically particular object’, Husserl writes, is the object-
in-experience ‘in the whole wealth of its concreteness, precisely as it 
participates in the fl ow of experience, with the precise determinacy or 
indeterminacy with which it lets its thing appear, now in this aspect, 
now in that, and with just that distinctness or mistiness, that fl uctuat-
ing clearness and intermittent obscurity, and so forth, which is peculiar 
to it’. Husserl emphasizes that it is indeed ‘only the individual element 
which phenomenology ignores, whilst it raises the whole essential 
content in its concrete fullness into eidetic consciousness’. Finally, 
Husserl concludes that we can ‘see at once that a conceptual and ter-
minological fi xation of this and every similar fl owing concretum is not 
to be thought of ’.1
While there should thus be no discussion of determining ‘eidetic 
singularities’ in the realm of Husserl’s phenomenological description, 
he writes that the case is entirely diff erent with essences ‘at a higher 
specifi c level’. These are, Husserl argues, ‘susceptible of stable distinc-
tion, unbroken self-identity, and strict conceptual apprehension’. What 
he is referring to here are the ‘generic essences’ of perception, such as 
the perception ‘of physical thinghood, of animal natures, and the like; 
likewise of memory, empathy, will, and so forth, in their generality’.2 
Thus, Husserl again asserts that the experience in general, cogitation, 
is to be understood as the subject matter of phenomenology, and it is 
that experience that can be brought into the absolute clarity of given-
ness. He compares the work of the phenomenologist with that of the 
geometer who freely imagines any possible shapes, producing in his 
mind ‘an infi nite number of new creations’ with the ‘freedom which 
opens up to him for the fi rst time an entry into the spacious realms of 
essential possibility with their infi nite horizons of essential knowledge’. 
The drawings, as Husserl asserts, only follow ‘after the constructions 
of fancy’, and they serve ‘chiefl y to fi x stages in the process already 
1 Husserl 1967, p. 209.
2 Husserl 1967, p. 210.
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previously gone through, thereby making it easier to bring it back to 
consciousness once again’.1
It is evident that Shpet’s idea of an eidetic science does not corre-
spond to the method Husserl promotes in Ideas. Soboleva summarizes 
that ‘Husserlian essence is a formal notion education, εἶδος […]. Shpet, 
to the contrary, in the spirit of Plato, interprets essence as atempo-
ral substantive being’.2 Shpet appears to suggest that each individual 
thing has its own essence and that this essence, furthermore, can be 
discovered through phenomenological elucidation. The diff erence is 
also revealed in how Husserl seems at fi rst to provide a rather similar 
example to Shpet’s vision of a man/chimney on the roof, and how he 
then resolves his problem in a manner entirely diff erent from Shpet’s. 
Husserl writes that there is often a ‘vague sense of distance’ in the given 
data, and that the essence it produces can likewise ‘only be something 
imperfect’.3 He writes:
where the single intuitions which underlie our apprehension of the es-
sence are on a lower plane of clearness, so also are the apprehensions of 
the essence, and correlatively of the object apprehended has an ‘unclear’ 
meaning, it has its disorderly mixtures, its lack of proper distinctions 
both within and without. It is impossibly or ‘only roughly’ possible to 
decide whether what is apprehended now here and now there is the 
same (the same Being) or something diff erent […]4
And yet, as Husserl writes, we must bring ‘to complete clearness, what at 
any time fl oats before us shifting and unclear’. He now observes that for 
every essence there exists, ‘so to speak, an absolute nearness, in which 
its givenness is in respect of this graded series absolute, i. e., pure self-
givenness’. Husserl asserts that in such a case we are not only aware of 
the given as given, ‘but it confronts us as a self given in its purity, wholly 
1 Husserl 1967, pp. 199–200.
2 Soboleva 2019, p. 67.
3 Husserl 1967, p. 193.
4 Ibid. Later, when Husserl (1967, p. 199) describes the nature of ‘outer perception’, 
he points out that for all the possible diff erences of clearness which can take place 
‘perception is not ordinarily conditioned by fog’.
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and entirely as it is in itself’. Any unclarity in such a seeing concerns the 
‘self-given phase, which therefore does not pass within the circle of 
light reserved for that which is given pure’. Most importantly, Husserl 
thus emphasizes his transcendental standpoint: ‘We do not identify 
the “self-given” with the “primordially given”, with the “embodied”’. 
Instead, to bring an unclear intuition to absolute clarity is to discover 
and examine it exactly in its particular unclarity: intuitions should be 
‘given a corresponding value’ to the one in which the intended appears.1 
Husserl asserts that one should speak of ‘exhibiting the clear “in itself” 
through the unclear’.2 We observe that Shpet’s understanding is quite 
diff erent. In seeking a defi nition of ‘immediacy’ (‘neposredstvennost’’) 
and ‘self-givenness’ (‘samo-ochevidnost’’), he asserts that from the per-
spective of phenomenology ‘with its principle of all principles there can 
be only one answer, viz., there, where something that is intellectually 
seen itself actually stands before us as ob-ject (pred-met), where it is in 
truth perceived (vosprinimaetsia), in short, where it is given to us in its 
originary givenness.3
According to Soboleva from this diff ering understanding of evidence 
and the nature of phenomenological eidetics ‘fl ows an endless row of 
other no less principled distinctions’ between Shpet and Husserl.4 The 
point indeed marks the beginning of a path that will lead Shpet to ques-
tion Husserl’s treatment of sense-bestowal, which eventually directs 
his theory to an original conception of hermeneutic phenomenology. 
In Soboleva’s view the most problematic part of Shpet’s interpretation 
is that his version of eidetic intuition actually takes him back to subject-
object dualism.5 I agree with many aspects of Soboleva’s reading: Shpet’s 
development of the questions of phenomenology as an eidetic science, 
of evidence, and of conceptual expression hardly follows Husserl’s 
thought in Ideas. Nevertheless, as I will try to show, Shpet’s reasoning is 
not entirely incompatible with Husserl’s phenomenology. In particular, 
1 Husserl 1967, p. 194.
2 Husserl 1967, p. 196.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 76. (Shpet 1914b, p. 99.)
4 Soboleva 2019, p. 67.
5 Soboleva 2019, p. 68.
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I aim to demonstrate that Shpet does, in spite of everything, remain 
fi rmly committed to the transcendental turn.
Without much of an introduction, Shpet now moves on to a prob-
lem of conceptual presentation. He states that he is presently interested 
in one question: ‘How in general are concepts used for the purposes of 
knowledge; how are they its instruments?’ Shpet’s stated goal is to fi nd 
grounds for the claim that concepts can be reliably used not only in dis-
course, but also in description. He writes that the question is ‘merely 
the consequence of a doubt concerning the role of concepts, a doubt 
resulting from the fact that logic has not just failed to prove a satisfac-
tory answer to these questions but actually has provided no answer at all. 
Logic has simply passed over this matter, taking it as something which 
“stands to reason”’.1
Shpet makes an important discovery, which will strongly direct his 
thought’s evolution when he detects an intrinsic connection between 
essences (as the objects of phenomenological investigation) and con-
cepts. He writes that ideal objects are ‘objects which in their essence fi nd 
expression in concepts’.2 Agreeing with Husserl, Shpet also points out that 
although an eidetic science, phenomenology cannot follow the model of 
mathematical disciplines, which ‘do not proceed by description’.3 Husserl 
writes that ‘geometry, for instance, does not grasp in single intuitions, 
describe and classify in order the lowest eidetic diff erences, the num-
berless spatial fi gures that can be drawn in space, as do the descriptive 
natural sciences in respect of empirical natural formations’.4 Instead, it 
constructs its truths axiologically, and its ideal concepts are exact and 
unambiguous. (Husserl provides examples of ‘fundamental constructs’ 
such as the ‘ideas of body, surface, point, angle, and the like’.5) Husserl 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 85.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 86. Here, Shpet seems to be referring to a point which Husserl 
presents only much later in Ideas, at the end of its third section. Husserl (1967, 
p. 347) writes that ‘everything remembered or fancied can, as such, have its mean-
ing (Meinung) in the noematic sense (and indeed as noematic nucleus) of any act 
whatsoever can be expressed conceptually (durch “Bedeutungen”)’. Shpet returns to 
this issue at the end of his book.
3 Shpet 1991, pp. 86–87; Husserl 1967, p. 204.
4 Husserl 1967, p. 204.
5 Ibid.
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juxtaposes the ideal concepts of mathematics and geometry with the 
vastly diff erent descriptive concepts that are what phenomenology must 
defi ne for itself:
Geometrical concepts are ‘ideal’ concepts; they express something 
which one cannot ‘see’; their ‘origin,’ and therefore their content also, 
is essentially other than that of the descriptive concepts as concepts 
which express the essential nature of things as drawn directly from 
simple intuition, and not anything ‘ideal’. Exact concepts have their 
correlates in essences, which have the character of ‘Ideas’ in the Kantian 
sense. Over against these Ideas or ideal essences stand the morphological 
essences, as correlates of descriptive concepts.1
Instead of Kantian ideas, Husserl’s phenomenology grasps in its de-
scriptions the essential forms present in consciousness, as concrete es-
sences, not through abstraction, but as eidetic concreta.2 To fi nd suitable 
conceptual expressions for such intuitively given essential data, Husserl 
writes, ‘we must indeed take them as we fi nd them. And we do not fi nd 
them otherwise than in a fl ux, and typical essences can in such a case be 
apprehended only in that essential intuition which can be immediately 
analysed’. Husserl, for now, takes his analysis no further than this, noting 
only that these fundamental problems are ‘still unsolved’, and that an at-
tempt to answer them will be presented in ‘the sequel to these studies’.3
Shpet, too, states that we must ‘turn to a pure description of the 
intuitively given in its most concrete essence’. But at the same time he 
disagrees with Husserl’s conception of the essential intuition as an in-
tuition of something concrete or individual, writing that ‘when the talk 
turns to logical expression and we address ourselves to concepts, we un-
wittingly feel embarrassed by this strange compound term “individual 
1 Husserl 1967, p. 208.
2 Husserl 1967, pp. 208–209.
3 Husserl 1967, pp. 207–208. Husserl has in mind Ideas II, which was published only 
posthumously. As Nemeth (1991, p. x) asserts, the themes of this text were however 
known to Shpet. According to Edith Stein’s testimony Husserl virtually read the 
manuscript of Ideas II during the lecture course ‘Nature und Geist’, which Shpet is 
known to have visited at least once.
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concept”’.1 Thus, Shpet begins his analysis of the conceptual expression 
of concrete essences independently from Husserl’s exposition of the 
same question in Ideas, and it indeed becomes his leading topic. Shpet 
stresses that he does ‘not want to discard anything from the problem of 
concept, conceived as an instrument of the theoretical and descriptive 
method’, and concludes his chapter:
Our question is now the following: We pointed out above that phe-
nomenology would employ an unusual method were it to destroy life, 
to transform living cognition, living being, into an herbarium. But how 
is it possible to preserve the living if the means to preserve it amounts 
in essence to the destruction of the variety of life, preserving only its 
scheme and skeleton? How does the logical concept become an instru-
ment of life and not its destroyer?2
Shpet’s original question regarding being in all its forms has thus 
been broadened, but he argues that the underlying interest remains the 
same: ‘We ask of both intuition as well as of a concept: How does the 
actual exist? How do we arrive at it, and as a specifi c question within 
this general problem, how is the actual “expressed,” and more specifi -
cally, how is it expressed “conceptually”?’ For Shpet now the problem of 
realism (or nominalism), of the relation between experiencing and ideal 
intuition, between evidence and rational motivation, between actuality 
and truth, between intuition and ‘logos’ comes down to this ‘one point’.3
2.2. ‘But Where Does Sense-Bestowal 
Come From?’
In the second Parisian letter to Husserl, written some three weeks 
after the initial one, Shpet reports a change in his views concerning 
some of the central questions of phenomenology. He had received the 
1 Shpet 1991, pp. 89–90.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 90.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 91.
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newly published second edition of Husserl’s fi rst fi ve investigations and 
writes to thank him: ‘The book brought me much joy, though many 
troubles also. My article again occupies fi rst priority in my work’.1 Shpet 
announces that reading the revised Logical Investigations had led him 
to ‘radically rework his entire exposition (izlozhenie)’: ‘The fi fth part of 
my work is expanding in particular — relying on the Untersuchungen 
and wishing to review the study of “meaning” more fully, I divided its 
contents into parts fi ve and six’.2 However, Shpet states that he is still 
waiting for the last investigation to draw a satisfactory conclusion for 
his own work and adds that he had also anxiously waited for ‘some ex-
planations in the “Foreword”, but… I had to turn my impatience into 
patience!’3
Correspondingly, the fi fth chapter of Iavlenie i smysl is where Shpet 
clearly marks his departure from Husserl’s original exposition: by ques-
tioning his analysis of the noema, by claiming that he fails to properly 
address the problem of sense-bestowal, and by suggesting that he has 
not accounted for a specifi c, third form of being (and its corresponding 
intuition), namely, the social being. Unsurprisingly, then, analyses of 
the relationship of Shpet’s thought with Husserl’s phenomenology have 
focused predominantly on these topics.4 The way in which Shpet’s ‘her-
meneutic turn’ in the last part of Iavlenie i smysl leads to his later theory 
of culture and language has also been repeatedly discussed.5 In the re-
maining part of the present chapter I will off er my own interpretation.
1 Shpet 1996, p. 124. By ‘article’, Shpet is referring to the manuscript of Iavlenie 
i smysl.
2 Ibid.
3 Shpet 1996, p. 125.
4 Thomas Seifrid (2009) and Anna Shiyan (2015) especially have advocated that Shpet 
essentially fails to follow Husserl. Another opinion has been off ered by Aleksei 
Savin (2016) and Natal’ia Artemenko (2017), as well as Marina Bykova (2016), who 
instead associate Shpet’s hermeneutic phenomenology with Husserl’s later period 
of genetic phenomenology, and possibly also with the tradition established by 
Heidegger and Gadamer.
5 This genesis has been analysed, for example, by Thomas Nemeth (2009 and 2018), 
Giulietta Ottaviano (2013), Natal’ia Artemenko (2017, 2018), Maryse Dennes 
(2006, 2010), Aleksei Savin (2015, 2016), Anna Shiyan (2015), and Thomas Seifrid 
(2009).
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2.2.1. Shpet on the Noematic Sinn
Shpet’s deviation from Husserl’s presentation appears with little 
warning. In discussing the method of phenomenological description of 
diff erent species of being and their modes of givenness, Shpet suddenly 
observes:
what strikes the eye here is that a peculiar species of empirical being 
is left out, namely social being (‘bytie sotsial’noe’), which, according 
to the position we have taken, must have its own peculiar datum 
and its own peculiar mode of cognition. At the very start a simple 
descriptive analysis of this species of being reveals that we must ac-
tually be dealing here with a quite distinctive mode of cognition in 
which so-called empathy and acts similar to it play a fundamental 
role. Husserl recognizes that in this species of ‘viewing’ (Ansehen) 
we have an ‘intuitive, presentive’ viewing. He refuses to recognize it, 
however, as ‘an act that is presentive of something originarily’.1 This, 
it seems to us, is the reason for the fact that in the place mentioned 
Husserl does not pause to isolate social being as a peculiar species 
of being.2
Shpet’s observation is surprising given that he has not mentioned the 
social being in any way before this. Again, the reader is left wondering 
whether Shpet has actually forgotten about the phenomenological re-
duction and taken up the study of ‘intellectual and cultural formations 
that presuppose the natural attitude’, as Nemeth doubts.3 However, 
1 Shpet is referring to the very beginning of Ideas where Husserl (1967, pp. 51–52) 
writes: ‘In “outer perception” we have primordial experience of physical things, but 
in memory or anticipatory expectation this is no longer the case; we have primordial 
experience of ourselves and our states of consciousness in the so-called inner or self-
perception, but not of others and their vital experiences in and through “empathy”. 
We “behold the living experiences of others” through the perception of their bodily 
behaviour. This beholding in the case of empathy is indeed intuitional dator, yet no 
longer a primordially dator act’.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 100. (Shpet 1914b, pp. 128–129.)
3 Nemeth 2009, p. 127.
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it is soon clear that what Shpet has in mind is actually related to the 
minutiae of the descriptive method of transcendental phenomenology 
itself. He asserts that an elucidation of his question is of fundamental 
importance, ‘since the vistas opened up by such an analysis reveal all 
objects without exception, both those of scientifi c knowledge as well 
as those of philosophical knowledge, in a completely new way’. Indeed, 
Shpet argues that ‘phenomenology itself undergoes a signifi cant modi-
fi cation in this process’.1
Shpet believes that an investigation of the nature of social being re-
veals something crucial about the nature of consciousness itself. It leads, 
he writes, ‘to the recognition of a factor that has been ignored up to now, 
a factor that makes a cognition merely by the fact that it exists show 
how it exists’.2 Shpet refers to a correlation between the experiencing 
and the eidetic intuition and asks how it happens that ‘we are not only 
in possession of intuitions, as the content of our knowledge, but also 
that we use intuitions as means’.3 While the link between Shpet’s earlier 
analyses and the present questions appears ambiguous at this point, he 
clarifi es it by entering the discussion of sense-bestowal, as presented by 
Husserl. Shpet writes:
Throughout the breadth of the phenomenological domain a large role 
is played, in Husserl’s opinion, by the remarkable ‘duality in unity’ of 
sensuous ὕλη and intentional μορφή, which is revealed in an immanent 
refl ection on mental processes. Namely, among mental processes we 
must single out those that are ‘primary contents’, that is, ‘sensuous’ 
mental processes or ‘sensation-contents’. These are sensuous Data of 
colour, sound, pleasure, and so forth. These concrete Data of a mental 
process enter as components in some other more inclusive concrete 
mental processes which, as a whole, are intentional, and, more partic-
ularly, we fi nd those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, 
as it were, ‘animates’, which bestows sense (or essentially involves 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 100.
2 Ibid.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 102.
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a bestowing of sense) — a stratum by which precisely the concrete 
intentive mental process arises from the sensuous, which has in itself 
nothing pertaining to intentionality.1
As Shpet explains, this notion adds up to nothing other than ‘that 
which specifi cally characterises consciousness’, when we say that it 
points to something of which it is the consciousness: ‘In order to avoid 
equivocation Husserl introduces the special term noesis, or noetic mo-
ment, to designate this moment [of sense-bestowal]’. Shpet asserts that 
the question of sense-bestowal, introduced along with noesis, should 
obviously now become the centre of the phenomenologist’s attention. 
‘Indeed, up to now we knew only that intentionality, the directedness 
of consciousness to something, belongs to the essence of consciousness 
and that consciousness is the consciousness of something. But where 
does sense-bestowal come from?’2
In late February 1914 Shpet wrote to Husserl again, now already from 
Moscow, drawing his attention to the parts of Ideas that troubled him. 
One of them was the question of noematic sense:
I have already said this once: it is not clear to me how ‘meaning’ can 
be only an abstract form when it is simultaneously the ‘content’ 
of the noema. […] The process of achieving concrete meaning, as 
the object in the ‘How of its givenness’ (Gegebenheitsweisen) […],3 
it seems to me, forces us to cross the boundary of ‘delimitation of 
the essence “noematic meaning”’,4 the delimitation which avoids 
‘all “subjective” expressions’ and among them [the expression] ‘gi-
ven’.5
1 Ibid.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 103.
3 Husserl (1967, p. 368) writes that the ‘Sinn’ is indeed ‘not a concrete essence in 
the constitution of the noema as a whole, but a kind of abstract form that dwells 
in it’.
4 This is the title of Husserl’s section § 130 in Ideas (see Husserl 1967, p. 363).
5 Shpet 1996, p. 127.
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Although Nemeth notes that Shpet’s ‘misunderstanding’ was afterwards 
corrected by Husserl in his response to the former,1 it is evident that the 
problematic nature of sense and its role in the noema remain far from 
resolved from the perspective of Shpet’s theory. In the fi fth and sixth 
chapters of Iavlenie i smysl he attempts to resolve these issues.
In Ideas Husserl argues that every intentional experience harbours 
in itself a ‘meaning’ thanks to its noetic phase. The noetic phases make 
the experience ‘meaningful’, and they exist in correlation with a cor-
responding ‘noematic content’, or ‘noema’.2 Famously, Husserl defi nes 
noema as the intended (perceived, judged, remembered, etc.) as such, 
and adds: ‘We must everywhere take the noematic correlate, which (in a 
very extended meaning of the term) is here referred to as “meaning” 
(Sinn) precisely as it lies “immanent” in the experience of perception, of 
judgment, of liking, and so forth […]’3 However, Husserl’s discussion of 
the conceptual pair of noesis and noema in Ideas is not entirely coher-
ent, which is something Shpet also appears to notice. He doubts that 
Husserl’s analysis has failed to account for the properly sense-bestowing 
moment in the noema and writes, ‘something is disclosed that is not 
really inherent’ in it.4 Shpet continues, asserting that the sense
forms only, as it were, a certain central stratum, or core, on which 
essentially the other moments are founded. These other moments, 
however, can, in an extended construction, be designated as ‘sense-
moments’. The full noema consists of diff erent strata grouped around 
this core, around a pure ‘objective sense’. The latter arises as something 
identical in all phenomenological descriptions, despite their variety 
and the diff erent characteristics integrally inherent in the given. These 
characteristics depend upon whether our concern is the sense of some-
thing perceived or remembered or imagined, etc.5
1 Nemeth 2009, p. 129. See Husserl’s answer to Shpet in Logos No. 3 (1992), pp. 236–
237.
2 Husserl 1967, p. 257.
3 Husserl 1967, p. 258.
4 Shpet 1991, p. 104.
5 Shpet 1991, p. 105.
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Thus, the objective sense, as the ‘core’ of the noema, or the ‘object 
simpliciter’ is the ‘something identical’ which is ‘perceived at one time, 
another time directly presentiated, a third time presented pictorially in 
a painting’, Shpet writes, citing Husserl.1 He asserts that this conclusion 
must serve as a starting point for his own analysis:
Actually here the whole mystery of the very being of our cognition is 
discerned and light is shed on its nature in the sense mentioned above, 
i. e. on the nature of its being. We know cognition, qua being, as a logi-
cal being. In accordance with the entire spirit of the phenomenological 
doctrine of the correlation between the noesis and the noema the logi-
cal is evidently also one of the strata in the noesis and the noema, one 
of the acts in the mental process as a whole. Evidently, moreover, if we 
seek clarifi cation of the essence of this being in its role as a cognitive 
instrument the more mysterious it is that this correlation pervades 
equally all spheres of the diff erent attitudes while maintaining their 
identity proper.2
Shpet’s deviation from Husserl’s discussion, as well as the reason for 
it, become evident here. What he fi nds lacking in Husserl’s treatment 
of the noematic sense is the logical stratum of meaning. Shpet contin-
ues that the central core of the noema, its ‘object simpliciter’, is indeed 
‘apprehended by a logical concept’, and that it becomes fi xed in it. The 
moment of intuitive sense-bestowal proves an increasingly complex is-
sue in Shpet’s theory. As he attempted to show with the example of the 
man/chimney on the roof, the intention of an object simply intended as 
such does not grasp the logical meaning of the intention, because it fails 
to account for the rationally conceived context of the full experience. 
Shpet asks, can it belong to the essence of the intuitive acts of seeing, 
remembering, judging, and so on to ‘give life’ to the object simpliciter? 
Or does the ‘necessary coexistence’ of sense-bestowal and ‘making 
something logical’ have another, separate foundation?3
1 Ibid. See Husserl 1967, p. 266.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 106.
3 Ibid.
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Shpet only refers to Logical Investigations once during this discussion, 
and even then, merely in a footnote,1 but it is obviously an important 
source for his present inquiry. Shpet, as it were, combines two lines of 
Husserl’s argument: alongside discovering the consciousness and its ob-
ject in their intentional correlation, as is Husserl’s method in Ideas, he 
returns to the latter’s earlier question of meaning intention and mean-
ing fulfi lment. As Shpet previously posed his two interconnected ques-
tions — how do we arrive at the actually existing, and how is it expressed 
conceptually?2 — he now asks, what is a ‘sense’, and how does it relate to 
the object of intuition, the object simpliciter? Returning to the descrip-
tion of the noema’s structure, as he fi nds it in Ideas, Shpet writes:
In every noema there is […] a pure objective something as a point of 
unity, and we can distinguish regarding the noema two concepts of 
object: this pure point of unity, the noematic ‘object simpliciter’, and 
the ‘object in the How of its determinations’. ‘The “sense”’, that is to say, 
‘is this noematic “Object in the How”, with all that which the description 
characterized above is able to fi nd evidently in it and to express concep-
tually’. The sense, in general, can change from noema to noema, but it 
can remain absolutely alike and can even be characterized as ‘identi-
cal’. There is, however, no noema in which sense would be wanting, 
and there is no noema which lacks its necessary center, point of unity, 
the pure determinable X. It is evident, on the other hand, that because 
of the need for sense to have a ‘bearer’ not only does each sense have 
an ‘object’ but diff erent senses <can> also refer to the same object.3
‘We undoubtedly sense some defi ciency in all this’, Shpet concludes. In 
his view it appears ‘unintelligible how predicative determinations (of be-
ing remembered, perceived, etc.) of an object can exhaust the noema’. 
Moreover, it remains unclear to Shpet how predicative determinations 
1 The footnote reads: ‘In fact it was precisely from this side that Husserl himself 
came to the idea of phenomenology in the second of his “Logical Investigations.” 
In particular, cf. Investigation I’ (Shpet 1991, p. 119).
2 Shpet 1991, p. 91.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 111.
106 2. Finding Sense in Appearance: Shpet on Husserl’s Phenomenology 
alone could bring about the sense of the noema. On the contrary, he 
fi nds it evident that a sense must inhere ‘immanently in the logical 
something because the claim of a sense-bestowing role for the act of 
predication qualifying the object simply claims this’.1 In other words, 
Shpet fi nds that a ‘logical stratum’ is necessary within the noema-noesis 
structure. But what is it, and what is its origin?
Shpet is not alone in noticing the discrepancy in Husserl’s description 
of the noema, and it has indeed led to all but opposing interpretations 
of the noema’s meaning and function. Among others, Robert Solomon 
has argued that Husserl’s characterizations of the relationship between 
the noema, the noematic correlate, and intentional content leave much 
to be desired. In his opinion there is also some confusion regarding the 
relationship between the noema, the object, and the noematic Sinn. 
At times, Solomon writes, ‘it appears that that the “full noema” (das 
volle Noema) is equivalent to the object; other times it is only equated 
with the Sinn. Sometimes the noema is said to be a Sinn; elsewhere it 
has a Sinn’.2
One of Husserl’s ‘spectacular insights’ in Ideas, according to Solomon, 
was his reinterpretation of perception along lines of analysis ‘that are 
usually reserved for such “conceptual” acts as asserting, believing, 
judging, doubting, and denying’.3 Thus, while Gottlob Frege limited the 
notion of Sinn to verbal expressions, Husserl observed that it could be 
extended to all acts of consciousness, including perceptual acts; and 
the ‘insertion’ of the Husserlian Sinn took place precisely through his 
noema. What this means, in Solomon’s words, is that even pure percep-
tion (prior to any judgement) gives rise to a type of ‘opaque context’ and 
perception itself becomes, to a certain degree ‘opaque’. This claim, as 
Solomon notes, is as old as Kant, though it remains radical to this day: 
all acts are ‘judgment and concept-laden’.4
1 Ibid.
2 Solomon 1977, p. 172.
3 Solomon 1977, p. 173.
4 Solomon 1977, pp. 173–174. In Rosemary Lerner’s (2004, p. 207) words, phenom-
enology’s revolutionary approach to the problem of reason ‘consists in proposing 
a radical reform of the meaning of λόγος’, which had traditionally been reduced to 
the sphere of reasoning.
2.2. ‘But Where Does Sense-Bestowal Come From?’  107
According to Solomon the main competing interpretations of the 
noema, the Gurwitsch and Føllesdal ‘schools’, both agree that noema 
is something by virtue of which the consciousness relates to objects.1 
Otherwise, the two interpretations come with vast diff erences. For Aron 
Gurwitsch,2 Solomon writes, the noema is nothing other than the ‘per-
ceived as such’. But for this reason, Gurwitsch’s conception of Sinn ‘is 
extremely emasculated’, because it comes to embody both the reference 
of an intuitive act, as well as its meaning, forming as a whole the ‘noe-
matic correlate’. In Solomon’s opinion this makes it not only diffi  cult to 
provide an adequate analysis of the noematic structure, but it also renders 
unclear why Husserl would have placed such importance on his concep-
tion of noema. In Gurwitsch’s view, Solomon writes, ‘the doctrine of the 
noema reduces to little more than a restatement of the epistemological 
platitude that we never simply “see” material objects, but only material 
objects from a certain perspective, within a certain context, and so on’.3
Gurwitsch’s interpretation leaves nearly no reason for the introduc-
tion of the term Sinn, and it appears that epoché alone would suffi  ce to 
bring the phenomenologist to a fi rst-person viewpoint from which to 
describe the objects of his/her experience. Dagfi nn Føllesdal’s noema, 
on the other hand, is closely related to Frege’s Sinn as the meaning of 
a linguistic expression. According to this view the noemata are abstract 
(non-perceptible) entities and are thus not perceived by the senses. Yet 
since the noema is what directs consciousness to its object, it must as 
a whole be ‘perceivable’. Føllesdal solves the problem by arguing that 
the noema is made up of two components: the unchanging (‘common 
to all acts that have the same content’) part, and the varying, ‘thetic’ 
part. In Solomon’s opinion Føllesdal’s interpretation is valid, but it omits 
something vital in the case or perception compared with Gurwitsch’s 
view. The meaning of any experience proves founded in language, while 
its source remains hidden from the phenomenological investigation. 
1 Solomon 1977, p. 171. For one thing, noema is thus not itself the object of conscious-
ness. Even this point itself, however, is obscured by Husserl’s talk of the ‘noematic 
content’, according to Solomon.
2 Solomon (1977, p. 170) also calls the Gurwitsch interpretation the ‘orthodox view’.
3 Solomon 1977, pp. 170–171.
108 2. Finding Sense in Appearance: Shpet on Husserl’s Phenomenology 
The intuition, as the actual object of the phenomenologist’s study, only 
‘colours’ the linguistically defi ned Sinn.1
In attempting to overcome the problems of Gurtwisch and Føllesdal, 
Solomon suggests his own reading of the noema, which bears certain 
similarities to Shpet’s understanding. Notably, both their interests lie 
more in the epistemic judgements regarding experience than the purely 
fi rst-person experience of the world: they focus on the positing character 
of experience. To justify his viewpoint, Solomon asserts that although 
in Ideas Husserl begins his analysis of sense in the perceptual paradigm, 
his larger discussion is devoted to questions of the noema of judgement. 
‘That is where Husserl’s primordial interests lie’, he writes.2 Like Shpet, 
Solomon emphasizes the importance of the notion that noema is not 
only an ‘appearance’, because it also has a Sinn. In other words, a ‘noemat-
ic nucleus’, as the sense, must be in one way or another separated from 
the changing characters of givenness that belong to it. Solomon writes 
that all perception therefore involves judgements, and we are always not 
just ‘seeing’ ‘but always seeing-as’, and the object of our intention is ‘not 
simply a “this” but always a “what” as well’. As a consequence, Solomon 
argues, it must then also be deduced that every act explicitly or implic-
itly harbours a logical factor: our experience is always concept-laden or 
‘meaning-full’. The ‘what’ of our experience is constituted in a judgement.3
The affi  nity of this reading with Shpet’s interpretation is evident. 
Yet the two commentators’ conclusions diff er markedly. Solomon sees 
Husserl’s radical reinterpretation of the originally Brentanian thesis 
as essentially Kantian. In his opinion Husserl’s ‘essence’ could indeed 
be fairly unproblematically translated into Kant’s ‘concept’. Shpet, on 
the other hand, was precisely struggling against what he conceived as 
a Kantian infl uence in Husserl’s thinking. Conceiving Husserl to suggest 
that constituting a ‘synthetical unity’ of the object of consciousness 
amounted to the same as a sense-bestowal, Shpet asks: ‘Are we not going 
back to Kant, although now a “Kant” in parentheses?’4 In the last two 
1 Solomon 1977, pp. 175–177.
2 Solomon 1977, p. 171.
3 Solomon 1977, p. 177.
4 Shpet 1991, p. 103. For a clarifi cation of Husserl’s synthesis and its relationship with 
Kant see Jansen 2015.
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chapters of his book Shpet attempts to give a non-Kantian (positive) 
defi nition of phenomenological sense. He understands sense not as the 
‘object in its determinant How but as the authentic sense’, which is not 
an abstract form but is ‘internally inherent in the object itself, its intimate 
something’. Shpet argues that sense is therefore not only ‘inherent in 
the concrete object, but it, sense, also determines the same’.1 In Shpet’s 
words, this is a question of ‘passing on to actuality’ and ‘formulating the 
rule of this transition’.2
It has often critically been noted that through his analysis of the 
phenomenological Sinn Shpet arrives at a conceptualization of an ‘au-
thentic’ and ‘internal’ sense of the concrete object.3 Shpet’s entelechy, 
abiding in objects, which is the main conclusion of Iavlenie i smysl, is 
without doubt an unorthodox ending for an analysis of Husserl’s Ideas. 
However, while the metaphysical ring in Shpet’s talk of the internal 
sense of a concrete object has been received with suspicion,4 it has 
at the same time been repeatedly suggested that his introduction of 
a meaningful social reality brought him close to Husserl’s conception 
of a lifeworld, thus foreseeing the development of the genetic and in-
tersubjective phenomenology that Husserl would launch only consider-
ably later.5 In the following I aim to examine these claims more closely.
2.2.2. Finding Reason in Reality
Donn Welton writes that ‘when Husserl speaks of bracketing the 
existence of the world, he does so in order to gain its presence and to 
open its meaning’. Welton adds that in this bracketing objects and ‘even 
1 Shpet, p. 116
2 Shpet 1991, p. 117.
3 See, for example, Bykova 2016, p. 3; Nemeth 2018, p. 277; Shiyan 2015, pp. 106–107.
4 Nemeth (2009, p. 125) indeed suggests that Shpet returns to a classic metaphysical 
notion of the essence of concrete objects. Later, he clarifi es his view, writing that 
along with his conception of the ‘intimate something’ Shpet ‘abandoned his earlier 
understanding of the phenomenological reduction, of the exclusion of actual exist-
ence from phenomenology, and thereby of its commitment to a form of idealism’ 
(2018, p. 275).
5 See e. g. Nemeth 2009, pp. 131–133; Savin 2016, pp. 42–46.
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things (Dinge) remain. Yet in a radical diff erence to the natural stand-
point they now function as “transcendental clues” to the analysis of the 
syntheses in which “new types of objects and new individual objects are 
constituted”’.1 Correspondingly, Husserl states in Ideas that ‘the brack-
eted matter is not wiped off  the phenomenological slate, but only brack-
eted, and thereby provided with a sign that indicates the bracketing. 
Taking its sign with it, the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main 
theme of the inquiry’.2 Husserl therefore argues that even though the
physical nature suff ers disconnexion, […] we continue to have not only 
a phenomenology of the natural scientifi c consciousness on the side of 
its thought and experience, but also a phenomenology of nature itself 
as correlate of the natural scientifi c consciousness. Similarly, although 
psychology and mental science are aff ected by the disconnexion, we 
have a phenomenology of man, his personality, personal qualities, and 
his conscious course (as a human being); a phenomenology, further, 
of the mind of the community, its social institutions, its cultural crea-
tions, and so forth.3
For Husserl, whatever is transcendent can be the object of phenomenol-
ogy, and as he emphasizes, ‘not only on the side of the consciousness of 
it’, but in the discovered correlation of the given and its ways of being 
given.4
Reasoning along similar lines, Shpet declares at the beginning of 
his sixth chapter (using parentheses around his undeniably troubling 
terms) that a ‘return’ to ‘actuality’ now takes place in phenomenology.5 
To understand what Shpet means by this return — and especially, what 
he does not mean by it6 — we must examine his discussion of Husserl’s 
1 Welton 1977, p. 55.
2 Husserl 1967, p. 212.
3 Husserl 1967, pp. 212–213.
4 Husserl 1967, p. 213.
5 Shpet 1991, p. 125.
6 Here, I disagree with Nemeth’s (2018, p. 275) reading, which considers Shpet’s at-
tempt to obtain an object’s sense in its actuality ‘particularly troubling’. Certainly, 
Shpet’s entelechy and the way he later conceptualizes it as a method of discovering 
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doxic modalities (e. g. believing, doubting or presuming something). 
As Husserl states, these ‘noetic characters’ are intrinsically correlated 
with diff erent modes of being. For example, a sense of reality is inher-
ent in our normal perception, where we are under a perceptual belief of 
the present as being real. To this perceptual assurance ‘corresponds in 
the appearing “object” as noematic correlate the ontical character “real” 
(wirklich)’.1 Thetic acts, therefore, ‘posit’ being, and as the doxic modality 
of givenness changes, so also the ontical modalities of the given change. 
Husserl asserts:
The way of ‘certain’ belief can pass over into that of suggestion or pre-
sumption, or into that of question and doubt; and, according to the line 
taken, that which appears […] will adopt the ontical modalities of the 
‘possible,’ the ‘probable,’ the ‘questionable,’ and the ‘doubtful’ respec-
tively.2
In the course of his reasoning Husserl presents an example surpris-
ingly reminiscent of Shpet’s man/chimney thought experiment. Husserl 
writes that in our normal perceptual experience, the perceived object 
‘stands out there at fi rst as a plain matter of course, a certainty’. Suddenly, 
we might become doubtful: what if it is after all a mere illusion, only 
seeming to be there? Or another possibility, ‘that which appears pre-
serves its ontical certainty, but we are uncertain with regard to some 
one or other of its sets of qualities’. For example,
The thing ‘suggests’ a man. Then a contrary suggestion sets in: it might 
be a moving tree, which in the gloom of the wood resembles a man in 
motion. But the ‘weight’ of the one ‘possibility’ is now considerably 
reinforced, and we decide in its favour perhaps, defi nitely presuming 
that ‘it was surely a tree’.3
the ‘true meaning’ of any cultural formation such as a work of art are suspect. I shall 
nonetheless argue that Shpet’s turn towards the actuality can be justifi ed from 
a Husserlian point of view.
1 Husserl 1967, p. 297.
2 Ibid.
3 Husserl 1967, pp. 297–298.
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Husserl does not fi nd anything too problematic in the changing doxic 
modalities of the perceived being and allows his perceiving intuition to 
move spontaneously from one object-perception to another. He also 
presents the possibility of a ‘neutrality-modifi cation’ of consciousness, 
as a contrast to a ‘real’ belief, presumption, doubt, and so on. In the neu-
tralized presentation the posited presents itself as ‘standing undecided’. 
According to Husserl we may shift between actuality and potentiality in 
a positing process, and their diff erence is not very unlike the diff erence 
between attention and inattention. He writes that the ‘all-enveloping 
time-consciousness’ is not ‘a continuous immanent perception in the 
pregnant sense, i. e., in the sense of an actual positing perceiving […]’1 
Instead, the actual positing is itself an experience, and it thus has a du-
ration, being constituted in time-consciousness. Nonetheless, Husserl 
believes that every consciousness is either actually or potentially posi-
ting. He writes:
Consider, for instance, the consciousness of the unobserved but subse-
quently observable background in perception, memory, and so forth. 
The explicit intentional experience is a ‘completed’ ‘I think’. But the 
same ‘I think’ can also pass over into an ‘unfulfi lled’ condition through 
changes in the process of attention. The experience of a fulfi lled per-
ception, a fulfi lled judgment, feeling or volition, does not disappear 
even when the attention turns ‘exclusively’ to something new, and the 
Ego consequently ‘lives’ exclusively in a new cogito. The earlier cogito 
‘rings off ’, sinks into ‘obscurity’, but it still continues to experience 
a modifi ed form of Being. Similarly cogitationes in the background of 
experience press their way up, sometimes following the path of recol-
lection or neutrally modifi ed, sometimes unmodifi ed.2
Husserl believes a certain priority is assigned to actuality in our ex-
perience, since ‘every thesis of whatever genus can, in conformity with 
essential laws, and through the doxic characterizations which belong 
inalienably to its essential nature, be transformed into an actual doxic 
1 Husserl 1967, pp. 314–315.
2 Husserl 1967, p. 323.
2.2. ‘But Where Does Sense-Bestowal Come From?’  113
positing’. There is a potentiality in every positing to become actual, as he 
writes: ‘We become aware of value in valuing, of the pleasant in pleas-
ure, of the joyous in rejoicing’, and so on.1 Husserl’s conclusion is that 
a certain ‘logical factor’ is harboured in every act and its act-correlate. 
They can always be made logically explicit by an action where ‘the noetic 
stratum of the “act of expression” attaches itself to all that is noetic’. 
This, in turn, means for Husserl that ‘all acts generally — even the acts of 
feeling and will’ are potentially objectifying acts, ‘original factors in the 
“constituting of objects”.’ Any act can be a world-constituting act as long as 
it is made in the actual mode of positing. In Husserl’s words, ‘Here lies the 
deepest of the sources for shedding light on the universality of the logical’.2
Shpet has no trouble agreeing with Husserl’s discussion. From it he 
confi rms, ‘we obtain the already noticed universality of the something 
logical […]’3 Indeed, Husserl’s conception of the positum, as, for example, 
the believed as believed, together with his analysis of its potentiality and 
actuality, seems to Shpet only to strengthen the claim he was making 
earlier.4 He writes:
Let us now designate the posited itself as such by the term ‘positum’. 
Hence, by virtue of everything that has been said we must see in the 
positum a unity of the posited characteristics and sense. Owing to 
this unity the concept of positum begins to play a fundamental role 
in the analysis of the noematic structure. This is because the concepts 
of sense and positum are inseparable from the concept of the object.5
Shpet maintains that it should be possible to express any positum, and 
it should thus also be possible to determine the logical signifi cation of 
any positum. He writes that it now only remains to ‘compare this with 
what we said above, where the delimitation of logical signifi cation and 
1 Husserl 1967, p. 331.
2 Husserl 1967, pp. 332–333.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 114.
4 Husserl also presented a discussion on the positing and objectifying acts in the fi fth 
and sixth logical investigations, and this probably aff ected Shpet’s conception in 
the last chapters of his book.
5 Shpet 1991, p. 115.
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sense was adduced, in order to see that the problem of the relation of 
sense to expression earlier received an unusual broadening and that 
this was carried over to the entire fi eld of intentional consciousness’. 
According to Shpet his earlier problem not only retains its clarity and 
rigour but actually gains added importance: ‘with this new formulation 
we become intuitively convinced that it is a matter not of a particular 
or specifi c question of logic but actually the basic question of the most 
fundamental philosophical discipline’.1
Clearly, sense is apprehended by a positum. But Shpet writes, ‘it is 
not obvious how a positional act itself can “disclose” the sense in a noe-
ma or an object’. According to Shpet the previous unclarity is now shown 
even more vividly than before, because, as he writes, he does not grasp 
how the notion of sense-bestowal is connected with the discussion; 
‘where and why a positional act can be sense-bestowing?’ Shpet asserts 
that he is fi nally persuaded to conclude that what Husserl has been des-
ignating with the name ‘sense’ is ‘not really sense at all’. Rather, Shpet 
proposes that it would be better to call this sense ‘content’. His claim is 
that Husserl’s Sinn, ‘being the object in its determinant How, is not […] 
the concrete essence of the aggregate noema, but only a kind of abstract 
form inherent in it. Therefore, the full noematic core in its concreteness 
is obtained only in the mode belonging to the sense’s fullness.’2
Shpet now approaches his own defi nition of sense, writing that he 
conceives of sense not as the object in its determinant How but as the full 
and authentic sense. This, according to Shpet, is ‘by no means an abstract 
form but that which is internally inherent in the object itself, its intimate 
something’. For him what lies in the sense is what ‘creates a whole and 
integral thing from the isolated content’. Finally, Shpet concludes that
If the object in its determinant How makes up only the content, then 
evidently something else must still be found in the noema besides 
the content and its bearer, something that demands its own phenom-
enological description, both from the noematic side and from the cor-
relatively noetic side. In other words, it is a question of the transition 
1 Ibid.
2 Shpet 1991, pp. 115–116.
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from sense, as the meant noema, to the sense of this meant something, 
as the being of the object, and thereby of its ‘actuality’.1
Shpet enters here, as it were, a new level of phenomenological analysis. 
He moves from the question ‘how is X given’ to ‘how is X given as it is 
given’. In other words, Shpet is interested not only in the fact that there 
is sense in the way things are given, but indeed in how this sense is there, 
what its origin and its nature are. Shpet states that he is thus looking 
for a formative beginning or a principle, included in the content of the 
noema. He fi nalizes his analysis with a formula: ‘The determinant How 
of the object gives, in our opinion, sense as sich, the How in the modes of 
givenness gives sense in sich. The question to which we advance is that 
of the sense für sich’.2
Shpet’s discussion stands in an interesting connection with the evo-
lution of Husserl’s thought in the period following the publication of 
Ideas, that is, the latter’s gradual transition to genetic phenomenology. 
As Anthony Steinbock writes, in this transition Husserl’s understanding 
of phenomenology as a whole changed considerably. If phenomenology 
had fi rst designated a style of openness that ‘allows one to be struck by 
modes of givenness, by phenomena’, in the new standpoint, the phe-
nomenologist’s task lies, additionally, in uncovering a sedimented his-
tory implicit in sense constitution.3 Husserl thus adopted an interpretive 
position with respect to the teleological genesis of sense and came to 
see the results gained in the static mode of phenomenology as leading 
clues to the new genetic problems.4 Moving to a genetic point of view 
was in Husserl’s words a way to ‘overcome the level of static Platonism’.5
According to Donn Welton, Husserl was indeed able to see — more 
clearly than any of his predecessors — the necessary, even if unseen, 
functioning of sense-giving horizons in any experience. Without these 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 116. Italics mine.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 117. For a brief elucidation of Shpet’s formula see Kuznetsov 2014, 
pp. 187–188.
3 Steinbock 1998, p. 127.
4 Steinbock 1998, pp. 128–133.
5 Husserl used the expression in a letter to Paul Natorp in 1918. Cited in Steinbock 
1998, p. 128.
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horizons, as Welton writes, ‘the world would cease to be signifi cant’. But, 
as he also observes, problems of ‘untold complexity’ arose for Husserl 
when he turned to questions regarding the constitution of the horizon 
itself, of how the horizon is formed, and how exactly it makes possible 
the givenness of the world to us.1 Moreover, Welton attributes Husserl’s 
diffi  culties in analysing the constitution of meaning-horizons to the 
abiding unclarity of his notion of meaning, which was noted above by 
Solomon. How meaning was conceptualized in Logical Investigations 
could not help Husserl with his new tasks, and the issue required thor-
ough rethinking. Welton fi nds that Husserl did not at fi rst succeed in 
this, and that his discussion on Sinn in Ideas had ‘a disturbing eff ect’ on 
his transcendental phenomenology project.
In Ideas the hyletic data are considered to be ‘a formless, timeless, 
immanent, noetic content of consciousness’, which the act of con-
sciousness ‘animates with a representative function’. Welton argues 
that Husserl, contrary to his most crucial principle, thus creates a split 
between the intentional object and the real object — and along with 
this come ‘all the problems of Hume’s empiricism’.2 Welton understands 
Husserl’s intentional object as that which is referred to through the 
meaning of an expressive act, which leads to the defi nition of the noema 
as ‘that meaning which is bestowed or taken up by the expressive act 
(noesis)’.3 But when Husserl attempts to apply this scheme to an analysis 
of perception, Welton notes, he runs into trouble:
On the one hand, we can contrast the ‘self-same’ object I perceive to 
the varying and diff erent profi les of the object I see. This contrast, 
however, is not a contrast within a possible object but rather one made 
with an individual real object in view. And this starting point moves 
precisely from what the logical characterization of the intentional 
object excluded, namely, a concrete object of perception. On the other 
hand, Husserl wants to speak of this perceptual contrast between the 
same object and its profi les not merely as a diff erence ‘in’ the fulfi lling 
1 Welton 1977, p. 55.
2 Welton 1977, p. 57.
3 Welton 1977, p. 56.
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object but as a diff erence in the perceptual act, as a diff erence which, 
in fact, makes the perceptual contrast possible.1
Welton maintains that the problem is that when Husserl characterizes 
the perceptual experience of an object, he must treat it through an in-
terplay of intention and its fulfi lment: the perceptual object is seen as 
a ‘fi lled-in’ intentional object. Welton continues:
As long as the coincidence between Darstellungsinhalt and the given 
was adequate and as long as meaning, logically characterized, was con-
sidered symmetrical with the unmodalized perceptual object fulfi lling 
or ratifying it, Husserl had no reason to be concerned with the unique 
structure of the perceptual object. But once it is seen as inadequate, 
even for the immanent sphere, we are left with a nasty split between 
intentional and perceptual object, between ‘mental’ object and con-
crete object.2
Welton’s criticism comes close to Shpet’s earlier concerns. As Shpet’s 
example of the man/chimney aimed to show, the perceptual object of 
a dark, unmoving fi gure and the actual object of a chimney did not at fi rst 
coincide; the perception became adequate only after an act of reason-
ing seemed to change the perceptual object to correspond to the actual 
object. In other words, it is not clear to Shpet just how it happened that 
the intuition was eventually ‘fi lled’. Shpet thus recognizes the need for 
a rational factor in experience and its correlative experiential actuality, 
arguing that phenomenology must fi nd a way to show ‘not only that 
reason fi nds itself in authentic actuality and asserts the truth in itself, 
but it must also show how reason arrives at itself by way of the path of 
comprehension’.3 To strengthen his claim, Shpet quotes Husserl:
Just as every intentive mental process has a noema and therein a sense 
by which it is related to an object, so, conversely, everything which we 
1 Ibid.
2 Welton 1977, p. 57.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 124.
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call object, of which we speak, which we confront as actuality which 
we hold as possible or probable, no matter how indeterminately we 
think it, is precisely therefore already and object of consciousness; 
and that which signifi es that whatever world and actuality taken uni-
versally may be called, they must be presented in the framework of 
actual and possible consciousness by corresponding senses or posita 
fi lled with more or less intuitive contents.1
Shpet’s recognition of a rational factor in actuality is indeed not too 
distant from Husserl, who, in his book’s fourth and last section (entitled 
‘Reason and Reality’), returns to what he calls a basic claim of conscious-
ness: that it is related to an objective reference. How are these objective 
relations in fact valid or invalid, Husserl asks? He asserts that these are 
the questions that must now be ‘made clear phenomenologically in the 
light of the distinction between noesis and noema’. Husserl asserts that 
he thus fi nds himself confronted with ‘the great problems of the Reason’.2
Following a parallel reasoning and, again, referring directly to Hus-
serl’s text, Shpet writes:
The sense relates to its ‘the same thing’, the object, a certain X, as 
its ‘bearer’. ‘But’, as Husserl then asks, ‘is it (this X -GS) actually the 
same? And is the object itself ‘actual’?’3 In every cognition as such there 
lie questions about actuality, since every cognition has its correlate 
in an ‘object’, which is meant as ‘actually existing’. But the following 
question always arises: When is the noematically ‘meant’ identity of 
X the ‘actual identity’ of X and not ‘merely’ the meant identity, and 
what does this ‘merely meant’ identity signify?4
1 Shpet 1991, pp. 125–126. See Husserl 1967, p. 374.
2 Husserl 1967, pp. 360–361.
3 Husserl (1967, pp. 376–377) writes: ‘The X in the diff erent acts or act-noemata 
furnished with a diff ering “determining content” is necessarily known as the same. 
But is it really the same? And is the object itself real? Could it not be unreal whilst the 
various agreeing and even intuitionally saturated posited meaning — whatever their 
essential content might be — fulfi lled their function according to the measures of 
consciousness?’
4 Shpet 1991, p. 126.
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Similarly, Husserl continues by asking: what does the word ‘real’ mean 
when we are thinking of real objects, of things in the ‘real world’, but 
which are given ‘only through meanings and positions’? Husserl again 
emphasizes that he is not interested merely in the ‘fact-world of con-
sciousness and the fulfi lling of its functions’. Consciousness, or the 
conscious subject itself, in Husserl’s words, ‘passes judgments about 
reality, asks questions about it, thinks it probable or doubts it, resolves 
the doubt and thereby passes “verdicts of the reason”’. What needs to be 
brought under phenomenological analysis is just this state of aff airs, 
which leads the focus to ‘the essence of this judicial right’, which, in 
turn, Husserl writes, is ‘correlatively the essence of “reality”’. He adds 
that the focus is, of course, not merely on realities (Wirklichkeiten), ‘in 
whatever pregnant sense the term be used’, but instead, all questions 
regarding reality are to be tackled in correlation with ‘all forms of knowl-
edge as such’.1
According to Hanne Jacobs Husserl’s main aim in providing phenom-
enological descriptions of the structures of consciousness was to develop 
an account of reason (Vernunft). That is, she asserts, ‘phenomenology 
is ultimately a phenomenology of reason’. In Jacobs’s reading Husserl’s 
ultimate aim was not only to describe intentional experience as such, but 
to describe the structure of the kind of experience which is found to be 
‘rational (vernünftig) or justifi ed (begründet)’ — phenomenology is thus 
fundamentally set against the threat of psychologism, relativism, and 
scepticism, striving to secure the possibility of absolutely indubitable 
knowledge. As Jacobs writes, for Husserl I can intend something ration-
ally if the way I take something to be ‘is true to how it in fact is’. Such 
intending requires something more than a singular clear-cut moment 
of intention. In an experience of such fulfi lment, I am at the same time 
‘aware of the grounds for taking something a certain way, and I am aware 
that I am rational in virtue of being aware of these grounds — when, for 
example, I see that the previously unseen backside of the object in front 
of me is how I took it to be’.2
1 Husserl 1967, pp. 377–378.
2 Jacobs 2016, p. 259.
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In other words, things do not just turn up with a certain sense; we 
also take or posit them to be the way they turn up. According to Jacobs we 
must thus be pre-refl ectively aware of how we take something to be, and 
accordingly, we must be sensitive to whatever speaks for or against tak-
ing something being in a certain way. Jacobs’s notion could be a solution 
to Shpet’s man/chimney dilemma: he was sensitive to the factors which 
directed him to take the blurry perceptual object in one way rather than 
another. This sensitivity adds up to ‘nothing less than an exercise of 
rationality’. As Jacobs notes, such a phenomenological refl ection is not 
obvious in Husserl’s most commonly used examples, in which he speaks 
of something as remembered, desired, imagined, and so on.1 Rather, the 
focus here turns to a refl ection on the origin or genesis of the sense of 
a particular experience. Thus, the refl ection now becomes doubly self-
aware, as in Shpet’s conception.
Jacobs writes that the pre-refl ective self-awareness, that is ‘presup-
posed for a refl ection on how I am aware of something’,
is not just a pre-refl ective awareness of my conscious awareness of 
something but a pre-refl ective awareness of my conscious awareness 
of something with a certain sense (i. e., in terms of how it is deter-
mined for me). And this awareness is constitutive of the exercise of 
rationality when not refl ecting. That is, if we were not pre-refl ectively 
aware of how we take something to be, we could not be sensitive to 
what speaks for or against us taking something in a certain way on 
the pre-refl ective level.2
It is important to note the pre-refl ective nature of this sensitivity: Jacobs 
asserts that we do not need to actively refl ect on how we take some-
thing to be if we are to be aware, mostly implicitly, of the grounds for 
our taking it in that way. Our consciousness of the given shifts from 
inattention to attention, and we can at any time focus on something 
that was previously in the ‘background’ of our perception. It seems that 
1 Jacobs (2016, p. 262) refers to this as an ‘explicit second-order awareness of our 
conscious experiences’.
2 Jacobs 2016, p. 263.
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mere attentiveness is enough to bring consciousness to a state of active 
positing. As Jacobs writes, ‘when attentive I accept the sense with which 
something is aff orded on the basis of it showing itself to actually be such 
and so’.1 Therefore, she continues, ‘the exercise of rationality extends 
beyond the rare moments of actual refl ection’. To make a judgement 
about what I experience, to posit something, I already pre-refl ectively 
hold the corresponding logical proposition to be true ‘on the basis of 
the object appearing to me that way, which is why I judge it to be such’.2 
Jacobs cites a passage from Husserl’s manuscript from 1911, where he 
writes that ‘A sensuous grasping, a grasping of something sensible pre-
supposes a sensuous appearance, and in this case the grasping entails an 
accepting, a taking on and taking up of something that already mani-
fested itself ’.3
Pre-refl ective rationality is possible because of the sedimentation 
of sense. All our past perceptions, predicative activity, and other com-
mitments (in short, all our positings) determine how we intend objects 
now.4 Husserl’s treatment of rationality is thus closely connected with 
his transition to genetic phenomenology: experience and sense-consti-
tution, which are necessarily interconnected, have a dynamic and evolv-
ing character.5 As Timo Miettinen puts it, Husserl’s genetic approach 
was focused on questions of how and why certain forms of experience 
were possible. Instead of any empirical causality, Husserl was interested 
in the structures of motivation which found these experiences; there 
is a certain teleology which directs them. According to Miettinen this 
notion is already present in Husserl’s discussion of positing (Setzung) 
in Ideas, although it still lacks the temporal dimension:
Introduced as a part of the static analyses of consciousness, teleology 
referred to the basic associative or synthetic structure of conscious 
1 Jacobs 2016, p. 265.
2 Jacobs 2016, pp. 263–264.
3 Cited in Jacobs 2016, p. 264.
4 Jacobs 2016, p. 266. Jacobs argues that the historicity of sense also gives us the 
opportunity to scrutinize our perceptions and beliefs, since ‘we do not always have 
grounds, let alone conclusive grounds’ for taking something in a certain way.
5 Miettinen 2019, p. 117.
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life, which constitutes the basic unity of experience. To say that our 
conscious life is ‘teleologically oriented’ simply means that we do not 
live through mere fl eeting experiences, but our conscious life aims at 
creating concrete beings as unities. For instance, individual percep-
tions of particular ‘sides’ of a thing have their telos in the constitution 
of ‘complete’ objects. Instead of a separate category of being, teleology 
was to be understood as the ‘form of all forms’ (Form aller Formen), 
that is, as the general structure of all meaning-constitution that we 
are constantly living through.1
Shpet locates this moment of motivation in Husserl’s text. However, 
as earlier in the case of the noematic sense, he argues that Husserl has 
failed to account for its origin. Shpet writes that even if ‘we can rec-
ognise that the mode of givenness in its completeness motivates the 
positing, then nevertheless <we can ask> how does this motivation exist 
and how do we arrive at it. (That is, how is it that the given intuition is 
at the same time that which motivates?)’.2
Like Husserl, Shpet maintains that this core question of phenom-
enology concerns not only the rationally motivated character of the pos-
iting. but in the necessary correlation also ‘the rationality of actual being 
itself ’. He repeats Husserl’s insight that to each truly existing object 
there corresponds ‘the idea of a possible consciousness in which the ob-
ject is grasped’.3 From the phenomenological standpoint, there is indeed 
no other way of addressing the ‘being itself ’ than from the perspective 
of it being given to a consciousness. Or, as Dermot Moran writes, there 
is no such thing as the thing in itself.4 And as both Shpet and Husserl 
agree, a moment of reason is necessarily present in this givenness. Yet 
1 Miettinen 2019, p. 118.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 132.
3 Ibid.
4 Moran 2005, p. 6. Shpet (1991, p. 142) comments on the same issue in a footnote: 
‘We stress that what interests us is not the so-called problem of the reality of the ex-
ternal world, which is a purely metaphysical problem. We merely wish to terminate 
this analysis of the content of appearance, taking it as the object of phenomenol-
ogy in its essential givenness. Kant’s “proof of the existence of things outside me” 
belongs to the purely metaphysical side of the question’.
2.2. ‘But Where Does Sense-Bestowal Come From?’  123
Shpet asserts that a crucial question remains unanswered: ‘How does 
the object show its “truth”, its rationality?’ In other words, Shpet asks 
that if ‘the mode of givenness in its completeness motivates the posit-
ing’, how, consequentially, ‘can an “appearance” prescribe “rules” for 
the positum? […]’1
To a large degree, Shpet and Husserl agree on the necessity and na-
ture of the discovered reason in actuality. Furthermore, it seems that 
for both of them being rationally demonstratable or identifi able corre-
lates with being true and being actual. According to Daniel Dahlstrom 
reason, truth and actuality are indeed in some sense equivalent in 
Husserl’s usage, or at least ‘there is a kind of metonymy’ in his uses 
of these terms.2 Yet Shpet’s consistent argument is that Husserl has 
not yet discovered the source of this reason. To him, it is ‘surely unin-
telligible how givenness as such, fi lling a positum, thereby motivates 
the latter rationally’. Shpet concludes that he must thus ‘suppose that 
“rationality” either is a new moment demanding explication or it re-
fers to the essence of givenness and, consequently, must have already 
been revealed to us’.3 In the fi nal chapter of his book Shpet proposes 
a solution to this problem. In this dense chapter he introduces the 
concepts of ‘social world’, ‘entelechy’, ‘internal sense’, and ‘intelligible 
intuition’, which move his thinking decidedly towards a hermeneutic 
phenomenology, concerned, above all, with comprehending the given. 
The new terminology is presented without much explanation, and the 
concepts (particularly, perhaps, the ‘internal sense’) remain diffi  cult to 
grasp.4 Yet they are of crucial importance to the further development 
of Shpet’s thinking.
1 Shpet 1991, p. 132.
2 Dahlstrom (2015, p. 275) adds that whereas Husserl’s approach to reason breaks the 
Kantian tradition, it has notable affi  nities with Hegel’s understanding of reason.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 132.
4 For example, Nemeth (2019b, p. 268) writes that Shpet ‘unfortunately, never devot-
ed the kind of attention to a detailed elaboration of the means, or the “mechanism”, 
by which we, as investigators, determine or uncover the purported sociality of an 
object that Husserl did to eidetic intuition’. Rakhmatullo Mukhamadiev (2008, 
pp. 137–139) has likewise criticized Shpet’s vague treatment of the abovementioned 
concepts.
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2.2.3. The Entelechy
Opening the fi nal chapter of his book, Shpet writes:
the distinctive feature of phenomenology as contained in Husserl’s 
exposition lies in the fact that for the time being he does not so much 
solve problems as pose them. This fact alone reveals the great productiv-
ity of the phenomenological method. For philosophy there is nothing 
which ‘goes without saying’. Yet to see a philosophical problem demands 
a particular philosophical way of looking as well. The phenomenologi-
cal attitude facilitates the intellectual seeing of problems. Indeed, it 
appears fraught with them. Every solution to a problem, or every at-
tempted solution that can now be made, in turn discloses to us a new 
series of questions and demands probing anew deeper into the matter.1
It is this openness to questioning, Shpet writes, that has defi ned his ap-
proach to Husserl’s phenomenology. He admits that he began his work 
with a doubt, or rather a demand for a critical answer concerning the 
distinction that ‘goes without saying’ between the two ‘sorts’ of intui-
tion, which Shpet associates with the old dispute between nominalism 
and realism. Does this division in fact exhaust the characteristics of the 
sources of originary givenness, Shpet asks? He can now conclude:
By proceeding deeper into the content of phenomenology and reveal-
ing the fundamental moments in the structure of an appearance, our 
aim was to demonstrate that as we suspected from the very start there 
actually is a defi ciency <in the mentioned division> and, as a conse-
quence, the ‘content’ itself of an appearance does not turn out to be 
completely revealed.2
The source of the coincidence which occurs between the positional 
act and the sense in the positum, remains unclear for now, or as Shpet 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 145.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 146.
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writes, incomplete. He declares that behind ‘the veil of the object there 
still lies the riddle of the “beginning” of the object itself and along with it 
the “source” or its rational motivation’.1 Shpet asserts that the authentic 
sense of an object is not found in the ‘the How of its determinations’; 
instead, he declares that it is ‘shown only by penetrating into the internal 
intimate something of that which stands before us!’2 To clarify his idea, 
Shpet provides his second famous illustration:
Let us take a concrete object and recall the example given by Aristotle 
of the axe. We, it is true, fi nd its ‘internal sense’ in its ‘chopping’. 
That the sense is shown in the fully concrete ‘independent’ object 
is quite correct. But how can the internal something, which we have 
been stressing, be connected to the concrete independent object if the 
former is not in the proper ‘Hows’ of the object? And what is more, 
it, this internal something, is also not in the content of the abstract 
dependency of the object! As we pointed out, ‘sense’ remains a ‘sig-
nifi cation’, although very broadened, and what we are looking for is 
not included in it.3
Shpet’s reference to Aristotle reveals much about how he is reading 
Husserl. His example of the axe connects him to Aristotle’s illustra-
tion of matter (e. g. wood and iron) and form (e. g. the power to chop), 
which together institute a composite, the axe.4 The example appears 
in Aristotle’s complex discussion of the notions of form and matter, as 
related to the notions of actuality and potentiality; his hylomorphic 
doctrine. We may have the material required to build an axe. While un-
built, the material has the potential to become an axe. In gaining its fi nal 
form as an axe, it gains actuality. The varying degrees of potentiality and 
actuality are present in all beings, animate or inanimate, for Aristotle. 
Each being has its own teleological direction: this assigns to each being 
their own way of being, or essence. Indeed, Aristotle writes that ‘if a tool 
1 Ibid.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 148.
3 Ibid.
4 Ackrill 1972–73, p. 122.
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like an axe were a natural body, the substance of the axe would be the 
essence of the axe, and this would be its soul’.1 As Fred D. Miller writes, 
the description (logos) of the axe includes the function of chopping, and 
were the axe to lose this function, it would no longer fi t this description.
John Lloyd Ackrill has argued that Aristotle’s conception, although 
immensely infl uential, remains open to interpretation. Interestingly, 
the concern Ackrill raises resembles that presented by Shpet. Aristotle 
gives the form of axe as chopping (or more exactly, the power to chop): 
if the initially formless material is manipulated so that it gains the power 
to chop, roughly put, it becomes an axe. But Ackrill notes that some 
interpreters have identifi ed this form with the concept of being an axe, 
although the concept of chopping is not identical with the concept of 
an axe.2 ‘Having sight is not sight, nor is being blind blindness’, Ackrill 
writes, following Aristotle; ‘“[t]he power to chop and “being able to 
chop” are not interchangeable expressions. Nor, moreover, are “being 
able to chop” and “being an axe”’.3
Ackrill’s question concerns ‘what-it-is-to-be-X’. He writes that for 
Aristotle to ask why an X is an X is ‘to ask why certain specifi ed matter 
is (constitutes) an X; and to answer such a question one must give the 
form of X’. He asserts that this is not to say that an X is identical with 
its form, since an X (say, an axe) is a composite of form and matter. 
Nonetheless, ‘the form is what the matter has to get or have if it is to 
become or be an X; for the matter, to become or to be an X, is precisely 
to get or to have the form’.4 Aristotle’s concepts of form and matter thus 
function best to explain change, while, as Ackrill notes, the matter-
form distinction is more diffi  cult to apply when the matter is itself al-
ready necessarily formed, as in the case of living bodies.5 Animate and 
inanimate objects are indeed crucially diff erent in Aristotle’s theory: all 
living beings have a soul as their ‘principle of life’, whereas man-made 
1 Cited in Miller 1999, p. 312.
2 Ackrill 1972–73, p. 121. The interpretation Ackrill has in mind is one off ered by David 
Wiggins in his Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (1967).
3 Ackrill 1972–73, p. 122.
4 Ackrill 1972–73, p. 123.
5 Ackrill 1972–73, pp. 125–126.
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artefacts do not.1 Yet there is a certain analogy between these two 
kinds of existing: the soul (psuche) of a living being stands in the same 
relationship to its body as the form of an axe to its matter.2 The im-
portant diff erence, at least from the perspective of Shpet’s thought, is 
that while axes are formed by giving the initial matter an outer form 
of a chopping tool, the form of a living being is their soul or essence as 
that which moves them from the inside.
Shpet’s ‘internal intimate something’ of the axe comes notably close 
to Aristotle’s soul. For him it is found in the concrete object, as it be-
longs to its essence and indeed creates it for the fi rst time.3 The language 
Shpet uses also carries connotations of a soul, as he compares perceiving 
a transcendent ‘concrete something’ to the ‘psychological seeing of the 
other’s individuality as a “whole”’. He hopes to grasp not just the sense 
of the appearance ‘but also that of the “object” (the X, the “bearer”)’. In 
so doing, he aims to fi nd ‘that which makes the concrete something con-
crete and the individual something individual’.4 Shpet’s straightforward 
merging of Husserl’s and Aristotle’s philosophies appears questionable. 
Still, there is evidently a direct line connecting his concern regarding 
Husserl’s sense, which he found to be but an abstract form and the in-
ternal sense of the axe, for which he is now looking. Shpet asserts that 
he the noema ‘not only in the How of the object, the objective How, but 
also in the entire concrete nature of its fulfi lment, i. e., in the fulfi lment 
of its sense’.5
Whereas Shpet previously argued that he could not see where 
Husserl’s sense-bestowal came from, he now makes a suggestion: once 
we are no longer ‘limited to an “unsubstantiated” givenness and evi-
dentness’, we can reveal the meaningful object’s motivation. ‘This mo-
tivation leads us to the essence of the thing being described and at the 
same time also shows us in this essence the essential “concatenations” 
(“sviazi”) of the thing described. Evidently they can be predicated as if 
1 Miller 1999, p 309.
2 Miller 1999, p. 311.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 149.
4 Shpet 1991, p. 134.
5 Shpet 1991, p. 149.
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they formed “part” of the object in its determinant How’. At the same 
time, however, Shpet notes that
there is something peculiar to these predicates of ‘motivation’ that 
prompts us to speak precisely of the ‘motivation’, something that, as it 
were ‘leads’ us away from the central noematic core. Correlatively, the 
noeses, too, adopt a new direction, and we can state intentional con-
sciousness ‘passes on’, as it were, to a new sphere of mental processes, 
without changing, however, the direction of its attention, which as 
before can remain directed to the corresponding central noematic 
core.1
Shpet proposes that a new ‘stratum’, connected with the determi-
nant How of the object — but which must nonetheless be distinguished 
from it — is revealed here. Shpet writes that he has grounds for consider-
ing this new stratum ‘as lying even deeper’ than the examined stratum 
of sense since ‘the former is revealed only in the latter’. This stratum 
is what Shpet now designates as the internal something. He explains:
Certainly I can predicate this ‘chopping’ as a pure quality, but it is 
impossible to ignore the fact that this is precisely that quality which 
‘leads’ me away from the ‘axe’, conceived as the ‘content’ of some noe-
ma, to the mentioned motivating concatenations. If I address myself 
to this quality, bearing in mind precisely this ‘aspect’ of it, it in itself 
will be for me only a ‘sign’, and the ‘chopping’ turns out to be the in-
timately internal something of the objective content itself. Thereby 
the ‘chopping’ on the whole turns out to be, according to Aristotle, the 
objective content’s ‘soul’ or entelechy. It is not diffi  cult to represent in 
this entelechic stratum or, more accurately, in the core of the sense 
itself as content something that has its bearer in the same object as 
the entire noema, but for which the object in its determinant How is 
only an ‘external’ sign.2
1 Ibid.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 150.
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It is of course somewhat surprising that Shpet uses Aristotle’s exam-
ple of an axe for his purposes, since, as we saw earlier, the latter specifi -
cally states that the axe does not have a soul. Shpet also goes further, 
associating the ‘soul’ (psuche) with Aristotle’s original and diffi  cult-to-
pin-down concept of entelechy (entelecheia). Werner Marx, too, equates 
Aristotle’s soul with entelecheia, or energeia, the two terms being nearly 
synonymous.1 It is what constitutes the unity of a body and produces it 
as a living thing; ‘it takes the body in its hand, so to speak, as it would 
a tool and thus actualizes it as an organized and ordered unity’. The soul 
is not therefore a part or a quality of a body, but that which determines 
it as what it is and fulfi ls it. Insofar as Aristotle considers the soul to be 
identical to the entelechy, Marx asserts that it could also be called ‘life’.2
Shpet, at fi rst, makes a clear distinction between the phenomena of 
the social world, such as an axe, and those of the natural world, such as 
a grain: the fi rst should be seen as carrying an internal sense, whereas the 
latter is an ‘object of pure content’, in which the content of the noema is 
exhausted in its fulfi lment. However, he continues that it ‘is not diffi  cult 
to convince ourselves that any object at all — in any case any concrete 
object — can have entelechy of its own. For this only the “assistance” of 
a corresponding act of intentional consciousness is necessary’.3 According 
to Shpet there is always a possibility of such a ‘motivational conversion’. 
He concludes that while we can see an entelechy in any object,4 what we 
fi nd is sometimes only a ‘quasi-entelechy’: when, for example, ‘we say 
a grain dances, a star predicts or an axe narrates’. This conception is re-
1 See Marx (1977, p. 41: footnote 93) for the complexities in interpreting the relation-
ship of entelecheia and energeia.
2 Marx 1977, pp. 41–42. The diff erent ‘functions’ of life, as classifi ed by Aristotle, 
are furthermore interesting from a phenomenological viewpoint. Marx notes that 
Aristotle ‘distinguishes between diff erent “parts of the soul”, its powers or pos-
sibilities, beginning with the nutritive, self-propagating soul, proceeding to the 
perceiving soul, then the appetitive, up to the function of the soul which occurs in 
man alone, namely, noesis, intuitive understanding. For Aristotle, this last function 
represents the fulfi lment of all the possibilities of the soul and thus the energeia, 
conceived as the telos, of the soul as a whole’.
3 Shpet 1991, pp. 151–152.
4 Nemeth (2018, p. 277) uses the examples of seeing a face in the clouds or taking it 
that the bridge of one’s nose was designed as a place to rest one’s spectacles.
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lated to Husserl’s notion of neutrality modifi cation, since in these cases, 
as Shpet writes, we do not demonstrate against the ‘falsity’ of posita, but 
we also do not assert their ‘truthfulness’.1
Hermeneutical acts are required for the grasping of the internal 
something or the internal sense. Through them we ‘intellectually see 
in the content of the noema only a sign for something’. For Shpet the 
positum thus changes its character: it is not only the unity of sense and 
the moments of positional character, but ‘their unity together with the 
unity of the entelechy and the moments of a hermeneutic character’. 
Correspondingly, the sense gains independence within the structure of 
the noema, and Shpet now notes that the act of sense-bestowal comes 
to be seen ‘as an independent act sui generis not necessarily attached to 
a pure positional act’. The sense is thus distinguished from the logical, 
conceptual meaning of the object, even if the two are interconnected. 
Shpet asserts that concepts that have a defi nitive signifi cation ‘can turn 
out to be completely devoid of sense, for example, the concept of “na-
ture” in the science of mechanics’.2 He considers the sense-bestowing 
act and the hermeneutical, comprehending act as symmetrical, and the 
term that covers them both is interpretation. Shpet writes:
Above all, the question can arise here whether the givenness of en-
telechy is not simply an originary givenness, which we could call an 
intuitive givenness. If so, we would have to speak of a separate kind of 
intelligible intuition, as demanded in accordance with everything we 
have said. But how would we understand this? Is it to be a third ‘genus’ 
of intuition alongside with the other two [empirical and ideal — LB]? 
If such is the case, we would have the characteristic of some third 
genus of objects alongside objects experientially and ideally given.3
Shpet points out that in the natural attitude things continuously ap-
pear before us as signs: language, art, any social objects, organisms and 
people seem to Shpet to always appear ‘with their own intimate sense’. 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 152.
2 Shpet 1991, pp. 153–154.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 158.
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He asserts that although we cannot in any way perceive it, we neverthe-
less know: ‘We know that “der Tisch” means the table, the table means 
an instrument for such and such an end. […] We know that birds have 
wings for fl ying, that a given pamphlet was written for a protest’.1 The 
intersubjective aspect of Shpet’s entelechy is obvious, as he points out: 
these purposes are learned. According to Shpet what is important is that 
it ‘belongs to the essence of consciousness itself not only to see intellec-
tually, but also to understand, to comprehend, what is intellectually seen. 
Indeed this “comprehension” is not merely an inference, just as it is not 
merely a representative function in general but also a presentative one’.2
Shpet asserts that a social union is indeed the very starting point of 
any intuition of the world and that to forfeit the faculty of intelligible 
intuition, or comprehension, which makes it possible, ‘even granted the 
full faculty of experiencing and ideal intuitions, means to go mad’; this 
he sees as the sole exit from this union. He continues:
With regard to our formulation of the question in the fi fth chapter 
we are now convinced that the sense of an appearance, to the extent 
that it is revealed in the content of the object, actually contains the 
principle for disclosing the physical thing as an actual being. But this 
principle is revealed in the object’s entelechy only by means of com-
prehension. Indeed only here does this principle appear in its fun-
damental signifi cation, since from it the principle that every object 
is sense bestowed is intellectually seen. Just as the sense of an ideal 
object lies in its very ideality and the sense of an abstract object in 
its abstractness as a dependent being, so the sense of the concrete is 
revealed in its intermediate position, its ‘translating’ relation, between 
part and whole, where the insight of entelechy is nothing other than 
the full act of seeing the ‘idea’ in its fulfi lling signifi cation.3
The being of reason consists in hermeneutic functions that establish 
the rational motivation or entelechy as the ‘bearer’ of objective being. 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 159.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 160.
3 Shpet 1991, p. 161.
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In Shpet’s words, it is the ‘spirit of the object’, which fi nds its characteris-
tic in an expression, in logos, which is the ‘manifestation’ or the ‘incarna-
tion’. and at the same time the ‘objectifi cation’ of this spirit. Ultimately, 
Shpet concludes that it is no longer necessary to suggest a third form of 
(intelligible) intuition, but that instead there is only a single intuition, 
which covers experience in its totality: every intuition can be elevated to 
the level of comprehension. ‘Such an elucidation of the question, it seems 
to us, gives us the right to construct demarcations between philosophy 
as a whole and that “peculiar” comprehension which can take its stand 
in its own right,’ Shpet writes. ‘Through a “comprehension” of the world 
as it is, through a self-comprehension of reason, philosophy arrives at the 
world’s “truth” and its “beauty”’.1
Certainly, Shpet’s talk of a spirit of the object, as well as truth and 
beauty, seems both ambiguous and questionable. In a recent article 
Nemeth appears to express his disappointment in this treatment of the 
entelechy, which brings scarcely any new information into the given-
ness of the object. Nemeth writes:
Shpet claimed that a deeper examination of the structure of an ap-
pearance reveals that it contains more than the two species can show. 
Although in any object we can fi nd its concrete noema, we cannot 
locate its ‘authentic sense’ in looking at it in abstraction. a concrete 
social or cultural object has an ‘internal something’ or ‘internal sense’, 
i. e., entelechy. True, this can be seen in the natural attitude, but Shpet 
asserted that in the phenomenological attitude we can see this more 
clearly. In the latter, we are not distracted by the sheer variety of in-
dividual properties given in experiencing intuition.2
Meanwhile, Rakhmatullo Mukhamadiev doubts whether there is any 
novelty in his theory if Shpet’s entelechy is a direct loan from Aristotle.3 
Nemeth’s earlier analysis helps to clarify Shpet’s elusive description of 
entelechy. He asserts that for Shpet an object’s entelechy lies within the 
1 Shpet 1991, p. 163.
2 Nemeth 2018, p. 277.
3 Mukhamadiev 2008, p. 139.
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core of the noematic content. Corresponding to entelechy there exists 
an ‘entelechic noesis’. The entelechy requires an act that motivates the 
positing belief, but at the same time this act lies within the positional 
act and thus does not form an act of its own. In Nemeth’s formulation 
‘such an act “sees” the noematic sense as a sign for entelechy, and 
therefore, as motivating the positional act, is hermeneutic. […] In other 
words, the entelechic noesis is a hermeneutic act, and just as the noe-
sis serves the function of sense-bestowal, so too does the hermeneutic 
act, the fulfi lled expression of which is an interpretation’.1 However, in 
a later text it appears to Nemeth that Shpet reaches this hermeneutic 
turn with a suspicious ease. He suggests that the philosopher’s notion 
of intellectual intuition is ill-defi ned, as it can be simply identifi ed with 
‘empathy’ or ‘comprehension’, presenting a ‘terminological inconsist-
ency, if not confusion’. Further, Nemeth proposes that Shpet’s turn 
might have been accomplished at the expense of the transcendental 
reduction.2
And yet, as Aleksei Savin writes, the idea of entelechy is ‘the key 
idea and main result of the Shpetian development of phenomenology’. 
According to Savin the conception of entelechy is the logical outcome of 
Husserl’s project for Shpet: ‘If Husserl had been able to think his move 
through to the end, he would have then obtained “Iavlenie i smysl”. 
That is what Shpet’s claim is like; no more, no less’.3 Shpet’s entelechy, 
to be sure, has proven diffi  cult to defi ne. Savin suggests that one reason 
for the diffi  culties in accounting for its signifi cance — in particular, its 
phenomenological signifi cance — can be explained by the fact that since 
the fi rst to analyse Shpet’s thought were philologists and especially 
‘Western Slavist philologists’, their point of view was often semiotically 
biased. Savin claims that ‘for them the most interesting and signifi cant 
was his analysis of the word, which they considered from the linguistic 
(semiotics’) perspective’.4 As a result, Shpet’s work in phenomenology 
1 Nemeth 2009, p. 130.
2 Nemeth 2014, pp. 62–63. Nemeth asks whose consciousness, after all, is constitut-
ing the sense of a given ‘social object’.
3 Denn & al. 2014, p. 148.
4 Savin 2015, p. 343.
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was often viewed as a preparatory stage, interesting mostly inasmuch 
as it led to the more mature hermeneutic understanding of history, lan-
guage and culture.
Savin wishes to question this style of interpretation. He argues that 
Shpet in fact never leaves his phenomenological position, and that his 
later works are modifi cations of his original interest. He describes the 
overall goal of Shpet’s intellectual career as an ‘explication of meaning of 
object and the conditions of its meaningfulness in light of the problem 
of the relation between constructive reason and reality, and respectively 
the resolution of the questions of meaningfulness and justifi cation of 
life in its concrete forms’.1 I agree with Savin’s claim and believe that 
not only should Shpet’s works, following Iavlenie i smysl, be analysed 
through his phenomenological conceptions, but that his hermeneu-
tic turn itself, leading to the conceptions of entelechy, should be seen 
strictly as part of Shpet’s phenomenological project. Here, I again follow 
Nelli Motroshilova, who suggests that all too often, something is read 
into Iavlenie i smysl which does not in fact occur in it.2 It seems to me that 
nothing in this work suggests that Shpet had any intention of making 
a departure from Husserlian phenomenology in 1914.
In the following chapter I present a short discussion of Shpet’s his-
torical and social entry point to phenomenology, and how it aff ected 
the outcome of his thought. In the meantime, however, I suggest that 
Iavlenie i smysl, in as much as is possible, be read independently of this 
broader, historiographical, hermeneutic and semantic context. I believe 
that letting Shpet’s phenomenological text ‘speak for itself ’ — as I have 
tried to do — will enable us to bring to light its inherently Husserlian 
qualities. Apart from allowing a detailed discussion of Shpet’s phenom-
enology, I argue that this might also alter how we understand the sub-
stance of his later theory of language and culture; especially his concep-
tion of the inner form of the word.
1 Savin 2015, p. 345.
2 Motroshilova 2006, p. 301.
3. The Hermeneutic Turn 
in Shpet’s Phenomenology
Shpet entered phenomenology from an angle that made him particu-
larly sensitive to questions of meaning. Natal’ia Artemenko is right in 
asserting that as he was busy writing Istoriia kak probema logiki (History 
as a Problem of Logic, 1916) at the time when he discovered phenomenol-
ogy, the ‘historical problem’, that is, the question ‘in what way is histori-
cal knowledge possible?’ served as the crucial philosophical context for 
Shpet’s phenomenological explorations. The verdict of his doctoral dis-
sertation was that history demanded its own semiotic and hermeneutic 
method, and this is indeed the method we can see Shpet approaching 
in Iavlenie i smysl.1 It thus seems probable that his seemingly out-of-
the-blue questions regarding the social being, and how the ideal being 
(ideas) can be expressed in concepts, discussed in the previous chapter, 
were motivated by this project. In the present chapter I will reconsider 
Shpet’s phenomenological conclusions, drawn in Iavlenie i smysl, but 
from the perspective of his hermeneutical interest, elaborated not only 
in Istoriia kak problema logiki but in the subsequent essays ‘Soznanie i 
ego sobstvennik’ (1916) and ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ (1917). My suggestion 
is that analysing their treatment of the historical nature of reality, the 
collective consciousness, and the linguistic nature of the latter will shed 
more light on Shpet’s phenomenology of the social being. Finally, at 
the end of his 1917 essay, we will see how Shpet transforms his elusive 
concept of entelechy into that of the inner form of the word.
In Istoriia kak problema logiki Shpet explains how he has come to 
understand history as ‘that reality which surrounds us, and from the 
analysis of which philosophy must originate’.2 He thus addresses reality 
1 According to Artemenko (2016, p. 153) Shpet’s method was signifi cantly infl uenced, 
e. g. by Dilthey, Sigwart, Wundt and Rickert.
2 Shpet 1916, p. 21.
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as a complex experience-structure, given through diff erent forms of in-
tuition: not only the empirical and individual intuition of physical and 
psychological states-of-aff airs, but also the social intuition of intersubjec-
tively constructed meanings, or, as he also calls them, facts. Shpet writes:
The fact of the matter is that an unbiased description of reality in 
all its concrete — historic — fullness demolishes the hypothesis of 
that reality supposedly only being a set of ‘sensations’. Not only does 
reality have a colour, off er resistance and appear as smooth, rough, 
slippery, etc., but to that it is necessary to add the so-called internal 
experience, as these are all […] experiences delimited by the individual 
sphere of the psychophysical body. With an equal lack of doubt we 
note the existence of facts, authorized not by theories and terms of 
individual psychology, but facts that clearly indicate that the human 
individual, despite the assertion of one contemporary logician, is not 
the inmate of a solitary prison. […] Facts and acts of the collective, the 
‘shared’, the very social order are just as real as the facts of individual 
experience.1
Social facts, things such as tables or laws, are both objective and socially 
constructed, which in Shpet’s opinion hints at the foundational nature 
of a collective world-creating activity. He writes that, indeed,
A person for a person is absolutely not just a fellow person; together, 
they both constitute something which is not their mere sum, but 
at the same time each of them and both, as a new unit, constitute 
not only a part, but also an ‘organ’ of a new human whole, a social 
whole.2
Although Shpet’s argumentation in Istoriia kak problema logiki is 
already clearly distinct from Husserl’s Ideas, I suggest that signifi cant 
points of comparison can be discovered between his hermeneutics and 
1 Shpet 1916, p. 22.
2 Ibid.
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Husserl’s later genetic phenomenology, and especially his 1929 book 
Formale und transzendentale Logik (Formal and Transcendental Logic). 
Shpet’s philosophy emphasizes the question of where the meaning-
component, apparent in our everyday experience, comes from. After 
Iavlenie i smysl, he took on a study of collective rationality to discover 
the phenomenological ‘roots’ of meaning. Interestingly, in his 1929 
work Husserl tackled a notably similar topic: the historicity of human 
rationality. Furthermore, Husserl’s interest in this issue can be at least 
partly traced back to the questions he raised between 1913 and 1914 as 
he was attempting to raise Logical Investigations (and in particular its 
last part) to the level of transcendental phenomenology. According to 
J. N. Mohanty this is precisely what he fi nally succeeds in doing in Formal 
and Transcendental Logic.1
After discussing the similarities between the two phenomenologists’ 
approaches to the hermeneutical problem, I will turn to Shpet’s re-en-
trance in the Moscow philosophical society shortly before the beginning 
of the First World War. In contrast with his pre-Göttingen scepticism, 
Shpet now appeared to be a staunch supporter of phenomenology. 
In particular, he considered it a way to argue against neo-Kantianism, 
which had become the leading strand of academic philosophy in Russia. 
However, Shpet also believed that phenomenology could ‘cure’ Russian 
philosophy from all strands of mysticism and scepticism, which he now 
located even in Lev Shestov’s thinking. In 1917, shortly before the revo-
lution, Shpet founded his own journal Mysl’ i slovo, which he would use 
to launch a new direction in Russian philosophy.
3.1. Genetic and Hermeneutic Methods
Rudolf Bernet associates the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy to-
wards the genetic version of phenomenology with the changes in his 
understanding of the noematic sense. The problem of the noematic 
sense was in turn related to the transformation that had taken place 
1 Mohanty 2011, p. 7.
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in his conception of the sign since its original formulation in Logical 
Investigations. According to Bernet these changes in Husserl’s views 
were due mainly to progress achieved elsewhere, and the problem 
of signifi cation appears most often in his post-1913 works as a non-
independent topic of investigation.1 Indeed, Bernet suggests that this 
problem can be seen very broadly as ‘revealing phenomena in their 
phenomenological apprehension’.2 As phenomenology focuses on how 
the world is given in human experience, the question of sense reaches 
beyond the problematics of signifi cation and is instead part of the entire 
study, as the issue of the noematic sense.
The complexity of the question of sense was revealed to Husserl 
properly only in his transcendental turn. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka 
asserts that this created a gap between Logical Investigations and the 
texts that followed it. Phenomenology was initiated in a framework 
in which Husserl attempted to discover in our cognitive experience, as 
Tyminiecka describes,
recurring, perduring distinctive nuclei, postulated to be the ‘certain’ 
and ‘necessary’ foundation of reality as it manifests itself in phenom-
ena, what he called ‘essences,’ ‘eidoi,’ that is, clusters of tightly articu-
lated signifi cant moments having ideal necessity, which as inherently 
subjacent structures subtend the nature and coherence of the respec-
tive phenomena.3
The discovered essential structures of knowledge could guarantee 
a measure of stability in the flux of fleeting empirical appearances. 
According to Tyminiecka Husserl’s investigations could provide ‘modes 
of cognitive certainty as well as of necessity grounded in the necessary 
1 The fi elds in which the mentioned progress was made were, according to Bernet 
(1988a, pp. 1–2): ‘the phenomenological understanding of intersubjective empathy, 
of the ideality of linguistic meaning, of intentional acts of will, desire, tendency, 
etc., and eventually also […] the understanding of the phenomenological reduction 
and of its relation to acts of phantasy’.
2 Bernet 1988a, p. 2.
3 Tymieniecka 2005, p. xxv.
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interconnectedness of the intuited objectivities themselves’.1 For 
Husserl’s early followers this suffi  ced as a working method, and the 
members of the so-called Munich school used it to launch investiga-
tions of various regional ontologies. However, Donn Welton suggests 
that for Husserl himself the Investigations was ‘more of a prolegomena 
to philosophy than philosophy itself ’. Between 1901 and 1913 Husserl 
realized that while the investigations certainly supplied ‘seminal studies 
into the phenomenological bases of a theory of logic and cognition’, the 
method lacked ‘the scope and universality required to make it genuinely 
philosophical’.2 Andrea Staiti contends that in Ideas Husserl entered 
‘genuine philosophy’ by formulating a critique of reason, albeit one that 
diff ered crucially from Kant’s. He writes that in Husserl’s treatment the 
very notion of reason underwent a radical transformation:
Husserl refuses to consider ‘reason’ a special faculty or a power that 
resides in the mind of specimens of homo sapiens. We do not have 
phenomenological access to ‘minds’ (whatever that is supposed to 
mean), let alone to special powers residing in them. All we have are 
concrete experiences (including their objective correlates) and the 
manifold ways in which experiences (including their objective cor-
relates) relate to (or fail to relate to) and cohere with (or fail to cohere 
with) one another. The meaning of reason, then, has to be sought in 
the confi gurations that such intra-experiential relations take.3
According to Staiti Husserl’s achievement in Ideas could be charac-
terized as a ‘thoroughgoing de-mentalization of reason’ which brings it 
‘much closer to Ancient Greek and medieval logos than to early modern 
ratiocinatio’.4 Husserl’s question of reason thus approaches the sphere 
of ontology, while at the same time defying any naively metaphysical 
interpretations of being.
1 Ibid.
2 Welton 2000, pp. 70–71.
3 Staiti 2017, p. 5.
4 Staiti 2017, pp. 5–6.
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3.1.1. Revealing Reality in its Rationality
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology focuses on the question 
of constitution. As Daniel Dahlstrom writes, this is a question of how, 
after familiarizing ourselves with all the diff erent structures inherent in 
the intentional experience, we can combine the correlatively diff erent 
acts into one act of constitution.1 At the end of Ideas Husserl reveals the 
inherent teleology of his account of constitution, which, according to 
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, culminates in an ‘ultimate rationalization of his 
project’.2 a constituted higher order object-of-intention cannot be re-
duced to a mere sum of its dependent parts. Instead, in the fi nal sections 
of his book Husserl raises the question of things like state, law or church, 
which ‘defy any psychologistic and naturalistic re-interpretation’. He as-
serts that all such ‘sorts of objectiveness’ must be ‘described, just as 
they are given, in terms of the basic kinds of them and in their succes-
sive orders, and the problems of constitution for them must be posed and 
solved’. Husserl asserts that these objects are ‘founded unities’ of a new 
kind, and each of them ‘brings with it its own constitutive phenomenology 
and, along with this, a new concrete doctrine of reason’.3 Thus, in a genuine 
Aristotelian spirit, as Staiti writes, Husserl’s reason ‘takes on diff erent 
forms and distinctive confi gurations depending on the ontological do-
main in which the rationally posited object (i. e., the object posited on 
the basis of an intuitively fulfi lled intention) belongs’.4
Unfortunately, Ideas ends rather abruptly after the various constitu-
tive phenomenologies are only hinted at. The book was originally con-
ceived as the fi rst part of a three-volume project. The two subsequent 
parts, drafted around the same years as the fi rst volume, presented for 
example studies of the material ontological domains of nature (physical 
and psychophysical or animal nature) and Geist, as well as an attempt 
to determine phenomenology’s relationship with various empirical 
1 Dahlstrom 2015, p. 280.
2 Rinofner-Kreidl 2017, p. 287. In her opinion the end of the book presents some of 
‘the most important and illuminating parts’ of Husserl’s entire phenomenology.
3 Cited in Rinofner-Kreidl 2017, p. 301.
4 Staiti 2017, p. 6.
3.1. Genetic and Hermeneutic Methods 141
sciences.1 However, soon after the publication of the fi rst Ideas, Husserl 
found himself faced with complex questions concerning constitution, 
related especially to the problem of the genetic method.2 In other words, 
he came to realize that to be able to constitute something requires that 
one’s intuition is founded in a wider, historically sedimented ‘rational 
background’. Hanne Jacobs writes that ‘our past perceptions, predicative 
activity, and other commitments, as well as what we take over from 
determinate and indeterminate others, shape our perceiving and acting 
in the world. That is, our positings (past and present, own and appropri-
ated) determine how we intend objects and situations in the future’. 
This creates a sedimentation or a history of sense, which we can also 
critically study; while we are ‘presumptuous in how we take the world 
to be’, we can also question and correct our conclusions.3
Husserl’s approach to the genetic method echoed the nineteenth 
century tradition of hermeneutics, which grasped the growing aware-
ness of the importance of historical experience in how humans relate to 
their surroundings. In Timo Miettinen’s words, one of the central ideas 
of the hermeneutical movement was that our relationship with the 
past is never a matter of pure description but involves an interpretative 
element between the whole and its parts. As the standard example goes, 
a particular text, for instance, ‘cannot be understood without refl ecting 
the overall context (or the “world”) in which it has emerged’. Within 
the phenomenological tradition the same issue became conceptual-
ized as pre-given ‘horizons’ of meaning. In the 1920s Husserl named 
these horizons the ‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt). In particular, in Die Krisis 
der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie 
(The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 
1936) and its manuscripts it was introduced as a novel ‘path’ to transcen-
dental phenomenology that was to accommodate also for the genetic 
or ‘generative’ dimensions of meaning.4 Accordingly, in 1937 Husserl 
1 Staiti 2017, p. 7.
2 According to Steinbock (1998, p. 131) the value of the genetic point of view to con-
stitution had become clear to Husserl by 1915.
3 Jacobs 2016, p. 266.
4 Miettinen 2019, p. 115.
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criticized his fi rst Ideas for the lack of horizons, which he now believed 
must be considered from the very fi rst steps of phenomenological analy-
sis. Husserl writes:
In the Ideen I thought I could introduce the phenomenological reduc-
tion in one leap and in so doing lead the reader to the new working 
fi eld of phenomenological philosophy, a fi eld in which it is necessary 
to learn a new way of ‘seeing’, of ‘experiencing’ and correspondingly 
a new way of thinking […]. In Ideen the point of departure was the 
‘natural concept of the world’ […] We shall see that this lifeworld 
(taken in its total temporal breadth) is nothing but the historical 
world. Therefore, it is palpable that a comprehensive systematic 
introduction to phenomenology begins and has to be carried out as 
a universal historical problem. If one introduces the epoché without 
the historical theme the problem of the lifeworld, viz., of universal 
history resurfaces. The introduction of Ideen does maintain its le-
gitimacy, but now I consider the historical path more principled and 
more systematic.1
In contrast to Husserl, Shpet entered phenomenology with an 
already formulated interest in the hermeneutic nature of historical 
knowledge. Istoriia kak problema logiki presents a survey of studies of 
historiography, or the logic of history as an independent discipline, from 
the pre-Kantian era. Shpet’s argument is that after Kant’s ‘Copernican 
revolution’2 Western philosophy had spiralled into a path of negativism,3 
1 Cited in Staiti 2017, p. 9.
2 In fact, Shpet (1916, pp. 2–3) disagrees with this term, writing that ‘the comparison 
of Kantian philosophy with Copernicanism […] is too formal. In our opinion, the 
parallel drawn by the Fichteanist and erstwhile professor at Kharkov, Shad, is more 
solid — that is the parallel between Kant and Luther, between Kant’s philosophy 
and Protestantism. According to Shpet Luther did not establish a new system of 
thought, but instead ‘overthrew a religious system that was highly harmful for 
mankind’. Shpet thus looks upon Protestantism as a form of protest, not a construc-
tive force.
3 Shpet 1916, p. 1. He writes: ’From the most militant to the most Quietist-deathly 
forms of positivism, we meet everywhere one enormous NON, non-metaphysics’.
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scepticism and relativism, as well as scientism, in the form of privatism.1 
This had led to a polarization of contemporary philosophy, with positiv-
ism and idealism at extreme opposite ends, but both failing to grasp the 
world as a concrete and shared reality.
While rooted in the Russian late nineteenth-century discussions of 
positive philosophy, Shpet’s viewpoint was also strongly infl uenced by 
Wilhelm Dilthey.2 In his 1912 essay ‘Odin put’ psikhologii i kuda on vedet’ 
Shpet asserts that Dilthey had opened a way for the renewal of psychol-
ogy, liberating it from ‘lifeless’ and ‘abstract’ forms.3 Noting the prob-
lematic infl uence of psychologism in logic — which Husserl had argued 
against a year earlier in his essay ‘Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft’ 
(‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’) — Shpet attests that the real prob-
lem regarding human knowledge is considerably broader. He writes:
As it happens, the site of the disease has been imprecisely located. 
More than logic is diseased: all of philosophy is ill; its entire organism 
is disturbed. The diagnosis needs to be supplemented. Philosophy is 
suff ering not only from psychologism in logic, but perhaps also to 
a greater degree from a completely analogous disease — logicism in 
psychology.4
If psychologism in logic leads to relativism and scepticism, the eff ect 
of logicism in psychology is no less dramatic, according to Shpet, as it 
impoverishes the descriptions provided by psychologists who, instead 
of concrete facts turn towards empty abstractions. Thus, Shpet asserts,
The living, bright, colourful and ever-changing content of the life of 
the soul is starting to seem a sequentially placed row of dull, Chinese 
1 Shpet 1916, p. 5. He writes: ‘The private character of scientifi c philosophy is a self-
evident thing. It is precisely from the privateness of that philosophy that its spe-
cialization in its forms fl ows, and that therein proceeds a constant battle between 
specialized directions, depending on one or the other “scientifi c” partiality’.
2 For discussions of Dilthey’s influence on Shpet see e. g. Plotnikov 2006 and 
Schastlivtseva 2009.
3 Shpet 2006, p. 257.
4 Shpet 2006, p. 250.
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shadows, sharp only in outline. The life of our soul cannot be seen 
through our psychology’s abstract schemes. a great master’s large, 
complex painting has been cut into pieces. People, houses, trees and so 
on have been cut out of it. One thing is matched with something else 
completely diff erent. No imagination is strong enough to reproduce 
the authentic original view of the work.1
Shpet believes that Dilthey’s descriptive psychology presented 
a fruitful example of a new kind of psychology, as a study of the ‘life 
of the soul’. In addition, he suggests that the descriptive psychologi-
cal method is superior to abstract psychology, because it can lead us 
to the actual and complete reality.2 Yet the crucial question remains 
unanswered for Shpet in 1912: how do we, in fact, transition from the 
knowledge of the life of the soul to that of reality? Shpet emphasizes the 
importance of this passage, writing that there is no reason to draw ex-
treme conclusions about the ‘spirituality’ of all reality. Spiritualism, he 
asserts, supports a similar kind of naive metaphysics as absolute materi-
alism; the spiritual in a metaphysical reading is understood as merely the 
highest level of material being. Shpet criticizes the position of William 
James in his a Pluralistic Universe (1909), arguing that spiritual intuition 
should not be considered a higher or superior form of experience, but 
simply one among its various forms.3 The new philosophy for which 
Shpet’s essay calls must be immune to the contemporary tendencies of 
‘logicizing and rationalizing’, and instead direct itself to the really and 
immediately given. ‘The new philosophy must stand out as a philosophy 
of life, as that life’s justifi cation, as justifi cation and confi rmation’, Shpet 
declares.4
By 1916 Shpet seems to have found his solution to the transition 
problem. In Istoriia kak problema logiki he now treats history as the new 
‘form’ of reality, which not only combines the material and the ideal, 
1 Shpet 2006, p. 250.
2 Shpet 2006, pp. 257–258.
3 Shpet 2006, pp. 260–261. See Khoruzhii 2010 for a discussion on Shpet’s views on 
religious or spiritual intuition.
4 Shpet 2006, p. 262.
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but does it in a way that reveals this combination as the concrete, actual 
and complete reality. Indeed, Shpet writes that by ‘reality’ he does not 
mean a theoretical premise or a construct. Instead,
Reality is the setting in which we live and philosophize, to which we 
ourselves belong, as a part and member of it; that is what surrounds 
us, what gives food for all our ruminations, cares, worries, raptures 
and disappointments, in equal fashion, of course, with those same 
ruminations and worries. That is the ‘natural’ reality which everyone 
knows well.1
Shpet’s ambitious goal, as he writes in 1916, is to include in philosophi-
cal description ‘[a]ll the colours and hues, sounds, the obstacles we en-
counter, the changes of spatial forms and relations, the pain and sweet-
ness of sensation, love and hatred’ as parts of the ‘the only authentic 
reality […] of our lives in all its vital fullness’.2 This, Shpet argues, is the 
‘everything’ (vse), the being of which emerges as the foremost problem 
for any positive philosophy that strives for an objective knowledge of 
being.
The discipline of history has the potential to provide truly objec-
tive knowledge due to its collective and shared nature. Shpet writes 
that if it proves possible to experience ‘one and the same thing behind 
diff erent emotional indicators, if it turns out that diff erent subjects 
speak of one and the same thing, regardless of the diff erence between 
their emotional givenness’, this is thanks alone to the power of reason 
(razum). Shpet believes that this is precisely where we fi nd the correct 
path of positive philosophy, leading to an objective knowledge of being. 
If in phenomenology he had discovered a methodology for the study 
of social and meaningful reality, Shpet now asserts that to reach the 
objective being, reality must indeed be studied in its givenness to con-
sciousness: ‘The actual world and the ideal world are in equal measure 
1 Shpet 1916, p. 12.
2 Shpet 1916, p. 13. Savin (2016, p. 45) suggests that Shpet’s conception comes close 
to that of Husserl’s life-world.
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worlds consciously perceived. Consciousness is thus a new general title 
for the philosophical problem’.1
As in his argument in Iavlenie i smysl, Shpet writes that only by fo-
cusing on the givenness of the appearing reality can we distinguish its 
essential characteristics: ‘here, we are given together that which exists 
and that which “seems”: partly, the reality surrounding us exists — it 
is the truth; and for another part it only “seems” — it is an illusion’. 
However, by illusion Shpet merely means that which is to be bracketed 
out in the phenomenological analysis. He writes:
Reality does not ‘stand’ before us — ‘everything’ moves and changes, 
appears and disappears. Everything in ‘everything’ is mere coincidence 
and chance. The philosophical statement of a fact so banal for life has 
momentous importance, as concurrently with the affi  rmation of ran-
domness, the necessity which correlates to it is also affi  rmed. Together 
with the random, with the many is affi  rmed the necessary and singular 
which penetrates it; in that which changes ‘the same’, ταὐτόν, opens.2
If in 1914 Shpet discovered a rational motivation that directed his 
experience of a man/chimney through a moment of comprehension, he 
now perceives reason as the unifying principle of reality-as-history. As 
we direct ourselves to this reality, reality-as-experienced, we discover its 
ideal foundation. ‘The points of identity’ (punkty tozhdestva) in the ap-
pearing reality ‘give not only fulcrums and correlation for the phenom-
ena of reality, but themselves stand out as a special subject and special 
basis for cognition — ιδέα’. According to Shpet here a ‘special world is 
formed, an ideal world, or a world of ideal object[s], with a fi rm internal 
predictability or order. This world in everything penetrates the world 
of actuality, discovering itself in every form and every phenomenon 
thereof’. Thus, the conceptions of ideality, reason, being and even truth 
prove nearly synonymous in Shpet’s treatment; ‘That which exists, ex-
ists, and is therefore always true; delusion proceeds from our ascribing 
1 Shpet 1916, pp. 14–15.
2 Shpet 1916, p. 13.
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being to that with does not exists, or from our denial of being in that 
with exists […]’.1
The connection between Shpet’s books of 1914 and 1916 is thus 
evident. If in Istoriia kak problema logiki he searches for a hermeneutic 
method that could ‘reveal’ reality in its rationality, in Iavlenie i smys 
Shpet is dealing with the nature of this very rationality. The latter is pre-
cisely what Shpet discovers when analysing his visual experience, and 
what he criticizes Husserl for not having accounted for in his analysis 
of the noema. Finally, Shpet’s own answer, which in Iavlenie i smysl is 
still presented only as a suggestion, is that this rationality, in the form 
of entelechy, should be treated as a foundation for all reality. Only after 
both these works, in his 1917 essay ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ is Shpet ready 
to assign a more exact defi nition to this rational principle. There, his 
answer is that the ‘word’, or logos, directs all thought (and all experience) 
following its own inner form or rule and presents the world accordingly.
3.1.2. The Logic of Knowledge
I suggested earlier that Shpet’s version of phenomenology, though 
formulated as an analysis of Husserl’s Ideas, also evolved in connection 
with Logical Investigations and their 1913–1914 revisions. Shpet alluded 
to this in his second Parisian letter to Husserl, but without specifying 
which parts of the revised investigations had rendered such a strong 
impression on him. Nevertheless, he asserts that he had been led to 
reconsider his exposition of phenomenological sense. Shpet never had 
the opportunity to acquaint himself with the revised sixth investigation 
(which was fi nally published in 1921), even though in 1913 he writes 
that he will await its appearance to fi nalize his own work.2 Yet the fi fth 
1 Shpet 1916, pp. 13–14.
2 A letter to Shpet from his former student (S. Shatenstein-Weizmann), written on 28 
July 1922, suggests that he might have, in fact, received the new sixth investigation 
after it was fi nally published. Shatenstein-Weizmann writes: ‘I managed to visit 
Freiburg, where Professor Husserl teaches, and to pass on your regards, albeit from 
quite some time ago, but Professor Husserl was very glad to hear that and asked 
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investigation alone provided Shpet with ample material on the question 
of sense.
There, Husserl’s explorations concerning the act’s matter and quality 
led him to the question of ‘as what’ something is experienced, that is, to 
the question of the sense of the experience. It is not diffi  cult to see a con-
nection between Husserl’s theme and Shpet’s man/chimney problem 
when Husserl concludes in the fi fth investigation that ‘matter’ is that 
element in an act ‘which fi rst gives its reference to an object, and reference 
so wholly defi nite that it not merely fi xes the object meant in a general way, 
but also the precise way in which it is meant’.1 Of course, Shpet was also 
well acquainted with the original version of Husserl’s last investigation 
and fully aware of its presentation of the categorial intuition. There, 
Husserl turns to an analysis of how diff erent acts may be expressed in 
words. He gives the example of looking into the garden and express-
ing his percept in words: ‘There fl ies a blackbird!’ ‘What is here the act 
in which my meaning resides?’ Husserl asks, observing that the same 
perception could have been expressed in a number of other ways: ‘That 
is a blackbird!’ ‘There fl ies that blackbird!’ ‘There it soars!’ etc.2 In other 
words, the same percept can serve as a foundation for several diff erent 
statements, while the sense of these statements may vary.
As Rudolf Bernet notes, Husserl’s exclamations owe their meanings 
only indirectly to the initial visual experience. Indeed, the lingual signs 
express not the perception itself, but the judgement made on the basis 
of the perception. The consequence of this, in Bernet’s words, is that 
‘the aforesaid semantical intuition is fulfi lled not by a purely sensuous 
intuition but by a categorial intuition’. The intentional object of such 
an intention is not one that ‘one can see with one’s eyes or upon which 
one can sit’; instead, it is an intellectual formation regarding ‘states 
of aff airs’.3 Indeed, Husserl concludes that a clear distinction must be 
drawn between sensuous and categorial intuitions, where the latter is 
about you in detail. I received a copy of the second edition of the sixth (fi nal) part 
of Logische Untersuchungen, which I will try to send you’ (Shpet 2012, p. 75).
1 Husserl 1970, p. 589.
2 Husserl 1970, p. 680.
3 Bernet 1988b, pp. 35–36.
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an ‘intuition in the extended sense’. In Husserl’s words, the founded 
acts, characteristic of the categorial intuition, ‘now count as the thought 
which “intellectualizes” sensuous intuition’.1 Bernet argues that after 
the fi rst edition of the Investigations Husserl changed his mind about 
the nature of the givenness of the categorial intuition. Whereas in 1901 
he had conceived it largely in analogy to the self-givenness of a sensu-
ous object, in the foreword to the second edition Husserl admitted that 
this conception had been a ‘fatal error’. According to Bernet Husserl was 
never able to give a satisfactory answer to his question of the categorial 
intuition.2 Meanwhile, it seems this issue is connected to the complex 
themes that Shpet was also to tackle: the question of sense-bestowal, 
phenomenology’s ability to grasp reality ‘truthfully’, as well as the ra-
tional foundation of any perception and its description.
Shpet’s aspiration in Iavlenie i smysl comes close to what John 
Drummond has described as the overall goal of Logical Investigations: 
a formulation of the normative philosophical discipline of ‘pure logic’ 
upon which any scientifi c theory could be founded. Drummond argues 
that any fully developed theory, in any fi eld of science, must be able to 
identify the underlying rules governing its formulations of propositions 
and arguments. It should also be able to clearly explain how the assertions 
presented in its framework are related to their possible object, and how 
the theory attempts to describe or explain the world, as its object, truth-
fully. ‘Philosophical logic is, in other words, inseparable from both phe-
nomenology and ontology’, Drummond writes.3 David Woodruff  Smith 
has likewise highlighted the particular nature of Husserl’s Investigations, 
which, he maintains, off ers a unifi ed system of philosophy; a ‘case study’ 
in ‘how the philosophical disciplines of logic, ontology, phenomenology, 
and epistemology can be unifi ed’. In Smith’s opinion Husserl could attain 
the imposing goal of such a unity because he was able to synthesize the 
‘long traditions of logical theory and intentionality’. Husserl’s phenom-
enology made possible a certain objective theory of knowledge which, 
arguably, overcame the main epistemological problems of Descartes, 
1 Husserl 1970, p. 832.
2 Bernet 1988b, p. 36.
3 Drummond 2009.
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Hume and Kant. Smith also points out that Husserl synthetized these 
results with the long tradition of ontology, beginning with Plato and 
Aristotle.1
To compare Shpet’s attempt to formulate an ‘objective theory of 
knowledge’ with Husserl’s, I suggest a final association of his phe-
nomenology with the latter’s considerably later work, Formal and 
Transcendental Logic (1929). It would of course have been impossible 
for Shpet to have any actual connection with this book, and yet some of 
its themes appear strikingly like his. In his 1929 work Husserl correlates 
the early presentation of formal logic in his Investigations with a new 
analysis of formal ontology. Drummond notes that Husserl arrives at this 
viewpoint through a study of two distinct lines of the logical tradition: 
that of Aristotle’s apophantic logic (in which assertive statements are 
made in the form of a predicative judgement, ‘of ’ something) and that 
of mathematical logic, which focuses on formalization, allowing us to 
speak of an ‘objectivity in general’ (freeing statements of their deter-
mined content). At the end of the seventeenth century Leibniz had 
already attempted to unite the two traditions. His mathesis universalis 
was a method by which all conceivable things would become exactly de-
terminable, but the plan fell short of its goal. With his transcendentally 
understood conception of intentionality Husserl now took up the task 
anew. His aim was to draft a formal method of approaching everything.2
In 1929 Husserl writes that, indeed,
one need only remind oneself that judging is the same as judging 
about objects, predicating properties of them, or relative determinations; 
taking this into consideration, one cannot fail to note that formal 
ontology and formal apophantics, despite their expressly diff erent 
themes, must be very intimately related and are perhaps inseparable. 
Ultimately all the forms of objects, all the derivative formations of any-
thing-whatever, do make their appearance in formal apophantics itself.3
1 Smith 2003, p. 22.
2 Drummond 2009.
3 Husserl 1969, pp. 78–79.
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Formal and Transcendental Logic is also mindful of the problems of the 
genetic nature of sense formation. While seeking an absolute founda-
tional discipline for all science, Husserl notes that all sciences and logic 
itself are but cultural formations, ‘given to us beforehand and bearing 
within themselves their meaning, their “sense”; since they are forma-
tions produced indeed by the practice of the scientists and generations 
of scientists who have been building them’. Husserl continues that as 
they are thus produced, ‘they have a fi nal sense, toward which they have 
been continually aiming’. Husserl’s task now is to ‘enter a community 
of empathy’ with scientists to understand this sense and place it under 
a ‘sense-investigation’.1 The ultimate goal of Formal and Transcendental 
Logic is therefore not merely to uncover the true unity of formal logic 
and formal ontology; Husserl aims to develop a transcendental logic.
Husserl argues that, understood as a theory of science, logic had from 
the beginning constituted itself to serve ‘that criticism which creates 
genuine science’. It took the statements of sciences ‘as mere “judgments” 
(suppositions) and judgment-systems, which must be submitted to 
criticism and which then […] must be fashioned in such a manner that 
the predicate “truth” can be rightly ascribed to them’. Husserl asserts 
that logic, therefore, ‘followed the attitude of the critic — who judges, not 
straightforwardly, but rather about judgments’. Logic was directed to the 
existent but ‘only mediately’.2 Husserl asserts that the new phenomeno-
logical logic must in contrast turn its interest towards the cognizing 
itself, to study the scientist’s activity, as it were, from the inside. By 
thus altering our viewpoint ‘we stand within the horizon of a science’ 
and, Husserl adds, ‘in the case of a formally universal consideration, we 
stand within logic’ itself.3
Husserl thus asserts that it is possible ‘to convert any judging into 
a judging at a second level’.4 Here, what was previously judged, and what 
1 Husserl 1969, p. 9. Husserl describes this investigation (Besinnung) as an act in 
which the sense, which has been only ‘vaguely fl oating before us’, is converted into 
a fulfi lled, clear sense. For a discussion of the nature of Husserl’s radical ‘Besinnung’ 
in Formal and Transcendental Logic see Hartimo 2018.
2 Husserl 1969, p. 130.
3 Husserl 1969, p. 108.
4 Husserl 1969, p. 132.
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was therefore an existing objectivity for the judge, is no longer posited. 
Rather, ‘the judged as such is posited in an act of refl ection’. Husserl char-
acterizes this act as a transition ‘from a judgment (a supposed objectiv-
ity simpliciter) to a judicial meaning or opinion (a supposed objectivity 
as supposed)’. We move from the straightforward stating-and-judging 
attitude in which we ‘have’ only ‘the pertinent objects’ to a refl ective 
attitude, ‘the attitude in which the corresponding object-meanings and 
predicatively formed aff air-complex-meanings become seized upon or 
posited’. Finally, Husserl designates this region ‘the region of senses’.1 
All this happens through a repositioning of our viewpoint that is very 
reminiscent of the move Shpet suggested in the fi fth chapter of Iavlenie 
i smysl. Furthermore, Husserl associates the change with his earlier dis-
cussion of the categorial intuition:
What is judged in a judging is the judged — the judgingly meant or sup-
posed — categorial objectivity. As we have ascertained, not until there 
is a judging on a second level does the proposition in logic’s sense of the 
word — the proposition as a sense, the supposed categorial objectivity 
as supposed — become the object; and, in this new judging, it is the 
judgingly supposed objectivity simpliciter.2
Husserl continues that the sense of any judging ‘lies’ within it. While 
we cannot always judge something about something with objective 
evidence, whatever we can say with evidence is ‘only by virtue of those 
judgments and evidences at a second level by which we “draw” from 
the simple judgments their suppositions, making these into objects’.3 
In other words, the sense of any statement or judgement must itself 
become thematic ‘if “criticism” is to be instituted’.4
In a footnote5 Husserl adds that while the universal concept of 
sense, extending to all intentional spheres, had already emerged in 
1 Husserl 1969, pp. 132–133.
2 Husserl 1969, p. 134.
3 Husserl 1969, pp. 134–135.
4 Husserl 1969, p. 136.
5 Husserl 1969, p. 135.
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Logical Investigations, he had back then developed it without taking 
into consideration the ‘deeper intentional analyses’ required to clarify 
the question, and especially in the sense he approached it later in Ideas. 
Correspondingly, he notes that because his early inquiries into the sense 
of a pure logic were guided by ‘the ideal of specifi cally theoretical sci-
ence’, disciplines such as geometry and theoretical physics, his view 
remained restricted. According to Husserl it should by now be obvious 
that ‘when we practice formalization on sciences of the type represent-
ed by psychology or phenomenology, or by history, and then ask what 
combines all the emerging proposition-forms to make up the unity of 
a system-form’, we can only answer that ‘such a science is an open infi n-
ity of propositions that hang together by virtue of their objects […]’ What 
this means, Husserl writes, is that we can appreciate the ‘principle of 
unity’ of such sciences ‘only by going beyond the analytico-logical form’.1
At the end of his book Husserl concludes a decades-long journey, 
which had taken him from his fi rst logical investigations to a transcen-
dental logic. He writes that it was
the evidence-problems connected with the fundamental concepts 
and laws of logic that led us (since it is evidence that is constitutive for 
truth, and for what truly exists in every sense accepted by us) to the 
most universal constitutional problems and the radical nature of the 
method appropriate to them. If logic, as having originated from a na-
ïve evidence, is not to remain suspended sky-high above any possible 
application, these problems, in their hierarchical sequence, must / be 
set and solved. […] The possibility of science cannot be shown by the 
fact of sciences, since the fact itself is shown only by <their> subsump-
tion under that possibility as an idea. Thus we are led back to logic, to 
its apriori principles and theories. But now logic itself is in question 
with regard to its possibility; and, in our progressive criticisms, it is 
continuously and very seriously called in question. These criticisms 
lead us, from logic as theory, back to logical reason and the new fi eld of 
theory pertaining to it.2
1 Husserl 1969, pp. 101–102.
2 Husserl 1969, p. 267.
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Like Shpet before him, Husserl equates the question concerning logical 
reason to that of logos. He writes that the meaning of this word ‘leads 
us predominantly to assertive thinking — judging, in the usual sense 
of the word — and, correlatively, to judgments as thoughts’. But since 
‘human thinking is normally done in language, and all the activities of 
reason are as good as entirely bound up with speech’, any act of think-
ing can indeed take the form of logos.1 To analyse rationality is thus to 
analyse logos. Mirja Hartimo asserts that Husserl’s method in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic exemplifi es this ideal through a radical ‘Besinnung’ 
or sense-investigation, which has the critical aim of considering, reshap-
ing, analysing, purifying and improving any form of scientifi c evidence.2 
Ideally, the clarifi ed and revised evidence can eventually be adopted as 
scientifi c norms, and transcendental logic should therefore ultimately 
lead to a complete revision of the fundamental concepts of the sciences.3
Apart from a radical and critical approach to rationality, Formal 
and Transcendental Logic also suggests a phenomenological ontology. 
All meaning-forms are correlated with and ‘teleologically ordered to-
ward’ fulfi lment in our recognition of object-forms. According to John 
Drummond if our suppositions are ‘confi rmed in fulfi lling experiences, 
then we recognize the identity that obtains between the meaning-forms 
and object-forms, between the categorial object merely as meant and 
the categorial object as it evidently presents itself ’.4 Indeed, that is how 
the world always appears to us: any object-forms can only be present to 
us through the mediation of meaning-forms. As Husserl writes,
The being-in-itself of the world might make good sense, but one thing 
is absolutely sure: it does not have the sense of a world independent of 
an actually existent consciousness. The world is in principle what it is 
only as the correlate of an experiencing [erfahrendem] consciousness 
related to it — and an actual consciousness, not merely a possible one.5
1 Husserl 1969, p. 19.
2 Cited in Hartimo 2018, p. 260.
3 Hartimo 2018, p. 260.
4 Drummond 2019, p. 270.
5 Cited in Drummond 2019, p. 269.
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In other words, a phenomenological ontology is not the study of things-
in-themselves distinct from the experience of them; it is the study of 
objects as experienced. The unity between being and sense is inherent 
to the very idea of phenomenological ontology; its topic is the sense of 
being an object.1
3.2. Returning to Moscow
When Shpet returned to Moscow in late 1913, he did so in the role of 
a phenomenologist. In the following February he wrote to Husserl, de-
scribing his fi rst impressions of the philosophical life of the city, which 
he now viewed from a novel perspective:
Dear Professor,
My return to Moscow gave me great joy in one respect: phenomenol-
ogy here arouses a great and serious interest in all philosophical circles. 
The ‘Ideas’ is for the moment not very well studied, but almost eve-
ryone is talking about phenomenology; there are even special socie-
ties for the study of phenomenological questions. I defend the ideas 
of phenomenology at my lectures and seminars, and twice already 
have I had the occasion to speak publicly, 1) at a jubilee session for the 
opening of a new ‘society for the study of scientifi c and philosophi-
cal questions’ and 2) I gave a presentation on phenomenology as the 
foundational science in our old ‘psychological society’.2
Shpet is happy to report that phenomenology ‘is in high and favour-
able regard everywhere’ and that it is seen ‘as a serious and new step 
in philosophy’. He avers that most of the objections presented during 
his presentations had been of a general nature, resulting from a lack of 
understanding of the objectives of phenomenology.3
1 Drummond 2019, pp. 270–272.
2 Shpet 1996, p. 125.
3 Shpet 1996, p. 126.
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Shpet’s letter also includes two questions regarding Ideas, as he was 
still working on his own argument for Iavlenie i smysl. Husserl replied 
in two parts, fi rst with a postcard that addressed Shpet’s question about 
noematic sense and then, some two weeks later, with a letter.1 In the 
letter, written at the end of March, Husserl reports that he is still con-
tinuing the diffi  cult battle ‘for the new rational construction of the 
concluding volume of Logische Untersuchungen’. He writes that while 
the winter had been unproductive, he has of late been making progress; 
‘…and God willing, something excellent will result’. However, what 
makes working diffi  cult is that Husserl attests to being excessively aware 
of the responsibility he has taken on himself; ‘You thus understand why 
I am replying to your letter which overjoyed me immensely only now, 
after a few weeks’.2
Husserl expresses his delight regarding the positive reaction phe-
nomenology has elicited among the Moscow philosophers. He states 
that the most important thing is
for your countrymen who are so capable of enthusiasm to under-
stand that we are speaking not of a new study of salvation, thanks 
to which the believer achieves bliss, but that a new science has been 
discovered, one endlessly fruitful, like the Russian plain, but like it 
only giving a rich harvest thanks to persistent labour (and not loud 
words).3
However, on 26 January 1914 Shpet himself can be seen to have used 
‘loud words’ to deliver his message. This was: phenomenology is the 
philosophical answer in a period of spiritual, cultural, intellectual, moral 
and social crisis. The speech Shpet gave at the opening of the Moscow 
1 The fi rst of Shpet’s two questions concerned his puzzlement regarding Husserl’s 
characterization of sense as an ‘abstract form’. The second question touched upon 
the question of the temporal constitution of cognition. This appears to have been 
a recurring theme for the two philosophers at the time: the following summer, 
when Shpet visited Göttingen again, Husserl reportedly read him an entire article 
on the question of time (see Shchedrina 2015, p. 63; Shpet 2005, pp. 208–209).
2 Gusserl’ 1992, p. 237.
3 Gusserl’ 1992, pp. 237–238.
3.2. Returning to Moscow 157
Society of Scientifi co-Philosophical Questions (Moskovskoe obshchestvo 
po izucheniiu nauko-fi losofskikh voprosov) was a declaration of this new 
philosophical beginning.1
3.2.1. Shpet and Logos: Answer to Neo-Kantianism
The transcript of Shpet’s January speech functioned as a prologue to 
Iavlenie i smysl, which was published a few months later. It is notewor-
thy that Shpet never mentions phenomenology or Husserl in his speech, 
which was to become something of a trend in his texts and public ap-
pearances in Moscow. At the same time, the text underscores the deci-
sive nature of the questions the Russian intelligentsia was facing and 
does not belittle philosophy’s potential for solving them. Considering 
the context in which the text was published, it is evident that Shpet is 
referring to phenomenology. He writes:
The hopeless time, when the ‘bankruptcy’ of the sciences was pro-
claimed, is being surmounted; the materialist era, when ‘beggars of 
the spirit’ ascended the throne in philosophy, is at an end. In all fi elds 
of scientifi c knowledge and in philosophy itself we are standing either 
at the radical breaking up of the old era and construction of a new one 
or on the verge of it. The period of doubt, decadence, sickly powerless-
ness, apathy and quietism are behind us! The unprecedented shocks 
in all fi elds of natural-scientifi c knowledge are only a consequence of 
the powerful increase and discovery of new forces and of a new life. 
The most fascinating bursts from and the all the more brightening 
light of our past in all fi elds of the humanities testify to the same. The 
penetrating aspiration of the philosophical spirits, withdrawing into 
its most secret depths, in philosophy, in its own self-consciousness, 
reveals the same features of our time! Indeed, we do not stand on the 
verge of a great epoch. We are already in it, in its irrepressible striving!2
1 Shpet refers to the speech in his letter to Husserl in February 1914.
2 Shpet 1991, pp. 179–180.
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Boris Iakovenko noted a year later that the appearance of the Society 
of Scientifi co-Philosophical Questions, with a number of other societies, 
groups and educational institutions, was a sign of the rapid growth of 
interest in philosophy in Russia since the turn of the century.1 There 
was a strong overall curiosity in philosophical — and generally spir-
itual — questions, and demands were made for the establishment of 
a modern and professional philosophy education in Russia. At the be-
ginning of 1906 Moscow University took up this task, when, as Aleksei 
Pavlov writes, ‘a new curriculum was implemented in the Faculty of 
History and Philology; it provided for the establishment of ten highly 
specialized groups, including a philosophical sciences group consisting 
of three sections: a) history of philosophy; b) psychology; c) systematic 
philosophy’. Chelpanov’s invitation to relocate to Moscow in 1907 was 
itself a key moment in this process of professionalization, and had come 
to be known as a ‘skilled organizer and heated adherent of professional 
philosophical education’. Chelpanov led the philosophical instruction 
at Moscow University with Lev Lopatin, while Shpet began to organize 
seminars on contemporary philosophy.2
With the success of the Logos journal neo-Kantian philosophy had es-
tablished itself as the leading, if not only, school of professional philoso-
phy in Russia by the time of Shpet’s return. Neo-Kantians framed their 
philosophical position against the arbitrary ‘philosophizing’ that had 
long characterized the Russian intellectual tradition (and that in their 
opinion was continued in the practice of the Put’ group). Instead, the 
neo-Kantian school taught philosophy students mental discipline and 
off ered a solid technical foundation with professional competence; in 
Iakovenko’s words, a ‘unity of tendency, consistency of argumentation, 
clarity of principles, certainty of view’, as well as an ‘overall discipline’.3 
It seems probable that this academic professionalism is what drew 
Shpet to Musaget and Logos before his departure for Göttingen, even 
though he had expressed a strong distrust of neo-Kantian philosophy. 
1 Iakovenko 1915, pp. 224–225.
2 Pavlov 2016, p. 168. According to Pavlov Shpet’s seminars would discuss works by 
Husserl, Meinong and Bergson.
3 Cited in Dmitrieva 2016, p. 382.
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However, by 1914 Shpet had arrived at his own understanding of what 
scientifi c philosophy should entail, and that his view diff ered from the 
neo-Kantian programme. Indeed, Shpet’s January speech presents an 
attack not only on the contemporary materialist, mystical-religious 
and irrational philosophical trends, but also Russian neo-Kantian philo-
sophy.
Shpet’s declaration thus bears a resemblance to Husserl’s 1911 Logos 
essay, which was his call for philosophy to be regarded as a ‘rigorous 
science’. Although the phenomenological and neo-Kantian projects of 
renewing academic philosophy were in many ways similar, there were 
also fundamental diff erences that set them apart. Julia Jansen suggests 
that what united Kant and Husserl was their shared concern for saving 
scientifi c knowledge from the threat of relativism. The problem was 
met with wide social urgency in the eras of both philosophers. In Kant’s 
time, the general public was awakening to a ‘fundamental contingency 
of human life, which was no longer counterbalanced by an unquestion-
able order secured by an omnipotent, omniscient God’. With the growth 
and fast development of the natural scientifi c paradigm scientifi c think-
ing came to rely on an accumulation of observable and, thus, contingent 
matters-of-fact.1 Jansen writes that for Kant,
one task of transcendental philosophy is to identify and validate 
those truths that retain their necessity amidst and in reference to 
the contingencies of nature and experience. At issue is therefore not 
primarily the necessity of analytic truths, which concern the laws of 
thinking as formulated by formal logic, but the necessity of truths 
about the contingent world experience, i. e., the necessity of syn-
thetic truths.2
Both Kant and Husserl believed that the question of the ‘truth’ of 
reality could only be answered in reference to the structures of con-
sciousness. Their transcendental philosophies therefore aimed to 
1 Jansen 2015, pp. 47–48.
2 Jansen 2015, p. 48.
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uncover the necessary conditions of the (unquestionable) knowabil-
ity of any contingent event in time and space.1 Both thus set aside all 
traditional metaphysics and replaced it with an attempt to determine 
a priori truths about how objects could be known, or how they could 
appear to the consciousness. However, in terms of the question of how 
to fi nd this ‘necessity in contingency’, the diff erence between Kant’s 
and Husserl’s approaches is evident. Jansen suggests that while Kant 
thought of the necessary unity between the given sensible manifold and 
its experienced unity as a unity that received its necessity ‘top-down’ 
from the ‘highest point’ of reason — that is, from the transcendental 
unity of apperception — Husserl thought of unity ‘laterally’, as a unity 
of ‘coincidence (Deckung)’. According to Jansen this enabled for Husserl 
an a priori insight not only into necessities that ‘reason itself produces 
according to its own plan’, as Kant famously claimed, but also into neces-
sities that reason ‘genuinely discovers’.2
Husserl faced Kant’s transcendental model mainly in the form of 
neo-Kantianism. It had become the most powerful philosophical move-
ment in Germany in the 1870s and held this position until roughly the 
First World War. Neo-Kantianism off ered an alternative to the earlier 
dominance of German Idealism, with Hegel as its leading representa-
tive. Instead of the traditional systematic philosophy and metaphysics, 
neo-Kantians argued that modern philosophy should become a ‘science 
of experience’, and that this goal could be achieved by adopting Kant’s 
critical approach to the conditions of possibility for knowledge. The main 
diff erence with Kant was that his theory would now be buttressed by 
modern scientifi c knowledge. With the help of experimental psychol-
ogy especially, philosophy could aspire to become the ‘science of the sci-
ences’ (die Wissenschaft der Wissenschaften).3 As John Krois writes, the 
1 This is just what Shpet (1991, p. 177) has in mind when he states in his speech that 
all contingency appears with necessity. He declares: ‘peer into this unconditional 
and unrestrained contingency, gentlemen, and you will see that all of its trouble 
stems from what it demands and seeks for itself. Like a shadow something haunts 
it: unconditional necessity! The changing, the transient, the present-day, in all its 
diff erent voices calls out to us to recognize its own necessity to be this way’.
2 Jansen 2015, pp. 48–49.
3 De Warren & Staiti 2015, p. 7.
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rejection of traditional systematic philosophy raised a problem: ‘what 
did philosophers have to contribute to knowledge that the empirical sci-
ences did not? The answer that emerged was simple: if philosophy could 
not explicate the nature of things in general as it had previously done, it 
could instead explicate knowledge itself ’.1
The transformation of philosophy into ‘Erkenntnistheorie’, a theory 
of knowledge, was precisely what Shpet viewed as a sign of negativity 
and misplaced scepticism. In his January speech he disdained the ‘sickly 
powerlessness’ and ‘apathy’ of this approach that from the outset, as he 
argued, denies its own possibility of knowing the true nature of reality. In 
Iavlenie i smysl Shpet indeed asserts that any theory of knowledge ‘leads 
inevitably either to a subjectivistic metaphysics or to a direct rejection of 
philosophy’.2 He thus begins his speech at the Scientifi co-Philosophical 
Society with a rhetorical question concerning the epistemic role of phi-
losophy. Shpet notes the term ‘philosophy’ has historically been used 
in two very diff erent senses. On the one hand, it has designated ‘all of 
our knowledge’, as it did in antiquity, and on the other, it has later been 
understood to cover ‘only some specifi c delimited knowledge’. Shpet de-
clares that philosophy must again adopt its original role as a foundation 
for all knowledge. In his opinion scientifi c views, ‘like any world-view 
in general, must rely on a philosophical groundwork because no other 
knowledge of foundations is possible’.3
Shpet thus sets scientifi c knowledge, as the contemporary and main-
ly neo-Kantian paradigm, against the pure and absolute philosophical 
knowledge of the beginnings of all reason. He argues that whereas the 
fi rst is essentially pragmatic knowledge (‘pour agir!’), the second is free 
from all theory and outside impact. Moreover, Shpet asserts that by being 
pre-theoretical (phenomenological) philosophy can attain knowledge 
not from a scientifi cally defi ned ‘narrow’ perspective but from the whole 
of lived experience.4 From this whole Shpet believes that truth itself, 
1 Krois 2013, pp. 101–102.
2 Shpet 1991, p. 9.
3 Shpet 1991, pp. 175–176.
4 Shpet (1991, p. 176) writes: ‘…let us take a closer look at the specifi cs of these world-
views and see their distinguishing features. One is a mathematical world-view, 
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concerning the very being of reality, can be discovered. Philosophy will 
therefore be able to ask the kind of questions that he took Kantian phi-
losophy to have denied itself. Shpet writes:
The mathematician tries to fi nd his discipline’s bed-rock and as a result 
of splendid discoveries and solutions to the most complex of tasks 
stands in bewilderment before its own foundation. The same holds 
true for physics, physiology, and history. What is space, time, a num-
ber, motion, force, life, death, the soul, society? The philosophical fun-
damental science is called upon not to solve the physicist’s problems or 
those of the historian but to indicate to each their own roots, sources, 
principles, leading to the universal foundation underlying the entire 
colossus of contemporary knowledge. Moreover, it must indicate not 
only how everything existing is and how each form of existing being 
is, it must point out to each form not only its place and purpose, but 
also reveal the single sense and the single intimate idea behind all the 
various manifestations and outbursts of the creative spirit in its full 
and actual self-realization.1
In a somewhat similar vein, in ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’ 
Husserl promoted the idea that phenomenology could bring philoso-
phy back to the concrete ‘things themselves’. He contended that the 
modern scientifi c attitude had been snared in a physicalist and naturalist 
‘false objectivism’. Operating in scientifi c abstractions such as ‘atom’ or 
‘synapse’, the natural sciences had had to relinquish a certain concern for 
their original foundations, the concrete experience. Conversely, this also 
resulted in the ‘false subjectivism’ of modern philosophy which, accord-
ing to Husserl, was in the process of abandoning the whole idea of the 
rational pursuit of necessary and all-embracing truths. Husserl criticizes 
all types of relativism and most importantly the historicist idea that no 
truth can transcend its historical and cultural frameworks. He maintains 
another mechanical, yet another biological, sociological, etc. What is going on here? 
Each is fundamentally an unsuccessful, hopeless, and narrow attempt to usurp the 
rights of philosophy’.
1 Shpet 1991, p. 179.
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that the natural scientist ‘sees everything as nature’, and the humanistic 
scientist ‘sees everything as spirit’, but neither of these Weltanschaaung 
philosophers notices the limitations of their perspectives.1 Thus, in 1911 
Husserl accused neo-Kantians of not having been scientifi c enough. In his 
opinion the scientifi c value of philosophy must not be measured by its 
utility to other sciences, but philosophy must itself become a rigorous 
a priori science.
Sebastian Luft suggests that Husserl introduced his phenomenol-
ogy as a wholly novel type of philosophy. Given the dominance of neo-
Kantian thought, it thus appeared as the main antagonist of Husserl’s 
method. ‘If one had to choose an enemy for one’s own “liberation nar-
rative”, it would have to be Kant and his successors’, Luft writes.2 And 
yet in both Germany and Russia neo-Kantian and phenomenological 
schools evolved in close connection and even collaboration. In Russia 
this closeness was further underlined by the common enemy of the two 
groups: the traditionally ‘Russian’ and largely non-academic philosophy 
(vol’naia fi losofi ia). Especially notable in the case of both Husserl and 
Shpet is their proximity to the (German and Russian versions of the) 
Logos journal, which Luft calls the ‘defi ning publication and dissemina-
tion outlet of the Neo-Kantian movement’.3 Indeed, Husserl was even 
part of the journal’s editorial board.4
This seeming paradox could be explained by the fact that, as Luft ar-
gues, the German neo-Kantian movement (particularly around Logos) 
was defi ned fi rst and foremost not as a philosophy of science, but as 
a philosophy of culture (Kulturphilosophie).5 Although the neo-Kantians 
would theoretically rely on a Kantian idea of Erkenntnistheorie, their 
spiritual background, according to Christian Krijnen, was the ‘ghost of 
1 Miettinen 2013, p. 129.
2 Luft 2018, p. 45.
3 Luft 2015, p. 29.
4 Krois (2013, p. 103) notes that the German Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie der Kultur, with Heinrich Rickert as its main editor, began publishing 
in 1910 and soon acquired ‘an illustrious editorial board’, including Husserl himself.
5 Luft 2015, p. 29. Nikolai Plotnikov (2007, p. 621) suggests that Logos was, indeed, 
not defi ned by neo-Kantianism but by a broad liberal and international cultural 
project, which ended with the First World War.
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nihilism’ and the ‘metaphysical void’ to which Hegel’s death had given 
rise in Germany. Along with Hegel his conception of the unity and fac-
ticity of meaning, of reason and reality, also faded. Neo-Kantianism 
thus made a case for the ‘rehabilitation’ of philosophy.1 While the core 
of their system was rooted in rationalism, neo-Kantians also reached 
much further in their attempt to analyse human experience. In Luft’s 
words, neo-Kantianism argued that while the human being was rational, 
he was however not wholly captured in this rationality. Thus, the space 
we occupy as human beings cannot be defi ned merely as the ‘space of 
reasons’. Instead, ‘the space we inhabit is more appropriately called the 
space of culture and a philosophy of culture has this space as its topic of 
investigation’, Luft writes.2
Likewise, in Russia the neo-Kantian philosophy of culture was 
part of a much larger attempt to overcome a crisis that threatened the 
very possibility of establishing moral, spiritual, existential or aesthetic 
truths. According to Natal’ia Nemirova ‘the reason for the revision of the 
positivist approach in science was, above all, not curiosity, not detached 
interests of thought, but complex questions of life, deep needs of moral 
consciousness’.3 Shpet’s philosophy matured in the same post-positivist 
atmosphere of the turn of the century. Thus, although he was strongly 
opposed to using philosophy as morality or a philosophy of life, Shpet’s 
thinking was evidently driven by similarly fundamental concerns. 
He too expressed an urgent need for philosophical answers — on which, 
indeed, the entire future of Russian culture depended.
However, while there had still been room for a certain scepticism and 
existentialism in Shpet’s thinking before his journey to Göttingen — 
especially in his admiration for Lev Shestov — his approach now turned 
out more strictly defi ned.4 Shortly before the October Revolution Shpet 
expressed his criticism of Shestov, who argued against Husserl’s method 
1 Krijnen 2015, p. 113.
2 Luft 2015, p. 3.
3 Nemirova 2007, p. 68.
4 In 1935, writing from his exile in Eniseisk, Shpet (1995, p. 57) laments to his friend 
Liubov Gurevich that ‘there is one thing in my articles of that time which I do 
not like and even irritates me sometimes: their arrogant tone. Looking back, I am 
amazed by their inappropriateness and untimeliness’.
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in his 1917 essay ‘Memento mori (po povodu teorii poznaniia Edmunda 
Gusserlia)’. Shpet believed that Shestov was severely misguided in his 
assertion that philosophy should not aspire to being rigorous and foun-
dational, and that it should instead leave room for ‘wisdom’ (mudrost’) 
and ‘eternal’ questions. In his response Shpet demanded that philosophy 
must instead clearly defi ne its own jurisdiction as that of ‘pure knowl-
edge’. As the infl uence of religious neo-idealism grew in Russia, especially 
after the revolution and under the authority of Nikolai Berdiaev, Shpet’s 
phenomenology proved increasingly disconnected from other forms of 
‘idealism’.
3.2.2. Shpet and Shestov: Answer to Scepticism
Shpet returned to Germany briefl y in June 1914. He travelled fi rst 
through Switzerland, where he stayed a few weeks in Coppet with 
Shestov, visiting his fi rst wife and daughters in Geneva, where they now 
lived with Shpet’s mother. From Coppet he continued to Göttingen, 
where he remained for almost a month. Shpet met with Husserl regu-
larly, discussing ‘general matters’, work in phenomenology, as well as his 
professional plans. He had already sent the recently published Iavlenie i 
smysl — dedicated to Husserl — to his teacher but, without a translation, 
they could hardly discuss the book’s content.
Shestov’s opinion was that it would be necessary to have the book 
translated to German, no matter what the cost or the amount of work it 
would require.1 It seems the question of a translation was also raised by 
Husserl during their fi rst meeting. Shpet reports in his letter to Natal’ia 
Konstantinovna: ‘Regarding the translation, Frau Husserl wrote yes-
terday to one publisher to enquire whether he knew a translator’.2 But 
fi nding the time to adapt the work for a translation appears to have 
1 Shpet (2005, p. 191) mentions in a letter to his wife that having the book translated 
would indeed call for further editing of the text, for which he cannot seem to fi nd 
the time.
2 Shpet 2005, p. 201.
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been diffi  cult for Shpet.1 In general, the Göttingen letters of 1914 speak 
of a contrast between his professional aspirations and the realities he 
faced. Shpet writes that he has wondered why he feels so at ease abroad 
and what draws him to travel, and concludes that he is perhaps simply 
drawn away from Moscow, the city that now appears to be ‘the only 
place’ where he is ‘not loved’. Shpet attests that he is surrounded by 
‘enemies’ and mentions dreaming of moving away, possibly ‘to the en-
virons of Moscow’. He could thus attain a quieter life, similar to that of 
Shestov, whom he admits he envies.2 Shpet also discusses the topic with 
Husserl, who is surprised to hear that instead of looking for philosophi-
cal allies in St Petersburg, Shpet entertains a dream of moving to Iur’ev 
(present-day Tartu), where, in his own words, he ‘could now indepen-
dently establish himself and receive a chair in the very near future’.3
The peace for which Shpet yearns, he believes, would allow him to 
focus on the theoretical tasks he had discovered during the writing of 
Iavlenie i smysl. At present, this is impossible due to the still unfi nished 
doctoral thesis. Shpet writes:
I am glad that I could at least publish my Iavlenie i smysl, because here 
I was able to say something, albeit to a microscopic degree. However, 
on the other hand, I am even more disappointed by the fact that I must 
abandon the continuation of that very work for a long time. I know 
that the dissertation is not at fault here — to the contrary, even, and 
I will need to say a thing or two in it to save myself from returning to 
it — but in any event, if I were free, I would fi nish up with it quickly 
and move on to my own work, but as precisely it will take up my free 
time, I feel a certain reluctance towards it.4
1 Shpet (2005, p. 208) writes to Natal’ia Konstantinovna: ‘When Shestov says that 
time needs to be found to rewrite the book for a German translation, I fully un-
derstand him — in his place, I would say the same to someone else — but I do not 
understand where to fi nd that time’.
2 Shpet 2005, pp. 206–207.
3 Shpet 2005, p. 205. Shpet adds that Husserl had reportedly spent ‘a few years’ in Iur’ev 
himself, which made him ‘absolutely not understand’ Shpet’s dream. For more on the 
philosophy faculty of the University of Iur’ev see Pavlov 2016, pp. 173–174.
4 Shpet 2005, p. 207.
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Following what Husserl tells him about his own method of writing,1 
Shpet fears that if he does not tackle the theoretical work now, he might 
lose his present clarity of intuition. He aims to continue from where 
Iavlenie i smysl ended and surprisingly writes that the work is to be ‘ethi-
cal’ in nature. Shpet was unable to realize these plans: his later philoso-
phy does not, overtly at least, develop an ethical theme. Seemingly, due 
to the increasingly diffi  cult circumstances, he repeatedly failed to seize 
the phenomenological opportunities presented to him. In one of the 
1914 letters from Göttingen, Shpet writes:
Husserl suggested something to me: he had received a letter from an 
editor of a French philosophical journal with the proposal to write 
an article about his phenomenology. Husserl does not want to do so 
himself, but asked me to write, as an extract from the book — which 
[he felt would not be] diffi  cult for me. However, I had to turn that 
down too, as again there was no time. That is of course very regret-
table, as it would have meant a lot to me, but there was nothing to be 
done about it!2
Having returned to Moscow, Shpet resumed his life with a young 
family (the three children from his second marriage were born in 1914, 
1916 and 1919), teaching and publishing. His 1916 essay ‘Soznanie i ego 
sobstvennik’ is one of the two texts in which Shpet continues to develop 
his phenomenological argument. The essay was published in a Festschrift 
dedicated to Chelpanov on the twenty-fi fth anniversary of his academic 
career, written by former students of his Kiev and Moscow seminars. 
Shpet’s doctoral defence took place in May 1916, and in the autumn of 
1917 he released the fi rst issue of his own philosophical journal, Mysl’ i 
1 Shpet (2005, p. 205) writes: ‘[Husserl] made some very interesting observations 
(which he even wrote down, but only for posthumous publication) about his own 
work. He says that he can only write when he has some “heaven-sent inspiration”, 
that for example, in his Logische Untersuchungen, almost everything was written 
by intuition, and that he only inserted some parts to give the whole a more fi nished 
appearance, and that those parts were the least successful’.
2 Shpet 2005, p. 208.
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slovo (Thought and Word), in which he published his second signifi cant 
phenomenological essay, ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’.1
It appears that during his stay in Göttingen Shpet had somewhat lost 
touch with his earlier philosophical circles. Boris Gornung, who would 
become a close associate of Shpet in the early 1920s, asserts that Mysl’ 
i slovo appeared at a time when Shpet had yet to found his own group. 
‘To juxtapose the annual publication “Mysl’ i slovo” on the one hand […] 
with “Logos” and, on the other, with those he would later call ‘nonsensi-
cal’, he with great diffi  culty had to assemble a circle of colleagues, and 
the only criterion for that was a negative quality — lack of membership 
of groupings which he considered his enemies’, Gornung writes.2 Mysl’ 
i slovo was intended to become an annual publication, but this plan did 
not materialize. Instead, only two issues were published: in 1917 and in 
1918–21.
Lev Shestov published in both issues of Shpet’s journal.3 Yet at the 
same time the two philosophers were at odds in terms of their reactions 
to Husserl’s phenomenology. Shestov’s ‘Memento mori’ was published 
in Voprosy fi losofi i i psikhologii in the autumn of 1917.4 This was a critical 
appraisal of Husserl’s philosophical programme as presented in the Logos 
essay. According to Shestov Husserl had been mistaken in stating that 
philosophy should be made scientifi c, arguing that it made phenomenol-
ogy amount to nothing more than another theory of knowledge. Like 
Kant, Husserl seemed to Shestov to have simply excluded a region of 
philosophy from his system — whether it be called metaphysics or ‘wis-
dom’. In Shestov’s opinion this made phenomenology blind to the deeper 
mysteries of existence. Relying steadfastly on the powers of human ra-
tionality, Husserl seemed to him to deny that there was anything it could 
not achieve. Soon after the publication of Shestov’s essay Shpet wrote 
1 The date of the journal’s publication is unknown, but on 26 December 1917 Georgii 
Adolfovich Lemahn-Abrikosov wrote a letter to Shpet with a review of the fi rst 
issue. (Shchedrina 2015, p. 66.)
2 Gornung (2001, p. 353) adds: ‘Thus M. O. Gershezon and I. B. Rumer, who had noth-
ing at all to do with the basic direction of the yearbook, ended up in “Mysl’ i slovo”’.
3 ‘Self-evident truths’ in the 1917 issue and ‘Socrates and Blessed Augustine’ in the 
issue of 1918–21.
4 Voprosy fi losofi i i psikhologii. Kn. 139. 1917.
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a draft commentary on it, defending Husserl against what he considered 
a misinterpretation. The review was never published, but its manuscript 
remained in Shpet’s archives.1
Shpet asserts that the argumentation in ‘Memento mori’ is unusu-
ally weak given Shestov’s habitual intellectual depth. In his opinion 
the essay lacks originality, insight and a true ability to express insights 
about the abyss, or the ‘groundlessness’ of existence: ‘there are no 
dangerous mountaintops — there is offi  ce fatigue and an armchair’.2 
Apart from misinterpreting transcendental phenomenology as a the-
ory of knowledge (and attacking it, as Shpet writes, with all the usual 
arguments used against gnoseology), Shpet accuses his colleague of 
making two grave mistakes: 1) criticizing gnoseological methodology 
from the perspective of ethical concerns (‘Shestov is only interested 
in “how morals are possible”’); and 2) confusing the diff ering tasks of 
philosophy as rigorous science, philosophy as wisdom, and the search 
for non-scientifi c truths about life ‘…for he himself needs God, and not 
truth!’).3 Shpet claims this leads Shestov to the impression that Husserl 
has promised that scientifi c philosophy will answer ‘all questions that 
perplex humanity’ and achieve the ‘fi nal truth’.4 In reality, Shpet asserts, 
Husserl is merely defi ning the possible research fi eld of rigorous phi-
losophy and only promising to answer all the questions attached to that 
fi eld.
Principally, however, Shpet’s dispute with Shestov concerns whether 
philosophy should try to account for knowledge of the religious type; 
knowledge about things beyond human rationality. In Shestov’s opin-
ion the metaphysical questioning of the ancient Greek philosophers, 
who were driven to know the foundations of all being, was of this kind. 
While the correctness of their claims could not be proven, the Greek 
1 Tat’iana Shchedrina (2004, p. 188) has suggested that Shpet’s decision not to pub-
lish his review might have been connected with the fact that Shestov had recently 
lost his son in the war.
2 Shpet 2010а, p. 210.
3 Shpet 2010а, pp. 220–221.
4 Shpet 2010а, pp. 211–212; 217. Tomas Sodeika and Lina Vidauskytė (2015) have dis-
cussed Shestov’s and Husserl’s approaches to the dichotomy of ‘chaos’ or ‘tragedy’ 
and philosophy as rigorous science.
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thinkers considered philosophy the highest of all forms of knowledge, 
reaching for the ‘Truth’ (Istina) itself, as something diff erent from veri-
fi able scientifi c facts. According to Shestov the direct juxtaposition of 
‘science’ (nauka) and ‘wisdom’ (mudrost’) was in fact unknown in the 
history of philosophy until Husserl’s statement. Indeed, he asserts that 
until then ‘the accepted opinion was that if there was anywhere wis-
dom and deep thinking […] could fi nd a fi rm mooring, it was only in 
a philosopher’s breast […]’.1 According to the defi nitions of Aristotle and 
Plotinus philosophy was the ‘most important, the most necessary, the 
most signifi cant’ activity of human minds, as well as the ‘most divine’ 
of all sciences.2 Shestov maintains that Husserl would probably disagree 
with such statements:
…he would hardly agree to repeat that philosophy is divine among 
sciences, that it is most inherent of God, that it had God as its subject. 
In my opinion, he would probably not agree to do so. The word ‘God’ 
would remind him of wisdom, which he as we know considers the 
enemy of philosophy, and would drive it out of his republic, as Plato 
drove the poet out of his.3
Indeed, Shestov argues that Husserl ‘could agree only to recognize the 
kind of God of which reason were proof, because […] alongside reason 
there is not and cannot be another authority’.4
Shestov acknowledges the boldness of Husserl’s statement. The latter 
seems to him to be making his argument ‘with all the impetuousness 
of a fanatically convinced person’ to prove that ‘it is possible, without 
resort to metaphysics, to save oneself from relativism, and that people, 
despite knowing little or not everything, really know what they know, 
and thus neither gods, angels or demons can dispute their truths […]’.5 
Shestov thus admits that Husserl’s search is directed towards a funda-
1 Shestov 1993, p. 190.
2 Shestov 1993, pp. 193–194.
3 Shestov 1993, p. 194.
4 Shestov 1993, p. 197.
5 Shestov 1993, p. 208.
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mental level of truth.1 The potential consequences of such a search are 
serious:
Husserl wants no compromises: everything or nothing. Either evi-
dence is the last point for which the human spirit strives when search-
ing for truth, and that evidence is fully achievable by human means, 
or the kingdom of chaos and madness must descend on Earth, one 
in which all who wish to may lay a claim to reason’s stately rights, to 
its sceptre and crown, and ‘truth’ will prove completely dissimilar to 
those unshakeable conclusions for which the strict sciences searched 
and which they have been fi nding until now.2
If that were to prove the case, Shestov concludes, philosophy might once 
again need to turn to ‘wisdom’.3
Shestov’s argument does not convince Shpet. He asserts that the 
former seems to suggest that, as Husserl confi rms the correlation of the 
world to consciousness, he at the same time rejects the existence of any-
thing that remains outside it — anything that is potentially beyond the 
grasp of human cognition. However, in Shpet’s opinion there is nothing 
in phenomenology that would contradict Shestov’s example of such 
an existence. For example, Shestov suggests it is entirely possible that
somewhere in other planetary spheres (and maybe much closer to us) 
masses are at present not attracted to each other, but freely approach 
and fl ee one another, in their movement not obeying any previously 
composed plan. That not only can, but must be allowed — if one is not, 
after Kant, to accept that reason dictates laws to nature.4
1 Shestov and Husserl’s friendship has been well documented, and it is often suggested 
that what drew the two philosophers together was the openness with which they 
disagreed with each other (see e. g. Szepieniec 2014; pp. 139–141). Shestov’s article 
‘Pamiati velikogo fi losofa (Edmund Gusserl’)’, published in the Parisian journal Russkiia 
zapiski in 1938, testifi es to their philosophical comradeship.
2 Shestov 1993, p. 214.
3 Ibid.
4 Shestov 1993, p. 221.
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In addition, Shestov argues that there is a confusion in Husserl’s usage 
of the terms ‘ideal’ and ‘eternal’ being. He demonstrates his argument 
with an example:
[…] in chess — this Husserl himself will tell you — the king or queen, 
in a word any chessman, is an ideal being which does not at all mu-
tate because of its real embodiments. If the king were made of gold, 
ivory or dough, if it were the size of a bull or a sparrow, bear a crown 
or a tiara — its ideal being would of course not change the slightest 
because of that, as it would not change if a single chessman had never 
been embodied in reality. The same goes for the other chessmen. […] 
It may even be triumphantly stated that monsters, angels and gods 
would have to see in it the same thing people see. And one must thence 
conclude that it is outside time, eternal — for were the whole world to 
perish, the ideas of chess would remain. However, even Husserl, with 
all his courage, would never think to speak on the subject of chessmen 
as eternal ideas […]’.1
In contrast, for Shpet Shestov’s example of the chess pieces is an 
accurate illustration of his unsound expectations of philosophical 
knowledge. He argues that the ontological status of the chess pieces 
is in fact a ‘wonderful example of the ideal’. Opposing postulations of 
any realities beyond the knowable one, Shpet defi nes the nature of an 
ideal being simply as something which is accessed through the ideal 
intuition. He attests that ideal objects and relations such as the rules 
that govern the movement of pieces on a chessboard are not ‘invented’ 
but instead ‘discovered’.2 For Shpet this is indeed an example of the 
kinds of truth that can be reached and analysed by philosophy as ‘pure 
knowledge’. Shestov appears to him to be caught up in a psychological 
scepticism that denies knowledge the possibility of reaching truths, 
thus making any philosophical progress impossible. The truth which 
1 Shestov 1993, p. 222.
2 Shpet 2010a, p. 215.
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Shestov is seeking, Shpet suggests, is in fact God, and thus beyond any 
philosophical endeavour.1
In what follows I discuss Shpet’s two essays, ‘Soznanie i ego sobstven-
nik’ (1916) and ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ (1917), which fi nalized the founda-
tion for the phenomenological method he would use in his subsequent 
works. In the fi rst of the texts Shpet formulates the idea of a collective 
consciousness, thus presenting an alternative to Husserl’s transcen-
dental subjectivism. The possibility of a shared consciousness supports 
Shpet’s theory of the entelechy, which is in turn a topic for his second 
essay. In ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ he reinvestigates the question of the 
inherent rationality of all experience and reinterprets the entelechy, 
the directing ‘force’ of this rationality, as language. Especially this sec-
ond essay, which was published on the fi rst pages of the fi rst issue of 
the journal Mysl’ i slovo, can be considered programmatic for Shpet’s 
post-Göttingen career. It not only promotes phenomenology, but also 
demonstrates the scope that Shpet considers fi tting for philosophy as 
pure knowledge. As the title of the essay suggests, this is done at least 
partly in response to Shestov’s concerns. Proposing a new conception 
of rationality for Russian philosophy, Shpet argues against treating it 
as wisdom.
It is uncertain which direction Shpet’s philosophical work would 
have taken had it not been for the October Revolution. Nonetheless, 
by 1917 he had completed a certain transition from a visibly Husserlian 
viewpoint to his original hermeneutic and semantic phenomenology, 
which would later form the basis of his cultural theory of the 1920s. 
‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ illustrates how the source of ‘meaning’ which Shpet 
was seeking in the noetic-noematic structures in Iavlenie i smysl is now 
discovered in a ‘word’ and its ‘inner form’. The foundation of Shpet’s 
linguistic theory is therefore phenomenological. As I attempt to show, 
this should also aff ect how we interpret the meaning of his theory of 
the inner form of the word. The theory itself will be the main subject 
of the fourth chapter.
1 Shpet 2010a, p. 221.
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3.3. From Entelechy 
to the Inner Form of the Word
Maryse Dennes has rightly spoken of the need to interpret Shpet’s 
version of the Humboldtian-Potebnian concept, the inner form of the 
word (vnutrenniaia forma slova), from a phenomenological viewpoint. 
She identifi es the root of the concept in the entelechy of Iavlenie i 
smysl, contending that Shpet’s theory is thus not merely semantic but 
also, signifi cantly, philosophical. Indeed, as Dennes suggests, Shpet’s 
texts of the 1920s in the fi elds of linguistic and cultural theory are but 
‘variations’ and ‘fragments’ of a broader and deeper issue, which he 
fi rst discussed in 1914.1 In my opinion Dennes correctly identifi es the 
source of Shpet’s theory, as well as the phenomenological problems 
that an interpretation of his inner form must address: for example, 
the noetic-noematic structure, the nature of positum, the question of 
sense-bestowal, Shpet’s intelligible intuition and, of course, the nature 
of entelechy. These problems’ relationship with the theory of the inner 
form of the word has itself yet to be addressed, and this is what I at-
tempt to do in the remaining parts of the thesis.
Dennes maintains that Shpet treats the word as a triad structure of 
sense (smysl), signifi cation (znachenie) and entelechy with the latter 
creating the connection between the former two. She compares this 
division with Frege’s Sinn and Bedeutung, suggesting that the sense 
of an object is given in perception, while its signifi cation is acquired 
through ideal intuition; it is part of a linguistic-cultural ideal structure.2 
The entelechy, then, is what makes the transition between the kinds 
of intuition possible: it ‘translates’ a sense perception to each culture’s 
way of seeing and thus, for example, allows us to see the tall wooden 
object in front of us as a bookshelf and not a large ladder, or just an 
obscure symmetrical structure. This reading comes close to what I have 
suggested concerning Shpet’s entelechy as a rational ‘motivation’ of 
1 Dennes (2006), of course, is referring to the titles of Shpet’s two works, Este -
ti cheskie fragmenty and Vnutrenniaia forma slova. Etiudy i variatsii po teme Gum-
bol’ta.
2 Dennes 2012, pp. 20–21.
3.3. From Entelechy to the Inner Form of the Word  175
experience. Yet, it seems to me that if we assume that Shpet’s entelechy 
simply ‘gives the right word’ for our sense-percept, the phenomenologi-
cal weight of his idea remains modest. I therefore propose that a further 
investigation into the philosophical signifi cance of Shpet’s idea is still 
necessary.
According to Dennes entelechy and the inner form can be understood 
as variations of Shpet’s conceptions of ‘nation’ (narod) and ‘spirit’ (dukh), 
which he uses in his 1927 work Vvedenie v etnicheskuiu psikholo giiu 
(Introduction to Ethnic Psychology). Thus, her interpretation of Shpet’s 
theory relates it closely to Humboldt’s and Potebnia’s expositions, where 
meanings are seen as being created collectively, following a certain ener-
gy or teleology inherent in a culture or language.1 Even though this view 
clearly resembles Shpet’s formulation in Iavlenie i smysl, I suggest that we 
should treat his phenomenology separately from his ethnic psychology. 
If the rational motivation which Shpet discovers in the very core of sense 
formation is defi ned as something like national spirit, his conception is 
indeed all but identical to Humboldt’s. But such a reading does not cor-
respond to the view, shared by Husserl and Shpet, of phenomenology as 
an absolute and rigorous cognitive ground for the indubitable knowledge 
of the given. It seems to me that both Shpet and Husserl are striving for 
‘truths’ instead of culturally defi ned meanings — even if the diff erence 
is not always easy to defi ne.2
Discussions of Shpet’s phenomenological hermeneutics have gener-
ally not addressed the truth-value of the culturally defi ned concept that 
can also be treated as a meaningful sign, such as ‘bookshelf ’.3 This has 
been further refl ected in the interpretations of his cultural theory. If the 
question of the relationship of the object-as-intended, the ‘meaningful 
object’ (e. g. chimney, axe, bookshelf) with truth is not raised, Shpet’s 
1 Denn 2009.
2 I am not the fi rst to observe that Shpet’s entelechy suggests more than a signifi ca-
tive relationship to reality, or that the inner form of the word is intended to express 
something ‘directly’ about reality. See e. g. Roman Schastlivtsev (2006, p. 258), who 
writes: ‘Concept […] cannot be seen as empty, it contains a concrete meaning, it is 
embedded with a direct relation to reality as to its own object. Concept for Shpet 
is the reality of an object as deployed in reason’.
3 Bernet (1988a, p. 3) asserts that this crucial distinction is also present in Husserl’s 
theory of signs.
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conception of culture potentially becomes relativistic.1 In the following 
chapter I present a reading of the inner form of the word that is more 
intricately connected with Shpet’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenom-
enology, also tackling the evasive question of ‘truth’. First, however, 
I will present a short analysis of the essays ‘Soznanie i ego sobstvennik’ 
and ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?.2 These texts are a necessary part of the founda-
tion of Shpet’s hermeneutics, as they introduce the possibility of a col-
lective consciousness and integrate the notion of language with the 
phenomenological conception of the entelechy. The outcome of the 
essays is therefore a vision in which Husserl’s pure consciousness as the 
‘place’ where the constitution of reality occurs is replaced by a collective 
rationality in which each individual consciousness takes part. According 
to Shpet this rationality is ultimately language, which thus formulates 
our vision of the world at the most fundamental level.
3.3.1. Shpet’s Collective Consciousness
Shpet’s essay ‘Soznanie i ego sobstvennik’ presents a clear-cut argu-
ment against Husserl’s manner of constructing phenomenology, so to 
speak, around the ‘pole’ of the transcendental ego. It is sometimes sug-
gested that he thereby returns to the earlier ‘non-egological’ conception 
of phenomenology, presented in Logical Investigations. For example, 
Thomas Nemeth writes that in 1916 Shpet questions ‘what he regard-
ed as Husserl’s fundamental thesis regarding the I, namely that every 
cogitatio eff ected is of the form cogito’. Shpet asks: what, or who, is this 
Ego cogito? Nemeth continues, ‘is it something other than the stream 
of lived experiences and, unlike ever changing stream of experiences, 
something numerically identical in those experiences or, even more 
fundamentally, that to which these experiences belong?’ Nemeth argues 
1 This indeed is Patrick Flack’s conclusion in his article (Flak 2010, p. 163), as he writes 
that ‘Shpet appears very vulnerable to sceptical relativist criticism’.
2 ‘Soznanie i ego sobstvennik’, while interesting in its own right, will be presented only 
briefl y, since its main content is repeated in ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’. For discussions on 
Shpet’s analysis of the philosophical ego, see e. g. Molchanov 2014 and Chubarov 
2014b.
3.3. From Entelechy to the Inner Form of the Word  177
that from Shpet’s point of view, the positing of an ‘I’ ‘behind’ an indi-
vidual consciousness ‘leads directly to subjectivism’.1 To tackle the issue, 
Shpet dedicates his essay to an analysis of what exactly we understand 
by an ‘I’, and what its relationship is to ‘consciousness’.
In Ideas Husserl framed phenomenology as an analysis of the pure 
transcendental consciousness — not that of the personal and empiri-
cal ego, but of the reduced one. It is thus a study of the lived experi-
ence and of consciousness in its necessary correlation to that which 
is transcendent to it. Phenomenology considers the consciousness as 
yielding meaning to what is experienced and treats every transcendent 
‘being’ as a unity of meaning. One thereby attains an absolute region of 
being which constitutes ‘all mundane transcendence’, in the words of 
Shlomit Baruch.2 In Ideas Husserl attributes this absolute region of being 
to transcendental subjectivity. Famously, he states that while he had 
still doubted the existence of the pure ego in Logical Investigations, he 
could no longer do so. Even after the transcendental reduction, he now 
fi nds that the pure ego is necessary and endures in pure consciousness: 
it belongs to every lived experience as that which remains identical even 
as the experience itself can change, appear, and disappear.
Shpet challenges Husserl’s conclusion, asking, ‘[…] how then did 
Husserl come to this identical I?’ He fi nds that, contrary to the latter’s 
habit as well as the principle of all principles, demanding evidence of 
all originary givenness, Husserl fails to provide any evidence for the 
presence of a pure ego in experience. Shpet notes that Husserl himself 
admits that the pure ego is not a ‘part’ in a lived experience, and states:
Here, to me, is how the matter stands: Having excluded the empiri-
cal I in the phenomenological reduction, Husserl can retain the ideal 
(eidetic) I only as an object, but by no means as the subject of con-
sciousness. And then in the ‘transcendental residuum’, as the object 
of phenomenology, a pure consciousness would remain, but it would 
be, so to speak, no one’s.3
1 Nemeth 2019a, pp. 155–156.
2 Baruch 2004, p. 201.
3 Shpet 2019a, p. 190.
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Shpet discards Husserl’s doctrine of ‘transcendence in immanence’ and 
asks, ‘does his ornate combination of Latin terms provide any clarifi ca-
tion of the matter?’ For him the ‘positing’ of a pure ego as the subject of 
experience not only leads dangerously to subjectivism, but also forces 
Husserl to alter his own principles by introducing a theory ‘where there 
is no need of it’.1 In the phenomenological analysis, Shpet asks, would it 
not be ‘more correct to say that there simply is nothing’, that is, nothing 
that would reveal the presence of a transcendental subjectivity in lived 
experience? He concludes that ‘nothing can be said, that nothing need 
be said and simply that there is nothing to say about this I, because it is 
not and I at all’.2
One of the three central claims of ‘Soznanie i ego sobstvennik’ is that 
the I can be discovered only as a ‘thing’, a ‘unity’ among others. According 
to Shpet to speak of a ‘psyche’ or a ‘person’ is to speak of a social thing 
just as one speaks of ladders, books, apples and so on. Consequently, the 
I cannot form a foundation of any kind. As for the I as an empirical unity, 
Shpet suggests that ‘a unity of lived experience or consciousness’ seems 
an adequate characterization. He realizes that this suggestion will seem 
counterintuitive to many, writing that, perhaps, ‘some Ivan Ivanovich 
will claim: I am a unity of consciousness. What are we to make of this? 
In my view, he will be right but only that Ivan Petrovich is also a unity 
of consciousness…’3 Thus, Shpet believes that one can indeed ask the 
question of ‘whose’ a consciousness is, of who is its ‘owner’, but only 
as long as we understand the underlying ‘I’ as a social category, deter-
mined in place and time. ‘For example’, he writes, ‘I live on such and such 
a street, I have a certain social standing, I am exhausted, I am wearing 
shabby clothes, I am bankrupt, etc.’4 In this case, Shpet asserts, asking 
‘whose’ the consciousness is will be much like asking ‘Whose coat?’ or 
‘Whose galoshes?’5 This does not amount to a philosophical question. 
Meanwhile, however, the complex nature of the ‘social’ I remains a prob-
1 Shpet 2019a, pp. 190–191.
2 Shpet 2019a, p. 193.
3 Shpet 2019a, p. 198.
4 Shpet 2019a, p. 159.
5 Shpet 2019a, p. 199.
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lem for philosophy. Shpet asserts that it is something ‘inexplicable’, and 
as such a subject always open to interpretation and to a ‘translation’ to 
socially constructed language.1
In contrast, Shpet argues that if we understand consciousness as an 
ideal object and wish to examine it in its essence, ‘it makes no sense to 
ask whose it is’. This is the second claim of Shpet’s essay: a ‘unity of con-
sciousness’ as such, eidetically understood, belongs to no one because 
it is not a ‘possession’ or a ‘property’. It is ‘consciousness itself ’, and one 
must therefore respond to the question ‘Whose consciousness?’, ‘It is 
its own’. Consciousness itself is free. The third and fi nal argument in 
Shpet’s essay concerns the possibility of a truly collective consciousness. 
He writes that if the unity of a single consciousness ‘certainly is the 
unity of this consciousness’, correspondingly, the ‘unity of a multitude 
or of a collective or of a communal consciousness is a unity of the collec-
tive consciousness!’ Shpet insists that this is not a mere play on words, 
but a distinction between a ‘meaning which has a genetivus subjectivus 
and a genetivus objectivus’.2 In addition, he argues that there is nothing 
metaphysical about such a conception: a ‘unity of consciousness’ can 
refer to a variety of cases, just as any ‘thing’, ‘content’ or ‘object’ can 
always be understood as unities of sorts.
At the end of his essay Shpet suggests examples of cases where 
consciousness may be attributed to a collective subject, and where the 
communal sphere and its essential types should be understood as inde-
pendent spheres of investigation. He writes: ‘Such expressions as the 
“moral consciousness”, the “aesthetic consciousness”, the “religious 
consciousness”, the “scientifi c consciousness”, etc. already show the 
directions from which corresponding problems arise […].3 Shpet’s hy-
pothesis is that the diff erent kinds of communal consciousness should 
have their own ‘form’ so that ‘they can be designated and then the sense 
of that designation, its logos, could be revealed’.4 The statement func-
tions as an indication of the direction that Shpet’s work would take after 
1 Shpet 2019a, p. 193.
2 Shpet 2019a, pp. 198–199.
3 Shpet 2019a, p. 202.
4 Ibid.
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the revolution. In the early 1920s he embarked on various studies of 
the nature of empirical communal consciousness(es) — most obviously 
in his research on ethnic psychology and on the philosophical issue of 
logos as a foundation of any communal consciousness, especially the 
aesthetic one.
Concerning the critique of Husserl’s egological phenomenology, 
Shpet is, of course, not alone. Nemeth suggests that his commentary can 
be read in connection with two well-known criticisms presented, even 
if decades later, by Jean-Paul Sartre (‘La Transcendance de l’ego. Esquisse 
d’une description phenomenologique’, 1936–37) and Aron Gurwitsch 
(‘A non-egological Conception of Consciousness’, 1940–41).1 The sec-
ond text is particularly interesting from the point of view of Shpet’s 
phenomenology.2 There, Gurwitsch points to the change that took place 
in Husserl’s view of consciousness between Logical Investigations and 
Ideas I. In the former he had rejected the view that acts of consciousness 
were derived from any ‘centre’ of consciousness, whereas in the latter 
he endorsed the existence of a pure ego as just such a centre. Both Sartre 
and Gurwitsch argue that in a phenomenological introspection the ego 
should not be considered the source of consciousness; instead, it appears 
to them as constituted by consciousness. Gurwitsch sees consciousness 
as a multi-part dynamic and fl owing whole, a ‘fi eld’. As Dermot Moran 
writes, Gurwitsch’s consciousness is ‘united into complexes that suc-
ceed each other, by the complexes themselves and not by any super-
vening ego’. For him the ego is nothing but this united complex, and it 
‘derives its unity and its coherence from the very acts that enter into 
it and constitute it; and it is nothing other than the organized totality 
of these acts’.3
More recently, Shlomit Baruch has joined the criticism, arguing that 
there is in fact a tension within the very concept of transcendental con-
sciousness in Husserl’s exposition. She asserts that one must, indeed,
1 Nemeth 2019a, pp. 156–157.
2 Alexander Haardt (2009) has discussed the relationship of Shpet’s aesthetics with 
Sartre’s literary theory, but he does not take up the issue of ‘La Transcendance de 
l’ego’.
3 Cited in Moran 2019, p. 7.
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criticize Husserl for returning in Ideas I to the classical assumption of 
a transcendental ego, so that the ego becomes a necessary structure of 
consciousness. This view is incompatible with Husserl’s defi nition of 
the concept ‘consciousness’. It is unnecessary as a unifying principle. 
The transcendental ego is ‘death of consciousness’.1
Baruch suggests that consciousness knows itself only as the conscious-
ness of a transcendent object. Consciousness, in other words, is a ‘trans-
parency’. While agreeing with her predecessors, Baruch believes that the 
criticisms of Sartre and Gurwitsch are insuffi  ciently radical. She fi nds 
a problematic tension between what she considers to be two competing 
goals of Husserl’s phenomenology: ‘on the one hand, phenomenology 
aspires to be pure intuitive science that describes what is given as self-
evident’, and on the other, ‘Husserl is looking for an absolute being, an 
absolute condition’. Thus, Baruch states that Husserl no less than con-
tradicts his own defi nition of phenomenology as a descriptive science, 
‘because he goes beyond the conception of consciousness as an absolute 
fact and presents it as a system of conditions’.2
Shpet’s motivation for rejecting Husserl’s egological position was 
his fundamental mistrust of anything that might lead to a subjectiv-
ist or relativist philosophy. Therefore, while he provides an elaborate 
analysis on the meaning of ‘consciousness’, the ‘I’ and the ‘ego’, his main 
point is nonetheless elsewhere: in proving the possibility of a collective 
consciousness. In this vein, it is interesting to consider J. N. Mohanty’s 
criticism of Gurwitsch’s approach, which, he believes, fails its task of 
‘domesticating’ the problem of inter-subjectivity. According to Mohanty 
Gurwitsch promotes a ‘fi eld theory of consciousness’, according to which 
we should speak not of transcendental consciousness but only of a con-
stitutive ‘function’ of consciousness. For Gurwitsch, as Mohanty summa-
rizes, consciousness is but a fi eld in the sense of the ‘totality of copresent 
data’, and the unity of any perceived object is due not to the perceiving 
subject, but the coherence of the system of which the object is part.3 
1 Baruch 2004, p. 204.
2 Baruch 2004, pp. 205–206.
3 Mohanty 1994, pp. 940–942.
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But he fi nds that simply replacing the ego with a ‘fi eld’ will hardly free 
consciousness from its privacy. Mohanty asserts:
To the contrary, it would seem that if mental life is private, it would be 
so even on a nonegological theory. The various fi elds of consciousness 
(replacing the putative egos) would not just become parts of a com-
mon public world (of consciousness); they would still be closed off  
from each other. So what is needed for solving the problem of inter-
subjectivity […], then, is not to deny the ‘I’ as a component of prere-
fl ective consciousness but a suitable theory of consciousness which 
makes it ‘visible’ to the other in an appropriate manner.1
It is my view that Shpet, with his theory of the collective conscious-
ness, the social world, and the inner form which functions as its foun-
dation, is attempting to formulate just such a ‘transparent’ theory of 
consciousness and its functions.
3.3.2. ‘Word’ as a principium cognoscendi
Although Shpet never mentions Husserl’s name in ‘Mudrost’ ili 
razum?’ — perhaps so that he might promote a distinct philosophical 
standpoint without attributing it to Husserl alone — it strikes the reader 
as a commentary on ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’, as well as a dis-
cussion on themes that Husserl presented in another programmatic 
work, his 1907 lecture course ‘Die Idee der Phänomenologie’ (‘The Idea of 
Phenomenology’). The essay also off ers an indirect criticism of Shestov’s 
1917 ‘Memento mori (po povodu teorii poznaniia Edmunda Gusserlia)’ and 
can thus be viewed as a response to the former’s concerns.2 In his text 
Shpet introduces his own philosophical programme, which reaches out 
1 Mohanty 1994, p. 952.
2 The connection of Shpet’s text with Shestov’s essay has previously been discussed 
by Shchedrina & Pruzhinin 2016, pp. 39–40, as well as Nemeth 2019b, pp. 209–210. 
I have suggested its association with Husserl’s 1907 lecture course in an earlier text 
(Bourgeot 2020).
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for a knowledge of reality in its ‘wholeness’, ‘concreteness’ and ‘unity’ 
while at the same time remaining rigorous in the Husserlian sense. Most 
importantly, Shpet asserts that the method he is suggesting allows for 
a direct access to the true and essential being of reality. In other words, 
Shpet is proposing a phenomenological method adapted to the Russian 
philosophical discourse.
As previously discussed, Shestov accused Husserl’s Logos article of 
carving out an unnecessarily restricted philosophical method. According 
to Shestov the truth about reality could never be attained by rational 
thinking alone, and so philosophy should remain open to other, irration-
al and mystical, models of thought. In Shpet’s opinion Shestov dreams 
beyond what philosophy as pure knowledge can attain. He argues that all 
knowledge must be securely built on a rational foundation, the critical 
examination of which is the task of philosophy. Shpet attacks meta-
physical theories that draw conclusions about reality without a philo-
sophical justifi cation and claims they are ‘quasi-philosophy’. Philosophy 
as knowledge, in contrast, must never stop reviewing its own reasoning. 
‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ presents a further development of the insights of 
Iavlenie i smysl. Shpet now tackles the ideal sphere of experience in more 
detail and approaches the question of entelechy from a new point of 
view, not only discovering it in experience, but attempting to distin-
guish its proper mechanisms.
Husserl also approaches the eidetic sphere in his Logos essay, stating 
that it is merely the ‘spell of inborn naturalism’ that makes it diffi  cult for 
us to see essences, or ideas. Or rather, as he continues, ‘since in fact we 
do, so to speak, constantly see them, for us to let them have the peculiar 
value which is theirs instead of absurdly naturalizing them’. According 
to Husserl intuiting essences actually ‘conceals no more diffi  culties or 
“mystical” secrets than does perception’. Indeed, when we bring ‘colour’ 
to ‘full intuitive clarity, to givenness for ourselves’, the datum is an ‘es-
sence’. Husserl argues that the phenomenological investigation must re-
main in the purely eidetic sphere, and its statements must describe the 
phenomena in full clarity ‘by means of concepts of essence, that is, by 
conceptual signifi cations of words that must permit of being redeemed 
in an essential intuition’. When phenomena are grasped in essential 
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intuition, they will permit ‘of being fi xed in defi nitive concepts and 
thereby aff ord possibilities of defi nitive and in their own way absolutely 
valid objective statements’.1
This is precisely Shpet’s task in ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’: to develop 
a method of reliably describing eidetic phenomena. Shpet asserts that 
to achieve this goal, philosophy must further investigate the nature of 
ideas, the eidetic realm, as the content of consciousness.2 This indeed 
appears to him the sole fi eld of research for philosophy, which should 
accept no pre-given theories and only include in its subject matter what is 
clearly experienced through diff erent intuitions (empirical, eidetic, etc.). 
Shpet understands these intuitions as the immediate and sole connecting 
point between consciousness and the external world, and as such they 
constitute the subject matter of philosophy. While other sciences take 
the givenness of reality for granted, philosophy must raise the question 
of how reality is given through intuition. The sphere of philosophical 
analysis is thus consciousness and more accurately, the correlative rela-
tionship between mind and reality.
Philosophy must take ideas as they are directed towards reality, 
Shpet argues. He speaks for the fundamental unity of epistemological 
and ontological viewpoints in such an outlook:
Being, understood as that which is, as truth, is then studied in an au-
thentically philosophical manner when we direct our refl ection on the 
very thought of being. For thought is revealed in itself to thought. It 
is revealed in its authentic essence and not as something that springs 
into being and passes away, something that ‘seems to us’. We have here 
the authentically ‘unshakeable heart of the complete Truth’. Being in 
itself is being and just that. Only through thought does being become 
an object of thought and, consequently, the object of philosophy as 
knowledge. We must come to the realization that philosophically 
1 Husserl 1981, p. 181.
2 Shpet’s ‘consciousness’ should be understood in the light of his previous article, i. e. 
not as a subjective ‘mind’, but a realm — possibly a collective one — of conscious-
ness.
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being exists through thought, that the object of thought and the ob-
ject of being are one and the same. They are a single object.1
Shpet asserts that positive and pure philosophy thereby fi nds a way of 
‘rigorously adhering to its tasks’ and now confronts ‘an infi nite fi eld of 
serious and fascinating work’. The tasks of philosophy are defi ned by its 
own essence; its goal is ‘reality itself in its genuine being, namely that 
which is, that which exists’. Indeed, Shpet identifi es ‘reality’ and ‘being’ 
as the same thing.
‘As long as we simply “live”, we fi nd everything in our experience: 
One thing enters into it, another one leaves; one is added, another is 
taken away. Nevertheless, we experience everything and only it’, Shpet 
writes. However, he notes that once we accept this, we must at the same 
time acknowledge that the initial question of positive philosophy, ‘what 
is?’ now appears diff erently. Shpet asserts that the question, in fact, 
‘removes us from the sphere of experience’. Instead, something ‘comes 
to a stop before us and stands like an enigmatic question mark. It lurks 
“behind” everything and stops the continuous stream in which every-
thing fl ows’.2 Shpet notes that if what is given to us is the experience of 
something, the external reality remains on the ‘other side’ of experi-
ence and knowledge. Shpet fi nds a remedy to the problem in Husserl’s 
epoche as a critical attitude. To attain true knowledge of being, one must 
discover what is absolute and unchanging in our directedness towards 
the ever-changing reality. The clarity and stability of intuitions vary, and 
Shpet states that not everything given in experience is ‘really’ given; 
‘not everything that exists is essential’. Thus, philosophy must ‘distin-
guish the essential, the essence, in what exists from what is not essential’. 
According to Shpet we can
concentrate our attention on what is not essential and ‘isolate’ it from 
what is essential, carefully removing from the given what ‘seems’ 
to be and what is ‘contrived’, thereby ‘cleansing’ it of what to us is 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 217.
2 Shpet 2019b, p. 230.
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‘habitual’, of presuppositions, conjectures, hypotheses, theories, and 
of what simply ‘happens’, ‘occurs’, or ‘takes place’ in what there is but 
does not abide in it. The essential, what abides in being, stays itself, 
‘the same’.1
Shpet’s quest is similar to Husserl’s search for apodictic evidence 
that presents the given in a way that is ‘stable’ in its variations; it is the 
 thoroughly reduced form of the given which could not appear in any 
other way. Husserl especially tackles the topic of apodictic evidence in 
his 1907 lecture course, in which he suggests that if we are, for example, 
presented with diff erent shades of the colour red, ‘can we not judge that 
they are similar to each other — not these particular, individual red phe-
nomena, but rather the species, the nuances as such?’2 The eidetic na-
ture of ‘redness’ can thus be grasped in intuition. Shpet conceptualizes 
the same idea diff erently. He asserts that as we direct ourselves towards 
reality, our gaze might sometimes dwell on the contingent ‘surface’ of 
reality, and sometimes probe more deeply through its essential ‘core’. 
The two sorts of intuition are a single intuition, but diff erent degrees 
of seeing.3
To reach the essential, however, a change of attitude is necessary. 
Shpet points out that there are objects in our fi eld of vision that are in 
constant movement, while others seem to remain stable and identical 
with themselves. ‘Through theory’, he writes, we learn that, in fact, 
everything changes in relation to space, distance, size, mass, time and 
so on. If we then consider our own position as the location point from 
which everything is perceived, this becomes easily evident: all the physi-
cal qualities around us change immediately, as our observing position 
is altered. This poses a problem for Shpet. He writes that to make some 
part or ‘piece’ of reality the object of our study, we must not only extract 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 231.
2 Husserl 1999, p. 42.
3 Shpet 2019b, p. 232. Nevertheless, it is important to remember the fundamentally 
diff erent nature of Shpet’s and Husserl’s views. Shpet interprets that concept of 
essentiality not as the objectively valid and reduced self-given, which the phenom-
enologist looks for ‘in’ his or her cognition, but as an essentiality that he discovers 
by ‘probing deeper’ into reality.
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it from the whole but even ‘freeze’ it in the fl ow of time. Thus, while 
reality itself and all our experiences have passed somewhere into the 
distance, we remain in ‘the past’, that ‘itself is not given, so to speak, 
directly to us, but only reproduced by us’.1
In the concluding part of ‘The Idea of Phenomenology’ Husserl also 
speaks of the ‘transcendencies’ that remain, even after the reductions, 
as if behind the truly self-given. He gives the example of hearing a sound 
or a melody:
If we look closer and now notice how, in the experience of a tone, for 
instance, even after the phenomenological reduction the appearance 
and that which appears stand over against each other, and do so in the 
midst of pure givenness, that is, within genuine immanence, then we 
begin to wonder. The tone lasts for a while; then we have the unity 
of the tone and its temporal span with its temporal phases — the 
now-phase and the past phases — in evident givenness; on the other 
hand, when we refl ect, the phenomenon of the tone duration, which 
is itself a temporal phenomenon, has its own now-phase and phases 
of ‘having been’.2
The ‘above indication already suffi  ces to make us aware of something 
new’, Husserl continues: ‘the phenomenon of tone perception, even 
the evident and reduced phenomenon, requires a distinction within 
immanence between the appearance and that which appears’. In other 
words, we now have two forms of absolute givenness, the givenness 
of the appearing and the givenness of the object. For things simply to 
be there, Husserl argues, is a ‘matter of certain experiences of a spe-
cifi c and changing structure, such as perception, imagination, memory, 
predication, etc.; and things are in them not as they might be in a case 
or container, rather, things constitute themselves’.3
A kindred concern is evident for Shpet in relation to any act of percep-
tion — even though his interpretation is again diff erent from Husserl’s. 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 234.
2 Husserl 1999, p. 67.
3 Husserl 1999, pp. 67–68.
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Shpet writes that any ‘slice’ of experience, after the actual moment of 
its experiencing, can be brought back into consciousness, but only as 
a ‘copy’ of the original: it is not the perception itself. Shpet concludes 
from this that ‘we always see the factually given as given mediately. 
It demands that it be the object of examination, of a representation’. 
Conversely, it is diffi  cult to reach that which is ‘actually originarily given 
here, what is presentatively given, what, to put it another way, “remains” 
after removing everything that is introduced by our “imagination”, “rec-
ollection”, “understanding”, “desire”, “apperception”, etc.’1 Thus, in this 
rather striking contrast with Husserl Shpet rejects the latter’s view of 
constitution as perceiving something as it is imagined, remembered, de-
sired and so on. According to Shpet to access the essential content of 
experience, we must somehow get to it without the contingency of the 
appearances, the forms of givenness, typical of empirical being; these 
are merely viewpoints enshrouding the essential.
This brings Shpet back to the question of the problematic nature of 
the eidetic, which, he says, ‘is often depicted as a system closed unto 
itself, abiding in a state of static equilibrium’. In this system ‘each “idea” 
occupies a strictly determined and carefully doled out “spot”. For this 
reason it cannot be “budged” without breaking its connection to the 
whole, without breaking certain “laws of logic”, without creating — 
and this would be the kiss of death! — a “contradiction”’.2 Shpet sug-
gests that the misunderstanding regarding eidetic beings is that they 
have been understood as ‘empty forms’, general concepts or abstract 
universals that must be ‘fi lled’ with actual content to be exemplifi ed in 
reality. On the contrary, he asserts that we should view eidetic beings 
as generalizations from reality, found as they are, with their contents.
Shpet is seeking a new kind of logic, which would not reduce the 
ideal to a static structure, writing that ideas are not ‘savage beasts that 
must be caged’. The eidetic realm should be considered in all its richness 
of forms, even if contradictory, because the limitations of our minds 
should not be surmised to be also limitations of ideal being. Shpet 
1 Shpet 2019, p. 234.
2 Ibid.
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asserts that the concepts themselves of ‘idea’, ‘essence’ or ‘eidos’ need 
revision. He writes that although they are by defi nition stable and ‘fi rm’, 
one must also account for their dynamism: ‘eidos not only always fi lls […] 
forms with an active content, with a sense, but even in the most exacting 
manner refl ects, by its own “movement”, the slightest demands on the 
part of the object’s formative content’. According to Shpet the instantia-
tion of the eidetic being in reality allows it to appear as part of a whole, 
of a meaningful structure, the changes of which are refl ected in each of 
its parts, and vice versa. If we can thus modify how we address reality, 
and how we single out the eidetic ‘forms’ in our reduced consciousness 
of reality, he argues that we might come to grasp the dynamic eidos that 
‘lives’ in the everchanging reality and gives it meaning.
Evidently, Shpet’s phenomenology has at this point come a long way 
from Husserl’s conception. As in Iavlenie i smysl, the diff erence is con-
nected to the problem of sense-constitution. If for Husserl it occurs in 
a combination of diff erent cognitive processes, for Shpet meaning is 
here created by a context ‘out in the world’. The nature of the contextu-
alized essence, which Shpet also calls ‘concept’, is dynamic: ‘Its dynamic 
is the dynamic of sense’.1 In this new kind of seeing of essences — as 
a meaningful part of a whole — Shpet fi nds the true opposite of the 
natural attitude: the properly philosophical outlook. He characterizes 
the perception of facts as a grasping of mere moments and secondary 
representations of the actual being, contrasting it with the direct in-
tuition of essences instantiated in reality. This originarily given (per-
vichno dannoe) is accessible ‘as itself ’ (samolichno), and because of its 
perdurable nature it remains as something from which consciousness 
can always ‘detach’ itself and then ‘return’ to it, fi nding it unchanged.2
Shpet thus fi nds it possible for an intuition to truly and directly pre-
sent (instead of merely represent) its object. The only way in which the 
eidos changes in our perception is in relation to its form (i. e. whether it 
is perceived, remembered, desired, etc.) or its ‘clarity’. Shpet writes: ‘The 
object toward which consciousness is directed is located at a distance of 
1 Shpet 2019, pp. 234–235.
2 Shpet 2019b, p. 235. (Shpet 1917, p. 32.)
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more or less nearness. It is found farther away or closer to the clearest 
“center” of consciousness. But with all these modifi cations of conscious-
ness […] the essence intuited in it remains invariably and calmly one and 
the same’. Although the eidetic realm is found in consciousness, as be-
fore Shpet is unwilling to attribute it to any subjective mind. He points 
out that the mind or consciousness of any actual person ‘appears to be 
entirely an empirical fact, a “contingency”’.1 Correspondingly, empiri-
cal experience, which Shpet considers a subjective form of perception, 
only gives us a sense experience (opyt) of things, which, in the course of 
a person’s life, ‘accumulates passively or is actively enlarged, classifi ed, 
ordered, etc.’2 But ‘whether experience itself can be called cognition 
even in a broad, improper sense is doubtful’, he writes.
Philosophy must ‘stop considering experience itself as a “dogmati-
cally” given thing of the real world’, Shpet declares. He argues that the 
strictly philosophical outlook, in which reality is considered ‘through 
consciousness’, can only be reached if one considers consciousness ‘not 
as an empirical experience of an individual, not as the data of “observa-
tion” or of “selfobservation”, but as consciousness given to conscious-
ness, consciousness in a refl ection on itself’. Shpet asserts that through 
this modifi cation we reach ‘pure intentionality as the consciousness of 
any object and of any objective content’ without any metaphysical ‘bag-
gage’, that is, without any singular viewpoint through which we would 
be tempted to jump to pseudo-philosophical conclusions. ‘There is no 
need to construct hypotheses and explanations here’, Shpet writes. ‘Since 
nothing “depends” on consciousness in its essence, it neither “acts” on 
anything nor does anything “act” on it. It is not a “thing”. It is not a “rea-
lity”. Rather, it is an “essence” and an “idea”’.3
A philosopher must remain fi rmly critical of their own thought, 
constantly analysing the content of their own consciousness as the 
content of their consciousness: the attention is now directed at the 
nature of this content. Indeed, as long as this position is held, that is, 
as long as thought studies thought, Shpet fi nds it possible to achieve 
1 Shpet 2019b, pp. 236–237.
2 Shpet 2019b, p. 238. (Shpet 1917, p. 35.)
3 Shpet 2019b, p. 239.
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pure knowledge. He asserts that the ‘guarantee of philosophical rigor 
lies simply in the “purity” of its descriptions, in the actual communica-
tion of what “we see” in the essential analysis of consciousness’. This 
clarifi catory task of philosophy is eternal and never-ending, ‘invariable 
and stands outside time’.1 Even though philosophers tend to rush and 
fail in their task, this in no way aff ects the potential truthfulness of 
philosophy itself, Shpet states.
The philosophers’ historical tendency to base their thinking on sub-
jective experience and the philosophical ego has therefore been mis-
taken, in Shpet’s opinion. He writes that all too often, the ‘I’ proved to be 
the criterion, the measure, the source, the owner and even the guarantee, 
not only of its own arguments, but of ‘all things’ and of truth itself. Shpet 
expresses the concern that if we grant the ego the ‘power to legislate’ and 
consider it able to ‘construct everything’, we soon slip into relativism. On 
closer inspection, he argues that we can see that the ego appears merely 
as a ‘point of location’. What we have grown accustomed to taking as the 
‘individual consciousness’ is only a ‘unity’ within something larger and 
non-personal. In Shpet’s opinion such a unity can ‘under no condition 
[…] serve as an “epistemological” guarantee’.2
Shpet distinguishes between two terms closely linked in Russian, 
soznanie (consciousness) and poznanie (cognition),3 suggesting that this 
distinction remains unclear only insofar as we fail to see that, when tak-
en as the subject matter of philosophy, consciousness must be treated 
in its essential form, as an eidetic consciousness, which is ‘ideal and not 
real’. Thus, it is not ‘my consciousness, or that of any other so-and-so or 
in general, of any real being’.4 The relationship between consciousness 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 241.
2 Shpet 2019b, p. 242. Following the reasoning of ‘Soznanie i ego sobstvennik’, Shpet 
continues: ‘In reality, the “I” is always a unicum, a social “unit”, a so-and-so. 
Certainly, each so-and-so is also a “unity” of consciousness, but this unity is surely 
a factual, empirical, and historical unity. If a unity of cognition, as essential, forms 
a certain “part” in the “whole” of consciousness, then obviously the philosophical 
problem of cognition simply goes past the so-and-so, “without touching” it. To an 
equal degree, it can neither give nor not give guarantees of knowledge’.
3 For example, another term for epistemology in Russian is ‘theory of cognition’ 
(teoriia poznaniia).
4 Shpet 2019b, p. 242.
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and cognition brings Shpet back to the problem of experience as pas-
sively received ‘opyt’, which now appears to us in a new light:
When we say that our knowledge is obtained from experience, taking 
the concept of experience in its broadest sense, as that which we live 
through, we correctly indicate the source of our cognition, but upon 
a closer examination such a formula for the principium cognoscendi is 
too crude.1
In Shpet’s opinion the picture of experience changes as soon as we con-
sider more closely the fact that it is given by two very diff erent kinds 
of intuition: the empirical and the ideal. The object towards which our 
consciousness is directed is one and the same, but it is presented to us 
with empirical or essential content, depending on our attitude. This, 
Shpet argues, cannot be explained if we understand ‘experience’ in its 
simple sense.
Regardless of the species of intuition, Shpet asserts, we do not intuit 
passively but actively switch from one intuition to another. To modify 
Husserl’s earlier colour example, we may choose to see red at a certain 
moment as the colour of a particular apple and at another moment the 
colour red in general. In Shpet’s opinion this is revealed in the philo-
sophical gaze directed towards consciousness itself as it is directed 
towards reality. In this standpoint, he argues, objects of experience ap-
pear to us in already ‘formulated’ ways (empirically or ideally); they are 
revealed as the content of consciousness. This requires an act of under-
standing: the given object is understood as the given object. The simple 
and passive consciousness (of objects) now becomes cognition (which 
grasps the form in which the objects are given).
Shpet concludes that the fi nal form which objects of experience 
take in cognition is undoubtedly that of the ‘word’ (slovo). This is the 
fi rst time Shpet refers to the word as a foundational principle, yet the 
discovery is scarcely emphasized in the text. He asserts that because 
the linguistic sign combines the empirical with the ideal, it can signify 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 243.
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transcendental objects in all their possible forms. In Shpet’s opinion 
the word is indeed so central to our mental activities that he is ready 
to affi  rm it as ‘the principium cognoscendi of our cognition’. He fi nds that 
‘it is worth our while to pause on whatever is involved in cognizing 
consciousness, and we fi nd it to be immediately impressed in words’. 
Illustrating this, Shpet cites Plato: ‘When the mind is thinking, it is 
simply talking to itself, asking questions and answering them, affi  rm-
ing and denying’.1
Shpet suggests distinguishing several forms (formy) present in this 
word: at least the grammatical, the stylistic, the aesthetic and the logi-
cal.2 Whereas the fi rst-mentioned forms are either structurally defi ned 
by the language of which they are part (grammatical forms) or can be 
used to express the speaker’s subjective nuances (stylistic forms), logical 
forms are found at the very root of any meaning formation. Shpet writes 
that they are ‘particularly important to us. They are neither fortuitous 
nor empirical, but essential and necessary, as stable and uniform as the 
formative object is identical in itself.’3 In other words, Shpet considers 
the logical forms of language (which he also calls the ‘inner forms of the 
word’) to coincide with the logical forms of thought.
The discovery has considerable consequences for Shpet’s vision 
of phenomenology. This, fi nally, is his answer to the question of how 
meaning is bestowed upon raw experiential data, similarly to Husserl’s 
theory of constitution. For Shpet the inner form of the word, that is, 
its logical form, serves to conceptualize the very point of meaning-
constitution. The logic of this constitution appears ‘transparently’ in 
the inner form: our inherent logic of thought is the logic of the inner 
form. In other words, the given, as it is given, is directly presented in the 
word. According to Shpet the word can thus be seen as holding within 
itself the full richness of the logic of thought itself, and logic should 
thus study words as expressions of the mind’s content. This prospect 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 244.
2 By ‘forms’ Shpet seems to mean diff erent ‘aspects’ of one word as it can be under-
stood or ‘looked at’ as a grammatical structure or as an aesthetically pleasing word, 
for instance.
3 Shpet 2019b, p. 244.
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of a new logic, Shpet fi nds, could ideally lead to an entirely new level of 
scientifi c explanation:
If a word, as an ideal inner form, could be immediately transmitted, 
perhaps our science would be as error-free as the truth itself that sci-
ence wants to transmit. However, the essential source of error and 
delusions lies in the fact that the ideal logical forms in a word itself 
are closely connected with other forms and that the fi nal empirical 
impression of a word is itself empirical.1
Shpet admits that with all that he has established his view of real-
ity, and of how philosophy should address it, proves tightly intercon-
nected with logic. But he fi nds this to be perfectly permissible since the 
logical form of thought should be located at the very core of knowledge 
itself. He asserts that we ‘see all of our knowledge only through this 
stratum. Consequently, it, as knowledge, cannot be other than in the 
logical forms necessarily peculiar to it’. Shpet’s conclusions strike one as 
somewhat radical: since the given is given directly in the logical forms 
of language, Shpet equates them with truth. In the word, he claims, we 
can fi nd a direct expression of being itself. Yet, this is not a metaphysical 
statement, but rather a methodological notion, which Shpet opposes 
to the neo-Kantian and, especially, irrationalist currents in contempo-
rary philosophy: ‘This is why all the ruckus about logic by certain rep-
resentatives of contemporary pseudo-philosophy is essentially absurd. 
a “protest” against logical forms of thought is just as absurd as a protest 
against a solution to a mathematical problem using the principles and 
techniques of mathematics’.2
The new dynamic logic of concepts Shpet proposes would be a ‘non-
formalistic’ logic. However, what is required fi rst is a reinterpretation of 
the notion of ‘concept’ (poniatie) itself. Shpet writes that the irrational 
argument against logic consists precisely in the fact that logical concepts 
are seen to ‘impoverish’ the lived experience, that they are considered 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 245.
2 Shpet 2019b, p. 245.
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‘boring’, ‘static’ and ‘formalistic’. All this, he thinks, is correct ‘as long 
as it is the matter of the logic that looks on “concepts” as delimitations 
of one content from another purely in terms of their respective exten-
sions and when it is concerned only with the relations between con-
cepts in terms of their extension’.1 But such a restricted understanding 
of concepts is not a necessary quality of logic, historically speaking, 
Shpet claims; it was not the case with Aristotle’s or the Stoics’ logic, 
with the logic of the Middle Ages, with Port Royal Logic or with the later 
rationalist logic. The novel term Shpet proposes to describe his logic is 
‘semasiology’ (semasiologiia). He looks on words as ‘signs’ (semata) that 
have the potential of denoting their content, that is, their meaning, 
directly. As Shpet emphasizes, this is not a case of representation but 
of presentation: it is the presentation of the logic of thought itself. We 
can still understand or fail to understand these signs, Shpet argues, but 
this is a question of our fallibility, not that of the sign.
Indeed, the act of interpretation is not a simple task, as the sign must 
be understood in its context. That, properly speaking, is where meaning 
becomes constructed. Shpet writes:
A concept considered semasiologically in essence cannot be character-
ized as ‘static’ or as a ‘snippet’. On the contrary, it is fundamentally 
dynamic, as dynamic as is its meaning. Such a concept is not a ‘snippet’ 
but a living organ. An understood concept lives and moves. Any verbal 
particle is understood only in connection with others and with the 
greater whole. And this whole is understood again in a new whole of 
which it is a part. a word, a sentence, a period, a conversation, a book, 
an entire speech — there are no cessations here to endless penetrating 
acts of understanding.2
Shpet’s argument is that all contextual connections are indeed ‘found’ 
within each word (or some other part of speech): they are implied by its 
inner logical form. The work of phenomenological analysis, in seeking to 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 248.
2 Shpet 2019b, pp. 248–249.
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untangle the structures of meaning, thus moves ever further from the 
consciousness of the transcendental ego in Shpet’s theory. However, dis-
course, or language, now seems to ‘embody’ the impersonal cognition, 
which he considers the true foundation of knowledge. Not ‘belonging’ 
to anyone, it is instead constituted collectively through every use of lan-
guage. It forms a hermeneutic ‘reality’ of concepts, created and under-
stood, which covers ‘everything’. Referring to the earlier conclusions of 
his Istoriia kak problema logiki, Shpet writes, we ‘have still another name 
for the whole [vse], as the empirical whole, and it is “history” [istoriia]’.1
Shpet therefore argues that we can grasp reality as a whole when 
we understand it hermeneutically. Herein lies the diff erence between 
philosophical understanding and empirical knowledge. The latter fo-
cuses always only on a part or moment of the fl ow of our total experi-
ence. In contrast, hermeneutic philosophy attempts to grasp everything 
as a moving and changing whole. This whole is therefore by its nature 
dynamic, and the logic that describes it is for Shpet dialectics.2 At the 
end of the essay, he returns to the question of how such a dialectical and 
hermeneutic construction may be connected to reality. Shpet clarifi es:
The issue here is that in a concept, as an internally formed word, we 
see not only the ‘concept’ but also — and this is essential — its eidetic 
content, which contains the sense or meaning of the concept. We pen-
etrate to this sense not by means of a simple ‘conceptualization’, but 
through an act of ‘establishing’ that includes within itself — insofar 
as it is in itself only a formative act — a sui generis act of ‘intelligible 
intuition’. It is this act that gives us an ‘understanding’ of the cor-
responding sense.3
The word-concept, which is not merely an extension or a class, but also 
a sign, requires an act of interpretation. Shpet describes this act as a pen-
etration into the concept’s meaning, ‘into, as it were, its “intimate some-
thing,” into the “living soul” of the word-concept’. The hermeneutic act 
1 Shpet 2019b, p. 249. (Shpet 1917, p. 50.)
2 Ibid.
3 Shpet 2019b, p. 251.
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of understanding a concept thus corresponds to the phenomenological 
practice of analysing the constitutive acts of cognition.
According to Shpet when we fi rst investigate the acts and content 
of our consciousness, this consciousness spontaneously becomes an 
interpretative one, and its content is converted into meaningful signs: 
consciousness becomes permeated with language. The meanings ‘found’ 
in consciousness are not constituted subjectively by the philosophiz-
ing ego, but they are formed through the collective meaning structure, 
that is, through language. Seeing the whole of reality thus saturated 
with meaning that changes dynamically with the historical changes in 
language (and its objects, the world), Shpet alters the saying ‘nihil est 
in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu’ to ‘nihil est in intellectu, quod non 
fuerit in historia, et omne, quod fuit in historia, deberet esse in intellectu’.1 As 
Nemeth comments, this is Shpet’s adaptation of the Scholastic doctrine 
that there is nothing in the intellect that does not come from the senses.2
A notable detail of Shpet’s theory of the word is that it does not, 
strictly speaking, refer to a reality outside itself. Words are signs that 
have a content, or a meaning, which they disclose. a sign (znak) expresses 
its meaning (znachenie), which is the ‘pure object’ as it is formulated 
into a cognizable object. Concerning the philosophical search for truth, 
Shpet writes, echoing Husserl’s argument in ‘Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science’, that the true nature and fi nal goal of philosophy should be 
found, quite simply, in clarity of description. He asserts that to ‘avoid 
lapsing into fantastic pseudo-philosophical revelations, what we have 
to say about this further deepening of our philosophical understand-
ing must — whether we like it or not — have a “purely” instructional 
character [kharakter chistykh ukazanii]’.3 Anyone who attempts to reach 
further will, in Shpet’s opinion, risk climbing too far on the ‘philosophi-
cal heights’, where ‘only the rare head was spared from spinning’, and 
will have us ‘bombarded with words written with a capital letter: Truth, 
Reason, Will, I, the Good’.4
1 ‘Nothing is in the intellect that has not been in history, and everything that was in 
history should be in the intellect’.
2 Shpet 2019b, pp. 251–252.
3 Shpet 2019b, p. 252. (Shpet 1917, p. 54.)
4 Ibid.
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In Shpet’s theory rationality assumes a prominent role as a philo-
sophical principle. His conviction is that this is not a convention or a the-
oretical outlook, but rather a necessary condition of human thought. 
The mind’s ‘movement’ from a sign to its meaning in the hermeneutic 
or understanding intuition is for Shpet a primary (pervichnyi) and im-
mediate (neposredstvennyi) act, so that this meaning is perceived in an 
immediate intuition.1 ‘A semasiological acceptance of the essence eo ipso 
forces us to seek in it, as the “beginning”, the sense, which is revealed 
to us as the rational foundation inherent within the essence itself ’, he 
writes.2 In other words, the very correlation of consciousness to the world 
is rational: the world, for us, is rational. Ontological and epistemological 
viewpoints are thus all but merged in Shpet’s phenomenology, and he 
appears committed to seeing word, language or eventually, culture, as 
a reality.
By 1917 Shpet had thus formulated a theory of how he thought phi-
losophy could grasp reality directly, yet in its encompassing totality. 
He approached that which ‘is’ phenomenologically, accepting it in its 
givenness. Meanwhile, the hermeneutical focus that had been visible 
in Shpet’s phenomenology from the start led him to its logical outcome 
when he moved from analysing the structures of consciousness to those 
of language. This transition allowed Shpet to gain a novel perspective on 
the problems of poetics and aesthetics, with which he became increas-
ingly concerned after the revolution. Shpet’s aesthetic theory would 
off er a counterargument to the leading neo-Kantian interpretations of 
art, as he argued that Russian artists had failed to come to terms with 
the actual and true reality. Correspondingly, even when speaking about 
art, Shpet never lost sight of his original and main interest, the being of 
reality.
1 Shpet 1917, p. 57.
2 Shpet 2019b, p. 254.
4. Formulating the Inner Form 
of the Word
Shpet welcomed the opportunity for social and cultural reform 
in Russia in 1917. Philosophically speaking, however, the October 
Revolution posed a problem for him. To him it seemed that the revolu-
tion had been mainly a consequence of a longstanding romantic dream 
of the opposition intelligentsia. What had materialized in 1917 was noth-
ing but their ‘illusion’, in Shpet’s opinion; the old reality had been torn 
down, but the negative logic of the revolution off ered no replacement 
for it. Russia, Shpet argued, now had no reality. His post-revolutionary 
cultural theory, put forward mainly in his 1922–23 Esteticheskie frag-
menty (Aesthetic Fragments), can be read as an attempt to create a new 
logic for Russian culture. Relying on his phenomenological conception 
of the inner form of the word, Shpet’s theory suggests that culture can 
express the nature of being directly, completely and unerringly. By being 
he means not the ‘naturalistic’ take on reality but the all-encompassing 
‘reality as collectively understood’. As before, Shpet’s conceptions of 
logic, meaning and being intersect. Through a new logic of cultural crea-
tion, he claims to be able to generate a ‘new reality’. His conception is 
thus suggested as a cure for the disillusionment that had come to replace 
the anarchic fervour.
In this final chapter Shpet’s theory is approached in the cultural 
context of the early 1920s. Its philosophical foundation had been fully 
formulated by the time of the revolution, but only the dramatic events of 
1917 properly defi ned the questions which Shpet would use it to tackle. 
The importance of expressing reality ‘as it is’ acquired a renewed urgency, 
and Shpet now joined in debates not only with other philosophical views 
but more importantly, other cultural visions. In Esteticheskie fragamenty, 
he attacks the ‘illusionism’ of symbolism, as well as futurism’s ‘pseudo 
theories’ as unsuitable for the requirements of the post-revolutionary 
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moment. Russia needed a new culture, and Shpet believed that only his 
theory displayed a suffi  cient and suitable philosophical foundation to 
manage this complex task.
Through his participation in the Moscow Linguistic Circle (Moskovskii 
lingvisticheskii kruzhok, or MLC), Shpet’s theory was integrated into the 
ongoing debates concerning Russian formalism. Indeed, his reinterpre-
tation of Humboldt’s and Potebnia’s idea has previously been analysed 
mainly in relation to the formalist conceptions of poetic semantics, 
evolving simultaneously with Shpet’s theory. However, in what follows 
I will analyse the inner form of the word as a philosophical — Husserlian 
rather than Humboldtian — concept. While taking into account the 
crucial incentive that Shpet received from contemporary artistic, lin-
guistic and semantic debates, my goal is to examine the uninterrupted 
infl uence of phenomenology on his thinking. Shpet’s inner form of the 
word is thus inspected as not ‘just’ a principle of his cultural theory but 
as a philosophical idea, carried over from his phenomenological conclu-
sions to the fi eld of culture. I argue that its meaning is thus ‘deeper’ than 
is perhaps immediately visible in Shpet’s texts from the 1920s.
The Humboldtian reading of the inner form of the word was dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. I will now suggest a further demarcation 
of the two interpretations of Shpet’s conception. One version of the in-
ner form can be extrapolated from works such as Vvedenie v etnicheskuiu 
psikhologiiu (Introduction to Ethnic Psychology) and Vnutrenniaia forma 
slova (The Inner Form of the Word), both published in 1927. In these texts 
the inner form is treated as a principle of creative activity — much like 
the Humboldtian energeia — and is considered from the perspective 
of a national language or culture. Here, Shpet’s focus appears to be on 
culturally specifi c logics that allow diff erent social groups — occupying 
a diff erent ‘spirit’ — to formulate diff erent expressions. But Esteticheskie 
fragmenty, published some fi ve years earlier, off ers another reading of 
the inner form. Here, the ‘word’ is examined not just as part of a culture 
(a ‘structure’ as Shpet calls it), but in its relationship to being, reality or 
truth — that which exists ‘outside’ culture and ‘on which’ the latter is 
established. In this visibly more Husserlian version Shpet’s theory gains 
a more transparent ontological or metaphysical meaning.
4.1. Towards a New Logic of Culture 201
The inner form thereby remains the same, but it can be viewed 
from two distinct points of view. Consequently, Shpet’s theory reveals 
an internal tension that had been present in his philosophy from the 
beginning. On the one hand, Shpet approached a cultural theory that 
would seek the most suitable forms of expression to refl ect the spirit of 
post-revolutionary Russian society. On the other, he remained invested 
in the philosophical problem of how to grasp reality in its true being. 
As the previous chapters have described, he reached the concept of the 
inner form through a long phenomenological search, culminating in the 
discovery of a rational principle of the non-subjective consciousness. 
In the 1920s Shpet puts this same principle into use in the delicate task 
of devising the kind of ‘word’ that could refl ect the experienced reality 
as immediately as his phenomenological theory promises.
The present chapter will fi rst outline the professional circumstances 
which Shpet faced after the October Revolution. It will then turn to 
his analysis of the problematic history of the Russian intelligentsia in 
the 1922 Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i (Outline of the Development of 
Russian Philosophy). According to Shpet Russian intellectuals had been 
misguided from the start, and by 1917 their actions had brought the 
nation’s culture to the brink of collapse. Thus, through destruction the 
revolution off ered something valuable: an opportunity for a complete 
re-creation of Russian culture. Finally, the last part of the thesis will be 
dedicated to a discussion of Shpet’s own cultural theory (as just such 
attempt at recreation) and his detailed elucidation of the inner form of 
the word in Esteticheskie fragmenty.
4.1. Towards a New Logic of Culture
University life in Moscow was almost unaff ected by the First World 
War. Lectures were held as usual, and the missing teachers were re-
placed by hiring the most promising graduates. Nor was there any dra-
matic change in the direct aftermath of the revolution. Although several 
professors left the philosophy department during the Civil War (most 
notably, Pavel Novogorodtsev, Sergei Bulgakov, and Evgenii Trubetskoi), 
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the faculty at the same time welcomed such renowned thinkers as 
Nikolai Berdiaev and Pavel Struve.1 Since his return from Göttingen, 
Shpet had become one of the department’s most popular lecturers.2 
Andrei Belyi attests that Shpet’s recognition had grown from early on, 
and that at the ‘Guerrier Courses’ (Moskovskie vyshchie zhenskie kursy), 
he already ‘fought off  female listeners of the philosophy courses in rows 
[…]; and female “Shpettists” [sic] multiplied by the dozen […]; very many 
of them wore a medallion with Shpett’s [sic] portrait on their breast; 
and at lectures he twirled philosophers’ systems like spinning tops’.3
At the end of March 1917, Belyi mentions Shpet joining meetings 
among a group of Moscow intellectuals, engaging in ‘endless debates’ 
following the February revolution.4 An anonymous note from a student 
at the Higher Courses for Women indicates that on 14 March Shpet de-
livered a lecture on the current political situation. The note reads: ‘Your 
words were a true revelation for me’.5 Another student would contact 
Shpet in February 1931, when he had already long been banned from all 
philosophical work. She also recollects Shpet’s words to the still ‘green 
students’ in 1917, ‘You must be not only contemporaries of the great 
revolution, but participants in it’.6 In a letter to his wife, written on 30 
August 1917, Shpet expressed a lack of sentimentality concerning the 
end of ‘old Russia’. He writes:
You write: ‘as long as Russia does not perish’. She has already per-
ished — that Russia which you love, and on the basis of which you 
imagine the future. Will there be a new Russia? In any event, she — if 
she comes to pass — will not be founded by those who now speak of 
love for her, as that is love not for the future Russia, but for the one 
that has already perished.7
1 Pavlov 2003, p. 69.
2 Severtseva 2000, pp. 173–174.
3 Belyi 1934, p. 310.
4 Belyi 2016, p. 434.
5 Shpet 2012, p. 126.
6 Shpet 2012, p. 133.
7 Shpet 2005, p. 281. Shpet’s letter reacts to the recent ‘Kornilov aff air’, of which he 
is extremely critical. For more see pp. 280–281.
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In Shpet’s view, Russia’s faith depended entirely on the future of 
its intellectual elite: culture needed to be renewed through education 
and a philosophical reformulation of its principles. This, he believed, 
could initiate a cultural ‘Renaissance’ in Russia, as a veritable rebirth 
of the nation. In what follows I will discuss Shpet’s views regarding the 
Russian intelligentsia, their past mistakes and contemporary challenges.
4.1.1. Philosophy after the Revolution
During the years of the revolution, Shpet managed a range of diff er-
ent tasks from editing his philosophical yearbook to writing new mate-
rial, lecturing, participating in committees and societies, and organizing 
new academic institutions.1 In addition to these endeavours, he returned 
to work at the Psychological Institute. Irina Sirotkina writes that with 
Chelpanov’s help it survived ‘the anxious and cold winter’ of 1917 
(the building was unheated) and even managed to launch the journal 
‘Psikhologicheskoe obozrenie’, founded on the eve of the revolution. The 
Institute began to receive funding from Narkompros and was even subsi-
dized to open new sections of applied psychology and work psychology.2
Between 1917 and 1918 Shpet published a series of articles under 
the title ‘Predmet i zadachi etnicehskoi psikhologii’ (‘The Topic and Tasks 
of Ethnic Psychology’).3 They formed the foundation for what was in-
tended to become a lecture course at the Cabinet for Ethnic Psychology 
at Moscow University, recently founded by himself and Chelpanov. The 
Cabinet grew into a large scientifi c centre, as Tat’iana Martsinkovskaia 
asserts: ‘Reports were sent there on various ethnographic and ethnopsy-
chological expeditions, the analysis of which was the basis for the prepa-
ration of a programme of ethnopsychological studies of the peoples of 
Siberia, Central Asia and Transcaucasia’.4 Shpet’s project culminated in 
1927, when he published Vvedenie v etnicheskuiu psikhologiiu, wherein he 
1 See Shpet’s activities during the Civil War years in Shchedrina 2015, pp. 66–69.
2 Sirotkina 2006, p. 258.
3 In Psikhologicheskoe obozrenie, issues 1.1 (1917), 1.2 (1917), and 1.3–4 (1918).
4 Martsinkovskaia 1996, p. 6.
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formulated the methodology for a study of the psychology of a collec-
tive consciousness that expressed itself in culture. Later in this chapter 
I will suggest that Shpet’s ethnic psychology can be seen as developing 
a distinct perspective on his theory of the inner form of the word. This 
interpretation found its full expression in the 1927 Vnutrenniaia forma 
slova, which places Shpet’s concept solidly in the Humboldtian tradition.
Meanwhile, phenomenology’s infl uence on Shpet’s thinking became 
outwardly less visible after the revolution. The correspondence between 
Shpet and Husserl was cut short by the war. In June 1918, taking advan-
tage of the ‘fi rst opportunity’, Shpet contacted his teacher. He writes:
The madness of ageing mankind, in all obviousness, is far from over, 
and we do not know what the near future will bring us. The only thing 
I can say with certainty is that all that occurred could not change my 
assessment of German philosophy, and there is nothing in the world 
which could shake my deep devotion to you personally! In these four 
long years past, I have not spent one day during which I did not ru-
minate on phenomenology and rejoice at my spiritual meeting with 
your work.1
Nevertheless, references to Husserl’s philosophy are scarce in Shpet’s 
post-revolutionary works. Overall, his correspondence from the Civil 
War years suggests that Shpet was in a state of physical and mental ex-
haustion. In July 1919 Lev Shestov wrote to him from Kiev, having heard 
that since their last meeting Shpet had ‘become excessively tired’ and 
‘at one time could not work at all’.2 In November 1920 Shpet explains 
his sorry state to his friend Natal’ia Ignatova:
I’ve always said: you only need to decide to fall ill, and a thousand mala-
dies will appear. My legs are painful too — that’s my old rheumatism. 
It’s unpleasant, because the pain is tiring, distressing and unrelent-
ing. And my psychasthenia is really bad: worse than on the days I was 
1 Shpet 1996, pp. 128–129. Husserl replied to Shpet in a similarly friendly tone but 
also reported the death of his youngest son on the front.
2 Shpet 2005, p. 336.
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tired. I write and don’t remember; I read and don’t understand. I see 
badly — everything blurs together. In general when I ‘relax’ I just feel 
the fatigue even more strongly. For it sometimes seems that I have […] 
a circular psychosis or simply a manic-depressive condition.1
In his letters Shpet complains of recurring headaches, noise in 
the communal apartment and depression.2 It seems that the work on 
Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i was especially hard. At the beginning of 
December 1920 he writes to his editor, Ferapont Vitiazev-Sedenko, to 
explain why he has been unable to fi nish a part of the manuscript by the 
promised date:
…I wanted to fi nish writing by December, with which aim I intended 
to stop everything else in November and just write. However, at the 
very start of November I was arrested, and even though I was released 
after just a few days, I needed a few more days to get my offi  ce and 
library unsealed and to get my fi les, and another few to tidy everything 
up, and it was only after the 20th that I got down to work. But here 
a new circumstance intervened. I stopped everything else I was occu-
pied with, but it was too late. The cold weather set in, we’re huddling 
in three rooms, and the children are wailing by our sides. However, 
that is only half a tragedy — I can write at night, which I usually do. 
The real tragedy came last Saturday: during that week I had been tor-
mented by stomach spasms. I thought it was normal gastritis, but on 
Saturday I fainted. The doctor diagnosed spasms as stomach ache on 
the basis of general ‘over-tiredness’ and, as he said, ‘anaemia’. On top 
of that, the psychasthenic symptoms I had two years ago returned 
with fresh strength — for example, after working for two hours I can 
no longer see, the lines I read or write blur into one another, my eyes 
hurt, and I have to stop working. Now my doctor is insisting I go to 
a sanatorium for a while (for three or four weeks), or at the very least 
stop working entirely. I am insisting he gives me at least the minimal 
time I need each day to work on the Ocherk, although I agree that once 
1 Shpet 2005, p. 348.
2 Shpet 2005, pp. 349, 350, 354, 364.
206 4. Formulating the Inner Form of the Word 
I am well again, I can catch up both in quality and quantity. However, 
on the other hand, I feel that total inactivity combined with my un-
fulfi lled commitments would depress me, and the correction itself is 
going slowly. Such are the external circumstances.1
A few days later Shpet writes to Ignatova: ‘How I hate the lines of my 
book lying before me! Are they even thoughts? They are some broken 
smithereens of a beautiful living language gathered in a heap to kin-
dle a communal stove — by a neurasthenic or an anaemic! THE DEVIL 
KNOWS WHAT!!!!!!’2
The teaching of philosophy at Moscow University remained almost 
unchanged until 1919, but the curriculum then went through a radi-
cal reorganization. At the end of 1918 Narkompros published a decree 
closing down the faculty of law and setting up a new faculty of social 
sciences (Fakul’tet obshchestvennykh nauk, or FON). Gradually, FON 
took charge of the teaching of law, as well as economics and politics. 
Various history subjects were either transferred to FON or abolished. 
In connection with this the faculty of history and philology — which 
oversaw the teaching of philosophy — was reduced to the faculty of 
philology. Yet Aleksei Pavlov suggests that some of the old professors 
continued to give lectures that were ‘full of philosophical content’. Lev 
Lopatin lectured at Moscow University until his death in 1920; Berdiaev, 
Boris Vysheslavtsev and Ivan Il’in until they were exiled in 1922; and 
Chelpanov until 1923.3
With the dissolution of the old faculties the question arose of how 
to prepare future specialists in the humanities. Seven scientifi c institu-
tions were therefore created under FON in 1921: the Institute of History; 
the Institute of Soviet Law; the Institute of Psychology; the Institute of 
Archaeology and Art Studies; the Institute of Linguistics; the Institute of 
Literary History; and the Institute of Scientifi c Philosophy.4 Shpet played 
an active role in the organization of the latter and was also appointed 
1 Shpet 2005, pp. 471–472.
2 Shpet 2005, p. 351.
3 Pavlov 2003, pp. 69–70.
4 Kogan 1999, p. 41.
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its director. According to Leonid Kogan he showed a personal interest 
in the details of the Institute’s work, selected its associates, developed 
its fi rst study programmes and fought to set up a philosophical society, 
as well as a philosophical journal.1 Pavlov adds that on Shpet’s initia-
tive the Institute of Scientifi c Philosophy also organized classes in logic 
and the methodology of sciences, ethics, psychology and the history of 
philosophy for those students who wished to complete their philosophy 
education in accordance with previous programmes.2
The designation of the new institute as ‘scientifi c’ played an impor-
tant role in its legalization in the conditions of the time. Kogan suggests 
that term ‘served as a password to the new society’, but it also diff eren-
tiated the Institute’s philosophy from mystical and vulgar materialist 
thinking — as well as Marxist philosophy.3 According to Kogan Shpet’s 
position at the Institute may have been supported by the fact that there 
was a tendency (albeit a weak one) at the beginning of the 1920s among 
Russian Marxists to recognize the merits of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
Liubov’ Aksel’rod, a ‘militant materialist’ in Kogan’s words, was espe-
cially sympathetic to Shpet’s philosophy. She hailed phenomenology 
as a new current that ‘rejects scepticism in the most decisive way’ and 
defends ‘the self-evidence of objective absolute truth’.4 Correspondingly, 
the journal Pod znamenem marksizma gave its support to Shpet twice 
in 1922. Vladimir Nevskii characterized his 1919 essay ‘Skeptik i ego du-
sha’ (‘The Sceptic and His Soul’) as ‘interesting in many respects’,5 and 
Vladimir Iurinets mentions Iavlenie i smysl as showing ‘talent’.6
During the last years of Shpet’s functioning at Moscow University, 
the Moscow Linguistic Circle, organized as part of the university, be-
came an important location for the development of his thinking. Shpet 
became a member of the MLC in 1920, and this was where he devel-
oped his aesthetic theory in collaboration with the Circle’s younger 
generation, to be published in Esteticheskie fragmenty. Shpet taught at 
1 Kogan 1999, p. 43.
2 Pavlov 2003, p. 70.
3 Kogan 1999, p. 42.
4 Cited in Kogan 1999, pp. 42–43.
5 Nevskii 1922, p. 98.
6 Iurinets 1922, p. 61
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the university until the summer of 1922, and later the same year the 
department was shut down. On 26 May 1922 he held his last seminar. 
Many of its participants would become his colleagues at the Russian 
Academy of Artistic Sciences (Rossiiskaia akademiia khudozhestven-
nykh nauk, or RAKhN — after 1925 GAKhN), of which Shpet had been 
an active member since September 1921.1 The topic of his seminar was 
‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’. In his university lectures Shpet indeed 
defended a Husserlian position. Iosif Levin, who would later become 
a notable legal scholar and philosopher in Soviet Russia, writes: ‘The 
Husserlians knew that Shpet had answers to all the questions. They had 
a humorous four-line ditty, of which I remember only the last two lines: 
There is no God but Husserl, / and Shpet is his prophet’.2
It is unclear whether Shpet ever attempted to return to Germany to 
continue his work with Husserl. In April 1921 Husserl in fact invited him 
to Freiburg, where he had settled in 1916. Having heard about Shpet’s 
continuing philosophical activities from a visiting Russian student,3 
Husserl writes:
In Russia you are a called representative of phenomenological philoso-
phy — the only thoroughly radical philosophy — absolutely honest 
and principled philosophy, for which the young generations strive both 
here and there. The time has come for you to join me in continuing 
our work, our new endeavours, our new achievements, to make that 
which is thought here accessible to your students too. And we would 
also like to hear what idea content in the philosophical Russia turned 
out powerful, and we would like to hear that from the mouth of the 
one with a calling.4
Whether Shpet responded to the invitation is unknown. The follow-
ing year he received a letter from Shestov, who was residing in Paris, 
1 Severtseva 2000, p. 175.
2 Levin 1991, p. 284.
3 Shpet mentions Elena Zaitseva in his letter to Natal’ia Konstantinovna on 18 June 
1915 (2005, pp. 231–232).
4 Gusserl’ 2013, p. 119.
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describing the growing phenomenological schools in Germany and 
France. Shestov tries to leave Shpet no excuse for not travelling, writing:
And you should, if you can, get abroad for two–three months to get to 
know the scientifi c movement here. They say it’s not too hard to get an 
exit permit these days. You would benefi t from it greatly. It is of course 
a question of means. But I think that if that is the only obstacle, you 
could try applying to various societies concerned with Russian culture 
(particularly American ones) for support.1
Shestov emphasizes the importance of collaboration between Russian, 
European and American philosophers, suggesting that the newly pub-
lished Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i could well be sold in Europe, even 
in the original Russian, and that with the weak currency the venture 
might indeed prove profi table. However, this plan did not materialize 
either.
Shpet was twice presented with the possibility of emigrating to 
Europe. According to his daughter, Jurgis Baltrušaitis, who had become 
the representative (and would later become the ambassador) of inde-
pendent Lithuania in Moscow, off ered to organize Lithuanian passports 
for the whole family in 1920.2 Second, in the autumn of 1922 Shpet was 
nearly expelled from Russia with some of the most eminent philosophers 
of the time. On 2 September the Berlin-based émigré newspaper Rul’ 
reported that on the night of 16 August he had been arrested in Moscow 
with the ‘entire Berdiaev Circle’.3 Within a few months the members of 
the circle, but not Shpet, were deported on the infamous Philosophers’ 
ships.4 Apparently, Shpet managed to appeal his case thanks to his 
1 Shpet 2005, p. 340.
2 Iakovich 2014, p. 14.
3 Artizov 2008, pp. 589–590.
4 On 29 September the steamship Oberbürgermeister Haken sailed from Petrograd 
to Stettin in Germany (among the passengers were N. A. Berdiaev, S. L. Frank and 
S. E. Trubetskoi). On 16 October another steamship, Preussen, carried N. O. Losskii, 
L. P. Karsavin, I. I. Lapshin and others to the same destination (Makarov & Khri-
stoforov 2003, pp. 113–116).
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long-time acquaintanceship with Anatolii Lunacharskii.1 By the end of 
1922 the Institute of Scientifi c Philosophy also ‘reached a turning point’, 
in Kogan’s words. In the spring of 1923, it came under severe criticism 
and was thoroughly reorganized. Shpet lost his position, and Chelpanov, 
with other ‘idealists like him’, were forbidden future work. However, at 
this point Shpet had already settled into a new academic environment, 
GAKhN, where his thinking was directed increasingly towards cultural 
theory.
4.1.2. The Spirituality of ‘Old’ Russia
Shpet was displeased with the intelligentsia’s reactions to the events 
of 1917. He believed that the only way to move forward was to accept 
the revolution and proceed from its negative logic to a new constructive 
post-revolutionary culture. Yet it seemed to him that revolutionary in-
tellectuals had been no more successful at this task than conservatives. 
In a letter to his wife, written shortly before the October Revolution, 
Shpet asserted that half of Russia’s socialists and liberals had absorbed 
their knowledge from books but lacked all practical experience, while 
the other half was blinded by their exclusive belief in class hierarchy; 
neither could see the wood for the trees. Post-revolutionary Russia thus 
needed an entirely new intellectual elite, as Shpet argued that the more 
‘the current “lovers” of Russia attempt to implement their ideas related 
to the past in which they have rooted themselves, the more diffi  cult it 
will be to create a new Russia’.2
In his 1922 work Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i Shpet traces the intel-
ligentsia’s problems in the face of the revolution to its evolution during 
1 Tihanov (2009a, p. 4; 2009b, p. 16) points out that neither the fact that Shpet’s 
name appeared on the list, nor the identity of his helper has been conclusively 
confi rmed. Yet Shpet appears to have had a close relationship with the Peoples’ 
Commissar. Shpet’s daughter Marina Shtorkh reports that when the family home 
on Dolgorukovskaia Street was turned into a communal flat, Lunacharskii se-
cured the largest room for the Shpets because of their sizeable and valuable library 
(Iakovich 2014, pp. 28–29).
2 Shpet 2005, p. 281.
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the previous centuries. If he had earlier expressed his admiration for the 
Moscow metaphysics of the 1860s, Shpet’s Ocherk presents a critical view 
of the history of Russian thought that preceded this school of thought. 
Shpet discovered in seventeenth-, eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century Russia a long tradition of ‘ignorance’ (neveglasie) and intellec-
tual utilitarianism, combined with a fear of philosophy. Over time the 
Russian intelligentsia had turned itself into an opposition force, claiming 
to carry the real voice of the nation and directing its path towards its true 
destiny. According to Shpet, however, the intelligentsia’s chosen path 
had led the nation astray, resulting not only from their detachment from 
the people, but also from the generally uncultured state of the Russian 
mind.
Shpet describes the revolution as an opportunity to uproot Russian 
culture, cleanse it from unwanted infl uences and initiate a true twenti-
eth-century Renaissance. The revolution thus presented a magnifi cent 
challenge to the intelligentsia, but sadly, Shpet believed, it was not up to 
it. He points out that the events of 1917 had not presented an accidental 
outcome of arbitrary events, but an actualization of the very intelligent-
sia’s hopes and ideals. Shpet writes that the revolutionary dream ‘was 
hatched, pampered and used by the intelligentsia of the nineteenth 
century to raise itself ’. And yet he asserts the October Revolution had 
turned out nothing like the majority had pictured. What does this mean, 
Shpet asks, ‘the reality of the revolution or the unreality of the intel-
ligentsia ideal, and consequently the intelligentsia itself, insofar as it 
lived by that ideal?’ Shpet was inclined to believe the latter.3 For him 
the core of Russia’s intellectual weakness was in the disproportionate 
weight that its history had placed on religious and spiritual issues. He 
argued that the intelligentsia had from the start directed its hopes and 
interests towards an illusionary vision instead of the actual and concrete 
reality. Indeed, he believed that the revolution itself had been the result 
of a romantic dream appropriated from Christian eschatology. Even in 
the new decade Shpet argued that the revolution continued to be per-
ceived through this romantic prism.
3 Shpet 1922а, pp. x–xi.
212 4. Formulating the Inner Form of the Word 
Although the years following the revolution saw a strengthening and 
institutionalization of scientifi c philosophy, the popularity of religious 
neo-idealism, indeed, grew even more strongly. The ‘old idealists’ re-
mained the leading fi gures of intellectual life in Russia, and their critique 
of Marxism and Bolshevism was infl uential. Holding high positions in 
the universities, the idealists were also in competition with academic 
philosophy.1 During the Civil War years Nikolai Berdiaev took the philo-
sophical centre stage in Moscow.2 Having founded the Free Academy 
of Spiritual Culture (Vol’naia akademiia dukhovnoi kul’tury) in 1918, 
Berdiaev believed that what revolutionary Russia needed most was spir-
itual healing. He contended that the revolution had unravelled exactly 
as the writers of Vekhi had foreseen in 1909 — in other words, miserably. 
Accusing the left intelligentsia of a misguided trust in the power of the 
people, he asserted that in that enormous mass of workers and peas-
ants, ‘not the higher truth, but the as yet dark instincts were uncovered’.3 
Instead of trying to attain a collective reform, Berdiaev maintained that 
the revolutionary culture must focus on refi ning the spiritual life of each 
individual. He writes: ‘The people must rise to a higher spiritual culture 
and higher culture in general; the people must reveal human identity, 
its qualities, its responsible creation’.4 The solution to the problem was 
Christian philosophy, which would promote a less blindly collectivist 
and more responsibly individualist way of thinking. Berdiaev advocated 
a reliance on the older generation of idealists and strove to bring out their 
voice in the revolutionary debates.5
Without state funding Berdiaev’s Free Academy relied entirely on 
donations from listeners and supporters — but proved a success. The 
goal of the Academy, in the words of Aleksandr Galushkin, was ‘the 
study of spiritual culture in all its expressions and forms in the area 
of scientifi c, philosophical, ethical, artistic and religious creation and 
1 Malinov & Troitskii 2013, p. 60.
2 Gornung 2001, p. 353.
3 Berdiaev 1990, pp. 186–187. ‘Torzhestvo i krushenie narodnichestva’ was fi rst pub-
lished in Russkaia svoboda № 14–15 in 1917.
4 Berdiaev 1990, p. 187.
5 Berdiaev 1949, p. 258.
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thought’.1 Berdiaev asserts that during the ‘diffi  cult years’ his institu-
tion proved to be the only place ‘where thoughts could still run freely, 
and where the questions asked still refl ected a high status of culture’.2 
Among the Academy’s most important contributors were Andrei Belyi, 
Viacheslav Ivanov, Semen Frank, Boris Vysheslavtsev, Iulii Aikhenval’d, 
Fedor Stepun and Mikhail Gershenzon.3 Shpet also spoke at Berdiaev’s 
Academy once, on 22 May 1920. His ‘Krizis fi losofi i’ outlined a history 
of philosophy and its moments of crisis, leading up to his own view 
of what contemporary philosophy should be. The harshest words of 
the speech are directed against Henri Bergson. Shpet states that in the 
‘bestial’ philosophy of Bergson irrationalism and alogism reached their 
highest point; ‘Bergson is the last word, and therefore the hope that 
the crisis is over!’4 The rigorous rationalism that Shpet promoted was 
clearly incompatible with Berdiaev’s philosophical vision. Fedor Stepun 
describes his critical response to one of the latter’s lectures at the Free 
Academy, writing:
The Christian tendency, which represented for [Shpet] nothing new, 
[…] suddenly excessively worried and even dismayed him. His little 
nose twitched, the cleverest little eyes in the world sparkled, and out 
came a nit-picking speech of the wittiest kind, rich in knowledge, 
associations and paradoxes, but on the whole unconvincing and un-
necessary.5
Stepun fi nds Shpet’s passionate attack on Christianity ‘incomprehensi-
ble’ and considers it equally surprising that in the Bolshevist Moscow he 
turns to a defence of ancient Greek thought. Stepun asserts: ‘I think that 
Shpet, feeling to an exaggerated degree the closeness of the Christian 
and Communist utopias, for that reason spoke only of a bright, sober 
and grounded Greek thought, that he was irritated by the traditional 
1 Galushkin 1997, p. 238.
2 Berdiaev 1949, p. 259.
3 Galushkin 1997, p. 238.
4 Cited in Shchedrina 2007, p. 99.
5 Stepun 1956, p. 192.
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and religious-philosophical view of the academy of Moscow as the Third 
Rome’.1
In his two texts of 1922, Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i and the fi rst 
volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty, Shpet indeed proposed a return 
to a ‘classical’ frame of mind, that is, a pre-Christian cultural logic. 
In Ocherk he argues that the seed of the intelligentsia’s problems had 
been sown in the actions of the revered ‘Thessalonian brothers’, the 
missionaries Cyril and Methodius. According to Shpet their undertak-
ing of translating the Bible into Church Slavonic had done an enormous 
disservice to Russian culture: it was left with a highly literal translation 
of the holy scriptures and no access to their original sources. This put 
Russia in an extremely weak position compared to Western civilization. 
Shpet writes that any European experiencing a momentary hesitation 
about the value of his or her civilization ‘could save himself or herself 
from desperation about the value of culture as a whole by consult-
ing the undoubted original source directly’. Even when the Western 
Christian culture brought itself to the brink of a crisis, it could simply 
turn towards its own cultural past, fi nd its roots, and recreate (vozrodit’) 
itself in the Renaissance.2
Through the Church Slavonic language, Russia inherited not the 
Hellenic tradition but merely that of a minor Bulgarian nation, Shpet 
argues. What could ‘a language of a people deprived of cultural tra-
ditions, literature and history off er’, Shpet asks? He asserts that the 
heritage of Byzantium had in fact trickled West, while Russia was left 
with ‘the mere surrogates of their own production, ones invented in 
the era of Russia’s moral and intellectual degeneration’.3 As long as 
the Russian culture evolved on its adopted Christian track, a ‘Russian 
Renaissance’ remained inconceivable, in Shpet’s opinion.4 Because of 
the power of the Eastern Orthodox Church, Russian culture had devel-
1 Ibid.
2 Shpet 1922a, p. 12.
3 Ibid.
4 Shpet (1922, p. 12) notes that the situation might have been diff erent had the Russian 
intelligentsia been brought up in Greek. What could have such a Renaissance been 
like, Shpet asks, ‘if the intelligentsia of the Muscovite period knew Greek the same 
way that the West knew Latin?’
4.1. Towards a New Logic of Culture 215
oped through the centuries not in a spirit of humanism but of religion; at 
its worst the latter was reduced to church dogma. Shpet argues that the 
Muscovite Patriarchate had indeed failed in its eff ort to off er a spiritual 
counterinfl uence to the Medieval European culture. It ‘feared the temp-
tation of  Western “spiritual delusion” but did not think of juxtaposing 
it with a living faith in its actual source’. The message of the patriarchate 
was deemed ‘Godly’ because it was written in a sacred language. In re-
ality, Shpet claims ‘it was a forgery based on “divine inspiration” and 
sometimes even a parody’.1
The authoritarianism of the patriarchate resulted in passivity and 
a growing ignorance among the intellectual elite. While the original 
cause of Russia’s intellectual weakness was in its Church Slavonic past, 
the ongoing problem of all Russian culture, in Shpet’s opinion, was the 
general uninterest and lack of enlightenment that had followed the 
latter. These traits had defi ned the evolution of Russian minds for centu-
ries, and in the post-revolutionary moment Shpet considered them to be 
as strong as ever. He therefore argued that Russian culture remained not 
only underdeveloped but non-developed, since it had, properly speaking, 
not even begun.
4.1.3. The Problem of Russian Intelligentsia
Since Shpet believed that the problems of Russian culture were origi-
nally linguistic — stemming from the creation of the Church Slavonic — 
he considered them to have grown into the very fabric of the Russian 
language. In his opinion the Russian ‘word’ had thus remained particu-
larly weak and had yet to fi nd its true form as a bearer of the national 
spirit. But the intelligentsia’s problem was also related to the fact that 
when the Russian intellectual life had fi nally begun to develop during 
the reign of Peter the Great, it did so in German. Shpet writes that the 
Russian nation, lacking their own homegrown word (slovo), had to ‘bor-
row from those who had not renounced their ancestors, were not scared 
1 Shpet 1922a, p. 13.
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by their temptation and did not cover their spiritual nudity with a letter’. 
In other words, once again, ‘a foreign language became the medium 
between the source of spirit and the Russian soul’.1
Nevertheless, Shpet suggests that in the seventeenth century ‘lights 
of knowledge’ began fi nally to appear in the ‘Moscow murk’ as Russia’s 
fi rst establishment of higher education, the Slavic Greek Latin Academy 
(Slaviano-greko-latinskaia akademiia) was founded in 1687. According 
to him this was less a result of the nation’s consolidated eff ort than an 
imported idea, and the impact of the Academy remained correspond-
ingly superfi cial. The level of enlightenment among Moscow inhabit-
ants remained barely higher than a hundred years earlier, when they 
had destroyed the city’s fi rst typography, founded a hundred years after 
the invention of the technique. ‘The people were simply silent’, Shpet 
continues, ‘– perhaps because they had nothing to say […], or perhaps 
because Moscow had learned to force them to be silent’.2 Gradually, The 
Slavic Greek Latin Academy was turned into an establishment of higher 
theological education, and in 1721 it was transferred to the care of the 
Holy Synod. There thus emerged ‘a specialized theological science of 
interest to few’, Shpet writes.
From then on, the Russian intelligentsia was no longer tied to spir-
itual work, and in the course of the eighteenth century it experienced 
a transformation and gained a new goal and a meaning. In Shpet’s words 
the intelligentsia turned into an administration (pravitel’stvo) and re-
mained in this role for another hundred years.3 Along with this trans-
formation, Shpet argues, the elite’s lack of enlightenment (nevezhestvo) 
gradually turned into a utilitarian ideology. Petrine Russia valued practi-
cal knowledge above all else, which was shown in the rise of new schools 
for navigation, artillery and engineering, for example.4 Shpet notes that 
although the appreciation of scientifi c knowledge grew, Russians’ inter-
est indeed remained at a level of professionalism and showed no signs 
of academic ambition. Not even the Academy of Sciences (Akademiia 
1 Shpet 1922a, p. 14.
2 Shpet 1922a, p. 10.
3 Shpet 1922a, p. 11.
4 Shpet 1922a, p. 18.
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nauk), founded in 1724, lived up to its founding idea of representing all 
fi elds of science and scholarship; eventually only physics and mathemat-
ics were taught at a high level.1 The Academy also suff ered from a lack 
of ideological freedom, which aff ected a wide fi eld of humanities, but 
especially philosophy. Shpet remarks that
the charter of 1747 strictly required professors to teach nothing con-
trary to the Orthodox faith, good morals and the form of the admin-
istration. Professors had to present the Chancellery with summaries 
of their lectures for evaluation of whether they were diverging from 
the teaching of the Orthodox faith and doubting the glorious position 
of the state.2
Only the opening of Moscow University in 1755 established philosophy 
permanently as a subject of higher education. Yet even with the new 
academic freedom philosophy failed to gain the interest of students, 
who continued to view their education mainly as a pathway to a com-
fortable position either in the state administration or the army. Shpet 
cites a history of Moscow University, stating that its goal had been from 
the outset to prepare Russian youth for all the branches of the state 
service. Therefore, he asserts, the history of the Russian university 
system is a history of ‘constant, useful and faithful service of this state 
aim’.3
Although cultural evolution accelerated in the nineteenth century, 
Shpet argues that in the sphere of the Russian ‘word’ progress could be 
seen mainly in poetic language. He asserts that ‘Russian fi ction strug-
gled heroically with the legacy of Cyril and Methodius in the language, 
and when Pushkin began to shine, the Bulgarian fog was dispelled 
forever’. In various fi elds of academic writing, however, ‘foreign lan-
guages had still to be used for a long time’.4 Moreover, what continu-
ously hampered Russia’s intellectual and philosophical development 
1 Shpet 1922a, pp. 19–20.
2 Shpet 1922a, pp. 21–22.
3 Shpet 1922a, p. 22.
4 Ibid.
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was the deep seated sophophobia of the intelligentsia. Shpet notes that 
during the Catherinian era, the social role of the Russian intelligentsia 
changed again — but their lack of enlightenment remained. The em-
press supported the ideals of the Enlightenment, famously engaging in 
correspondence with leading French philosophers. Shpet suggests that 
the state now adopted the role that had traditionally belonged to the 
intellectual elite: it began to ‘educate’.
As a result, the quest for ‘pure’ wisdom was once again blocked, but 
this time by the state’s paternalistic attitude. The intelligentsia, who 
continued to suff er from a lack of freedom, now transformed itself into 
an opposition. ‘That which had to happen happened,’ Shpet writes. 
‘Radishchev happened — the prototype of that opposition intelligentsia 
who replaced the government intelligentsia in Russian history’.1 Shpet 
considers Radishchev’s role in Russian history through a comparison 
with the founder of Moscow University, Mikhail Lomonosov. As models 
of the intelligentsia, he fi nds them to be each other’s opposites. Shpet 
writes that Lomonosov
went to Europe, studied what he needed to, returned and began to 
teach that which no one needed, and only by the time of his 200th 
anniversary did his descendants guess who our own ‘Newton’ was. 
The other one also travelled to Europe, learned what was not taught, 
and did not learn what was taught — one and a half centuries later 
his grateful progeny recognized him as ‘the fi rst Russian revolu-
tionary’.2
When Radishchev’s attempts to shake the autocratic structures of the 
state were annulled by the enlightened empress, the intelligentsia fi -
nally turned itself into a revolutionary force of resistance.
The level of academic discussions, especially philosophical ones, re-
mained low throughout the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, Shpet 
argues. Freedom of thought was repeatedly restricted by both the church 
1 Shpet 1922a, p. 24.
2 Shpet 1922a, pp. 24–25.
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and state, and in 1817 the two powers were administratively united. 
The new institution supervised all spiritual and ideological education 
in Russia and its central idea, Shpet writes, was to direct ‘the popular 
education […] for the purposes of inclusion in a society of constant and 
saving agreement between faith, behaviour and power’.1 He considers 
the consequences of this policy ‘most pitiful’. It began an ‘unhinged 
period’ in the history of Russian enlightenment: ‘books, people, con-
victions and intentions were persecuted’. Eventually, all philosophical 
faculties in Russia were closed in 1850, because, in the words of the 
minister of education Platon Aleksandrovich Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, 
‘the use of philosophy is unproven, but its harm is possible’.
How is it possible that all this was accepted by Russian society, Shpet 
asks? After all, Russians were no longer uneducated and had access to 
information — not only through the state but also independently of 
it. And even more so, since the intelligentsia had turned into an op-
position force, it was now free and supposedly able to defend its rights. 
‘How could it withstand it?’2 Shpet believes the answer is found in the 
general ignorance and lack of intellectual curiosity of educated Russians. 
He cites a contemporary commentator, who remarks that on their grad-
uation from universities students were quick to lose their interest in 
critical thinking: ‘They are being destroyed by the materialism and the 
immoral indiff erence of our society’.3 There was simply no demand for 
intellectual culture, Shpet states:
The exclusively utilitarian attitude to cultural creativity fl ows either 
from the barbarian ignorance of the nature of science, art and philoso-
phy, or from an organic incapacity for free creation, from a lack of tal-
ent. In both cases the requirement for creativity is lacking; the creative 
organ is idle. The people do not have anything to express them; there 
is no bearer of the nation’s creative soul.4
1 Shpet 1922a, p. 28.
2 Ibid.
3 Cited in Shpet 1922a, p. 29.
4 Ibid.
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In an especially Chaadaevian tone Shpet asserts that the Russian 
nation was for centuries unable to create (tvorit’) its own culture. Russia 
had become ‘European’, but only because it was guided by German bu-
reaucrats. The ‘living spirit’ of Russian culture remained undeveloped, 
and its Westernizing efforts represented, in Shpet’s words, merely 
a ‘popular instinct for self-preservation’. The opposition intelligentsia 
was doomed to fail in the task of cultural creation as well, as it was 
inherently nihilistic by nature — ‘all nihilism proceeds from the word 
nihil,’ Shpet writes. Consequently, he suggests that the typical battle 
between freedom-yearning people and the controlling state proved fee-
ble and unproductive in Russia: ‘this struggle is cast in the paradoxical 
form of bickering between an ignorant state, in the form of the govern-
ment, and the free culture of ignorance, in the form of the opposition 
intelligentsia’.1
The shape which the Russian intelligentsia adopted in the 1820s was 
to be its fi nal one. It became the intelligentsia ‘par excellence’. ‘Nobody 
was bothered,’ Shpet concludes, ‘by the fact that our rather uneducated 
opposition intelligentsia pulled from its very own sphere judges for the 
sentence in the matter of enlightenment value of scientifi c and philo-
sophical theories.’2 Although Shpet argues that the intelligentsia who 
gave rise to the revolution had indeed been an ignorant one, he insists 
that this was merely a historical contingency, a phenomenon of social 
psychology, and not a universal characteristic of the Russian people. 
There was no real obstacle for the development of serious, academic and 
politically uninterested philosophy in Russia, and Shpet suggests that 
the utilitarian history of Russian thought should indeed be considered 
a pre-history of Russian philosophy proper.3
But to initiate a pure and serious Russian philosophy, Shpet states 
that Russian thinkers must fi rst critically investigate the foundations 
of their own thinking. He suggests that over the centuries the Russian 
intelligentsia had repeatedly raised the question of the origin and nature 
of the Russian nation — in other words, of themselves — to the level of 
1 Shpet 1922a, p. 30.
2 Shpet 1922a, p. 31.
3 Shpet 1922a, pp. 35–36.
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a philosophical problem; to them ‘all Russian history is a mystery of 
some kind’.1 The trend had prompted generations of intellectuals to pon-
der the Russian soul or the Russian idea, feeding on ideas such as that of 
the ‘Third Rome.’ In short, Russian philosophy had become thoroughly 
utopian, revealing a national psychology that Shpet describes as a kind 
of mental cannibalism. Finally, he laments that intellectual discipline 
has traditionally been considered a sign of dryness, narrowmindedness, 
and one-sidedness in Russia. This is precisely what he now hoped to 
change: the revolution had created the opportunity for the ascent of 
a new ‘aristocracy of talent’.2
The critical approach of the Ocherk was not celebrated by the Russian 
philosophical community at large. Yet the work found support in the 
medieval historian Dmitrii Petrushevskii, who reviewed the book in 
a letter to Shpet. Petrushevskii considered Shpet’s text an accurate, if 
painful, self-diagnosis of the nation’s current situation. He believed 
that its timing could not have been better either, as it off ered a fresh 
perspective on Russia’s tragic situation after years of war and struggle. 
Petrushevskii writes: ‘The cup you bring to the current citizen is im-
measurably bitter, but only such a draught (and only if it is taken very 
spiritually and with much soul) can be good for him’. The publication of 
Shpet’s book gave him hope in the future; for him, it was an ‘eloquent 
indicator that we are still capable of life’.3
The task defi ned in Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i was taken up by 
Shpet in his Esteticheskie fragmenty. There, he approaches the construc-
tion of a new culture for Russia: one that is formulated on pre-Christian 
philosophical principles and thus emancipates Russian culture from its 
overgrown spirituality and corresponding self-centredness. This was 
a way to overcome the romantic revolutionary mindset and initiate 
a new culture of realism. He writes in the fi rst volume of fragmenty:
Romanticism — like all Christianity — lacked the resolve of a sincere 
lie, such as that held by the cynics and Pyrrho, and hid behind irony. 
1 Shpet 1922a, p. 36.
2 Shpet 1922a, p. 37.
3 Shpet 2005, p. 449.
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Such a transparent anagram, and nonetheless the Christian world has 
not solved it. Ειπωνεία = illusio, romanticism = illusionism. Christianity 
has not been able to understand that, because it is itself romanticism. 
In announcing itself, romanticism announced Christianity, and in an-
nouncing Christianity, it announced itself. In both Christianity and 
romanticism conscious illusionism covered the insincerity of the lie. 
The current cultural crisis is a crisis of Christianity, because for the 
twentieth century […] there is no other culture.1
Instead of the old illusion, Shpet hoped that the intelligentsia might now 
at last discover the true being of Russia. And as he argues in Esteticheskie 
fragmenty, the construction of the new culture must begin with it a re-
newal of the Russian slovo.
4.2. Shpet’s Theory of Culture
Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i contested a popular notion that Russia 
had in fact inherited the classical culture more directly than the West: 
that precisely because the roots of Russian culture were in Byzantium 
and not in Rome, the Greek infl uence remained more concrete in it.2 
Poets such as Viacheslav Ivanov and Osip Mandel’shtam, and religious 
thinkers such as Pavel Florenskii, Sergei Bulgakov and Aleksei Losev, 
famously conceived that the link between early twentieth-century 
Russian culture and the Hellenic tradition could, in one way or another, 
be discovered within the Russian language. Their views exemplifi ed 
some of the founding ideas of the ‘Silver Age’ culture: its spiritual-
ity, connectedness to the Orthodox heritage, the idea of the Russian 
logos and the belief that the Russian cultural Renaissance should be 
1 Shpet 1922b, pp. 62–63.
2 Clare Cavanagh considers the main initiator of this idea to be Faddei Zelinskii 
(Tadeusz Zielinski), who taught at St Petersburg University between 1885 and 1921. 
His interpretation of Russia’s relationship with Hellenistic culture ‘attracted not 
only poets and philosophers; it captivated a generation of Russian intellectuals in 
search of “true community” in a disrupted age’, Cavanagh (1995, p. 124) writes.
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intrinsically religious.1 Indeed, according to Boris Gasparov the cross-
fertilization between Orthodox Christianity and art was precisely what 
gave the Russian fi n de siècle culture its unique characteristics. He asserts 
that many (if not all) major achievements of the period resulted from 
‘transplantations of Western concepts into a cultural context shaped 
by the Orthodox Christian tradition’. While this dynamism was as old 
as Russian culture itself, Gasparov argues that it became especially 
productive at the turn of the century ‘when a resurgence of interest in 
Christianity among the Russian intellectual and artistic elite merged 
with neo-Kantian trends in philosophy, utopian social ideas, and the 
advent of Modernism in literature and art’.2
Shpet’s proposal for a post-revolutionary Russian culture, in its 
anti-religiousness and anti-spirituality, rationalism, and the quest for 
the ‘true’ ancient philosophical foundation, is the direct antithesis of 
these views. Yet when it comes to his theory of the inner form of the 
word, this contrast has not always been clear. Shpet’s mystical sounding 
concept, with its roots in the Humboldtian-Potebnian tradition, has 
indeed often been situated as part of the religious logos movement. For 
example, Thomas Seifrid asserts that Shpet’s conception of language 
‘combined a complex series of infl uences from German linguistics to 
Orthodox doctrines of Christology, Trinitology, and icons’.3 In the fol-
lowing I will attempt to re-contextualize Shpet’s description of the new 
post-revolutionary culture as he believed it should unfold in some of 
the contemporary artistic debates. Shpet’s account in the fi rst volume 
of Esteticheskie fragmenty was directed especially against symbolism, 
whose views he considered outdated, and futurism, which he argued 
was built on unfounded theories. For a while Shpet associated himself 
1 The term ‘Renaissance’ (Vozrozhdenie or Renessans) was fi rst used in the context of 
modern Russian culture by Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, who conceived that the future 
(or already ongoing) Russian Renaissance would be intrinsically Christian. Hence, 
he believed that it should be treated as the second historical Renaissance, which the 
West would soon follow (Ermichev 2012, p. 96). According to Vladimir Pustarnakov 
(2003, p. 203) the fi rst to raise the notion in a philosophical discussion was Sergei 
Bulgakov. For him, too, the idea was connected with the ‘new religious conscious-
ness’.
2 Gasparov 1993, p. 2.
3 Seifrid 2005, p. 134.
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with the imaginists, who represented a new poetic vision in Civil War 
Moscow, but eventually concluded that they too were unable to refl ect 
the spirit of the time. Throughout, Shpet’s vision of culture remained 
faithful to the principles laid out in Ocherk razvitiia russkoi fi losofi i, and 
when he took up the construction of his own cultural theory, it sup-
ported a neo-classicist and realist approach to art.
4.2.1. From Symbolism (and Futurism) to Imaginism
After the October Revolution neo-idealist conceptions of language 
gained a renewed intellectual and ideological signifi cance in the strug-
gle against Marxism. For example, Viacheslav Ivanov’s 1918 essay ‘Nash 
iazyk’, published in the collection Iz glubiny, describes the special fea-
tures of Russian that make it unsuitable for pragmatic and utilitarian 
purposes. Ivanov writes:
Many features of this language are worthy of wonder: its fl exibility, 
majesty, euphony, phonetic and rhythmic grace, its direct, capacious, 
sharp, powerful brevity and artistic expressiveness, its freedom in the 
composition and order of words, the complexity of its manner and 
construction of its speech which refl ects the uncatchable shades of 
soulfulness.1
According to Ivanov the inner form of Russian integrates a dualism of 
divinity and humanity, while embodying a balance between Hellenic 
and Slavic influences. He asserts that this has allowed Russian to 
evolve without breaking the connection with its origins, and that it 
remains the only modern language which still carries the ‘independ-
ent and pure element’ of the Hellenic civilization: its spirit, image 
and word structure. Having originated in the spirit of ancient Greece, 
Ivanov argues that Russian was ‘blessed for the second time’ (vtorichno 
1 Ivanov 1990, p. 145.
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oblagodatstvovan) through the ‘mysterious baptism’ in the ‘life-giving 
jets’ of Church Slavonic.1
While the symbolists had been Shpet’s first connection with 
Moscow’s cultural circles, in the fi rst years of the 1920s he began to 
distance himself from the group. This concerned not only Belyi but also 
Ivanov, with whom Shpet seems to have been in regular contact in 1914 
and 1915.2 According to Galin Tihanov their relationship grew gradually 
‘from Shpet’s respect and interest in Ivanov the poet and thinker into 
a friendship in which Ivanov gradually came to acknowledge Shpet’s seri-
ousness as a philosopher and commentator on literature’.3 Ivanov shared 
Shpet’s fascination with Husserl’s thinking, and Gennadii Obatnin sug-
gests that the former’s characterization of phenomenology as a solution 
to the problem of nominalism versus realism, as well as his conception 
of the collective consciousness, might indeed have been relevant for 
Ivanov’s symbolist theory.4 In the fi rst polemical volume of Esteticheskie 
fragmenty, however, Shpet states that as an artistic vision, symbolism 
was out of touch. Having long dreamed of transcending or even trans-
forming reality, symbolists had experienced the war and the revolution 
almost as eschatological events.5 And yet, as Shpet argues, the reality 
which Russians now faced was not a reality at all, but an ‘ontological fi c-
tion’ (ontologicheskaia fi ktsiia). He asserts: ‘Our history now is an illusion. 
Our past is ash.’6 According to Shpet symbolism was a necessary quality 
of any poetic expression, but it was not enough to explain its nature — it 
could not be considered a theory of art. Thus, soon after the revolution, 
Shpet’s interest turned towards another poetic group in Moscow: the 
imaginists.
1 Ivanov 1990, p. 146.
2 Shchedrina 2015, pp. 63–64.
3 Tihanov 2019, p. 75.
4 Obatnin (2018, pp. 434–435) adds that Shpet presented Ivanov with three inscribed 
copies of his works: Iavlenie i smysl, Filosofskoe nasledstvo P. D. Iurkevicha, and Istoriia 
kak problema logiki. According to Obatnin Shpet’s philosophical yearbook also be-
longed to Ivanov’s library.
5 For more see Hellman 1995.
6 Shpet 1922b, p. 64.
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Sergei Esenin was the fi rst imaginist to make Shpet’s acquaintance, 
and in 1918 Shpet joined in an attempt to assist him with a thorny tax 
issue.1 Contact between the two seems to have intensifi ed in 1919 and 
peaked between 1920 and 1921. Apart from their drinking companion-
ship (in Tihanov’s words, Belyi ‘saw behind this friendship a shared pro-
clivity to alcohol-induced merriment’), Shpet had an interest in Esenin’s 
poetry, and the latter gave him several of his books. Furthermore, 
Tihanov argues that Shpet must also have ‘lent a sympathetic ear’ to 
Anatolii Mariengof’s works, since, for example,
in the fi rst half of September 1921, the Imagists, insulted by an article 
in which Lunacharskii referred to them as ‘charlatans who wish to fool 
[…] the public’ […], published a challenging response in the journal 
Pechat’ i revoliutsiia, calling Lunacharskii to a ‘public discussion on 
Imagism, where Prof. Shpet, Prof. Sakulin and other representatives 
of science and the arts will be invited in the capacity of competent 
judges.’2
Just what made Shpet favourable towards imaginism is not immedi-
ately evident. According to Tomi Huttunen the main distinguishing fea-
tures of the group in the fi eld of post-revolutionary Russian poetry were 
their emphasized individualism (outwardly shown in dandyish dress) and 
anarchic attitude to the state and its ideology (exemplifi ed in provoca-
tive stunts).3 Indeed, the imaginists were suspicious of all ideologies and 
philosophies, which lent them an image of bohemian nihilist-hooligans.4 
In 1922 Valerii Briusov characterized the group’s poetics through their 
denial of any ideal content (ideinost’) in poetry. He writes:
The imaginists drew a conclusion: if the essence of poetry is the im-
age, then secondary to that is not only the phonetic structure, […] 
1 Tihanov 2009, p. 59.
2 Cited in Tihanov 2008, p. 268.
3 Huttunen (2013, p. 64) suggests viewing the imaginists’ performances and hap-
penings as ‘everyday life theatre’ or an early form of street art.
4 Huttunen 2007, pp. 10–13.
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not only rhythmicity and so on, but the nature of the ideas; ‘music is 
for composers, ideas are for philosophers, political questions are for 
economists, the imaginists said — and poets get images and images 
alone’.1
However, the imaginists were the latest and loudest poetic school 
in the Moscow of the early 1920s. They were able to win the support of 
Anatolii Lunacharskii, with whom Shpet was likewise on good terms.2 
And perhaps most importantly, both Shpet and the imaginists formu-
lated their own artistic visions in opposition to futurism. In Esteticheskie 
fragmenty, Shpet asserts that although futurism had been presented as 
the artistic answer to the new reality, it had little substance to support 
this claim. He found the futurists’ pretence to theoretical relevance 
particularly upsetting, stating:
…it immediately became distasteful and one’s sense of smell was 
repulsively tickled when the Manifesto announced the age of Their 
Majesties: the oldest of us, it said, are thirty! How? You are thirty 
and you already have a theory of art? Then you are not artists, artists 
in creativity […]. You could only be artists in theory! […] Those who 
claimed the primacy of poetics over poetry — the futurists.3
According to Shpet the futurists’ dilettantism had led to dangerous 
misunderstandings regarding the nature of art. Modern Russian poetry, 
Shpet claims, had for instance failed to appreciate the structural distinc-
tions between diff erent art forms. ‘A funny matter’, Shpet writes, ‘is the 
occupation of modern poeticism, which brings musical analogies into 
poetry. […] Poetry as a “synthesis” of music and sense is a synthesis of 
cobwebs and honey. How can sense make music? Sense does not make 
music — music kills sense — tone disables poetry.’4 Similarly, Shpet 
criticizes the idea of a Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk and any use (prime-
1 Cited in Huttunen 2007, p. 14.
2 Huttunen 2011, p. 8.
3 Shpet 1922b, p. 45.
4 Shpet 1922b, p. 28.
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nenie) of works of art for something for which they were not originally 
intended. In his opinion,
When the brothel was taken out of the temple, and music, painting 
and poetry out of the palace, when theatres were transformed from 
a celebration for all the people into a cash register open all day, art lost 
its ‘purpose’. The modern pinacothèques, louvres, national museums 
[…] have begun to serve pedagogy. As if it were possible to hide behind 
that the tastelessness and state encouragement of the accumulation 
of a collection in a single barn — like wine in cellars — of the prod-
ucts of artistic creativity which failed to fi nd ‘purpose’ or even worse, 
removed from their ‘purpose’, ‘nationalized’.1
Shpet’s argument can be associated with the imaginists’ demands 
that art be separated from the constraints of the state, although their 
reasons diff ered. Huttunen asserts that the anarchistic and individual-
istic behaviour of the imaginists mainly represented an attempt to over-
come futurism, which had previously been ‘the main disruptor of social 
calm’. However, starting with the revolution, avantgarde art had entered 
a collaboration with the new regime. In the eyes of the imaginists, fu-
turist collectivism had now joined the ranks of cultural conservatism.2 
For them, in the era of state communism, it was necessary for art to 
formulate a deeply individualist ideal, but not of the bourgeois kind of 
the Russian symbolists, but a modern, urban and forward-looking indi-
vidualism. As Vadim Shershenevich wrote in 1920: ‘The contemporary 
individualist goes onto the square, mixes with the crowd, throws these 
fragments into the noise of the crowd, becomes poor of soul (content) 
and is fi lled with something “from the city” (form)’.3
As Huttunen remarks, it is also likely that the near-simultaneous 
considerations on ‘diff erentiation’ by Shpet and the imaginists were 
interconnected.4 The poets declared: ‘We are preaching the most precise 
1 Shpet 1922b, pp. 17–18.
2 Huttunen 2007, pp. 12–18.
3 Cited in Huttunen 2007, p. 15.
4 Huttunen 2013, p. 68.
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and clear division of one art from another; we are defending the dif-
ferentiation of the arts’. According to Huttunen their opposition to the 
unifi cation of artistic languages was directed against the ‘intersemiosis’ 
of the futuristic books of Aleksei Kruchenykh and Ol’ga Rozanov, as well 
as Briusov’s and Ivanov’s symbolism.1 Shpet’s call for artistic diff erentia-
tion again resulted from his reinterpretation of the inner form of the 
word as an artistic principle. This lent each art form a distinct inner logic 
and therefore an individual structure. Furthermore, since artistic struc-
tures developed as part of the shared and objective meaning-creative 
‘language’ of culture, Shpet argued that their composition was ‘organic’. 
He viewed cultural objects as in-depth structures, beginning with an 
inner logic, and resulting in the corresponding expression.2
In Esteticheskie fragmenty, Shpet asserts that ‘the structured nature 
of each art, of each work of art, that is, the organic nature of its con-
struction is a sign of the concrete nature of aesthetic objects’.3 The vi-
sion of art as a form of reality gets an especially tangible formulation 
when Shpet describes that ‘[t]he master, performer, artist, poet mould. 
Their path is from particularity to individuality. Shpet concludes: ‘Down 
with synthesis, unifi cation, unity! Long live division, diff erentiation, 
disorder!’4 His conception of ‘diff erentiation’ was especially signifi cant 
in the field of theatre theory. The 1921 pamphlet ‘Differentsiiatsiia 
postanovki teatral’nogo predstavleniia’ drafts his unusual argument that 
theatre companies should off er their plays to a professional ‘interpret-
er’ specializing in elucidating textual meanings before staging them. 
Hence, Shpet also argued for the diff erentiation of tasks within one 
artistic fi eld.5
1 Huttunen 2007, p. 18.
2 Continuing the organic metaphor, Shpet (1922b, p. 28) writes: ‘Art is the organs of 
philosophy; philosophy needs not only a head, but also hands, eyes and ears to feel, 
see and hear. It is time to stop walking on our heads and applauding (futurism) with 
our ears!’
3 Shpet 1922b, p. 20.
4 Shpet 1922b, p. 21.
5 According to Huttunen (2013, p. 68) Shpet’s and the imaginists’ versions of ‘dif-
ferentiation’ probably come closest to each other in their respective theatre theo -
ries.
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Shpet’s theory of art tackled the artistic expression’s relationship with 
being and meaning through the theory of the inner form. In his opinion 
all art was by its nature symbolic. Correspondingly, he argued, symbol-
ism should not be expected to function as an artistic school or style.1 ‘As 
naturalism is the denial of art, symbolism is the substantial quality of 
art’, Shpet writes; ‘[t]he symbol is the juxtaposition of the order of the 
sensual with the sphere of the ideal’. The symbol carries and formulates 
the meaning, uniting the ‘two kingdoms’ of empirical and ideal being. 
It thus comes close to Shpet’s previous concept of the word. He writes 
that ‘the symbol is a sign in the sense of “word” as a sign for other words, 
directly (or metaphorically) naming a “thing” […]’.2 According to Shpet all 
art must harbour a certain amount of realism, understood as the inclu-
sion of content. He asserts that the requirement of the form ‘fl ows from 
the content’. ‘Content without form is pure passivity. Content is subject 
to form — and suff ers without it […]’.3 Nevertheless, Shpet emphasizes 
that this content must not be understood in a naively naturalistic fash-
ion. Instead, his cultural theory returns to his earlier phenomenological 
argument, in that it accepts reality only as an experienced reality. Shpet 
writes: ‘Realism, if it is not realism of the spirit, but merely of nature and 
the soul, is distracted realism, a slope into the “nothing” of naturalism. 
Only the spirit in the real sense is realized — even materialized […]’.4
Even the imaginists had not succeeded in expressing the spirit of 
the new reality, in Shpet’s opinion. However, Esteticheskie fragmenty 
names one poet who had accomplished this diffi  cult task. He writes: 
‘Did our artists already see the new reality […]? The common view is 
that Blok did. I think that Andrei Belyi did.’ In Shpet’s opinion Blok 
had trapped himself in the old illusionism of symbolism, when he ‘was 
1 When symbolism ‘poses’ as an artistic style, Shpet (1922b, p. 35) claims that it turns 
into stylization (stilizatsiia).
2 Shpet 1922b, p. 36.
3 Shpet 1922b, p. 38. Describing the imbalance in contemporary poetry, Shpet (1922b, 
pp. 64–65) writes: ‘When reality becomes an illusion, only empty form exists. That 
is where our current sophistication in poetic technique comes from, our ability even 
to forge new forms — for no content whatsoever.’ Shpet accuses Anna Akhmatova 
especially of such ‘aesthetic falsehood’.
4 Shpet 1922b, p. 39.
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not satisfi ed with seeing’ but ‘wanted an apparition’1 In contrast, in his 
Khristos voskres (1918) Shpet argues that Belyi was no longer a symbolist. 
This poem presented already ‘another vision: external, present, real’.2
4.2.2. From New Realism to Neo-Classicism
What is expressed in art, according to Shpet, is not the empirical 
reality which simply ‘exists’. Instead, it is the ‘soul’ that ‘lives and nar-
rates [its own] biography’, or the ‘spirit’ that is ‘present to appear in 
culture, waits, suff ers long, hopes, weathers all, does not rampage, is 
not proud, is not self-seeking’. Shpet asserts that this spirit has long 
been misinterpreted by the Christian tradition as ‘love’, while that too 
is indeed merely a creation of the former.3 At the same time he under-
lines the importance of not conceptualizing the spirit through a Platonic 
model. This mistake, he argues, had been shared by both symbolism and 
futurism, which harnessed poetry to reach for otherworldly spheres.
However, the key culprit in spreading such illusionism had been 
Berdiaev’s philosophical school, or as Shpet calls it, the ‘Balderdash’ 
[‘Beliberdiai’]. He writes that the latter ‘gave out theosophical employ-
ment records to artists’, and so ‘theosophical wisdom drove creative real-
ity into the underground’.4 The mystical theories of art suggested going 
beyond reality, which, according to Shpet, was a grave misunderstanding:
Since time immemorial the theosophic theories have told us that real-
ity is under a blanket; the folds of it which have risen up are the horror 
of madness. And truth be told: before the black nothing who would 
not go mad? Here is a criterion for identifying an artist: place the 
subject before a blanket, convince him to lift it up, and the artist, not 
a theosophist, will strictly expel the experimenter. Is it really possible 
to destroy that mystery, the beauty of the folds of the blanket, with 
1 Shpet is referring to Blok’s 1918 poem Dvenadtsat’.
2 Shpet 1922b, p. 58.
3 Shpet 1922b, p. 39.
4 Shpet 1922b, p. 47.
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a cynical hand movement? Can the artist really independently destroy 
the reality which is placed before his eyes and therefore authentic? 
Is there really another reality? Can another really exist? It can only 
be ‘imitated’; it needs to be created; it is obvious; behind it there is 
nothing. Depict it, but do not disfi gure it.1
Shpet asserts that the spirit is no ‘metaphysical open sesame’. It is ‘real 
not “in itself”, but in its recognition’. In art the spirit acquires a form and 
a matter. Shpet characterizes realism as an ongoing process of concretiza-
tion: ‘Realism is realization, and not being’. When the spirit is formulated 
and materialized in accordance with its own character, Shpet argues 
that ‘art’ can develop into a ‘style’; to ‘cognize the real, to realize the 
idea and make it exist — such is the path from the Renaissance to style’. 
He maintains that the new artistic style that could result from a post-
revolutionary Renaissance of Russian culture must be a ‘new realism’.2
Esteticheskie fragmenty describes the post-revolutionary transition 
period as ‘the hours and months “between” — the hours and months of 
waiting’. One must have patience, Shpet asserts; even if the old reality 
had been swept away in an explosion, the birth of the new being would 
be a serene appearance, ‘quiet, calm’.3 Meanwhile, Russian culture ap-
peared to Shpet to be at a loss. He writes: ‘[…] we do not know what 
reality is. We have lost it. We dream of it; we do not know what it is. Our 
life has become unreal; our reality has become nonsense.’4 Futurism, as 
art that ‘cannibalizes, refl ects’ is symptomatic of the present state of 
lifelessness, that is, a cultural crisis. Shpet writes:
Never before, it seems, has there been such absurdity in spiritual life: 
philosophy, instead of refl ection, seeks cognition through ‘experi-
ence’, it has mixed up all meanings and senses of the word concipio and 
runs from the face of reason, hating it, and art, instead of spontane-
ously creating, refl ects, fulfi ls all meanings of the word experior and 
1 Shpet 1922b, pp. 47–48.
2 Shpet 1922b, 40.
3 Shpet 1922b, p. 43.
4 Shpet 1922b, p. 47.
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subjects experience to ‘poeticism’ — of the present, past and future, 
as there is no absolute poeticism outside time. The poeticism of the 
future is considered absolute poeticism. Futurism is the theory of art 
without art itself.1
Esteticheskie fragmenty does not off er much more information about 
the actual nature of ‘new realist’ art, as Shpet’s defi nition of it is drawn 
mainly through the negative: new realism opposes the mystical visions 
of symbolism and the avantgarde hubris of futurism. However, his si-
multaneous involvement in the Moscow Linguistic Circle, the younger 
generation of which adopted Shpet’s arguments as their own, off ers 
a wider viewpoint on his aesthetic project.
Shpet was elected a member of the Circle on 14 March 1920, follow-
ing his presentation of a paper entitled ‘Esteticheskie momenty v struk-
ture slova’ (‘Aesthetic Features in the Structure of the Word’). Nikolai 
Plotnikov asserts that although Shpet’s paper has not survived, the 
meeting’s transcript off ers an idea of his argument. Plotnikov suggests, 
in responding to Dmitrii Ushakov’s question — ‘is using the concept 
of “structure” necessary at all, and is it not enough to speak merely of 
the “aesthetic aspects of the word”?’ — that Shpet spells out one of his 
central theses. The transcript reads: ‘G.G. Shpet argues that structure 
means construction into the depths [of the word], vertically. Linguists, 
in contrast, usually direct their attention to one of the layers of this 
structure, taken horizontally […].’2 Shpet’s atypical theory of the word 
(as well as, according to some, Shpet’s personality) played a role in the 
organizational history of the Circle, which had existed since 1915: his 
infl uence was arguably the catalyst that resulted in its break-up in 1924.3 
Igor’ Pil’shchikov suggests that the MLC was divided into two competing 
factions after 1920, the ‘phenomenological wing’, formed by Shpet and 
his young followers, and the ‘empirical positivists’ (especially Roman 
Iakobson and Boris Iarkho). Whereas the empirical wing had previously 
been the Circle’s dominant force, the phenomenologists now ‘wanted 
1 Shpet 1922b, p. 44.
2 Plotnikov 2010, p. 37.
3 Dmitriev 2009, p. 86.
234 4. Formulating the Inner Form of the Word 
to build a system of poetics based not on phonology, but on semasiology 
(semantics), because they considered language a semiotic phenomenon 
par excellence’, Pil’shchikov writes.1
In 1921 the Circle was further fractured when Boris Gornung, Aleksei 
Buslaev and Maksim Keningsberg (apparently, with the support of 
Shpet’s students Nikolai Zhinkin, Nikolai Volkov, Aleksei Tsires and 
Aleksandr Akhmanov, known as the phenomenological ‘kvartet’)2 es-
tablished a group of their own. Ars Magna, Gornung asserts, was found-
ed to broaden the sphere of discussion from theoretical linguistics to 
more general philosophical questions.3 Shpet was a central fi gure for 
the members of Ars Magna; in particular, Gornung’s memoirs depict the 
close relationship between himself, Keningsberg and Shpet.4 Gornung 
states that he did not associate Shpet, some twenty years their sen-
ior, with the philosophers closest to his age: Berdiaev, Frank and Lev 
Karsavin. Their worldview appeared foreign to Gornung’s generation, 
who felt isolated by their experience of the revolution and identifi ed 
as the fi rst generation of ‘Soviet youth’. Gornung asserts that ‘like the 
generation of Andrei Belyi’, his own generation were also ‘children of 
the turn’ (det’mi rubezha), albeit not of the turn of the century, but 
the revolution. He writes: ‘“Ours” was only the turn itself, in its facing 
to both sides (and with its “transitional” daily life), but both the eras 
themselves were foreign in some way.’5 Identifying with none of the 
existing philosophical or artistic schools, this generation looked for 
guidance in individuals. Gornung writes:
When there was no unity of the ‘style of perception of the world’, 
there was no common language with our peers, and the peers with 
1 Pilshchikov 2017, p. 48.
2 For the 25th anniversary of their teacher’s academic activities the ‘kvartet’ pub-
lished a collection of phenomenological essays in 1925. For more see Antologiia 
fenomenologicheskoi fi losofi i v Rossii. T. 2. (Moscow, 2000).
3 Gornung 2001, p. 372. According to Maksim Shapir (1994, p. 77) the group was 
organized during the summer months of 1922. Among other themes Ars Magna 
also dedicated a series of discussions to Husserl’s philosophy.
4 Gornung 2001, p. 353.
5 Gornung 2001, pp. 327, 330.
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whom we lived as if on diff erent planets were the majority. They could 
include members of the Komsomol, young Communists, inveterate 
‘internal emigrants’, and politically neutral but perfectly loyal young 
men and women. And precisely because age did not play a decisive 
role, we, like the ‘younger symbolists’ had our members who were 
a ‘little older’.1
Among older colleagues Gornung asserts that what distanced them 
from Belyi was the latter’s inability to accept the new reality and for-
mulate a positive aesthetic programme compatible with it. Instead, he 
writes: ‘the ‘halo’ of G. G. Shpet […] soared above all of us: we were the 
ones ‘he’ valued and promoted in all sorts of ways, the ones he protected 
in all our endeavours’.2 According to Gornung Shpet had already present-
ed the second and third theoretical volumes of Esteticheskie fragmenty at 
the MLC in 1920, and in January 1922 when ‘the fi rst issue came out […]; 
we were at fi rst shocked by the style, but then appreciated and valued it 
and cited the most mischievous formulations in the way Hegel is cited’.3 
At the same time Shpet was hated by many, but because of his infl uential 
position, they were forced to ally themselves with Shpet, as well as his 
younger students for ‘tactical’ reasons. Among such associates, Gornung 
surmises, were the imaginists, as well as the Moscow Kamernyi teatr, 
where Mariengof’s wife worked as an actress.4
Shpet’s infl uence is especially visible in the typewritten journal of 
Ars Magna, Hermes.5 It was aimed at a small circle of readers and prepared 
independently from the MLC’s offi  cial publication, Trudy MLK. Indeed, 
1 Gornung 2001, p. 332.
2 Gornung 2001, p. 355.
3 Gornung 2001, pp. 375–376.
4 According to Gornung (2001, p. 355) this was especially the case with Anatolii 
Mariengof during the period of the publication of the journal ‘Gostinitsa dlia pute-
shestvuiushchikh v prekrasnom’ (1922–24).
5 The fi rst issue of Hermes (Germes) appeared in July 1922. The journal came out in 
twelve copies, circulated mainly from hand to hand in Moscow and Petrograd, and 
were read until they ‘literally fell apart’ (Shapir 1994, p. 77). The fourth and last is-
sue was not published, probably due to the untimely death of Maksim Keningsberg 
in June 1924. Lev Gornung writes that Keningsberg, who had a weak heart, col-
lapsed while working on the journal. For more see Gornung 1992, p. 176.
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according to the declaration of the group the MLC had by 1922 ‘stopped 
being an organization which united people with a single credo in the area 
of linguistics and poetics’, and Trudy MLK could therefore no longer func-
tion as its programmatic publication.1 In Georgii Levinton’s words, the 
editorial board of Hermes was made up of ‘part of the second generation 
of the MLC, the direct students of G. G. Shpet, of a sharply anti-futurist 
and anti-OPOIAZ bent’.2 Although Shpet’s participation in the Hermes 
issues was mainly indirect, the mark of his views is nearly omnipresent.3 
Indeed, his authority aff ected even the journal’s orthography: like Shpet, 
the editors ‘also wrote and typed in several cases without doubling conso-
nants — masa instead of massa, klasa (klassa), gramatika (grammatika)’.4 
Hermes’ aesthetic programme was likewise anchored in Shpet’s cul-
tural theory. In exchange, Ars Magna seems to have off ered him the 
scholarly approach to art that he found lacking in Russia. In Esteticheskie 
fragmenty Shpet indeed laments the diffi  culty of initiating a new artistic 
style when Russian culture had for so long been in a state of intellectual 
decay. The new style must be ‘theirs’, formed by the cultural spirit of 
the people, but it could only appear ‘after the school’. Shpet continues:
But we did not go to school. Therein lay our cultural antinomy. The 
West was schooled, but we only learned from the West when we need-
ed to attend the school the West had. We never had time to study […]. 
Instead of the alphabet, we immediately read the latest news in the 
newspapers; we love the latest words; we solve the most recent ques-
tions. It is as though we were children, but on the school bench we are 
the uneducated. So we were born — our antinomy was born — from 
birth, or rather, from baptism: we were baptized and are baptized in 
the Byzantine manner, learned the Bulgarian alphabet, read German 
books and write books without style.5
1 Cited in Shapir 1994, p. 75.
2 Levinton 2017, p. 75.
3 According to Lev Gornung’s (1992, p. 175) description ‘Several times Shpet visited 
our fl at, kindly and with interest regarded our manuscript journal Hermes and even 
participated in it a little’.
4 Levinton 2010, pp. 267–468.
5 Shpet 1922b, p. 34.
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Shpet locates the hope of Russian culture in the study of its language, 
as the objective semantic structure that allows meanings to evolve. Shpet 
asserts that the ‘philologists’ secret must be debunked: everyone must 
become word-lovers, everyone is called to cognition of the cognized’.1 
Some of the essays published in Hermes can indeed be treated as for-
mulations of an aesthetic programme, suggested — at least partly — by 
Shpet’s cultural theory. Here, his anti-futurist idea of new realism was re-
interpreted as an aesthetic programme of neo-classicism. Maksim Shapir 
asserts that the classicism of Hermes was understood as ‘“new”, “spir-
itual”, “verbal realism” — that is, in opposition to “nominalism”’. This 
was a ‘realism of the “sign” in all the conscious and expressed defi nition 
of its structure’.2 Viktor Mozalevskii, who was engaged in the journal’s 
work, also suggests that
In the formation of literary-philological outlooks of the participants of 
Hermes, Shpet’s infl uence played a decisive role. Their ideas of the neces-
sity of the emergence of a new classicism and expressed anti-futuristic 
position flowed directly from Shpet’s views on literary evolution.3
Mapping the direct references to Shpet on the pages of Hermes, 
Levinton points, for example, to an essay by Maksim Keningsberg, pub-
lished in the journal’s second issue, ‘Iskusstvo i istina (v zashchitu i protiv 
realizma)’. Keningsberg, who was arguably Shpet’s closest student at the 
time, asserts:4
Classical art may be realistic art. Classical art should be called the art 
of expression — a sign possessing content. Classical art is art as knowl-
edge. Knowledge has as its subject truth. Truth is reality. The truth of 
art is aesthetic reality.5
1 Shpet 1922b, p. 61.
2 Shapir 1994, p. 78.
3 Cited in Gornung 1992, p. 183.
4 Shpet dedicated Vnutrenniaia forma slova to the memory of Keningsberg and tried 
to have his unfi nished works posthumously published by Kolos (Shapir 1994, p. 82). 
For more see Shpet 2012, pp. 572–573.
5 Cited in Levinton 2010, p. 472.
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Approaching Shpet’s phenomenological pairing of truth and being, 
Keningsberg recommends Shpet’s introduction to Istoriia kak problema 
logiki as further reading, as well as Husserl’s Logical Investigations. He con-
cludes: ‘True art is art as the knowledge of aesthetic reality. Only art as 
knowledge, an art [that is] material and conscious, real and positive, can 
be called classical art’.1
Likewise, the opening article of the journal’s fi rst issue declared an 
unbreakable connection between philosophy and poetics, that is, be-
tween art and ‘reality’. The editors assert: ‘“Style” contains an issue of 
the interpretation of reality, and the problem of reality, the dismantling 
of this term is the basic problem of philosophy’.2 Thus, they argue that 
new artistic phenomena must fi rst be ‘justifi ed’ by aesthetics, and this 
discipline must in turn be founded on ‘principles of pure logic, which 
now presents to us as the study of the word’. Referring to ongoing debates 
concerning the real nature of the poetic word, they conclude:
The strictly scientifi c achievements of aesthetics of recent years shed 
light on the concepts of the aesthetic object and aesthetic perception, 
forming an unbreakable link between that concept and the issue of 
sense in the phenomenon. In the light of these achievements, the 
foundations of the supposedly scientifi c theories which had tram-
pled the foundations of Russian futurism, and which had been laid 
by the academic and dialectical scholars sympathetic to it (futurism), 
crumble.3
Hermes was interpreted as a declaration of war against the formal 
method. Indeed, ‘Already that very phrase appears as a kind of cat-
achresis’, asserts Keningsberg in ‘Vyrozhdenie slova (k uiasneniiu futuris-
ticheskoi poetiki)’, published in the fi rst issue. He avers that the main mis-
take of Opoiazian formalism was that it based its method on the poetic 
language of futurism, the ideas of the ‘self-suffi  cient word’ (‘samovitoe 
1 Ibid.
2 Cited in Gornung 2001, p. 207.
3 Cited in Gornung 2001, p. 206.
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slovo’) and the ‘zaum’ language. For Keningsberg ‘that which was pre-
pared by Russian decadentism, which apprehended the ideas of French 
symbolism when it was exercised by the symbolists who transferred 
the cult of the aural side of the poem to Russian soil, was brought to its 
conclusion and to absurdity by the futurists’. Futurism therefore only 
accentuates ‘the awkward ideas of Bal’mont’s “Poeziia kak volshebstvo”’ 
and ‘the magical Steinerism of Belyi’, moulding them into their own 
‘pure art of sound, of the homonym’. Thus, Keningsberg reserves the 
right to call them by the old name, ‘decadentism’.1
According to Keningsberg Opoiaz had forgotten about the lan-
guage’s essence. He asserts that only a very ‘low step of a cultural 
level’ could have led them to ‘the ability to see in an arrangement of 
sounds the word […], as if all the zoological species Homo sapiens had 
to do was open his mouth and start pulling sounds out of it for that to 
forthwith become a language, words’. In conclusion, he states that this 
has led Russian formalism into terminological confusion, clearly dis-
played on the pages of Roman Iakobson’s ‘Noveishaia russkaia poeziia’. 
Keningsberg writes:
R. Iakobson […] formulated these ideas in the words ‘poetry is lan-
guage in its aesthetic function’ but did not even spend a minute think-
ing about the great responsibility incurred by that formulation. Here 
not one word is thought out or grasped. To characterize a thing — and 
a word is a thing — by its function means to fail completely to notice 
the thing itself. Moreover, the term ‘aesthetic’ requires understand-
ing, and neither the futurists nor Iakobson […] give that or are able 
to give it.2
1 Cited in Levinton 2017, p. 64. According to Keningsberg the only exceptions among 
futurists were Viktor Zhirmunskii and Boris Eikhenbaum, ‘who had clearly turned 
up there by mistake’.
2 Cited in Levinton 2017, pp. 65–66. Emphasizing the need for the study of ontologi-
cal and logical characteristics of the word, Keningsberg refers to the theory of the 
inner form. Curiously, his reference is not to Shpet, but to the theory of Anton 
Marty, as well as the fi rst volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Regarding 
Marty, he writes that the latter’s conception must be ‘cleansed’ of some of its psy-
chologism.
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Shpet’s theory of the inner form of the word, as it was explicated in the 
second volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty — known to the members of 
Ars Magna since 1920 — can be interpreted in relation to Keningsberg’s 
frustration. There, Shpet attempted to off er a comprehensive analysis of 
the constitution of the word as an objective being, as well as a sign with 
a potentially poetic nature.
4.3. The Inner Form of the Word
Shpet’s presentation of the inner form of the word is far from un-
equivocal, not least in its relation to Humboldt’s original theory. In the 
second volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty Shpet notes that Humboldt’s 
elucidation of his own term was likewise ‘not always clear’. He cites 
what he believes to be an example of the very core of Humboldt’s the-
ory, namely his claim that ‘the character of languages consists “of the 
particular means of connecting thoughts with sounds” (in der Art der 
Verbindung des Gedanken mit den Lauten)’. This, Shpet observes, could be 
interpreted ‘in this way and that’, and adds: ‘On the whole, […] I merely 
borrow the term from Humboldt, but contribute my own meaning’.1 
Yet his subsequent Vnutrenniaia forma slova carries the subtitle ‘Etiudy 
i variatsii na temy Gumbol’ta’ and indeed presents a discussion of Shpet’s 
theory as refl ected against Humboldt. Apart from the latter, Shpet cites 
a wide range of thinkers from Wolff  and Kant to Hegel and Schelling, 
as well as Heymann Steinthal and Anton Marty. This creates a contrast 
with Esteticheskie fragmenty, in which Shpet’s theory stands alone.
If the second volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty especially advances 
a systematic elucidation of the conception of the inner form, the focus 
is quite diff erent in his 1927 work. On the fi rst pages of Vnutrenniaia 
forma slova it becomes evident that Shpet is interested in a broader 
topic. He discusses, for example, the ‘national spirit’ (natsional’nyi 
dukh) that creates language and directs a community’s relationship with 
reality; an individual’s experience of language as a tool of expression 
1 Shpet 1923a, p. 67
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and communication; language as energeia, as well as the diff erent ways 
in which the inner form may be conceptualized. Echoing Humboldt’s 
original style, Shpet’s characterizations adopt a metaphorical tone. 
He writes, for instance:
the internal verbal-logical form is the law of the very formation of 
understanding, that is, of a kind of movement for development, the 
consequent exchange of ideas which we call the dialectical exchange, 
refl ecting the development of sense itself: its Wandlungen (changes) 
are transformations or even transubstantiations. That is not a scheme 
and not a formula, but a device, a means, a method of forming word-
concepts.1
Unsurprisingly, Shpet’s book was met with criticism by the formalists. 
Mikhail Grigor’ev wrote in his 1927 Literatura i marksizm review: ‘The 
formalists will not like G. Shpet’s book: they will say (and are already 
saying) that G. Shpet’s defi nition of inner form is so broad that it can 
include anything, and that nothing remains of language itself in its spe-
cialized characteristics’.2 Moreover, Grigor’ev notes that Shpet’s analysis 
remains so ambiguous that he cannot imagine ‘how […] linguists and 
literary scholars can use that concept in their work’.3
Later attempts to decipher Shpet’s conception have often resulted 
in similar outcomes: compared to the formalists’ perspicuous language, 
his theory has appeared fi gurative and vague. However, as I will try to 
demonstrate in the following, the second volume of Esteticheskie frag-
menty off ers a diff erent version of Shpet’s concept: one that can be 
straightforwardly defi ned with the help of his earlier phenomenologi-
cal terminology, used in Iavlenie i smysl, ‘Soznanie i ego sobstvennik’ and 
‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ The phenomenological interpretation of the inner 
form is visibly more precise than its Humboldtian reading. Yet Shpet’s 
conception remains philosophical in its nature, and thus its utility to 
poetic theory remains unclear.
1 Shpet 1927, p. 117.
2 Grigor’ev 1928, pp. 30–31.
3 Grigor’ev 1928, p. 38.
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4.3.1. The Elusive Inner Form
The Petrograd formalists perceived Shpet as a foe. The MLC’s reform, 
through which his infl uence had become ‘overpowering’, was associ-
ated with Roman Iakobson’s emigration to Czechoslovakia in 1920.1 
In 1965 Iakobson would look back at the history of the Moscow Circle 
with nostalgia, describing how in the mid-1920s:
In vehement disputes on linguistic essentials — phenomenology of 
language and the strictly empiricist approach; the place of phonet-
ics and semantics in the science of language; the problem of the 
Humboldtian internal form; criteria for the delimitation of poetic 
and ordinary language; or fi nally the relation between language and 
culture — the Moscow team lost its former unity of purpose and prin-
ciples. New institutions, like for instance the State Academy for the 
Study of Arts (GAXN), attracted the most active workers of MLK, and 
in the summer of 1924, during the tenth year of its existence, the 
Moscow kružok was formally dissolved.2
Iakobson viewed Shpet’s views as insuffi  ciently radical.3 There was 
thus a certain symbolism in the fact that the last session Iakobson led 
on 25 April 1920 included Keningsberg’s fi rst presentation at the Circle. 
According to Pil’shchikov ‘The Keningsbergian phenomenology of the 
poem was almost in all points contrasted with the empirical statistical 
poetry studies — both in the version of it developed by Iarkho and in 
the one developed by Tomashevskii’.4 Pil’shchikov suggests that Shpet’s 
phenomenological approach was especially hard to swallow for Boris 
Eikhenbaum. In a letter to Grigorii Vinokur on 30 June 1924 he men-
tioned the necessity of ‘liberating’ poetics from the infl uence of aes-
thetics and philosophy, ‘because only thus can the science of literature 
1 Tihanov 2019, p. 86.
2 Cited in Pil’shchikov & Ustinov 2020, p. 413.
3 Pilshchikov (2017, p. 48) suggests that Iakobson later attempted to synthesize the 
two antagonistic methodologies of the MLC, combining the linguistic and semiotic 
approaches.
4 Pil’shchikov & Ustinov 2020, p. 410.
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become independent and concrete’. Eikhenbaum adds: ‘I do not believe 
in Shpet — that is pure oratory’.1
Yet the formalists’ approach to Shpet was not entirely negative. For 
example, as Tihanov writes, Esteticheskie fragmenty provided the idea 
of poetics as ‘the grammar of poetic language and poetic thought’. In 
the 1960s Iakobson adapted Shpet’s concept for his study of ‘the poetry 
of grammar and the grammar of poetry’, although, Tihanov asserts, he 
‘purifi ed’ and developed it into a ‘term with distinct scope and content’. 
Shpet’s conception of ‘structure’ also appeared in some formal studies 
of poetic language during the 1920s. Most notably, Viktor Vinogradov 
utilized a distinction between ‘system’ (horizontal organization) and 
‘structure’ (suggesting depth).2 Indeed, Vinogradov makes a positive 
reference to Shpet in his memoirs:
At that time in Moscow people began to be interested in Professor 
Gustav Gustavovich Shpet’s aesthetic works, and when Muscovites 
came to Leningrad they got to know those propositions, but [we] had 
a very negative attitude towards that […]; both Shpet’s ‘Esteticheskie 
fragmenty’ and the later ‘Vnutrenniaia forma slova’ could not satisfy 
us then, at least not fully; but one idea, unnoticed and without refer-
ences to Gustav Gustavovich’s work nevertheless was found in our 
work. This was the idea. In general, Shpet diff erentiated between the 
concepts of system and structure. I remember one discussion with 
him personally. He was talking about what a system is in general. It 
is something given in one plane. a system is a row formation of ele-
ments found in relations to each other, and a structure is an internal 
unifi cation of diff erent little clouds which, one covering the other, 
allow for reaching into the depth, into the essence, and at the same 
time form an internal unity. The concept of structure seemed more 
suitable when studying the composition of an artwork, because only 
thus could some internal essence of the whole be discovered.3
1 Cited in Dmitriev 2009, p. 89.
2 Tihanov 2019, pp. 87–88.
3 Vinogradov 1975, p. 265.
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The formalists’ interest in Husserl’s phenomenology is, of course, 
well known; according to Igor’ Chubarov Husserl’s phenomenological 
reduction even infl uenced Shklovskii’s idea of ‘ostranenie’, and Nikolai 
Plotnikov asserts that Shpet’s ‘pathos of the overcoming of psychologism 
with the help of phenomenology was quite compatible with their goals 
and ideals’.1 Yet to many his own the hermeneutical phenomenology of 
reason seemed a strangely old-fashioned reading of Husserl. Tihanov 
asserts that compared to the empirically minded formalists Shpet’s ap-
proach to poetics was ‘still very much rooted’ in a Diltheyan nineteenth 
century hermeneutic paradigm. Shpet appears to him to have been torn 
between traditional and modern paradigms, at times appreciating litera-
ture and culture mainly as manifestations of national consciousness, 
while at others focusing on distinct forms of poetic expression.2 Tihanov 
rightly states:
Ultimately — and here lies the crucial diff erence between Shpet and 
Formalism — literature was for him not a self-suffi  cient system to be 
explained with reference to the specifi cally poetic function of lan-
guage; literature for Shpet — even when all his semiotic inclinations 
are taken into account — is primarily just one of the spheres of creativ-
ity appropriated by what he calls ‘aesthetic consciousness’.3
However, the juxtaposition of Shpet’s views with those of formal-
ists as ‘anti-modern’ advocates a somewhat biased interpretation of his 
theory. This is visible, for example, in Dušan Radunović’s reading of 
Shpet. Radunović asserts that the fi rst generation of Moscow formalists 
were the authors of a methodological revolution in that they emanci-
pated the study of poetic language from the traditional semantic burden. 
He suggests that Shklovskii’s theory of ‘ostranenie’ had ‘liberated art 
from an ontologically subordinate status’ in relation to reality, espoused 
1 Chubarov 2014a, p. 98 and Plotnikov 2010, p. 37. Of the formalists there is no doubt 
that Husserl’s infl uence was strongest in Iakobson’s work. For more on this con-
nection see e. g. Holenstein 1976, pp. 2–5.
2 Tihanov 2019, p. 88.
3 Tihanov 2019, p. 89.
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since Plato’s institution of the concept of art as mimetic presentation. 
Following Shklovskii, the formalists had discovered an entirely new par-
adigm for their thinking, which was the idea that ‘art is an autonomous 
fi eld with its own, self-governed mechanisms of emergence, growth and 
decline’, Radunović writes.1 To him Shpet’s infl uence in the MLC appears 
as an opposite force. He contends that
in the midst of the non-semantic coup and a demand for literature to 
be considered as an autonomous domain, an alternative conceptual 
dominant emerged to take on the previous one, conquer the scien-
tifi c fi eld and in fact restore the old épistème. Inaugurated, or rather, 
reintroduced by the Russian philosopher Gustav Shpet, the category 
of ‘inner form’ was meant to assert itself as an alternate conceptual 
dominant, one with the power to challenge the validity of the non-
semantic conceptualisation of form and, seemingly at least, establish 
a bond between those new epistemological conditions and the logo-
centric legacy of the past.2
Radunović is apprehensive concerning Shpet’s use of ‘a rather obso-
lete, and, in the context of Russian modern humanities, all but notori-
ous, concept of inner form’. In his opinion the revitalization of such an 
outdated term ‘emerges as a thorough denunciation of the epistemologi-
cal foundations on which the transformative changes in the Russian art 
and studies stood’. Radunović surmises that one could even take the 
argument further: Shpet’s rejection of the idea of art and language as 
autonomous phenomena could be seen as ‘a rejection of the project of 
intellectual modernity as a whole’.3
Shpet’s use of the archaic term, carrying an unwelcome echo of 
Aleksandr Potebnia, is indeed noteworthy.4 Possibly for provocative 
1 Radunović 2017, p. 141.  
2 Radunović 2017, p. 142.
3 Radunović 2017, p. 148.
4 As Radunović (2017, p. 148) contends, it was ‘precisely against the understanding of 
language as inner form as articulated by Potebnia, that the non-semantic revolution 
in Russian studies of language and art broke out.’
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purposes, he even fails to state his opposition to the latter’s psycholo-
gistic theory before the third volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty. There, 
Shpet writes: ‘Psychological poetics, poetics as the “psychology of artis-
tic creation”, is a scientifi c vestige. Our anti-Potebnianism is a healthy 
movement’. According to Shpet Potebnia ‘compromised the concept 
of the “inner form of language”’.1 Yet although Potebnia’s name is not 
mentioned in the second volume of the same work, a reference to his 
theory is already implied. Shpet clearly rejects the Ukrainian linguist, 
writing:
Thus, the non-linguist may also group certain words with an initial root 
or basis, insofar as one word formation or another seems obvious to 
him, for example, when he is dealing with a newly formed loan term. 
At the time, some were discomfi ted by the word ‘vliianie’ (‘infl uence’, 
introduced by Karamzin), from the verbs ‘lit’’, ‘vliiat’’ (‘pour’, ‘pour 
in’), and for that matter, the phrase ‘vliianie na kogo’ (‘infl uence on 
someone’). To the layman, it is clear: ‘poniatie’ (‘concept’) from ‘po-
iat’’ (‘to start doing’ — ‘to take’). And so on. In such ‘ruminations’, in 
the absence of syntactically formulated sentences, it is as if its own 
internal form is formed from the relationship between ‘initial mean-
ing’ (etimon) and the lexical-logical meaning used.2
The formalists struggled for clear-cut defi nitions in their reinter-
pretations of the inner form. In the 1920s Potebnia’s theory, or more 
generally, poetic semantics, was a prevalent theme among them; the 
issue was considered at least by Iurii Tynianov, Grigorii Vinokur, Roman 
Iakobson, Boris Iarkho and Viktor Zhirmunskii.3 From the perspective 
of the history of Russian formalism Shpet’s conception indeed appears 
merely one among many. It has therefore also typically been analysed 
1 Shpet 1923b, pp. 38–39. In Sergei Zenkin’s (2004, p. 156) formulation, in using 
the term ‘inner form’, Shpet’s aim was ‘to return to the philosophical foundations 
of that idea, having released it from philological and particularly “psychological” 
simplifi cations, that is, to return to Humboldt via the head of Potebnia’.
2 Shpet 1923a, p. 69.
3 For an analysis of their corresponding views see Pilshchikov 2017.
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as a semantic theory. For example, Pil’shchikov approaches Shpet’s idea 
through Keningsberg’s characterization of the inner form as ‘a relation 
between the grammatical form and the logical form’. As Pil’shchikov 
asserts, Shpet’s inner form is essentially a ‘relation’ (between the ‘outer’ 
signicative form and the ‘object form’ which is the word’s ‘content’). It is 
therefore not ‘meaning’ itself, but that which motivates the meaning 
and connects the content of the word to its audible or visible form. The 
inner form is indeed described by Shpet as an ‘algorithm’ that constitutes 
the relation between sign and sense.1 Pil’shchikov cites a passage from 
Shpet’s treatise Iazyk i smysl (Language and Thought), drafted in 1921–25 
but published only posthumously:
Forms are that which or thanks to which understanding occurs; 
meaning is that which is understood itself. In living experience they 
are united, and their unity is in form. a concept, as a means of under-
standing, is not meaning in the actual sense, but rather formalized 
meaning. The inner form of the word, as a concept, is not meaning 
itself, but a kind of relationship between the terms of correlation: 
word — meaning.2
In a similar vein Vladimir Feshchenko describes Shpet’s theory of the 
inner form as a theory of ‘deep semiotics’. He suggests that the meta-
phor of depth was omnipresent in Shpet’s writings on language, signs 
and understanding, and that the main objective of this approach was 
indeed to study the ‘vertical’ dimension of the sign’s structure, ‘that 
is, the relation of inner and outer dimensions of the sign as a carrier 
of human cognition’.3 Feshchenko notes that Shpet was probably the 
fi rst Russian to use the term ‘semiotics’ in its modern meaning. Yet his 
approach to it was original: instead of remaining on the ‘surface’ of the 
sign’s formal properties, he immersed himself in the ‘semasiological’ 
correlation of the sign to its referential meaning. Feshchenko asserts 
that Shpet’s approach to language remained ontological, as he sought 
1 Pilshchikov 2017; pp. 46, 54.
2 Cited in Pilshchikov 2017, p. 47.
3 Feshchenko 2015, p. 236.
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to determine the ontological (semasiological) properties of the sign. 
In other words, he endeavoured to discover what made a sign or word 
‘meaningful’ — what made a sign a sign.1
While the semantic-semiotic interpretation presented by Fesh-
chenko and Pil’shchikov is quite correct, my aim in the last part of the 
thesis will be to off er another, phenomenological, reading of Shpet’s 
idea. It indeed appears that Shpet developed his theory within two 
distinct discourses. The phenomenological version of the inner form, 
I argue, is found in the second volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty (pub-
lished in 1923). There, the correlation between sign and its meaning 
is placed under phenomenological scrutiny. In other words, I suggest 
that Shpet’s search for the ‘source’ of sense, as it unfolded in his earlier 
phenomenological studies, is now transferred to the fi eld of language 
and culture. In ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ he discovered the ‘inner’ or ‘logical’ 
forms of the ‘word’ as the rational principle that directs all cognition. 
In Esteticheskie fragmenty, the theory of the inner form itself is elevated 
to a topic of investigation.
The 1923 phenomenological reading of the inner form of the word is 
thus to be distinguished from Shpet’s analyses in the 1927 Vnutrenniaia 
forma slova and even the aforementioned Iazyk i smysl. Their focus is 
on the dual problem of signifi cation and understanding, that is, the 
question of how a sign emerges and lives in a language or culture; 
how a ‘subjective’ meaning is ‘objectivized’ into a language to be used 
and understood. According to Boris Gornung this topic was already 
quite distant from the questions Shpet shared with the members of 
Ars Magna. Gornung writes that in Vnutrenniaia forma slova ‘Shpet in 
many respects distanced himself from his own thoughts of the early 
1920s’.2
To clarify the distinction between the two versions of the theory, 
I suggest considering the semiotic conception of the inner form in rela-
tion to Shpet’s ethnic psychology presented in Vvedenie v etnicheskuiu 
psikhologiiu (1927). There, he argues that in any cultural expression, 
1 Feshchenko 2015, p. 242.
2 Gornung 2001, p. 368. On a personal level Gornung (p. 355) attests that many of 
his earlier followers had distanced themselves from Shpet by 1926.
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there is a ‘conscious or unconscious relationship with “sense”’, and 
that this very relationship is the subject of collective psychology; ‘Not 
sense, not meaning, but co-meaning, the accompanying implementa-
tion of the historical, subjective reactions, worries and the relation to 
it are the subject of psychology’. According to Shpet this ‘sphere of life’ 
(sfera zhizni), as the properly social reality, surrounds the fundamentally 
objective sense (smysl) of all expressions. He asserts that one must ‘be 
able to read the “expression” of culture and social life in a way that un-
derstands their sense and sympathetically catch, feel, and co-experience 
their subjective moods’.
It is as if, Shpet argues, there are two sides to a cultural expression: 
it is expressed (vyrazheno) objectively, but in the objective meaning 
of the expression the ‘attitude’ of the creative subject is also refl ected 
(otrazheno). Ethnic psychology treats this creative subject as a member 
of a collective consciousness and analyses the distinctive features of dif-
ferent cultures. Meanwhile, analysing the objectivity of an expression’s 
‘meaning’ requires an altogether diff erent approach. This, it seems to 
me, Shpet found in phenomenology. In what follows I present Shpet’s 
elucidation of the inner form of the word as it unfolds in the second 
volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty. As Shpet returns to his earlier phe-
nomenological terminology, his conceptions of ‘sense’, ‘truth’ and ‘be-
ing’ again converge.
Arguably, Shpet comes closest here to solving his problem of how 
to grasp reality in its true being. If this is the case, one may agree with 
Radunović’s argument: Shpet indeed goes against a founding idea of 
modern language theory, namely, Saussure’s argument that the relation-
ship between the ‘signifi er’ and the ‘signifi ed’ is arbitrary.
4.3.2. a Phenomenological Reading of the Inner Form 
of the Word
The second volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty off ers an elucidation 
not only concerning the inner form of the word but the latter’s structure 
in its entirety. In this structure the inner form is a ‘technical’ part like 
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any other, and Shpet refers to it sometimes in the singular and some-
times in the plural; its name also varies from an ‘inner’ to a ‘logical’ form. 
This fl uctuation already seems to distance his theory from the religious-
metaphysical ‘logos interpretation’ of the inner form that is sometimes 
assigned to it. This was noticed in 1926 by an unknown author (probably 
one of Shpet’s students from GAKhN) of an unpublished review article 
of Esteticheskie fragmenty. The review reads:
The eternally generated secret of the word has since ancient times 
attracted poets, religious thinkers and philosophers to itself; but they 
usually stopped at the contemplation of the beauty and strength of 
verbal bliss, without attempting to subject it to strict philosophical 
analysis. But if communion with the sacrament of the artistic being 
of logos permeates the poet’s creativity, and if the greatest mastery of 
logical thinking is simultaneously the greatest mastery of the dialecti-
cal word, the philosophical refl ection as such has no straighter or more 
essential object of its practice than the word itself.1
The reviewer associates Shpet’s book with phenomenology, writing: 
‘If for Husserl the sphere of pure logic is the sphere of absolutely pure 
ideal connections, if the foundations of his philosophy do not allow 
him to review the social being as primary, categorical’, Shpet’s work 
is an attempt to overcome these restrictions.2 Shpet’s analysis of the 
structure of the word indeed evolves in accordance with his earlier phe-
nomenological arguments; specifi cally, his development of the problem 
of sense formation and the analysis of noema-noesis correlation — but 
he now approaches these questions but from the opposite direction: 
looking at language, Shpet’s task is to discern the teleological source of 
reason within it.
1 Polivanov 1992, p. 72. The manuscript of the review was discovered by the son of 
Viacheslav Ivanov, Dmitrii Ivanov, in Rome in 1989. It was taken out of Moscow 
in 1928 by Ol’ga Shor, who apparently intended to have it published in Europe. It 
seems the text had been inspected by Shpet himself, whose markings were visible 
in its margins.
2 Ibid.
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Despite the title, Shpet’s concern in the second volume of Este-
ticheskie fragmenty is not fi rst and foremost with the aesthetic aspects 
of the word. Instead, he states that the word ‘is not in itself an aesthetic 
object’; it takes a separate analysis to discern the aesthetic moments of 
the word which come into view in correlation with an aesthetic con-
sciousness.1 In its essential being the word is a sign (znak) sui generis 
which indicates that the connection between it and its meaning is of 
a specifi c kind. Shpet asserts that all psychological attempts to explain 
this signicative connection, based on ‘associations, connections of cause 
and action, means and goals, pre-meditated agreement, and so on’, are 
merely hypotheses, ‘the working value of which, in the present crisis, 
descends to nil’. To understand the nature of the relationship between 
the word and its meaning, Shpet argues that it does not help to study 
the empirical, outer, characteristics of the word. Instead, one must in-
vestigate the distinctive nature of meaning (smysl).2
Shpet points out that his defi nition of the word (slovo) is broad: ‘what 
“one” word or a “discrete” word is defi ned by the context’. Indeed, ac-
cording to him, almost any distinguishable meaning-complex can be 
defi ned as a word. Shpet writes:
‘Khod’ (‘motion’) is a discrete word, as are ‘parokhod’ (‘steamship’), 
‘belyiparokhod’ (‘whitesteamship’), ‘bol’shoibelyiparokhod’ (‘big-
whitesteamship’) and so on. [Words deliberately run together with-
out spaces for eff ect — translator’s note.] The syntactic ‘connection 
between words’ is also a word, consequently speech, a book, litera-
ture, the language[s] of the whole world, all of culture is a word. In 
the metaphysical aspect nothing prevents the consideration of the 
cosmic universe as a word. Everywhere, the essential relationships 
and typical forms in the structure of the word are one.3
Correspondingly, Shpet asserts that in his discussion of the word’s 
structure ‘not a morphological, syntactic or stylistic construction is 
1 Shpet 1923a, p. 14.
2 Shpet 1923a, pp. 8–9.
3 Shpet 1923a, p. 10.
252 4. Formulating the Inner Form of the Word 
presupposed, not at all its location in a “plane”, but, on the contrary, 
its organic one, in depth’. Structure is a ‘concrete relationship’ between 
the word’s individual parts, ‘from the sensually perceived to the formal-
ideal (eidetic) object, [which spreads] to all relations located on all steps 
between these two terms’.1
Not all parts of the word carry meaning, according to Shpet: a pho-
netic expression, as a purely material voice (golos), might convey an emo-
tional tone, but no signifi cance. ‘Thus, a phoneme, by dint of its direct 
involvement with nature and independence from sense, does not yet 
constitute a word as such’, Shpet writes.2 The fi rst ‘layer’ of the word to 
carry a kernel of meaning, according to him, is the morpheme. It is ‘the 
fi rst step from the emotional to the cerebral, the outer clothing of sense, 
the fi rst fulcrum for the level of understanding’. Echoing a Potebnian 
metaphor, Shpet continues:
a morpheme, as a sound formation, being wholly subject to the laws 
of phonetics, cannot liberate itself from the pressure of sense with-
out eff ort. It can, to a certain point, like lava, harden and fetter sense 
with itself, but beneath the surface it bubbles and retains its fl ame. 
Historical and archaeological excavations reveal its dynamism and 
movement, but sometimes a simply successful use of a word — par-
ticularly in poetic speech — reminds us of a living soul which gushes 
under the petrifi ed wrinkles of the morpheme.3
But, he adds, for the morpheme to become a ‘fi rst step’ towards a word, 
‘it needs not be the only one, it needs to be merged into a united whole 
with the consequent steps, it needs to be included in the context of 
authentic and immediate forms of the sense itself as such’.4 Shpet’s 
thought is reminiscent of his argument in ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’ as he 
states that an ‘individual word’, ‘strictly speaking, when deprived of 
sense is not λόγος’, but merely a ‘lexis’; ‘It is not the word of a mes-
1 Shpet 1923a, p. 11.
2 Shpet 1923a, p. 27.
3 Shpet 1923a, p. 26
4 Shpet 1923a, p. 27
4.3. The Inner Form of the Word 253
sage, although it is already a means of communication’.1 The argument 
corresponds to Shpet’s earlier statement about the need to renew logic 
as a study of the eidetic being so that it off ered not ‘a static picture’ of 
‘empty’ forms but instead presented a way to grasp ideas in their ‘con-
text’ and ‘movement’, fi lling forms with a sense.
For Shpet the word is defi ned by its connection to the eidetic realm. 
Similarly to his previous assertion, alongside Husserl, that the ideal can 
be intuited with no special eff ort, Shpet now sees no reason to ques-
tion the word’s capacity to draw the connection. He writes: ‘N, when he 
utters a word-name, and I, when I hear it, will understand the word to 
mean one and the same thing. That is the object being spoken about, the 
one that the “word” talks about’. Thus, the word ‘relates not to sensual, 
but to intellectual givenness’. This makes the word’s meaning objective, 
as Shpet suggests that ‘[t]hat to which the word now refers is understood 
by it; by the word the object is understood. N understands it, and we un-
derstand it; he “has it in mind” and we “have it in mind”’. But the ability 
of the speaker and the listener to grasp the same eidetic object is not 
yet enough to create understanding, according to Shpet. He argues that 
understanding ‘something as something is not understanding, but only 
cognition […], grasping, holding, conceptualizing, having it in mind. 
There is nothing about the content and meaning-sense, only about the 
volume and form’.2 Indeed, the pure idea (predemet)‘is merely a certain 
point of attention, “something”, a provided theme’, or even a ‘secret’, 
an ‘X’. As in Iavlenie i smysl, the pure ideal object (a ‘certain X’) is merely 
the potential bearer of actualized meaning.
The ideal (non-empirical and non-existing) content of a word is re-
vealed through its meaning via a ‘complex process of the discovery of 
sense, content’; it is a ‘transfer to the empirical, singly real being’.3 Shpet 
writes: ‘[b]ut precisely because the object can be realized, fi lled with 
content, implemented, and precisely through the word it will also be 
given sense; it is the formal formative beginning of that sense’. This 
1 Shpet 1923a, p. 28
2 Shpet 1923a, p. 36
3 Shpet 1923a, p. 38
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speaks for the absolute necessity of an ideal content in the word, with-
out which its structure falls apart. Shpet writes:
The object groups and forms the word like a message and like an ut-
terance in general. It contains in itself content, forming it from the 
semasiological side, it is the “bearer” of sense […] If the word was not 
understood to contain an object, fettering and cementing things in the 
unity of conceivable form, they would disintegrate under their own 
name, as sand fl ows from the palm of the hand when one makes a fi st.1
At the same time as Shpet takes non-referential words (suggested, for 
example, by the futurists’ Zaum language) not to be words at all, he 
also considers non-verbal thinking an impossibility. According to him 
a ‘non-sensual thought is normal; it is a thought which hovers above 
bestial experience’. However, a ‘non-verbal thought is pathology; it is 
a thought which cannot be born, one stuck in an infl amed womb and 
there disintegrating in pus’. Shpet states that the word is not ‘the swad-
dling clothes of thought, but its fl esh. Thought is born in the word and 
together with it. Even that is but little — the thought is conceived in the 
word’.2
Located between the ideal (ontic) forms and the sensual (morpho-
logical) forms, ‘is inserted as a system of relations between them, an in-
tertwinement of new forms, precisely logical forms’, Shpet writes. It is 
by learning to distinguish these inner forms that ‘the whole content of 
what N is communicating now fl ows for us’. According to Shpet
we follow [them] — ‘we notice’ [them], somewhere in the second 
level of consciousness, we remark [them] — beyond the oscillations of 
morphemes and ontical forms, but only insofar as the changes in them 
modify the logical forms of the sense itself. When we again transfer 
to them the strike of attention or they themselves force us to do so 
with their ‘unexpected falseness’, grotesqueness, ugliness or, on the 
1 Shpet 1923a, p. 39
2 Shpet 1923a, p. 43
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contrary, unexpectedly charming delight, we lose the balance of ‘un-
derstanding’, and meaning as such slips away from us.1
In a move reminiscent of the phenomenological reduction Shpet 
turns his focus to the expressive word, as an analogue to the experienc-
ing consciousness, to ask how the word expresses what it expresses. He 
suggests that it is through such an ‘inward’ look that we gain a true un-
derstanding of the word as a sign. In other words, Shpet treats language 
not as a transparent, neutral stratum refl ecting ‘reality as such’. Instead, 
he asserts that such an outlook allows not for understanding, but merely 
crude conceptualization: ‘we would only receive “concepts”, […] that 
is, the outlines of sense, a riverbed, but not the actual fl ow of sense 
along that bed’.2 According to Shpet, the one who ‘perceives concepts, 
“volumes” of thought for the thought itself, for “concept” is precisely 
the one who does not understand’.3
To reach a suffi  cient level of understanding through language, Shpet 
suggests viewing the functioning of the inner forms at a level ‘higher’ 
than the morphological one, that is, the syntactic level. According to 
Shpet it might seem intuitively correct to identify the syntactic forms 
of language with logical forms of thought, but this, he asserts, would be 
a mistake. Shpet illustrates his argument with a staircase: ‘if the whole 
process is depicted as an ascent of steps, it emerges that one may not 
simply proceed from the syntactic step to the logical one; rather, one 
must go from one to the other via special, sometimes peculiarly laid 
connecting bridges’. In other words, ‘[b]etween the syntactic and logi-
cal forms […] it is as if a delay in the movement of thought occurs’.4 The 
syntactic forms, Shpet argues, are not only ‘forms of thought’; they also 
function as self-referential signs of their own, refl ecting the very task 
they fulfi l in a context: for example, as suffi  xes. They thus display the 
expressive capacity of the language itself. In Shpet’s words, this is the 
same as demonstrating the ‘vital energy’ of language; ‘The phoneme and 
1 Shpet 1923a, p. 46
2 Shpet 1923a, pp. 46–47.
3 Shpet 2007, p. 223. This sentence is not included in the original 1923 publication.
4 Shpet 1923a, p. 56
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morpheme of the “case ending” are […] a sign, a symptom of its special, 
“secondary” normative meaning, as it were, of the second derivative 
in the normative function of the word’.1 The movement and evolution 
of the syntagmas guide the life of morphological forms, which, Shpet 
writes, are ‘as it were, statistical registering summary from an observa-
tion of life in the syntax of language. Syntax is exposition; morphology 
is the index and heading to it’.2
Syntactic forms are also of particular interest to Shpet because their 
‘relationship as forms to the ideal parts of the verbal structure is not 
essential or organic but a conventional relationship’. By this he means 
that a syntagma ‘is a sign, but a sign not only semasiological or nomina-
tive, but also symptomatic, shall we say’. It ‘appears as a sign of meaning 
and a thing, and as a sign of the fact that it is that sign. It is, as it were, the 
nomen of the thing and simultaneously nomen nominis’.3 Syntaxis can 
even be described as the ‘ontology of the word’, according to Shpet: it 
‘studies not only the word as a word about something else, but simply 
the word, that is, the syntax itself is the word about the word, about 
the word as word, about the word as wordthing (slovoveshch’)’.4 Thus, 
the syntactic forms ‘are produced by the caprice of the language, they 
form its smile and grimaces’; as forms they are ‘playful, free, mobile and 
dynamic’. Indeed, these forms also have the power to change logical 
language into a poetic one.5 By modifying the logic that binds the ideal 
content and the syntagma in which it is expressed, one may reach a ‘sui 
generis poetical logic, an analogon of the “logical” — the study of the 
inner forms of poetic expression’. Shpet writes:
This diff erential and its relationships are the sphere of new forms […]. 
We shall call them, to diff erentiate between purely logical ones, inner 
diff erential forms of language. It is as if they are composed in the game of 
syntagmas and logical forms between each other. Logical forms serve as 
1 Shpet 1923a, p. 57
2 Shpet 1923a, pp. 59–60.
3 Shpet 1923a, p. 56.
4 Shpet 1923a, p. 61.
5 Shpet 1923a, p. 65.
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the foundational basis of this game, and insofar as in it may be noticed 
ideal permanency and regularity.1
Just like logical words, poetic words are also expressions of an eidetic 
‘X’, an idea (predmet) that becomes formulated and fi nds its meaning in 
a word. ‘The objects of poetics (emancipated from reality) — motives, 
themes — should possess their material justifi cation and fi lling, their 
meaning and content, as objects of science do’. This is the peculiar kind 
of realism for which Shpet calls in poetic expression: ‘In the game of 
poetic forms full emancipation from existing things may be reached. 
However, [poetic expressions] retain their own sui generis logic. And 
together they retain sense, as emancipation from things is not emancipa-
tion from sense […]’. Therefore, with ‘transcendental (material) truth 
and logical truth comes poetic truth, as a correspondence of syntagma 
to the object, albeit really non-existent, fantastical, fi ctitious, but nev-
ertheless logically formed’.2
The realistic expression of the poetic logic takes place in a symbol. 
Shpet writes that this symbol is not an abstraction but a concrete re-
lationship. Just as the ‘logical meaning is the given understood in the 
present context, so the symbolic meaning is the created and sensible in 
the created context’. a language lives and evolves especially in its poetic 
uses, Shpet asserts; ‘The sphere of poetic symbolic forms is the sphere 
of the greatest, tensest, fi ery life of the word. It is a thicket bursting 
with the inexhaustible life creation of the word’.3 Shpet therefore espe-
cially highlights the importance of proper theories of poetic language. 
According to him ‘of particular danger are the experiments to deduce the 
symbol from “similarity”’. Shpet emphasizes the power of the symbol 
to express in a concrete, empirical form something which only existed 
ideally, as a non-real being:
in every symbol the external is used to symbolize the internal. Through 
the symbol, the internal is the external, the ideal is the real, a thought 
1 Ibid.
2 Shpet 1923a, p. 66.
3 Shpet 1923a, p. 74.
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is a thing. Through the symbol the ideal dead void is transformed into 
living things — these ones, with smells; with colours, sounds, cheerful 
things. […] And the journey of that creation [is] precisely from noth-
ing, from the ideal, from the internal, from 0 to 1, to the external, to 
the real.1
For Shpet, to understand a word, to grasp its meaning that is revealed 
in the never-ending movement of its ideal and empirical opposite sides 
against each other, ‘it means, rather briefl y, concretely, to live in the 
world of ideas’.2
In his earlier texts Shpet came to the conclusion that only by adopt-
ing a philosophical outlook, by turning our focus from a naively ‘direct 
experiencing’ of the world to a position where we discern the ways in 
which we in fact experience the world, can we discover reality in all its 
richness of forms, colours, nuances and meanings. For Shpet this total 
reality can be entered by engaging in the shared consciousness that in 
theory can experience ‘everything’. In turn, this consciousness is by its 
nature linguistic, that is, logical. The rationality of the word permeates 
reality and all our experiences of it. Therefore, Shpet concludes, ‘on earth, 
on the waters and in the sky, all is ruled by the word. Logic, that is, the 
science of the word, is the greatest power on the earth and in the heav-
ens. Alogism as a system is mental atheism; an alogist is an empty soul, 
deprived of the feelings of verbal grace […]; an alogist is in a progressive 
paralysis of thought.’3
4.3.3. Further Development of the Inner Form 
of the Word
Esteticheskie fragmenty was the product of a transition period. From 
1921 Shpet moved gradually from the position of an individual thinker 
to being part of a cultural institution with direct links to the Bolsheviks’ 
1 Shpet 1923a, pp. 75–76.
2 Shpet 1923a, p. 102
3 Shpet 1923a, p. 44.
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policymaking: the State Academy of Artistic Sciences. Nadezhda Pod -
zemskaia mentions him as belonging to an informal circle whose gath-
erings can be considered the starting point of the Academy, offi  cially 
founded in October 1921.1 In February 1922 a Philosophical Section 
opened, with Shpet as its director, and in July 1924 he was appointed 
the vice president of GAKhN.2 The change can be clearly perceived, for 
example, in Shpet’s publishing activities. After the three volumes of 
fragmenty, the product of the independent publishing house Kolos, 
nearly all his subsequent texts were published by GAKhN.
The third and fi nal volume of Esteticheskie fragmenty continued the 
analysis of the word’s structure, but with a focus on its aesthetic as-
pects. However, Shpet asserts that the previous volume had already 
outlined the topic, and the third part merely presented its details: ‘Every 
‘i’ has been written in. It remains only to add the dots’.3 Shpet contin-
ued developing the theme in the essay ‘Problemy sovremennoi estetiki’ 
(‘Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics’, 1923), which, according to 
Tat’iana Shchedrina, was originally intended as the book’s fourth vol-
ume.4 There, he approached the question of aesthetics as a philosophical 
discipline. Attacking the dominant trends of normative and psycho-
logical aesthetics, he insisted that the aesthetic object itself (as an ex-
pression, ‘vyrazhenie’) with its specifi c ontological qualities, must be 
brought to the centre of attention. In an especially ‘gakhnian’ spirit, the 
references of Shpet’s discussion are found not in the ongoing Russian 
debates (between, for example, the constructivists and formalists, or 
the avant-gardists of the LEF group), but in German academic aesthet-
ics. Indeed, as Nikolai Plotnikov suggests, GAKhN strove to profi le itself 
as a ‘serious’ and ‘educated’ voice in contemporary artistic debates.5
1 Podzemskaia 2017, pp. 62–63. The other members were Aleksandr Gabrichevskii, 
Robert Fal’k, Aleksandr Shenshin, Vasilii Kandinskii, Evsei (‘Iusha’) Shor and 
Aleksei Sidorov.
2 For more on Shpet’s position in GAKhN, see e. g. Gidini 2008. Shpet’s daughter 
Marina Shtorkh maintains that in all scientifi c questions, the vice president was 
the highest authority of GAKhN (Iakovich 2014, p. 1144).
3 Shpet 1923b, p. 7.
4 Shpet 2007, p. 8.
5 Plotnikov 2015a, p. 134; Plotnikov & Podzemskaia 2017, pp. 17–18.
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According to Aleksandr Dobrokhotov ‘Problemy sovrememnnoy es-
tetiki’ refl ects the rootedness of Shpet’s views — his attention to the 
hermeneutic and rational aspects of culture, with its ‘inner’ teleolo-
gy — in classical German aesthetics. Thus, he contends that the latter’s 
declaration of art as the utmost ‘justifi cation’ (‘opravdanie’) of reality 
and the statement ‘nature can only be legitimized through culture’ 
are to be explained in terms of German Idealism.1 Similarly, Plotnikov 
connects Shpet’s understanding of culture primarily with a Hegelian 
tradition, albeit through Humboldt and Dilthey.2 Nevertheless, as 
I have argued in this dissertation, Shpet’s views on art’s relation to 
reality can also be motivated by his reading of phenomenology. His 
claim that culture, as an expressed reality, is more real than reality itself 
is connected with Iavlenie i smysl and ‘Mudrost’ ili razum?’, in which 
the most certain and stable point of connection between the ‘mind’ 
and the ‘world’ was discovered in the logic that serves as their correla-
tion.
In ‘Problemy sovrememnnoi estetiki’ Shpet asserts that contemporary 
philosophers (phenomenologists and empiricists alike), had built their 
arguments on a simplifi ed notion of reality as a natural reality. According 
to him reality ‘prima facie, is exactly not “natural”, but “social”, “histori-
cal”, “cultural”’, even though this had gone unnoticed in the history of 
philosophy. Thus, Shpet maintains that the philosophers’ skill of inter-
preting the ‘sociocultural’ aspect of being, that is, the ‘concrete reality’ 
of social objects, had remained underdeveloped. In his opinion this had 
also led to serious misunderstandings concerning the aesthetic object. 
Within the structurally unifi ed cultural reality Shpet now argues that 
the ontological nature of aesthetic expressions is indeed distinct from 
social objects such as axes. He writes:
Signs as ‘expressions’ are ‘imitations’, ‘incarnations’, ‘impressions’, 
etc., of the original spirit. If we make an abstraction of this spirit, we 
end up with a social object, with a thing — canvas, paper, paints, and 
1 Dobrokhotov 2017, pp. 134–135.
2 Plotnikov 2015b, p. 75.
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the like, they are tools, but not ‘signs’, not ‘expressions’. Their social 
value is retained, while the cultural one disappears: Tolstoi’s letters 
may be used to fi re a stove to just as high a temperature as a newspaper 
or the Okhrana’s archives, a Rubens painting may be used as a canvas, 
and a Stradivarius violin can be used to hide rescinded documents from 
police searches… And for all that, as a result of such actions the object 
still does not become ‘natural’, that is, not-spiritual, but naturally self-
suffi  cient, merely acting as a link in the causal-necessary chain and 
no more.1
Nonetheless, much as in the case of the axe, Shpet states that even in art 
the ‘sign’ we deal with is ‘a sign to which a sense corresponds’. As with 
sociocultural reality more generally, Shpet views ‘word’ as the prototype 
of the artistic sign.
The problem of the inner form of the word was broadly integrated 
in the research conducted at GAKhN’s Philosophical Section. As Galin 
Tihanov notes, several of Shpet’s earlier supporters at the MLC — among 
them Boris Gornung, Maksim Keningsberg, Aleksei Buslaev and Nikolai 
Zhinkin — followed him to GAKhN, and even the library of the MLC was 
transferred there.2 In June 1923 Shpet organized a special Commission 
for the study of the question of ‘artistic form’. His presentations on the 
varied meanings of ‘form’, as well as Humboldt’s concept of the inner 
form, were followed by his younger colleagues’ papers on, for exam-
ple, the inner form in Heymann Steinthal’s, Potebnia’s and Marty’s 
discussions. The presentations were later published in the collection 
Khudozhestvennaia forma (1927). In its introduction Aleksei Tsires as-
serts that the members of GAKhN, approach their problem through the 
conception of the inner form ‘[in] opposition to the so-called formalists 
of the OPOIAZ type’, who tend to restrict their analyses to the ‘outer’ 
forms of the word.3
Yet Shpet’s term was not universally accepted within the Academy. 
Instead, it came under harsh criticism especially by Boris Iarkho, an MLC 
1 Shpet 2007, p. 319.
2 Tihanov 2019, p. 86.
3 Tsires 1927, p. 5.
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formalist and the head of GAKhN’s Commission for literary transla-
tion and the Cabinet for theoretical poetics.1 In the late autumn of 1924 
heated debates took place between Iarkho, Shpet and the supporters 
of the two on the topic of ‘the limits of the study of literature’. Shpet 
objected to Iarkho’s empirical and statistical method, which strove to 
answer questions such as ‘what?’, ‘where?’, ‘when?’ and ‘how many?’. In 
Shpet’s opinion the methodology of literary theory had to be founded 
on philosophical knowledge. He argued that Iarkho had failed to submit 
his terminology to a logical analysis and was thus unable to account for 
the true nature of the poetic word — he treated it just like any other 
empirical object. Shpet was of course calling for attention for the word’s 
inner forms, while Iarkho ‘considered the concept of inner form in both 
the wider and narrower sense unclear and almost useless for the literary 
theorist’.2
The issue of the inner form led Shpet to the problem of the ‘topic’ 
(siuzhet) of the literary work of art. This was the ‘ideal content’ of an 
artwork: the ‘meaning’ (smysl), ‘theme’ or ‘material’ that was articulated 
in an expression, allowing it to gain a concrete form. Shpet’s focus was 
hardly compatible with Iarkho’s formalist principles. The latter asserted 
that ninety per cent of lyrical texts ‘satisfy themselves with hackneyed, 
banal thoughts’, and that poetic art did not require originality on the 
level of the topic.3 Shpet’s theory of art thus remained arguably con-
servative due to its focus on the ideal content. Tihanov, for example, 
suggests that a certain discrepancy can be perceived between his innova-
tive theoretical refl ections and the eventual outcomes of practical work, 
whether in the fi eld of theatre or translation. Shpet’s ‘noviy realizm’, 
despite the refi ned phenomenological foundation, led to artworks that 
exemplifi ed a rather traditional strand of realism.4
Tihanov has also proposed that Shpet’s traditionalism be con-
sidered part of a wider phenomenon visible across GAKhN’s depart-
ments. In his opinion the overarching Soviet cultural conservatism 
1 Pil’shchikov 2015, p. 324.
2 Akimova 2006, pp. 2–3.
3 Akimova 2006, pp. 3–4.
4 For more, see Tihanov 2019, pp. 80–85.
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that became dominant in the late 1930s could at least partly be traced 
back to work done at the Academy.1 From this perspective, the positive 
reaction that Shpet’s Vnutrenniaia forma slova elicited from Valentin 
Asmus, a Soviet philosopher of Abram Deborin’s Hegelian neo-Marxist 
school, is noteworthy. In a review article published in 1927 in Vestnik 
Kommunisticheskoi akademii Asmus applauds Shpet’s deep understand-
ing of the linguistic turn which, he argues, was taking place in every 
sphere of the humanities. In his opinion Shpet’s treatment of the word’s 
structure off ered an accurate way to analyse cultural dialectics. At the 
same time, Asmus commends the book for not falling into either of the 
two leading camps of language theory. He writes:
Metaphysical idealism stubbornly and fruitlessly clung to the idea that 
language is a consequence and product of the active force of the spirit. 
The limited empiricism of linguistic specialists, on the other hand, 
came off  worst against the theory that thought itself is only a product 
and consequence of the formative force of language.2
Neither school of thought, in Asmus’s opinion, had been able to discern 
the actual correlative relationship between thought and language, and 
this is where Shpet’s work was particularly successful. To him Shpet 
presented a powerful argument against ‘vulgar social naturalism’ which 
reduced the study of social and collective phenomena to an evolution-
ary analysis of their historical emergence. What Shpet’s work off ered 
instead was a description of the independent — dialectical — laws 
according to which social and cultural phenomena developed. Asmus 
concludes that it thereby appears ‘strange and surprising […] that Prof. 
G. G. Shpet does not mention the philosophical trend which fi rst came 
out with severe methodological criticism of naturalism in sociology. 
That trend is dialectical materialism’.3
1 Tihanov’s lecture, ‘Aleksandr Gabrichevskii: literaturoved i iskusstvoved’ (27 March 
2021), was part of ‘GAKhN Displaced’, an online conference and exhibition organ-
ized on the initiative of Ruhr University Bochum.
2 Asmus 1927, p. 254.
3 Asmus 1927, p. 258.
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Asmus suspects that Shpet’s disregard for dialectical materialism 
might be explained by his continuous suspension of judgement (‘ἐποχή’) 
concerning ‘all kinds of explanative theories’. He cites the second vol-
ume of Esteticheskie fragmenty, in which Shpet declares that explanative 
theories ‘must be feared like the plague or stupidity’.1 As Asmus sug-
gests, even in Vnutrenniaia forma slova Shpet thus remains Husserlian 
in his outlook. His continuing phenomenological search for the ‘true 
being’ of reality is also refl ected in his correspondence with the phi-
losopher Timofei Rainov in late 1927. Rainov expressed his opinion on 
Vnutrenniaia forma slova in his letter to Shpet on 13 November:
I admit that your utterances on inner form often dissatisfi ed me. That 
was not because they were uttered badly or wrongly, but precisely 
because they did not satisfy. You pull back the curtain slightly, show 
something authentic, signifi cant and stirring. And precisely because 
it is authentic, one wishes to see more.2
According to Rainov, it was as if Shpet had been able to catch a glimpse 
of something evasive; ‘as if something is compelling you and you cannot 
resist it — in exactly the way one should not look too long at the sun 
because of the risk of going blind’. What Shpet seemed to Rainov to have 
glimpsed was the ‘reality of the spirit itself ’ (‘dukhovnaia deistvitel’nost’ 
kak takovoi’).3
In his answer Shpet admits that Rainov’s interpretation was correct. 
‘The single and main question for me is precisely one of actuality and 
reality [deistvitel’nost’ i real’nost’],’ he writes, but adds that tackling the 
question is often anything but simple. Shpet writes:
Whenever I approach that fundamental, large, perhaps only topic of 
philosophy, I invariably feel a kind of fear and even awe: it all seems 
you are not prepared either outwardly or inwardly for that large, main 
thing. And so, instead of approaching that big thing and beginning to 
1 Asmus 1927, p. 264; Shpet 1923a, p. 22.
2 Shpet 2012, p. 60.
3 Ibid.
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speak about it directly, you step back, mumble something, and then, 
when you see those mumblings on paper, you lack the strength to 
cross them out: it seems that you caught something, albeit hazily, 
out of the corner of your eye, and you want to share even a hint, the 
mood, something aroused by that ‘something’ with someone else, and 
thus spur someone else, entice them and, perhaps, make them take 
a deeper look and say more.1
In this sense, as Shpet states, the whole problem of the inner form is 
indeed merely a ‘path’ leading to his main question.
1 Shpet 2012, p. 62.
Conclusion
By the beginning of the 1930s Shpet’s philosophy had fallen from 
grace in the eyes of the Bolsheviks. He was imprisoned in 1935 and 
executed in Tomsk two years later. Not only Shpet’s life but also his 
intellectual career were callously cut short. After the 1929 purge of 
GAKhN he lost his academic positions and was banned from all scho-
larly work except for translations — and even then under ideological su-
pervision. Yet Shpet’s oeuvre still opens new perspectives for research, 
and especially his nuanced work in the fi eld of cultural theory remains 
to be analysed further in the cultural, social and political context of 
post-revolutionary Moscow. Shpet’s neo-classical aesthetics may in-
deed hold a signifi cant place in the development of early Soviet cul-
ture.
At the same time one is drawn to wonder what would have happened 
had Shpet followed Husserl’s invitation to travel to Freiburg in the 
early 1920s. The attempts to introduce his phenomenological work to 
Germany were not restricted to those of Shestov and Husserl. Vladimir 
Iantsen asserts, for example, that discoveries made in the archives of 
Evsei Shor — a founding member of GAKhN and the scientifi c secretary 
of its Physico-Psychological Section until his emigration in 1922 — sug-
gest that the latter not only attended seminars of both Heidegger and 
Husserl but also actively discussed Shpet’s ongoing phenomenological 
work. Moreover, their discussion — in which the philosopher Dmitrii 
Chizhevskii, another student of Husserl’s, also participated — appears 
to have continued at least until 1929. Apparently, it was then suggested 
that Shpet’s text be published in an international journal on phenom-
enology alongside Gadamer and other former students of Husserl. 
Chizhevskii, who had received Vnutrenniaia forma slova as a present 
from the author, expresses his strong disappointment with the book. 
He suggests that they should instead move forward with a German 
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translation of Esteticheskie fragmenty.1 Alas, this translation did not see 
daylight.
Shpet’s phenomenology should undoubtedly become a topic of fur-
ther philosophical research. In the present work I have merely presented 
the historical and intellectual contexts of his meeting with Husserl, and 
laid out the themes and questions from which a more focused phenom-
enological analysis might spring. Shpet’s work is indeed signifi cant not 
only for the history of Russian philosophy, but for the history of phe-
nomenology as a universal exercise. What infl uence — if any — Shpet 
had on the evolution of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology is a question 
that remains unanswered for now. Meanwhile, the similarities in their 
approaches to the inherent rationality of experience should certainly be 
studied in more detail. Concerning Russian philosophy, Shpet’s career 
can function as an opening to new perspectives on the age-old ques-
tion, ‘what is Russian philosophy?’ In arguing against any mystifying 
approaches to this issue, Shpet not only formulated a philosophy that 
was on a par with some of the most infl uential contemporary Western 
thought. His interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology is even more 
interesting because it was motivated specifi cally by a Russian intellec-
tual tradition: that of the Moscow metaphysical school of the 1860s. 
I believe a more encompassing study of this philosophical current, as 
distinct from the religious tradition of thought, might reveal a history 
of academic Russian philosophy far richer and more consequential than 
has previously been thought.
1 Iantsen 2006, pp. 357–362.
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